

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS

TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS.

**EDITED BY
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VOL. VI.—THE VAIŚEŚIKA SŪTRAS OF KAṆĀDA

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P R E F A C E.

The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Śaṅkara Miśra and extracts from the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa and the Bhāṣya of Chandrakānta, was first published in the years 1910 and 1911. In spite of the numerous imperfections of the work, it appears to have awakened a lively interest in the study and propagation of one of the oldest systems of Hindu Philosophy. For, its publication has been followed by a number of very valuable contributions to the literature of the subject from the pen of some eminent scholars. First and foremost amongst them is the *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* by Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. (1915). Dr. Seal observes that "Hindu scientific ideas and methodology (e. g. the inductive method or methods of algebraic analysis) have deeply influenced the course of natural philosophy in Asia—in the East as well as in the West—in China and Japan, as well as in the Saracen Empire", and enters into "a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu science". He gives very lucid expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theoretical Theory, of the conception of Molecular Motion (Parispanda), and of the ideas of Mechanics (Kinetics) and Acoustics, and deals very fully with the Doctrine of Scientific Method. In the following year (1916), that accomplished scholar, Dr. Gangānātha Jha, M. A., D. Litt., came out with an English translation of the *Padārtha-Dharma-Saṃgraha*,—the *Magnum Opus* of the Vaiśeṣikas,—that is, Praśastpāda's Bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda, with Śrīdhara's Commentary (Nyayakandali) on the Bhāṣya. In the Introduction he explains the Vaiśeṣika conception of Bhūta ('element'), and points out that "what the Vaiśeṣika means by saying that these are the 'five bhūtas', is that there are five states of matter: *solid* (Earth), *liquid* (Water), *gaseous* (Air), *luminous* (Fire), and *ethereal* (Akāśa)." The notes he has added in the body of the book are very illuminating, and clear up many obscure points in the text. In the year 1917, was published the *Daśa-Padārtha-Śāstra*: Chinese Text (translation), with Introduction, Translation and Notes, by H. Ui, Professor in the Sotoshu College, Tokyo, under the editorship of F. W. Thomas Esquire. It is a remarkable publication in many ways. In the first place, it presents us with a Chinese version of the tenets of Kaṇāda in the form of Kwei-ci's quotations, probably from a commentary on the treatise. The author tells us that the treatise was composed by a follower of the Vaiśeṣika, named Mati Chandra, and translated into Chinese by Yuan Chwang in 648 A. D. It is in the form of a catechism, and, as a catechism of the doctrines of the later school of the Vaiśeṣikas, it is almost unsurpassed. In the second place, the author has compiled from Chinese records an account of the traditions current among Chinese scholars respecting Kaṇāda, his work, and his school. His researches fully confirm our view of the great antiquity and popularity of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras. Last but not least is *Indian Logic and Atomism* (1921) which is an exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Systems, by A. B. Keith, D. C. L., D. Litt., a well-known orientalist. He regards them "as able and earnest efforts to solve the problems of knowledge and being on the basis of reasoned argument". He has attempted "to set out the

fundamental doctrines of the systems with due regard to their history and their relations to Buddhist philosophy". It is gratifying to find that, as in the ancient past, even so at the present day, the *Vaiśeṣika* has engaged the attention of earnest students all over the world.

Now, what is the *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*? We do not know when or by whom the name '*Vaisesika*' was first applied to the teachings of Kaṇāda. In the *Sūtras* the word appears only once (in X. ii. 7) where it means 'characteristic', 'distinguishing'. According to the rule of Pāṇini, IV. iii. 87, the word is derived from the word '*Viśeṣa*', meaning 'a treatise on *Viśeṣa*'. The word '*viśeṣa*' has various meanings; e. g. species, distinction, difference, excellence, superiority. Accordingly the word '*Vaiśeṣika*' also has been variously interpreted. "The origin of the name", in one view, "is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the *Sāmkhya*". In another view, "the work was named the *Vaiśeṣika sâstra*, since it excelled other works in all respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence". A third view is that it is called *Vaiśeṣika*, because it particularly or specifically treats of Genus, Species, and Combination which have not been dealt with in any other treatise and though they are included in the predicables Substance, etc. In a fourth view, it is distinguished from the *Sāmkhya* in its theory of *Buddhi* (understanding), namely that *Buddhi* is an attribute of the Soul, and not its instrument of knowledge. In another view, it is distinguished from the System of Jaiminî in so far as it declares that the highest good is to be achieved by the renunciation of the things of the world and by the contemplation of Truth, and not by positive performances. Lastly, it is explained that Kaṇāda's system has come to be called "*Vaiśeṣika*" from his theory of '*viśeṣa*' inhering in the ultimate atoms (I. ii. 6). His atoms are 'mathematical points', without parts, and possessing the same attribute and activity in their respective classes of 'Earth', 'Water', 'Fire', and 'Air'. It is by means of their '*viśesas*' or individual characteristics that they are distinguished from one another, and account for the variety of things in nature. This last explanation appears to be preferable to all the others.

The *vaīśeṣika* is a *Mokṣa-sâstra*: it teaches a doctrine of release, release from the coil of mortality. According to Kaṇāda, man must work out his own salvation. It is given to him, if he will, to hear the Truth from the Scriptures or from a preceptor, on high or here below, to think over it in his mind, and to meditate upon it in the recesses of his heart. He can control his sensory and motor organs, and, by eliminating superficial psychic states, make the mind steady in the Soul. Steadiness of the mind in the Soul is called *Yoga*. *Yoga* is neither a mystery nor is it mysticism. It is the realisation of the freedom of will, of the free Self. He then becomes master of time and space. For him there is no distinction of past, present, and future; no distinction of here, there, and elsewhere. The mind being at rest, pleasure and pain do not arise, activity ceases, and the law of Karma is cancelled for all time to come. The accumulated Karma of the past, however, remains. Having realised the fundamental freedom of the Self, he sees what experiences are in store for him, and lives out those experiences in appropriate forms and surroundings brought about by the

creative power of will. In this way he cancels the past as well. Thereafter, when death takes place, and the soul finally quits its temporal abode, it does not pass into other forms of finite life, but remains free for ever till the end of Time. That freedom is called Mokṣa, the supreme good, the be-all and end-all of existence.

Self-knowledge, Self-realisation, Ātma-sākṣātkāra, is then the only means of attaining Mokṣa. The fundamental teaching of Kaṇāda, therefore, is "tattva-jñānāt niḥśreyasam", the supreme good results from the knowledge of the truth about the Soul. It is a translation of the Vedic text, "Tarati śokam Ātma-vit", the knower of the Self overcomes Evil.

The Soul is therefore to be known. Kaṇāda shows how it is to be known. Hence the Vaiśeṣika Śāstra is also called *Adhyātma Śāstra*, a treatise respecting the Soul. It was not necessary for him to call attention to the nature of the Soul in itself, the pure Soul as it was in the beginning and as it will be in the end. It was enough for his purpose to demonstrate the nature of the Soul in the interval of Time, the suffering Soul, the Soul revolving on the wheel of births and deaths and re-births under the Law of Karma. The universal experience of Suffering ("Duḥkha") compels an enquiry as to the means of its removal, namely, realisation of the truth about the Soul; and Kaṇāda's view is that the Soul can be known by means of the Not-Soul.

The Soul and the Not-Soul make up Reality. The Real is that which is knowable and nameable. Reality therefore consists of Padārthas, nameables or predicables. They are not merely categories of Thought, in the sense that they have no existence outside and independent of thought. They are classes of entities which have an existence antecedent to, and independent of, our thought. They become objects of our thought, they are knowable and nameable, because they exist. "In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition" (Bergson). Tattva-sākṣātkāra, immediate intuition of reality, is the aim of Kaṇāda's philosophy.

By a subtle process of analysis and synthesis, Kaṇāda divides all nameable things into six classes: viz. substance, attribute, action, genus, species, and combination. He then shows, that attribute and action exist by combination with substance. Without substance, there were no attribute and action. Similarly, genus and species are correlative, and are not absolute, except in the case of the highest genus which is existence, and the lowest species which is the viśeṣas or individual characteristics appertaining to, inhering in the eternal substances. Genus and species therefore exist by combination with substances. Without substance, there were no genus and species. Similarly, combination is "the intimate connection in the inseparably connected things"; e. g. of parts and wholes, of substances and their attributes, of action and the sent of action, of genus and species and substances in which they reside, and of eternal substances and their ultimate differences. Without substance, then, there were no combination. Substance, therefore, is the fundamental reality.

By analysis, substance is resolved into nine kinds: viz. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind. Of these Earth,

Water, Fire, and Air are, as effects, i. e., wholes made up of parts, non-eternal. Their ultimate atoms which are without parts, are eternal. On the other hand, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind are without parts, and therefore eternal. Ether is held to be "nothing other than the cosmic vacuum (?) which contains all objects, and gives room for their activities". Time and Space are complementary to Ether. The three substances are in reality one only (Prasastapâda and Chandra-kânta). Mind, again, is entirely material, and yet capable of coming into intimate relation with the Soul; it is as it were a sort of *camera obscura* to the Soul. In another view, the ultimate atoms are subject to change; they produce effects, and themselves undergo changes, but do not initiate changes, except in so far as they reflect themselves in the Mind. Mind also suffers change; it modifies in the form of every object it comes in contact with; otherwise it is absolutely inactive. The Soul, on the other hand, does not suffer change of states. It is the initiator of change in everything else. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impressions are its attributes, and not its essence. They are determinations of Will, and prove a state of "indetermination of Will" in which the Soul is truly free and eternal. It follows that Atoms, Minds, and Souls are the ultimate units in Creation. The highest Soul, the Supreme Person, is God.

Atoms and Minds do not exist for themselves. They exist for the Souls, for their bhoga and apavarga, transmigration and emancipation. In the beginning of Creation, activity is induced in them—they are set in motion,—by Adṛiṣṭam, the resultant energy abiding in the Souls as a consequence of their previous activities. It causes the combination of atoms to form the body and the world. "The sphere of transmigration is the common result of the individual *adṛiṣṭa*, and every one's body and other personal circumstances are the special results of the individual *adṛiṣṭa*". It has no activity during the time of the world's dissolution. At the end of the period of dissolution, it is set free by the will of God. It then starts the process of Creation, and maintains it; it is the sustaining energy from the beginning to the end of Creation. It can be neutralised,—its force can be exhausted,—only by the action of the Soul (Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, V. ii. 16).

In this view the interesting references that are met with here and there in the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, to cosmology, geology, mineralogy, botany and plant-physiology, zoology, physiology, mechanics, acoustics, and other positive sciences, become explained. The doctrine of *adṛiṣṭa* carries the enquiry further into the field of ethics and sociology, on the one hand, and logic and epistemology as well as psychology and philology, on the other. For, the Soul is at the core of reality, that is, the real which is knowable and nameable. Every individual Soul is the centre of a separate world of its own, which is evolved to suit its *adṛiṣṭa*. To know the Soul,—to have immediate intuition of it, therefore, it is necessary to know the Not-Soul. "For we do not obtain an intuition from reality, that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it,—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations. (Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics).

Kaṇâda accordingly elaborates a process of thinking consideration of things. As Dr. Deussen rightly observes, "Indian Philosophy did

not start, as, for the most part, the Grecian did, from an investigation free of assumptions into the existent, but rather like modern philosophy from the critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed down (through the Veda). "Hence the Vaiśeṣika is also called *Manana śāstra*, treatise based on reasoning, rational or critical system. The starting point of the system is the observation and analysis of objects, with a view to their strict definition and a correct appreciation of their place and function in the world of bhoga and apavarga, probation and perfection, bondage and freedom. And tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth, is its end and aim. To accomplish this result, it evolves a doctrine of Scientific Method, which, however, is "only a subsidiary discipline, being comprehended under the wider conception of Methodology," which proceeds by way of "(1) the proposition (or enumeration) of the subject-matter (Uddeśa), (2) the ascertainment of the essential characters or marks, by Perception, Inference, the Inductive Methods, etc.—resulting in definitions (by lakṣana) or descriptions (by upalakṣana); and (3) examination and verification (parikṣa and nirṇaya)" (Seal). In this method, logic is not pure reasoning or inference; the reasoning is also proof. And the Methodology evolved by Kanāda and Gotama has been carried almost to perfection in the later Nyāya, "which, inspite of its arid dialectics, possesses a threefold significance in the history of thought: (1) logical, in its conceptions of Avachchedaka and Pratiyogi, being an attempt to introduce quantification on a connotative basis, in other words, to introduce quantitative notions of Universal and Particular, in both an affirmative and a negative aspect, into the Hindu theory of Inference and Proposition regarded connotatively as the establishment of relations among attributes or marks; (2) scientific, in its investigation of the varieties of Vyāpti and Upādhi (and of Anyathāsiddha), being an elaboration of Scientific Method, in the attempt to eliminate the irrelevant; and (3) ontological and epistemological, in its classification and precise determination of the various relations of Knowledge and Being, with even greater rigidity and minuteness than in Hegel's Logic of Being and Essence" (Seal).

The criterion of truth, in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras, is the correspondence of thought with things and *vice versa*. Truth and reality are, in this system, convertible terms. " * * * the existence of the concept of an object, subjective as well as objective, is the logical reason for and the real consequence of the existence of the object" (Ji). Existence pervades the world of reality: to be real, is to be existent: and to be existent is to be knowable and nameable; that is, there must be in it "an immediately intuitable element, which is determined by the function of one or more of our senses, or by inner perception" (Sigwart), or, as we should say, by the 'mind', and all, by meditation and transcendental or pure perception (tattva-sāksātkāra). Hence the Vaiśeṣika is called a realism, and, —a dualism.

A characteristic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is its Kriyā-vāda. This is the doctrine which holds that self is active, or that self is affected by pleasure or desire, etc., in other words, that it is a kartri or an agent, in the course of the evolution, or more correctly, revolution of its transmigratory existence.

Another characteristic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is its Ārambha-vāda: the doctrine, namely, that the world as an effect, is not a mere appearance (vivarta) of the cause, nor an evolution (pariṇāma) of the cause, but is produced by aggregation of the cause, which is the ultimate atoms. And this leads to the doctrine of Aśat-kārya-vāda, that is, that an effect has only a temporary existence, and that, before its production, and, after its destruction, it is non-existent.

Before we close this short notice of the scope and character of the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, it is our pleasant duty to acknowledge our obligations to the distinguished authors cited above. Our special thanks are due to Dr. Seal and Professor Uj whom we have freely quoted.

Translator.

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THE VAIŚEŚIKA SŪTRAS OF KAṆĀDA
WITH THE
COMMENTARY OF ŚĀṆKARA MIŚRA
AND
EXTRACTS FROM THE GLOSS OF JAYANÂRÂYAṆA.
AND
THE BHÂṢYA OF CHANDRAKÂNTA.

ŚĀṆKARA MIŚRA'S INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Śrī Gaṇeśa !

I bow to Hara who has the Heavenly River playing on the lap of His uptied matted locks, and whose forehead is adorned with the Embellisher of the Night.

My Salutations constantly reach those two, Kaṇāda and Bhavanātha, by whom I have been thoroughly enlightened in the Vaiśeṣika System.

Note.—Kaṇāda here does not refer to the author of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtram, but to a well-known Vaiśeṣika teacher of a recent date.

Bhavanātha was the father of Śāṅkara Miśra.

May success attend this venture of mine who, like a funambulist in the air, walk here without any support, with the only help of the Sūtram.

Note.—Sūtram—a piece of rope ; an aphorism ; just as a rope-dancer walks in the air with the help of a Sūtram (rope), so the commentator traverses the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣikas with the help of the Sūtram (aphorisms) of Kaṇāda.

Human existence is subject to threefold afflictions. These afflictions are partly ādhyātmika, i.e., bodily and mental. They are partly ādhibhautika, i.e., caused by natural agencies, e. g. man, beast, bird, reptile and the immobile. And they are partly ādhidaivika, i.e., caused by supernatural powers, such as Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, Vināyaka, etc. Discriminative men, struck with the threefold afflictions, looked for the root-cause of the cessation of the threefold afflictions. They gathered from the various Srutis (Revelations), Smritis (Recollections), Itihāsas (Histories), and Purāṇas (Cosmogonies), that it is the immediate intuition or direct vision of the principle of the self, or simply, self-realization, which is that cause. They then desired to know the path also which led to the attainment of self-realization. Accordingly they approached the very kind sage (muni) Kaṇāda.

Now, the Muni Kaṇāda had accomplished the knowledge of the principles (tattvas), dispassion, and lordliness. He thought within himself that the knowledge of the principles of the six padārthas (predicables), by means of their resemblances and differences, is the only royal road to the attainment of self-realization, and that that would be easily accomplished by the disciples through the dharma (Merit or Worth) of renunciation. He therefore resolved first to teach them dharma alone with reference to its essential form and with reference to its characteristics, and then to teach them also the six padārthas by means of their enumeration, definition, and demonstration.

Note.—Dharma of renunciation.—The indirect method of Self-realization is Pravr̥t̥ti Mārga, i. e. through and by means of worldly experience. The direct method of Self-realization is Nivr̥t̥ti Mārga, i. e. through and by means of abandonment of worldly experience.

Hence, to invite their attention, he proposes.

Jayanārāyaṇa's Introduction.

He who of His own will spreads out the production, preservation, and destruction of the universe; He who, even though shining forth in suppression of all these, still is not known by other than wise men; He, by knowing whom as He is in Himself, men are saved from further immersion into the waves of the stream of transmigration; the same is Bhava (i. e., the Lord of Creation), and He is easy of access by the path of communion with Him in constant devotion.* May† He be pleased to give you prosperity.

I adore Bhavānī (the consort of Bhava), Māheśī (the consort of Maheśa, the Great Lord), who, Herself bearing limbs as dark as the cloud, still dispels the mass of darkness by myriads of collected rays; who while cutting asunder the bond of re-birth of Her devotees, is Herself bound by love to Bhava and is His constant delighter; who, although She is born of the Immobile (the Himālaya), still moves from place to place; and who while being the consort of the Pure (Siva), is seated on a corpse.

After bowing to his good preceptor, the fortunate twice-born Jayanārāyaṇa is writing out the *vivṛiti* (explanation or elaboration) of the aphorisms of Kaṇāda for the pleasure of Īśvara.

Here, indeed, one and all of the disciples, desiring to throw off the multitude of afflictions arising from birth, decrepitude, death, and the like, hear from the various Śrutis, Smṛitis, Itihāsas, Purāṇas, etc., that the vision of the reality of the Self is the fundamental means of escaping them. Thus, there is the Śruti: "Verily, verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard about, to be thought over, and meditated upon. Verily, O verily, this is (the measure of) immortality" (Bṛihadāraṇyaka 2, 4, 5); also, "When the Puruṣa (the in-dweller) will know himself—the Self—as "I am," then wishing what, for which desire, will he pursue the course of transmigration?" And the Smṛiti also: "By elaborating his understanding in three ways, namely by sacred writings, inference, and habitual flow of contemplation, a person attains to laudable communion."

* Cf. Nārada Bhakti Sūtram, aphorism 58 p. 23, S. B. H., Vol. VII.

† Cf. Śāṇḍilya-Sūtram, III, 1, 7, page 71, S. B. H., Vol. VII.

Now, some disciples, who were unenvious and who had properly studied the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas, (i.e., treatises regarded as so many limbs as it were of the Vedas) and had also achieved the *Śravaṇa* (i.e., the stage of self-culture known by the name, *audition*, in other words, the mere acquisition of knowledge or information as referred to in the preceding paragraph), with due rites approached the great and mighty sage Kaṇāda for the purpose of *manana* or *intellection* (the second stage of self-culture, i.e., that of discriminative understanding). Thereupon that sage, full of great compassion, taught them a system (of self-culture) in Ten Books. There in the First Book he has stated the entire group of *padārthas* (Predicables); in the Second Book he has ascertained Substance; in the Third Book he has described the Soul and the Inner Sense; in the Fourth Book he has discussed the body and its constituents; in the Fifth Book he has established *Karma* (Action); in the Sixth Book he has considered *Dharma* (piety) according to Śruti; in the Seventh Book he has established Attribute and *Samavāya* (co-inherence or combination); in the Eighth Book he has ascertained the manifestation of knowledge, its source, and so on; in the Ninth Book he has established particular or concrete understanding; and in the Tenth Book he has established the differences of the attributes of the Soul.

The operation of this treatise (towards teaching) is three-fold: Enumeration, Definition, and Examination or Demonstration. Classification or Division is a particular form of Enumeration; and hence it does not constitute an additional method.

Although this system is mainly concerned with the determination of the Predicables, still, inasmuch as *Dharma*, being at the root of the knowledge of the essence of the Predicables, possesses a prominence of its own, therefore he (Kaṇāda) proposes to ascertain that (*Dharma*) first of all.

Dharma is to be explained.

अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ १ । १ । १ ॥

अथ *Atha*, now. अतः *Atah*, therefore. [धर्मम् *Dharmmam*, piety, religion. व्याख्यास्यामः *Vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*, (We) shall explain.

1. Now, therefore, we shall explain *Dharma*.—1.

Upaskāra.—‘*Atha*’ indicates sequence to the desire of the disciples. ‘*Atah*’—Because disciples, skilful in *Śravaṇa* (audition), etc., and unenvious, approached (him), therefore. Or the word ‘*atha*’ has the sense of auspiciousness. For it has been said: “*Omkāra* (aum) and the word *atha*—these two came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of Brahmā; hence both of them are auspicious.” And it is as it should be. How, otherwise, is it possible on the part of the great sage, while composing the Vaiśeṣika system of self-culture, not to observe the auspicious ceremony, which has acquired the obligatory nature of a duty, by a succession of observances by pious men? It cannot be said, on the other side, that the non-observance might be due to the experience of the non-appearance of fruit even where the auspicious ceremony has been observed and of the appearance of fruit even where it has not been observed; since a wise man does not engage in a useless pursuit. For its usefulness becomes certain on the supposition of its observance in another birth in the case of the above non-observance where the fruit still appears, and of defect in some part (of the ceremony) in the case of the above observance, where the fruit does not still appear.

Again, there need be also no apprehension of its uselessness merely on account of the non-appearance, for the time being, of the fruit of that, the obligatory nature of which has been taught in the Śruti and can be inferred from the conduct of the elect or polite. Nor is it that there can be no supposition of something in another birth since an act must produce its fruit in this (one) life only; because, as in the case of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, so in every act the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life is not proved to exist. Whereas the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life belongs to *Kāriṇī* (sacrifice for rain) and other sacrifices, because these are performed with that desire alone. Here the agent is desirous of completion, as the agent in a sacrifice is desirous of heaven. The difference is that there the object (of the observance) is a new entrance in the shape of *adṛiṣṭam*, while here it is the annihilation of hindrances, since the undertaking is with the desire that what has been begun may be safely completed.

It cannot be said that the fruit of the observance is the mere annihilation of hindrances while completion will follow from its own cause. For, the mere annihilation of obstacles is not in itself an object of volition, whereas completion as the means of happiness is an object of volition, and it is also uppermost in the mind. Moreover, the mere destruction of demerits is not the fruit, for that being otherwise capable of accomplishment by propitiation, singing the name of God, crossing the river Karmanāśā, etc., there will be plurality of causes, i.e., a violation of the rule (that only the observance of the omen will produce the result). If it is held that the destruction of demerits is the end, as the destruction of the particular demerits which obstruct the fulfilment of the undertaking, then the fulfilment itself properly becomes the end. Here too there will be a violation of the rule, since such destruction of particular demerits is producible by gift of gold, bathing (at the confluence (of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā) at Prayāga (Allahabad), etc.; and it will be rash to speak of them as so many good omens.

Again, the causality of the good omen consists in this that it being observed, the completion must necessarily follow. So it has been said: "Because of the rule that the fruit necessarily results from an act, complete in all its parts, according to the Veda." Hence an alternative cause also is certainly a cause, for the idea of a cause in the Veda refers only to the uniformity of immediateness or to the immediate sequence of the effect. It is perverse to suppose a difference in kind in the effects, in the case of a plurality of causes. Where causality has to be deduced from agreement and difference, there the rule of antecedence to the effect should be observed, but not in the Veda also, where the appearance of difference does not figure as a weighty consideration. Thus it is not a violation of the rule to say that the omen being observed in all its parts, the completion necessarily follows.

Now, completion or fulfilment is that on the performance of which arises the belief that this act has been completed. In the case of writings it consists in the writing of the last sentence; in the case of a sacrifice, etc., in the final oblation; in the case of a cloth, etc., in the addition of the last thread; in the case of going to a village, etc., in the final contact of the feet with the village; and it should be similarly understood in all other cases. Therefore in the case of completion produced by an auspicious observance, even if we suppose a difference in kind in the effect, still there is no violation of the rule of agreement and difference.

An auspicious observance is an act which brings about fulfilment as its fruit by the path of the annihilation of obstacles, and that is really of the form of salutation to the deity, etc. Even where obstacles do not exist of themselves, although the commonly attributed (as above) characteristic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles is absent there, still the idea of the auspicious observance is not too narrow, because the salutation, etc., as such, possess the incidence of the characteristic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles. This is the point.—1.

The *Virṛiti* adds: Others again say that the non-existence of any hindrance having been insured by the virtue born of concentration (*Yoga*), the sage did not attend to the auspicious observance, or that if he did, he has not inserted that at the beginning of the book. Later thinkers, on the other hand, say that, as in the treatise of Gautama (*i.e.*, *Nyāya Sūtra*), in the recital of the word *pramāṇa* (Proof) which falls within the group of the names of God, so too in this treatise, the auspicious ceremony has been observed, in the form of reciting the word *dharma*, which also is a synonym of God.

It should be understood here that *dharma* leads up to knowledge by the way of the purification of the mind (*chitta*), thirst after knowledge, and so on. For the Veda says: "They come to thirst after knowledge by the performance of sacrifices." etc. And says the *Smṛiti* also, "Knowledge is produced after demerits or dark deeds have been destroyed by good acts."

Chandrakānta :—The classification of *Dharma* is not shown by *Kaṇāda*, as it does not fall within the scope of his philosophy; for, he has undertaken the *Śāstra* with the object of teaching *Tattva-Jñānam*, knowledge of the essences or principles, only.

Definition of Dharma.

यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ॥ १ । १ । २

यतः Yataḥ, whence. अभ्युदय-निःश्रेयस-सिद्धिः Abhyudaya-niḥsreyasa-siddhiḥ, Exaltation, Supreme Good, Accomplishment. सः Saḥ, that. धर्मः Dharmah, Piety, Religion.

2. *Dharma* (is) that from which (results) the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good.—2.

Upaskāra.—Now he describes the subject proposed :

'Abhyudaya' means knowledge of the essences. 'Niḥsreyasa' is final cessation of pain. That from which both of them result is *dharma*. The compound of the two words, rendered as 'niḥsreyasa' by the path of 'abhyudaya,' belongs to that class of compounds which are formed by the elision of the middle term: or it is a *Tat-puruṣa* compound ablatively formed.

This *dharma* will be later on described as being characterised by forbearance. If it is the effect of constant contemplation and other practices of *Yoga* and is the same as *adṛiṣṭam* (the invisible, potential after effects of actions, or Merit and Demerit), then it is producible by positive performances.

The Vṛittikāra, however, says: "Abhyudaya' is happiness, and 'niḥṣreyasam' the simultaneous annihilation of all the particular attributes (*i.e.*, modifications) of the Soul. The proof is that in the case of *dharma*, the body, etc., of Devadatta are made up of elements so directed by the particular attributes of the enjoyer or sufferer, and as they are products or effects, they are, as the means of his enjoyment or experience, like a garland made by himself." Now, this explanation has been discarded by superficial readers as being not wide enough to apply to each and all (*a*). Whereas in fact "what is *dharma*? and what its characteristic?"—the enquiry of the disciples being of such a general nature, the answer comes, "That from which (results) the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good."

Thus, that which leads to the attainment of Exaltation, and also that which leads to the attainment of the Supreme Good, both of them are *dharma*. Thus that the invariable cause of the object of volition is *dharma*, being the matter to be expressed, the expression "the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good" has been used with the object of specially introducing the two great objects of volition, *viz.*, happiness and absence of pain. Because paradise and emancipation are the only great objects of volition, being the objects of desire which is not dependent upon desire for ulterior objects. And it will be shown that the absence of pain also is an object of volition.—2.

[Note.—(*a*) "Not wide enough to apply to each and all."—The separate characteristics are that it produces pleasure and that it produces the Supreme Good. The former does not include the *dharma* of *nivṛtti* and the latter does not include the *dharma* of *pravṛtti*. The collective characteristic is that it produces both pleasure and the Supreme Good. And this does not include that which produces pleasure only, nor that which produces the Supreme Good only. Thus the definition of *dharma* as explained by the Vṛittikāra is in either case too narrow. This is, according to Upaskāra, the view of superficial readers.]

Chandrakānta :—Wherefrom does the production of the good and of the ultimate good result? The production of the good and of the ultimate good results from *Pravṛtti*, activity or employment, that is (observed in the world, or) exertion of the speech, the mind, and the body. Therein, it is said, that a person cultivates *Dharma* with the speech, by telling agreeable and wholesome truths and by studying the sacred writings; with the mind, by showing compassion, contentment, and faith; with the body, by practising charity and by relieving the poor and the distressed and those who are in danger. यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त दवास्तानि धर्म्मणि—This text of the Veda also shows that *Dharma* is the designate of the word, "yajati," to perform (sacrifices, etc.)

And this *Dharma* is subsidiary, because it subserves *tattvajñānam*, knowledge of the principles; which is the principal *Dharma*, because it is the means of the supreme good.

Authority of the Veda.

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् ॥ १ । १ । ३ ॥

:तद्वचनात् Tad-vachanât, being His Word or declaration, or its (of *dharma*) exposition. आम्नायस्य Āmnâyasya, of the Veda. प्रामाण्यम् Prāmāṇyam, authoritateness.

3. The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being the Word of God [or being an exposition of *dharma*].—3.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, "Well, the Veda is the authority for this that *dharma* characterised by *nivṛtti* is the source of the Supreme Good by means of the knowledge of the essence or reality. But we are doubtful about the authoritativeness of the Veda itself, on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition. Falsity is shown by the non-production of the son, even after the sacrifices for a son has been performed. The *homa* (oblation to fire) after sun-rise, etc., actually prescribed in the ordinances 'He offers oblation unto fire after sunrise, he offers oblation unto fire before sunrise, he offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,' is counteracted by such texts as 'Śyāva (a dog of Yama) eats up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire after sunrise, Savala (the other dog of Yama) eats up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire before sunrise, Śyava and Savala eat up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,' etc. And repetition surely appears from the mention of the thrice recital of the first and the last *Sāṃdheni* (the Kik III. 27. 1-11. directed to kindle fire) in 'He will recite the first for three times, he will recite the last for three times.' Beside there is nothing to establish the authoritativeness of the Veda. Its eternality being uncertain, its eternal freedom from defect also becomes doubtful. On the other hand, if it is the product of a human brain, then by the possibility of mistake, oversight, uncertainty, want of skill in the author, etc., its characteristic of being the infallible testimony of a great and good (*āpta*) man, certainly becomes doubtful. Thus there is no Supreme Good, nor is knowledge of reality its means, nor again is *dharma*. Thus all this remains uncertain."

To meet this objection he says :

'Tat' alludes to God whose existence is well-known, although the word does not appear in the context; as in the aphorism of Gautama, "That is unauthoritative on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," the Veda is alluded to by the word 'tat,' although it does not appear in the context. Thus 'tadvachanāt,' means being the composition of Him, *Īśvara*; 'āmnāyasya,' of the Veda; 'prā-mānyam.' Or, 'tat' refers to *dharma* only which is close by i. e., in the context. Thus, of *dharma*; 'vachanāt,' being the exposition; *āmnāyasya*, of the Veda; 'prā-mānyam,' since that statement is really proof which establishes something which is authoritative. God and the quality of His being an *āpta* (i. e., a great and good person) will be established later on.

Now, with reference to what has been said, namely, "on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," there in the case of falsity, the explanation lies in the supposition of producing result in another existence or the supposition of defect in the act, the agent, and the instrument, since there is the rule that the result necessarily follows from an act, complete in all its parts, prescribed in the Veda. Moreover, it is not the case that the result must appear in this and only this life, as in the case of *Kātri*. (i. e., sacrifice for rain.) There the occupation is that of one who desires a revival of crops which are getting dry. In the case of the sacrifice for a son, the occupation is that of one who desires a son only. This is the difference. There is also no contradiction, because the condemnatory passages such as "Śyāva eats up his oblations," etc., have reference only to cases where after having particularly vowed oblations, after sunrise, etc., one performs such *homas* at other times. Nor is there the fault of repetition, because the repetition has this justification that eleven *mantras* for kindling fire having been as a matter of fact recited, fifteen such *mantras* as required by the text, "By the means of the fifteen word-thunders he opposed that enemy who is here," cannot be obtained without reciting the first and the last *mantra* for three times each.—3.

Vivṛiti.—Or here the word ‘tat’ itself denotes Īśvara, on the strength of the saying: “*Om, Tat, Sat*—this has been remembered to be the three-fold reference to Brahman.”

Knowledge of Predicables is the means of attaining the Supreme Good.

**धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां
पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ॥ १ । १ । ४॥**

धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् *Dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtāt*, Produced by a particular *dharma*. द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां *Dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām*, of Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination. पदार्थानाम् *Padārthānām*, of the *padārthas* or predicables. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यां *Sādharmmya-vaidharmmyābhyām*, By means of resemblance and difference. तत्त्वज्ञानात् *Tattvajñānāt*, From knowledge of the essence. निःश्रेयसम् *Niḥśreyasam*, The Supreme Good.

4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, produced by a particular *dharma*, of the essence of the Predicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.—4.

Upaśkāra.—Having described the nature and characteristic of *dharma* in accordance with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining the subject-matter and the “relation”.—

‘Such knowledge of the essences is dependent upon the Vaiśeṣika System; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of the Supreme Good. If, through its derivation in an instrumental sense, namely, that the essence is known by it, the word ‘*tattvajñāna*’ refers to the treatise, then it will not have apposition to the word ‘*dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtāt*.’ In ‘*dravya-guṇa*, etc., the compound is a ‘copulative compound’ wherein all the words are prominent, because the knowledge of the essence of *all* the Predicables is the source of the Supreme Good.

Now, here the ‘relation’ is understood to be: between the Doctrine and the Supreme Good, that of the means and the end or motive; between the Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of form and matter; between the Supreme Good and the knowledge of the essences, that of effect and cause; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and the Doctrine, that of the demonstrable and that which demonstrates. And from the knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supreme Good apply themselves to this Doctrine, and those who desire salvation apply to it only when they realize that the sage is an *apta* or trustworthy person.

“*Niḥśreyasam*” is final cessation of pain; and the finality of the cessation of pain consists in its non-simultaneity with the antecedent non-existence of pain in the same substratum, or in its simultaneity, in the same substratum, with the simultaneous annihilations of the special attributes of the Soul, *viz.*, *adṛiṣṭam* and *samskāra*. Or, Salvation is the antecedent non-existence of pain upto the moment of the annihilation, without leaving any trace, of these special attributes.

Notes.—“Antecedent non-existence”: Non-existence is fourfold, viz.

- (a) antecedent, e.g. of the pot before it is produced.
- (b) emergent, e.g. of the pot after it is destroyed.
- (c) reciprocal, e.g. of the characteristic of the pot in a picture and vice versa.
- (d) absolute, e.g. of the pot in a room where there is no pot.

It will be noticed that antecedent non-existence has no beginning; emergent non-existence has no end; and reciprocal non-existence and absolute non-existence have neither beginning nor end.

The thing of which there is non-existence, is said to be the opposite or counter-opposite (*pratīyogī*) of that non-existence. In the above illustration the counter-opposite is the pot.

One kind of non-existence (e.g. of the pot) is differentiated from another kind of non-existence (e.g. of the picture), by means of the characteristics of their counter-opposites. These characteristics are therefore called determinants or differentiators (*avachchedaka*).

Now, mere cessation of pain is not Salvation; because there remains the possibility of pain in future and there remains also the memory of the pain that has then passed into non-being. The cause of the possibility of pain is *adṛiṣṭam* or *karma* (merit and demerit); and the cause of the memory of pain is *saṃskāra* (the imprint of the experience of pain left in the soul). Salvation will result only when there is not merely the cessation of the pain actually experienced, but also the neutralisation of the causes of possible pain viz. *adṛiṣṭam* and *saṃskāra*.

Not that it is not an object of volition, being incapable of achievement, because even antecedent non-existence can be brought about by the neutralisation of the cause. Nor does it thereby lose in the characteristic of being antecedent non-existence, because such characteristic remains as the characteristic of the non-existence of the producer of the opposite (i.e., the existence of pain); and to be the producer is merely its essential or general fitness to be the cause. Again, antecedent non-existence is not the last member or element, so that, it existing, the effect must necessarily appear; for if it were so, then it would follow that an effect also has no beginning. Thus, as in the absence of a contributory cause it did not produce the effect so long, so also in future it will not produce it without the co-operation of a contributory cause, the person operating to the eradication of the cause. Therefore this aphorism too upholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in the second aphorism of Gautama, “Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notion—on the successive removal of these in turn, there is the removal of the one next preceding and thereafter salvation,” (Nyāya Sūtram, I, i, 2), the statement of the non-existence of the effect on the non-existence of the cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antecedent non-existence of pain. Removal of activity on the removal of faults, removal of birth on the removal of activity, of pain on the removal of birth—here removal does not mean annihilation but non-production, and that is nothing but antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is not known, for the opposite is surely known in the form of pain in general. As in the case of propitiation, there too only the non-production of pain is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world also it is seen that the removal of the snake, thorn, etc. is for the purpose of the non-production of pain. So the activity of the wise is directed only towards removing the causes of pain.

Some however say: “Only the absolute non-existence of pain is salvation. If it is not seated in the Soul, yet, as seated in the stone, etc., it is connected with the Soul; and its connection lies in the annihilation of pain which does not accompany the prior non-existence (or potential existence) of pain; as it is found in connection with such annihilation of pain, seeing that such annihilation taking place, there arises the consciousness of the absolute non-existence of pain in that

place. This being so, such texts of the Veda as "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," also become explained." We reply that it is not so. Absolute non-existence of pain, being incapable of accomplishment, is not an object of voluntary activity. Nor has annihilation of pain any connection to that, since this would entail a technicality.

Note.—Absolute non-existence has neither beginning nor end. It does not therefore depend upon human will or effort. Hence it cannot be pursued as an object of desire. You may say that, as long as it is not accomplished in the Soul, as the connection of that which is not connected with it,—such connection taking the form of the annihilation of pain which does not coexist with the antecedent non-existence of pain—so long surely it is an object of desire. But to this also there is an objection; viz., that the annihilation of pain does not form such a connection, as it is not co-extensive with the soul. To hold otherwise, would be to put a new interpretation upon the word "connection" (*Sambandha*).

The text of the Veda "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain" implies that, by way of the neutralization of causes, prior non-existence of pain may be reduced into a condition similar to that of the absolute non-existence of pain.

It may be said, "This is not an object of the will, as it is not an object of desire which is not subject to another desire, because those only who seek pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeing that pleasure is not produced at the time of pain." But this is not so; because it is equally easy to say the contrary also. Will not desire for pleasure also be subject to the desire for the absence of pain? seeing that men overwhelmed with grief as well as those who turn their faces away from pleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are inclined to swallowing poison, hanging themselves, etc..

Neither can it be said, "Even if it is an object of the will, it is so only because it is an object of cognition. But salvation as absence of pain is not even an object of cognition. Otherwise (*i.e.*, if to be an object of cognition were not a necessary condition of being an object of the will) men would be inclined to bring about the state of swoon, etc." For that which is capable of being known from the Veda and by inference cannot be reasonably said to be unknowable. For there are the texts of the Veda: "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," "By knowing Him only one transcends death," etc. There is inference also: The series of pain is finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a series like a series of lamps; and so on. It can be known by perception also, since final annihilation of pain for a moment becomes the subject-matter of thought in the realization of pain in consciousness (in the moment prior to death) and (if you do not admit this), also because the *yogins* perceive the future annihilation of pain by virtue of the power born of concentration (*yoga*).

It cannot be said, "Still, the loss and gain being the same, it is not the object of the will, since with pain, pleasure is also removed, the removal of both being due to the same set of causes"; for men naturally dispassionate and fearful of dark days of suffering and who overestimate every glow-worm of pleasure, are active to that end.

It cannot again be said, "Cessation of pain is still not the object of the will; because cessation of pain which is yet to come, is impossible, pain which is past is in the past, and pain which is present will cease even without an effort of the person"; for the activity of the person is towards the eradication of causes, as in penances. Thus,

false knowledge attended with desire, is the cause of *Samsāra*, i.e., succession of mortal existences ; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the truth about the Self ; and knowledge of the truth about the Self is producible by the practice of *Yoga* ; hence activity in this direction is justified.

It cannot be said that only the manifestation of permanent pleasure is salvation, and not the absence of pain ; for there is no proof that pleasure can be permanent ; if there were such proof then the manifestation of pleasure being constant, there would be no difference between a worldly and an other-worldly or liberated man, and also manifestation being a product or effect, on its termination there will again follow *Samsāra* or stream of mortal existence.

It cannot be said that salvation consists in the *laya* or disappearance of the *Jivatmā* or embodied Self into the *Brahmatmā* or un-embodied or universal Self ; for if *laya* means amalgamation, then there is an obstacle, as two do not become one. It cannot be explained that *laya* means the removal of the subtle embodiment composed of the senses and of the physical organism ; for hereby the absence of the causes of pain being implied, it follows that the absence of pain alone is salvation.

Hereby the doctrine of the *Ekadāṇḍins* (a sect who carry staffs consisting of single sticks) that salvation means the remaining of the pure Self after the cessation of Nescience or false knowledge and that Self is by nature true knowledge and happiness, is also refuted, because there is no evidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the Veda "Brahman is eternal, knowledge, and bliss," is no evidence, because it proves possession of knowledge and possession of bliss. For we have the perceptions "I know," and "I am happy," but not the perceptions "I am knowledge" and "I am happiness." Moreover, Brahman being even now existent, it would follow that there is no distinction between a liberated and a worldly man. The cessation of Avidyā or false knowledge is also not an object of the will. Brahman also, being eternal, is not a *sādhya* or what has to be accomplished. The realization of Brahman within the Self, having Him as the object, is not a *sādhya* or what has to be accomplished. Similarly bliss also, having Him as its essence or object, is not a *sādhya*. For these reasons activity directed towards Him is not justified.

It cannot be said that salvation lies in the purity or unimpeded flow of the stream of consciousness. For if by purity is meant the removal of such impediments as pain, etc., then this much alone being the object of the will, there is no reason for or proof of the survival of the stream of consciousness. Moreover, the retention or survival of the stream of consciousness can be possible only by means of the body, etc., and hence in this view the retention of *samsāra* or the stream of mortal existence also would be necessary.

It is therefore proved that cessation of pain as described above is alone the Supreme Good.

In 'knowledge of the essence' the genitive has been used in the

Although a property which is recurrent in one place is divergent in another, and *vice versa*, still knowledge in the shape of recurrent and divergent properties, is here intended.

Here the enumeration itself of the Predicables, Substance, etc., has come to be their division, which has the effect of excluding a more or less number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables are *only* six in number. And this is not proved. If any other Preamble which requires to be excluded is known then the rule does not stand good; if it is not known, then the exclusion is invalid. It cannot be said that this is not the exclusion of the addition of something else but the exclusion of non-application; in other words, that the non-application of the characteristics of the six to all predicables or things is excluded. For all known predicables having been included by the word 'Preamble,' there is here then the fault of proving over again, and also that something else is not known. Moreover, which is to be excluded, non-application of the characteristics jointly or their non-application severally? In the first alternative, joint non-application prevails everywhere, so that there can be no exclusion. It cannot be said that in the second alternative also there can be no exclusion as with reference to one another their individual non-application prevails everywhere; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude the non-application of the characteristics of the six, when, according to others, they do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other Predicables recognised by them. Therefore the meaning of the rule that Predicables are *only* six in number is that in all perceptible objects, there is application of one or other of the characteristics of the six, and not that there is non-application. Now, 'only,' if it goes with the noun, it means exclusion of the addition of something else; if it goes with the adjective, it means exclusion of non-application; and if it goes with the verb, it means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according to some "only" has all this three-fold significance; while others say that its force lies in mere exclusion and that non-application, addition of something else, etc., are things to be excluded, which are derived by association.

"Produced by a particular *dharma*" is the adjective of "knowledge of the essence." Here "particular *dharma*" means piety characterised by forbearance or withdrawal from the world. If by "*tattvajñāna*" explained as "by this essence is known," the treatise (*i. e.*, the Aphorisms of Kaṇāda) is meant, in that case it should be said that "particular *dharma*" means the grace of and appointment from God, for it is heard that the great sage Kaṇāda composed this System by obtaining the grace of and appointment from God. In the aphorism by "knowledge of the essence" the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding is intended, because such realization alone is competent to root out false knowledge attended with desire. "By knowing Him only one transcends death, no other road is known (*vidyate*) for travelling," "Two Brahmins have to be known (*veditavye*)," "Having no eyes He yet sees, etc."—in all these passages the word *vedana* has the sense of realization in the understanding, and the use of the fifth case-ending in the causal sense in the word '*tattvajñānāt*' indicates that such realization of the Self comes in the progressive

career of hearing from the *Śāstras*, thinking within oneself, meditation, etc.,—4.

Vivṛiti.—‘Dharmmaviśeṣaprasūtāt’ means produced by a particular (good conduct, virtue or) merit, acquired in this life or in previous births. It is the qualification of ‘tattvajñānāt’ (knowledge of essence). As pointed out by the author of *Muktāvalī*, ‘Sādharmmya’ means common property, and ‘Vaidharmmya’ means opposing (*i. e.*, distinguishing) property. The use of the third case-ending indicates manner. The fifth case-ending in ‘tattvajñānāt’ has the sense of applicability. Thus the meaning is: By particular virtue knowledge of essence is produced by means of the generic and specific properties of the Predicables, Substance and others; thereafter is produced ‘intellectual conception’ of the Self, and next comes the realization of the Self in the understanding by constant meditation; after this liberation follows in the train of the removal of false knowledge, etc., (*Vide Nyāya Sūtram*, I. i. 2.)

The author of the *Upaskāra* has however said: The word ‘tattvajñāna’ in the aphorism conveys the principal idea of the realization of the Self in the understanding; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental sense, it refers to the treatise which is the (instrument or) means of such realization. In the first of these cases, the word ‘dharmmaviśeṣa’ will mean that dharma the characteristic of which is forbearance (*nivṛitti*); and in the latter case it will mean a particular virtue or merit in the form of the grace of and appointment from God, according to the tradition that the great sage Kaṇāda composed this treatise under the grace and appointment of God. And as the causal use of the fifth case-ending bears the sense of applicability, the realization of the Self in the understanding will follow from the treatise through the chain of intellection, constant meditation, and so on, for the word *knowing* in such texts of the Veda as “By knowing Him only one transcends death,” “Two Brahmins have to be known,” etc., denotes realization in the understanding (*i. e.*, spiritual intuition), and alone is competent to root out false knowledge together with desires.

This should be considered. If the word ‘tattvajñāna’ in the aphorism denotes the realization of one’s Self in the understanding which counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it would follow that the expression ‘by means of generic and specific properties’ as well as the term, ‘of the Predicables,’ bearing the sense of the sixth case-ending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the modality of the generic and specific properties, nor the materiality or substantiveness of the six Predicables; because they do not exist there, as they are distinct from the body, etc., whereas the realization of the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires, etc., which are not distinct from the body, etc. It cannot be said that in the state of the representation of separateness from the other (*i. e.*, the Not-Self) in the Self by the virtue born of *Yoga* (concentration), knowledge of the six Predicables, namely Substance, etc., by means of their generic and specific properties, is also produced through their temporary contiguity, inasmuch as the subject-matter of such knowledge

(i. e., the Predicables, etc.). appears there for the time being. For notwithstanding that such representation contains such indifferent generic property, etc., within itself, since it is not necessary for the real purpose in view, the description of it by the revered sage will mean so much mad talk on his part.

Again, the venerable author of the *Upaskāra* has brought forward the texts "By knowing Him alone, etc." as being evidence that the realization of the Self in the understanding is the cause of liberation. That too has been improper. For the Supreme Self alone being implied by the text, "I know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun, beyond the reach of darkness," the word 'tat' (that) has reference to the Supreme Self, and therefore it cannot refer to the *Jivatma* (Subordinate or Embodied Self) which has not been so implied. So much for the sake of brevity.

Here the enumeration of six Predicables has been made under the view of Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non-Being also has been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence there is no impropriety either in the aphorism "Non-existence of effect, from non-existence of cause" (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in such aphorisms as "From non-existence of qualification by Action and Attribute" (IX. i. 1) of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the *Nyāya-Līlāvati*, it has been said: "Non-existence also should be stated as conducive to the Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This conduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence of the effect follows from the non-existence of the cause in all cases. In the *Dravyakiraṇāvali* also, Nyāya teachers have admitted that Non-Existence is the seventh Predicable, in the passage ending thus: "And these Predicables have been mentioned as being the principal ones. Non-Existence, however, although it possesses a form of its own, has not been mentioned, not that it is something negligible, but because its ascertainment is dependent upon the ascertainment of its opposite." Thus the knowledge of the generic and specific properties of the seven (and not six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good; and that conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the mode of knowledge of marks (*liṅga*), etc., in the matter of the establishment of separateness from the Not-Self in the Self.

The Supreme Good, according to the views of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṅkhya philosophies, consists in the permanent cessation of pain, and results as the annihilation of pain, which is not synchronous with pain co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is non-synchronous with pain co-existent with itself, since no pain can at that moment arise in the liberated Soul. With a section of the Nyāya thinkers, salvation means permanent cessation of demerit only, because, in their view, this only can be directly accomplished by the realization of the Self in the understanding, as the Veda says, "And his actions wear off when he sees that High-and-Low (*Muṇḍaka* 2, 2, 8)." In the opinion of the one-staffed Vedāntin, salvation lies in the cessation of nescience, and nescience is (with him) a different Predicable. In the opinion of the three-staffed Vedāntin, salvation means the disappearance of the Embodied or finite Self in the Great Self, and results as the cessation

of the *Upādhi* or external condition of the *Jīva* (Embodied Soul), and of the causal body. Causal body again has been proved to be "the organic combination of the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and ten senses, arising from the elements which have not been compounded (*i. e.*, redintegrated), possessing subtle limbs, and being the means of experience (*i. e.*, *bhoga*)". The Bhaṭṭas however say that salvation consists in the manifestation of eternal happiness, and that eternal happiness, though evidenced by the Veda and penetrating all living beings (*Jīvas*), is unmanifest in the state of transmigration (*Samsāra*), and becomes manifest to the sense, immediately after the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding. The possible defects in these views are not shown here for fear of increasing the volume of the book. But in all the views the permanent cessation of pain in the state of salvation remains uncontradicted. And that is our point.

Now, it may be contended, "There are additional Predicables such as Energy, Similarity, etc. How else can it be explained that in the vicinity of the jewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes burning and is caused when it is not in the vicinity? Therefore it must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning energy of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them revivifies it. In like manner, Similarity also is a different Predicable. For it does not fall within the six forms of existence, as it equally applies to them all, since such similarity as in "As bovine-ness is eternal, so also is horseness," is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence, as it appears in the form of an existence." But our reply is that reconciliation being possible by the mere supposition of the self-activity of fire, etc., existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of the absence, etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper to imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation. It should not be asked again how there can be burning even in the close presence of a powerful jewel, because that supposition has been made only of the absence of jewels in general, which are powerful but remote. In the same way, Similarity also is not a different Predicable, but denotes that, while one thing is quite distinct from another thing, the one possesses the majority or the chief of the attributes belonging to the other; as the Similarity of the moon in the face, means that the face which is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness, and other attributes belonging to the moon. This in brief.

Chandrakānta. (1) *Dharma* presents two aspects, that is, under the characteristic of *Pravṛtti* or wordly activity, and the characteristic of *Nivṛtti* or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these, *Dharma*, characterised by *Nivṛtti*, brings forth *tattva-jñāna* or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes.

(2) Here the separate enumeration of *Sāmānya*, etc., is unnecessary, on account of their non-divergence; for, *Sāmānya*, etc., falling, as they do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their separate mention, however, is justified on the possibility of difference in the mode of treatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing in their methods, are taught for the benefit of embodied souls, differing from one another. This is, then, the *Vaiśeṣika* System, of which the distinctive features are *Sāmānya*, etc., as are, in the other (*Nyāya*),

System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof and the Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand apart by means of *Sāmānya* and the other Predicables; and so it is called the *Vaiśeṣika* System. Otherwise it would be merely an *Upaniṣat* teaching *Adhyātma-vidyā*, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * *

'*Sāmānyam*' means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error arise from (observation of) *Sāmānyam* and from non-observation of *Viśeṣa* (or distinctive) peculiarity. Observing the common properties, altitude and extension, of a pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant of their differentia, one feels the doubt whether it be a pillar or a person; error also arises in this way: observing the common property only and in consequence of fault or imperfection, one mistakes a pillar for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece of silver. False cognition, again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that '*Sāmānyam*' has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is included in Substance, etc. '*Viśeṣa*' is that by which a thing is reduced to itself. False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property: whence arises correct knowledge, which is called *tattva-jñānam*. * * *

For this reason '*Viśeṣa*' is separately mentioned, although it is included in Substance, etc. If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined in particular ways, comes to be used as '*Sāmānyam*' and '*Viśeṣa*,' then it falls within (the class of) Attributes. Or, if these are mere technical names, then they are not additional Predicables. '*Samavāya*' means complete approximation, i. e., indentification: as it has been said, '*Samavāya*' is inseparable existence. * * * '*Samavāya*' is an attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either characterised as plurality or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in Substance, and does not possess Attribute; nor is it a form of Action. Now, birth means a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body, the senses, and the feelings. Thereafter the *Jīva* errs that the Self has no separate existence from the body, etc., in consequence of which a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains, and on the cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of his sufferings being dried up. Hence '*Samavāya*,' though included in Attributes, is separately mentioned.

(3) There are other Predicables also, viz., *pramāṇa*, Proof; *prameya*, Provable; *saṁśaya*, Doubt; *prayojana*, Purpose; *dṛṣṭānta*, Instance; *siddhānta*, Tenet; *avayava*, Member (of a syllogism); *tarka*, Confutation (or Reasoning); *nirṇaya*, Ascertainment; *vāda*, Discussion; *jalpa*, Wrangling; *vitandā*, Cavilling; *hetvābhāsa*, Fallacy; *chhala*, Equivocation; *jāti*, Showing the futility of the mark of inference; and *nigraha-sthāna*, Ground of Defeat or Opponent's Error. These too come under the Predicables of *Kaṇāda*.

(4) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. False knowledge about the Self, etc., is of various kinds, e.g., the sense of Non-Ego in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego.

Enumeration of Substances.

Upaskāra.—Because as the soul it participates in salvation and is the support of all the

Predicables, therefore he now says by way of giving the division and particular reference of the first mentioned Predicable, Substance.

पृथिवी पस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति
द्रव्याणि ॥ १ । १ । ५ ॥

पृथिवी Prithivī, earth. आपः Āpas, waters. तेजः Tejas, fire. वायुः Vāyuh, air. आकाशं Ākāśam, Ether. कालः Kālah, time. दिक् Dik, direction, space. आत्मा Ātmā, Self. मनः Manas, mind. इति Iti, only. द्रव्याणि Dravyāṇi, substances.

5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and Mind (are) the only Substances.—5.

'Iti' has the sense of determination. Thereby the meaning is that Substances are nine only, neither more nor less. If it is doubted that the exclusion of a greater or less number having been secured by the force of the division itself, there was no need for the word 'iti,' then it should be understood that it being possible to take the aphorism in a merely denotative, indicatory or enumerative sense, the word 'Iti' is used to indicate that it has the object of division also, and that the word is used also to indicate that gold, etc., as well as God are included in them, and also that Darkness which may be apprehended to be an additional substance is a non-being. The fact that the words have not been compounded goes to show that they are all equally prominent. And the author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions or differentiae while treating of 'difference.'

It cannot be said that gold is neither Earth as it has no smell, nor Water as it has no wetness and natural fluidity, nor Fire as it has weight and on the last account, nor Air; nor again Time, etc.; therefore it is something over and above the nine. For, in the first two cases, there can be no comparison; in the third case, that which has to be proved is something imaginary (i. e., that gold is not a transformation of Fire). After that there has been analogous argument, although there is no doubt about that which has to be proved, and also the mark of inference is fallacious. He will prove afterwards that gold is a transformation of fire—5.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected, "The writer of the Kandalī and the Sāmkhya teachers have held that Darkness is a Substance. And it is right. For otherwise how can people have the perception of quality and action in it, viz., 'Dark Darkness moves'? Now, being devoid of Smell, Darkness is not Earth; as it possess dark colour it cannot be included in Water, etc. Therefore how is it right to say that the substances are nine only?" We reply, "It is not so, because it is illogical to imagine another Substance, when it can be produced by the absence of necessary Light. The perception of dark colour is, like the perception of the vault of heaven, erroneous. The perception of movement is also an error, occasioned by the departure of light, as the perception of movement by the passengers of a boat in respect of the trees, etc., standing on the bank of the river, is occasioned by the movement of the boat, etc. The supposition that Darkness is a substance will entail

the supposition of the antecedent non-existence and annihilation of an infinite number of its parts. In the opinion of the writer of the Kandalī Darkness is included in Earth. So that according to him there is no impropriety in the exclusion of a greater number.

Among these nine divisions of Substance, Ether, Time, and Space do not form any class, since they have only a single individual existence, but the rest form classes.

Chandrakānta. The separate mention of Time and Space is intended to indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according to the difference of the effects. *Ākāśa*, though it is one, still admits of a variety of names and uses, according to the difference of effect. It is not that Time and Space are essentially different objects from *Ākāśa*, Ether.

Enumeration of Attributes.

Upaskāra.—He gives the enumeration and division of Attributes immediately after substance, because Attributes as such reside in all substances which become their substrate, are manifested by substances, and themselves also manifest substances.

**रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोग-
विभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्ध्यः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च
गुणाः ॥ १ । १ । ६ ॥**

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. **संख्याः** Saṃkhyāḥ, Numbers. **परिमाणानि** Parimāṇāni, Measures, Extensions. **पृथक्त्वं** Prithaktvam, Separateness. **संयोगविभागौ** Saṃyoga-vibhāgau, Conjunction and Disjunction. **परत्वापरत्वे** Paratvāparatve, Priority and Posteriority. **बुद्ध्यः** Buddhayaḥ, Understandings. **सुखदुःखे** Sukha-duḥkhe, Pleasure and pain. **इच्छाद्वेषौ** Ichchhā-dveṣau, Desire and Aversion. **प्रयत्नाः** Pratyatnāḥ, Volitions. **च** Cha, And. **गुणाः** Guṇāḥ, Attributes.

6. Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.—6.

The word 'cha' gathers up Weight, Fluidity, Liquidity, Impression, Virtue, Vice and Sound; they are well-known Attributes, it is hence that they have not been verbally stated. Their attributeness, he will, in their proper places, explain with respect to their nature and mark. The words Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are compounded into a *Samāsa* in order to show that they do not co-exist with contemporaneous Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. But Numbers and Measures are not so compounded and are stated in the plural number, to show that they co-exist with contemporaneous Numbers and Measures. Although that which co-exists with unity is not another unity or that which co-exists with largeness, or length not another largeness or length, still there is in fact co-existence of duality, etc., amongst themselves and also of largeness, length, etc., with largeness, length, etc., of a different kind. Although separateness is co-existent with the separateness of Two, etc., and therefore should be specified in the plural, like numbers, still its

specification in the singular goes to indicate its difference from Numbers, namely, to be known or shown by its limits. Conjunction and Disjunction are stated in the dual number to show that both of them are the effects of one and the same act. Priority and Posteriority are stated in the dual number to show that they are to be known in relation to each other and that they are equally marks of Space and Time. The plural number in 'understandings' indicates the refutation of the theory of one and only one understanding held by the Sāmkhya thinkers, on the ground of its division into knowledge, etc. The dual number in Pleasure and Pain is intended to point out that both of them are causes of one effect which is distinguished as experience (*bhoga*) and that they are equally instrumental to the inference of *adristam*, and also that even Pleasure resolves into Pain. The dual number in Desire and Aversion indicates that both of them are causes of Activity. The plural in Volitions is meant to show that ten kinds of volitions which comprise both permitted and prohibited acts, are causes of Virtue and that ten other kinds are causes of Vice.

Or, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch have been shown in a *samāsa* form to teach that they are the means of the disposition of the elemental senses or sense-organs or to establish the operation or changes due to heat. Number is mentioned in the plural number to indicate a refutation of this that there is a contrariety in numbers, such as duality, plurality, etc. Separateness is separately mentioned to indicate that it is also plural on account of the plurality of Numbers, and also that its difference from Numbers lies in its being revealed by the knowledge of limits. In Measures or Extensions the plural number is meant to remove the contradiction of length, shortness, etc. The dual number in Conjunction and Disjunction points out their mutual opposition. Priority and Posteriority are mentioned also in the dual number lest it might be doubted that the division of Attributes is too narrow, because Priority and Posteriority may be four-fold by the possibility of their being different in kind by their difference as relating to Space and as relating to Time.

He will give their definition as he proceeds.—6.

Enumeration of Actions.

Upaskāra.—Actions become the object of the sense by reason of their production by Substances and Attributes as well as of their Combination with Substances having colour. Therefore, immediately after the statement of Substances and Attributes, he states the enumeration and division of Actions.

उत्क्षेपणमवक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनमिति
कर्म्मणि ॥ १ । १ । ७ ॥

उत्क्षेपणम् Utkṣepaṇam, throwing upwards. अवक्षेपणम् Avakṣepaṇam, throwing downwards. आकुञ्चनम् Ākuñcanaṁ, contraction. प्रसारणम् Prasāraṇam, expansion. गमनम् Gamaṇam, going, motion. इति Iti, namely. कर्म्मणि Karmmaṇi, action.

7. Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction Expansion, and Motion are Actions.—7.

Throwing upwards, Throwing, downwards, Contraction, Expansion, and Motion are Actions. 'Iti' has the force of determination, as Rotation etc., are included in Motion. Here then there are five 'classes' directly pervaded by Action-ness, namely, the quality of throwing upwards, the quality of throwing downwards, the quality of contraction, the quality of expansion, and the quality of motion (or throwing-upward-ness, throwing-downward-ness, contraction-ness, expansion-ness, and motion-ness).

Well, but this is disproved by the fact that Motion is a synonym of Action, because the consciousness of Going is experienced in all cases. The four classes, throwing-upward-ness, etc., which have the co-extension or common field of the absolute non-existence of each in the others, are not known to be co-existent; therefore the classes pervaded by Action-ness are only four. (To this objection we reply): It is true that Motion is another name for Action. But it is separately mentioned with the object of collecting under one word Rotation, Evacuation, Percolation, Flaming upward, Bending, Uplifting, etc.; which produce different states of consciousness and are known by different names. Or Going-ness also is really a fifth class pervaded by Action-ness. So that the application of Motion to Rotation, Evacuation, etc., alone is primary and if there is the application of Going to throwing upwards, throwing downwards, etc., then it is secondary or analogous. The common property of the primary and analogous instances is only this that they are the non-combinative causes (*i. e.*, conditions) of Conjunction with and Disjunction from constantly changing places and directions, and this belongs to Rotation and others, so that by the inclusion of Going these too have been included.

The states of egress, ingress, etc. however, are not classes; for, in respect of one and the same Action, *e. g.*, a person going from one room to another, one observer will have the consciousness, 'he enters'; while another, 'he comes out'; and thus there will result an intermixture of classes. So also in the case of Rotation, etc., on entering one water-course after coming out by another, there will arise two states of consciousness, 'he comes out' and 'he enters'; therefore these should be resolved into relativity in general.

In the case of throwing upwards, etc., however, the action of throwing upwards is caused in the hand by the volition produced by the desire 'I throw up the pestle,' through the non-combinative cause of conjunction with the soul exercising volition; then from the non-combinative cause of motion in the hand thrown up, there appears the action of throwing upwards in the pestle also; or, these two actions take place simultaneously. Then through the conjunction of the soul exercising volition produced by the desire to throw down the hand and pestle which have been thrown up, and also through the motion of the hand there is produced in the hand and the pestle simultaneously the action of throwing downwards favourable to the fall of the pestle within the mortar. Then towards the sudden going upwards of the pestle after conjunction with a harder substance, neither desire nor volition is the cause, but the springing up of the pestle is due only to Re-action; and this is only going and not throwing upwards; the application of throwing upwards to it is only secondary. Similarly is the application

of the name of Throwing upwards to two bodies of Air as well as to grass, cotton, etc., carried by them, going upwards by the force of the collision of two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions. So also in the case of the going up of water under the collision of two currents. Thus the use of throwing upwards and throwing downwards is primary, only in the case of the body, its limbs and pestles, clubs, etc. in contact with them ; for there are such perceptions as he throws up the pestle, he throws up the club ; as also, he throws down.

Contraction is action which produces flexion in cloth and other things made up of parts and non-initial conjunctions of parts among themselves even while there exist the initial conjunctions of those parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the lotus contracts, the cloth contracts, the leather contracts. Similarly, Expansion is action destructive of the non-initial conjunctions already produced, of parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the cloth expands, the leather expands, the lotus expands. Actions which are different from these four are forms of Going. Therein Rotation is action, favorable to oblique conjunctions, appearing in the hand, from conjunction with soul exercising volition, and in the wheel, etc., from revolving and from conjunction called *nodana* (molecular motion) with the hand possessing Action. Evacuation, etc., should be similarly explained. He will also make them clear as he proceeds.

Now it should be understood that in the case of prescribed sacrifices, baths, gifts, etc., these Actions are the products of conjunction with the soul exercising volition favourable towards the production of Virtue ; and in the case of going to a forbidden place, slaughter, eating tobacco, etc., they are the products of conjunction with the soul exercising volition tending towards the production of Vice.—7

• *Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action.*

Upaskāra.—After the enumeration of Substance, etc., he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three. He states the Resemblance of the three even before the enumeration of the other three Predicables, Genus, etc., inasmuch as it is expected first of all by the disciples, because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favourable to the knowledge of reality.

सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत् कार्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति
द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषः ॥ १ । १ । ८ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. अनित्यं Anityam, non-eternal. द्रव्यवत् Dravyavat, containing substance. कार्यं Kāryam, effect. कारणम् Kāraṇam, cause. सामान्यविशेषवत् Sāmānya-viśeṣavat, being both Genus and Species. इति Iti, this. द्रव्यगुणकर्मणाम् Dravya-guṇa-karmmaṇām, of Substance, Attribute, and Action. अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ, resemblance.

8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have Substance as their combinative cause, are effect as well as cause, and are both Genus and Species.—8.

In the presence of the word 'viśeṣa' the word 'aviśeṣa' denotes Resemblance. 'Sat' connotes the quality of being the object of the per-

ception and name in the form of that which is existent, because all the three have fitness for existence. 'Antyam' connotes the quality of that which tends towards annihilation. Although it is not common to the ultimate atoms, etc., still it is intended to denote the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function or nature of that which tends towards annihilation. 'Dravyavat' means that which contains substance as its combinative cause. This too is not present in the ultimate atoms, etc. Therefore the intension is to denote the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which contains substance as its combinative cause. 'Kāryyam' is intended to denote the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-existence (or potential existence). 'Kāranam' indicates the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which belongs to the class of constant (Mill's invariable and unconditional) antecedents of all effects except knowledge. Thus the definition is not too wide so as to include the Soul which is the object of Self-intuition, as a cause of Self-intuition, or to extend to the generic quality of being a cow, etc; nor is it too narrow so as to exclude the ultimate atoms (*lit.*, perfect spheres) which are not causes. 'Sāmānyaviśeṣavat,' means the possession of those characteristics which though they are genera, still are species inasmuch as they serve to differentiate themselves severally, *e.g.*, Substance-ness, Attributeness, Actionness, etc. It cannot be said that causality is too wide, because from "Give a cow," "A cow should not be touched with the feet" and other texts of the Veda it appears that class or kind (जाति) also is a cause of virtue and vice; for a class has the sole use of limitation.

This aphorism is illustrative. It should be observed that the Resemblance of the three lies also in their being capable of being denoted by words having the meaning inherent in them.

If it is said that the characteristics of being effects and non-eternality belong to those only which have causes, and that this is their Resemblance as laid down by Professor Praśastadeva in "And causality (appears) elsewhere than in the perfect spheres (ultimate atoms)," then according to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables.

The characteristics of being the causes of Attributes and also the effects of Attributes belong to the three except the eternal Substances.—8.

Resemblance of Substance and Attribute.

Upaskāra.—He now points out the Resemblance of Substance and Attribute only.

द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यम् ॥ १ । १ । ६ ॥

द्रव्यगुणयोः Dravya-guṇayoh, of Substance and Attribute. **सजातीयारम्भक** Sajātiyārambhakatvaṁ, the characteristic of being the originator of congeners. **साधर्म्यं** Sādharmmyam, Resemblance.

9. The Resemblance of Substance and Attribute is the characteristic of being the originators of their congeners.—9.

He makes clear this very aphorism in the following one.—9.

Explanation of the foregoing aphorism.

द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरः ॥११११०॥

द्रव्याणि Dravyāṇi, Substances. **द्रव्यान्तरं** Dravyāntaram, another Substance. **आरभन्ते** Arabhante, originate. **गुणाः** Guṇāḥ, Attributes. **च** Cha, and. **गुणान्तरम्** Guṇāntaram, another Attribute.

10. Substances originate another Substance, and Attributes another Attribute,—10.

Upaskāra.—The Resemblance in respect of the characteristic of being the originators of congeners should be understood or observed with the exclusion of universal Substances composed of final parts, the Attributes of what are composed of final parts, and also the Attributes of Duality, the Separateness of Duals, Priority, Posteriority, etc. Or the author means to indicate the possession of the *upādhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which originates its congener, whereby Substances and individuals which are not causes, are also included.—10.

Actions do not originate Actions.

Upaskāra.—But it may be asked : Why do not Actions originate other Actions ? So he says :

कर्म कर्मसाध्यं न विद्यते ॥ १ । १ । ११ ॥

कर्म Karma, action. **कर्मसाध्यं** Karnmasādhyaṃ, producible by action. **न** Na, not. **विद्यते** Vidyate, is known.

11. Action, producible by Action, is not known.—11.

Here the root 'vid' has the sense of knowledge, and not existence. The meaning is that there is no proof of the existence of Action which is producible by Action, as in the case of Substance and Attribute originated by their congeners.

Here the idea is this: If Action is to produce Action, then it will, like Sound, produce it immediately after its own production. Therefore Disjunction from substances in Conjunction having been completely caused by the first Action itself, from what will the second Action cause Disjunction ? For Disjunction must be preceded by Conjunction, and a new Conjunction has not also been produced in the subject in question. But the definition of Action suffers if there is non-production of Disjunction. It cannot be said that a new Action will be produced at another moment ; because a patency cannot be delayed and because there is nothing to be waited for. In the case of the production (of Conjunction) at the very moment of the destruction of the previous Conjunction, the production of Disjunction (by Action) will be surely not proved. The same also will be the result in the case of its production of the subsequent Conjunction. And after the subsequent Conjunction there is really destruction of Action. Therefore it has been well said that Action producible by Action is not known.—11.

Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action.

Upaskāra.—He mentions the Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action :

न द्रव्यं कार्यं कार ॥ञ्च बधति ॥ १ । १ । १२ ॥

न Na, not. द्रव्यं Dravyam, substance. कार्यं Kâryyam, effect. कारणं Kâraṇam, cause. च Cha, and. बधति Badhati, opposes ; annihilates.

12. Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by cause.—12.

Substance is not destroyed either by its own effect or by its own cause. The meaning is that the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed does not exist between two Substances which have entered into the relation of effect and cause, because, (and this is the purport), Substance is destroyed only by the destruction of the support or substratum and the destruction of the originative Conjunction.

The form 'badhati' (instead of the correct form 'hanti') is found in aphorisms.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He says that Attributes are capable of being destroyed by effect and cause.

उभयथा गुणाः ॥ १ । १ । १३ ॥

उभयथा Ubhayathâ, in both ways. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes.

13. Attributes (are destroyed) in both ways.—13

The meaning is (that they are) capable of being destroyed by effect as well as by cause. The initial Sound, etc., (in a series) are destroyed by their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last but one destroys the last.—13.

Bhâṣya :—An attribute sometimes destroys its cause (*e. g.*, in chemical compounds), and sometimes does not destroy it (*e. g.* in physical compounds or masses).

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—After stating that Attributes are opposed by (and so cannot co-exist with) both their effects and causes, he mentions the opposition of effect to Action.

कार्यविरोधि कर्म ॥ १ । १ । १४ ॥

कार्यविरोधि Kâryya-virodhi, whereof the effect is the opposite or contradictory. कर्म Karmma, action.

14. Action is opposed by its effect.—14.

'Kâryyavirodhi' is *Bahuvrîhi* or adjective compound meaning that of which the opposite is effect, because Action is destructible by subsequent Conjunction produced by itself.

The non-opposition of effects and causes is uniform in the case of Substances only. But it is not the rule in the case of Attribute and Action. For what the author desires to say is that those Attributes destroy, which are the opposites of the destruction due to the destruction of the non-combinative cause of the destruction of the substratum.—14.

Characteristics of Substance.

Upaskāra.—After describing the Resemblance of the three according to the wish of the disciples, he now goes on to state their marks.

क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकार मिति द्रव्यलक्षणः ॥११११५॥

क्रियागुणवत् Kriyā-guṇa-vat, possessing Action and Attribute. **समवायिकार** Samavāyi-kāraṇam, combinative cause. **इति** Iti, such. **द्रव्यलक्षणं** Dravyalakṣaṇam, mark of substance.

15. It possesses Action and Attribute, it is a combinative cause—such (is) the mark of Substance.—15.

‘Kriyāguṇavat’ means wherein Actions and Attributes exist. The word ‘lakṣaṇa,’ by the force of its derivation, viz. ‘By this it is marked out,’ denotes a mark as well as a particular differentiating mark or sign which divides off objects of like and unlike kinds. Therein by Action it is marked out that this is a substance. And by the possession of Attributes, Substance, excluded from objects of like and unlike kinds, is marked out. Of these the like kinds, i. e., objects which resemble one another in being existent, are five, viz., Attributes, etc. The unlike kind however is Non-Existence. Therefore Substance is different from Attribute, etc., because it possess Attribute. That which is not different from Attribute, etc., does not possess Attribute, e. g., Attribute, etc. Although the possession of Attribute is not found in a substance made up of parts at the moment of its origin, still the possession of the opposite of the absolute non-existence of Attribute is meant to be stated, because the antecedent and the subsequent non-existence of Attribute are also opposites of the absolute non-existence of Attribute. Similarly, the being the combinative cause also, which divides the six Predicables, is a mark of the Predicable, Substance.

Here the *Sādhyā*, i. e., that which has to be proved, does not suffer from the fault of being unknown, for difference from Attribute, etc., is proved by perception in the water-pot, etc. Nor is here the fault of proving that which has been already proved, for although the difference of the water-pot as such from others has been proved, yet such difference remains to be proved in respect of it considered as a Substance. Some say that in the case of the difference of that which defines the *pakṣa* (i. e., the object in which the existence of the *Sādhyā* is sought to be proved, e. g., the mountain when the existence of fire is sought to be proved in it), there can be no proving of that which has already been proved, as, for instance, in “Word and Mind are eternal.” But this is not so, for that which has to be proved being proved in anything whatever determined by that which determines the characteristic of being a *pakṣa*, the *pakṣa* suffers in its essential, and hence that which has to be proved in such cases, must be proved as such, i. e., independently.

The word ‘it,’ means ‘others,’ Therefore the possession of Number, the possession of Measure, the possession of Separateness, the possession of Conjunction, and the possession of Disjunction also are brought together.—15.

Bhāṣya :—Although the soul is void of action, i. e. change, still it appears to possess action by the action of the mind or internal organ

of sense, in the state of its phenomenal existence ; and hence it is called a Substance.

Characteristics of Attribute.

Upaskāra.—Attributes having been enumerated after Substances, no gives their mark.

द्रव्याश्रय्यगुणवान् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति

गुणलक्षणम् ॥ १ । १ । १६ ॥

द्रव्याश्रयी Dravyāśrayī, inhering in substance. **अगुणवान्** Agunavān, not possessing Attribute. **संयोगविभागेषु** Samyoga-vibhāgeṣu, in Conjunctions and Disjunctions. **अकारणम्** Akāraṇam, not a cause. **अनपेक्षः** Anapekṣaḥ, independent. **इति** Iti, such. **गुण-लक्षणम्** Guṇa-lakṣaṇam, mark of Attribute.

16. Inhering in Substance, not possessing Attribute, not an independent cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions,—such is the mark of Attribute.—16.

‘Dravyāśrayī’ means that of which the nature is to reside in Substance. This however pervades Substance also. Therefore he says ‘Agunavān’ or Attributeless. Still it over-extends to Action; so he adds ‘not a cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions.’ Yet it does not include Conjunction, Disjunction, Merit, Demerit, knowledge of God, etc.; so he adds ‘independent.’ After ‘independent,’ ‘Attribute’ should be supplied. The meaning therefore is that Attribute is that which is not an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions and Disjunctions, etc., are depended upon by Conjunction and Disjunction. Attribute-ness is the characteristic of possessing the genus pervaded by existence and residing in the eternal with eternal functions. The revealer of Attribute-ness is the causality present in something possessing genus and devoid of combinative causality and non-combinative causality towards Conjunction and Disjunction combined. Conjunction and Disjunction are severally caused by Conjunction and Disjunction, but not jointly. Merit, Demerit, knowledge of God, etc., have been included, because they are only occasional or conditional causes of both and are not their combinative causes or non-combinative causes. Or the revealer of Attribute-ness is the characteristic, co-extensive with genus, of being devoid of combinative and non-combinative causality towards Conjunction and Disjunction. Or the mark of Attribute is simply the characteristic of not possessing Attribute along with the possession of Genus and of difference from Action.—16.

Characteristics of Action.

Upaskāra.—He states the mark of Action which has been mentioned after Attribute.

एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्म-

लक्षणम् ॥ १ । १ । १७ ॥

एकद्रव्यं Ekadravyam, resting or residing in one substance only. **अगुणं** Agunam, devoid of Attribute. **संयोगविभागेषु** Samyoga-vibhāgeṣu, in Conjunctions and Disjunctions.

tions and Disjunctions. अनपेक्षकारणं Anapekṣa-kāraṇam, independent cause. इति Iti, such. कर्मलक्षणं Karmma-lakṣaṇam, Mark of Action.

17. Residing in one Substance only, not possessing Attribute, an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions—such is the mark of Action.—17.

‘Ekadravyam’ means that of which only one Substance is the substratum. ‘Aguṇam’ is that in which no Attribute exists. ‘Samyoga etc.’ means independent of something in the form of positive existence which comes to appear after its own production; so that it is not unestablished where there is necessity for or dependence upon the combinative cause and also where there is dependence upon absence of antecedent conjunction. Or independence of that which has its production after the production of Action itself, is meant, because the annihilation of the antecedent conjunction also has its production after the production of Action itself, and because as a non-existence it does not bear relation to its first moment.

Action-ness is the possession of the genus directly pervaded by existence other than that residing in the eternal, or the possession of the genus determinative of the uncommon or specific causality which produces the perception that something moves, or the possession of the genus residing only in what is devoid of Attribute and not being an Attribute, or the possession of the genus determinative of the causality towards Disjunction present at the moment immediately subsequent to the production of Action itself.

And this again is a Predicable evidenced by the perception that something moves, which cannot be demonstrated by its production, etc., at places having no interval between each other, because the breaking up of a moment will be refuted later on.

The manner in which the mark serves to distinguish it from others is the same as has been already described.—17.

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action.

Upaskāra.—Now he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three only by way of their cause :

द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां द्रव्यं कारणां सामान्यम् ॥ १ । १ । १८ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्मणां Dravya-guṇa-karmmaṇām, Of Substance, Attribute, and Action. द्रव्यं Dravyam, Substance. कारणं Kāraṇam, cause. सामान्यं Sāmānyam, Common, Uniform.

18. Substance is the one and the same cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action.—18.

‘Sāmānyam’ (common) means the same one, as in ‘These two have a common mother.’ The meaning is that Substance, Attribute and Action exist in one and the same Substance which is their combinative cause.

The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus having the function of that which has Substance as its combinative cause.—18.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He states the Resemblance of the three as having Attribute as their non-combinative cause :

तथा गुणः ॥ १ । १ । १६ ॥

तथा Tathā, Similarly. गुणः Guṇah, Attribute.

19. Similarly Attribute (is the common cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action).—19

The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus residing in that which has Attribute as its non-combinative cause. Conjunction is the non-combinative cause of substance. The possession, as their non-combinative cause, of Attributes which are the causes of their congeners, belongs to the Attributes of effects, *e.g.*, Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Extension or Magnitude, Separateness, etc. The Attributes of the ultimate atoms of Earth have Conjunction with Fire as their non-combinative cause. The non-combinative cause of Actions, however, are Fire etc., internal vibration, impact, weight, fluidity, impression, conjunction with soul possessing invisible consequences of Actions (*adriṣṭam*), conjunction with Soul exercising Volition, etc. These should be respectively understood by the reader. Sometimes even one Attribute gives rise to all the three Substance, Attribute and Action ; for instance, Conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed of Impetus, produces Action in another ball of cotton, originates a Substance, *viz.*, an aggregate of two balls of cotton, and the Extension of that aggregate also. Sometimes a single Attribute originates a Substance and an Attribute ; *e. g.*, Conjunction which may be described as an aggregation independent of Impetus, with a ball of cotton as well as its Extension.—19.

Bhāṣya : reads I. i. 19, as *Ubhayathā guṇah* and, interprets it to mean that Attributes sometimes become the cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action, and sometimes do not.

Effects of Action.

Upaskāra.—He says that sometimes a single Action is productive of a multitude of effects :

संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म समानम् ॥ १ । १ । २० ॥

संयोगविभागवेगानां Saṁyoga-vibāga-vegānām, Of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus. कर्म Karmma, Action. समानं Samānam, Common.

20. Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus.—20.

The word 'kāraṇam' should be supplied. Producing as many Disjunctions as the number of Substances in conjunction with the Subs-

stance in which Action is produced, it (Action) also produces an equal number of Conjunctions elsewhere. And the same Action again produces Impetus in its own substratum.

The word Impetus indicates Elasticity also.—20.

Difference between Substance and Action.

Upaskāra.—But it may be argued that originative Conjunction having been brought about by substance possessed of Action; the substance which is originated thereby, is surely produced by Action since Action has been its antecedent as a rule. Hence he says :

न द्रव्याणां कर्म ॥ १ । १ । २१ ॥

न Na, not. द्रव्याणां Dravyāṇām, Of Substances. कर्म Karma, Action.

21. Action is not the cause of Substances.—21.

The meaning is that Action is not the cause of substances.—21.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He points out why it is so :

व्यतिरेकात् ॥ १ । १ । २२ ॥

व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekāṭ, because of cessation.

22. (Action is not the cause of Substance) because of its cessation.—22.

‘Vyatirekāṭ’ means on account of cessation. Substance is produced, on the cessation of Action by the ultimate Conjunction; therefore Action is not the cause of Substance. Neither is Action which has ceased to exist, a cause of Substance. Moreover if Action be such a cause, it must be either the non-combinative cause of Substance or its conditional cause. It cannot be the first, because then it will follow that Substance will be destroyed, even on the destruction of the Action of the parts, inasmuch as Substance is capable of being destroyed by the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Nor can it be the second, for in that case there will be a violation of the rule, since small pieces of cloth being produced just from the Conjunctions still existing after the destruction of a large piece of cloth, it is seen that even parts which are devoid of Action, originate Substance.—22.

Bhāṣya reads I, i. 21 and 22 as one aphorism, and interprets it thus : Action does not become the immediate cause of substances. Why? In consequence of its cessation. For, when a Substance becomes what it is, at that moment cessation of Action takes place. Action in the constituent parts of a Substance ceases on conjunction, and the Substance becomes what it is. Action, therefore, is not an immediate cause in the production of Substances. What the author means to say is, as the expression shows, that the mediate causality of Action in the production of Substance is not refuted.

Difference between Substance and Action.

Upaskāra.—Having stated that one may be the originator of many, he now states that of one effect there may be many originators :

द्रव्याणां द्रव्यं कार्यं सामान्यम् ॥ १ । १ । २३ ॥

द्रव्याणां, Dravyāṇām, of many substances. द्रव्यं, Dravyam, a single substance. कार्यं, kāryam, effect. सामान्यं, Sāmānyam, common.

23. A single Substance may be the common effect of more than one Substance.—23.

Of Substances, *i.e.*, of two Substances as well as of more than two Substances. Thus by two threads a piece of cloth consisting of two threads is originated, so also by many threads one piece of cloth is originated. It cannot be said that a piece of cloth consisting of one thread is seen where the warp and woof are supplied by one and the same thread, for owing to the non-existence of the Conjunction of a single object there is no non-combinative cause here. Nor again can it be said that the Conjunction of the thread and the fibres is the non-combinative cause, because the relation of such parts and whole being naturally established there can be no Conjunction between them, also because the relation of that which is to be originated and the originated is not perceived, and also because of the impenetrability of condensed bodies. It cannot be said that this is commonly observed. For here, as a matter of fact, cloth is produced by the mutual conjunction of many small pieces of thread, produced on the destruction of a long thread by the impact of the loom, etc., whereas from the nature of things there arises the false notion of unity in respect of threads which are really many in number.—23.

Above continued

Upaskāra.—Well, it may be asked, as a single Substance is the effect of many Substances, as also a single Attribute of many Attributes, so is a single Action the effect of many Actions? Hence he says :

गुणवैधर्म्यात् कर्मणां कर्म ॥ १ । १ । २४ ॥

गुणवैधर्म्यात्, Guṇa-vaidharmmyāt, on account of the difference of Attributes. न Na, Not. कर्मणां, Karmanāṁ, of Actions. कर्म Karmma, Action.

24. Action is not the joint effect of many Actions, on account of the difference of their Attributes.—24.

‘Kāryam’ is the complement. It has been already stated that the resemblance of Substance and Attribute is that they originate their congeners. Also it has been already denied that Actions are productive of Action, in the aphorism “Action producible by Action is not known” (I. i. 11). This is here repeated. This is the idea.—24.

Difference between Attribute and Action.

Upaskāra.—Now, pointing out that Attributes which reside in aggregation are originated by many Substances, he says :

द्वित्वप्रभृतयः संख्याः पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाश्च ॥ १ । १ । २५ ॥

द्वित्वप्रभृतयः, Dvitya-prabhṛitayaḥ, Duality, etc. संख्याः Saṅkhyāḥ,

Numbers. **पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागः** Prithaktva-samyoga-vibhāgaḥ, Separateness, Conjunction, and Disjunction. **च** Cha, And.

25. Duality and other Numbers, Separateness, Conjunction, and Disjunction (are originated by more than one Substance).—25.

“Originated by more than one substance”—This is the complement. The word Separateness appearing together with Duality, etc., also denotes Separateness of two, etc. Thus Numbers beginning with Duality and ending with the highest arithmetical figure, Separateness of two, etc., Conjunctions, and Disjunctions are originated by two as well as by more than two Substances. So that the characteristic of residing in more Substances than one belongs to them. And this characteristic again is the same as co-extension with the mutual non-existence of combinative causes.—25.

Above continued.

Uṣakāra.—Well, it may be asked, as Substances which are made up of parts, as well as Attributes already mentioned, have the characteristic of aggregation, so does not that characteristic belong to Actions also? So he says :

असमवायात् सामान्यकार्यं कर्म न विद्यते । १ । १ । २६॥

असमवायात्, Asamarāyāt, on account of non-combination. **सामान्यकार्यं**, Sāmānya-kāryyam, common effect. **कर्म**, Karma, action. **न**, Na, not. **विद्यते** Vidyate, is known.

26. Action which is the joint result (of an aggregate of two or more substances,) is not known, as it is not found in combination with them.—26.

‘On account of non-combination’ should be joined with ‘in two substances,’ and ‘in more than two substances.’ Thus a single Action does not combine in two substances; nor does a single Action combine in more than two substances; so that Action which is the effect of an aggregate, is not known. Here too the root ‘vid’ in ‘vidyate’ has the sense of knowledge and does not denote existence. If Action resided in aggregation, then one substance moving, there would arise the consciousness ‘It moves,’ in respect of two substances and more than two substances; but it is not so; therefore Action does not reside in aggregation. This is the meaning.

It cannot be argued, “The Action of the body and its parts are certainly originated by many substances, namely, the body and its parts; otherwise, the body moving, how can there be the consciousness, ‘It moves,’ in respect of the hands, feet, etc.? Similarly in the case of other objects made up of parts.” For such consciousness is due to the fact that the quantity of the Action of the parts is pervaded by the quantity of the Action of the whole made up of these parts. The contrary is not the case, because the part moving there does not arise the consciousness, ‘It moves,’ in respect of the entire whole made up of the parts. Otherwise from the conjunction of cause and not-cause, the conjunction of effect and not-effect also will not follow, since there can be conjunction of an effect also, only with the Action of the cause.—26

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute and Action.

Upaskāra.—He again mentions a single effect of many (causes) :

संयोगानां द्रव्यम् ॥ १ । १ । २७ ॥

संयोगानां, Saṁyogānām, of Conjunctions. द्रव्यम्, Dravyam, substance.

27. Substance is the joint effect of many Conjunctions.—27.

The meaning is that substance is the single effect of many Conjunctions. It should be observed that here 'Conjunctions' should be taken to the exclusion of the conjunctions of touch-less substances, substances made up of final parts or ultimate formations, and heterogeneous substances.—27.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Now he says that many Attributes produce one Attribute as their effect .

रूपाणां रूपम् ॥ १ । १ । २८ ॥

रूपाणां, Rûpāṇām, Of colours. रूपं, Rûpam, colour.

28. Colour (is the joint effect) of many colours.—28.

'Colour is the single effect'—this is the connection. The word 'colour' in both the instances are indicative, and its indicative power is such that it does not abandon its own meaning. And the common property of the intrinsic and the indicative significance is dependence upon the relation of the product and producer by means of the proximity known as combination with an object which is one and the same as the cause. Hence Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Liquidity, Natural Fluidity, Unity, and Separateness of one are brought together. For these, being present in the cause, originate in the effects only one Attribute of the same kind. In fact the operation of non-combinative causes is two-fold. Some produce their effects by proximity to the object which is one and the same as the cause. Here the cause is the combinative cause and it is the cause of the effect, namely colour, etc., which have to be produced. Thus Colour which is present in the potsherd originates the Colour of the pot by means of the combination, known as combination with the object which is one and the same as the cause, with the combinative cause, namely pot, etc., of the effect such as Colour, etc. Similarly Taste, etc. In some places, however, there is an operation of non-combinative causality by means of proximity to the object which is one and the same as the effect. For instance, Sound, although it is a cause, originates in the sky another Sound, although it is an effect. In the sky itself Colour, etc., also are produced by Conjunction of Fire with the ultimate atoms of Earth by means of the proximity in the form of combination with the object which is one and the same as the effect.—28.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He says that a single Action may be the effect of many causes :

गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंज्ञापानाम् चपलम् ॥ १ । १ । २९ ॥

गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंयोगात् Gurutva-prayatna-samyogānām, of Gravity, Volition, and Conjunction, उत्क्षेपणम् Utkṣepaṇam, Throwing upwards.

29. Throwing upwards (is the joint product) of Gravity, Volition, and Conjunction.—29.

The meaning is that Throwing upwards is their single effect. Here Weight residing in the hand, stone, etc., is the conditional cause and Conjunction of the Soul exercising Volition is the non-combinative cause, of the Throwing upwards seated in the hand, whereas the non-combinative cause of the Throwing upwards seated in the stone is the internal movement or vibration of the hand.

Here also the term Throwing upwards is indicatory of Throwing downwards, etc.—29.

Causality of Action upheld.

Upaskāra.—But it has been said that Attributes which have taken a shape, (i. e., by appearing in some Substance) are, as effects, preceded (and so caused) by the Attributes of the causes ; it has also been said that they are preceded by the Attributes of that in which they reside ; therefore it follows that Action produces no effect whatever. That being so, even the inference of ultrasensual phenomena such as the movements of the Sun, etc., becomes impossible in the absence of any mark of inference. For this reason, merely reminding the reader of what has already been said in the aphorism “ Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus,” he says :

संयोगविभागाश्च कर्मणाम् ॥ १ । १ । ३० ॥

संयोगविभागाः Samyoga-vibhāgāḥ, Conjunctions and Disjunctions. च Cha, and. कर्मणाम् Karmmaṇām, of Actions.

30. Conjunctions and Disjunctions also (are individually the products) of Actions.—30.

‘ Products ’ is the complement. The plural number is for the purpose of individual reference. ‘ Impreression ’ also should be taken as indicated.—

Vivṛiti.—The word ‘ cha ’ implies Impetus and Elasticity in addition (to Conjunctions and Disjunctions).

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But it has been already said that Substance and Action are not the effects of Action. Conjunction and Disjunction again are the effects of Conjunction and Disjunction alone. So that the affirmation of the Causality of Action here seems to be self-contradictory. So he says :

कारणसामान्ये द्रव्यकर्मणोऽङ्गकारणत्वं कम् ॥ १ । १ । ३१ ॥

कारणसामान्ये Kāraṇa-sāmānye, under the topic of causes in general. द्रव्यकर्मणाम् Dravya-karmmaṇām, of Substances and Action. कर्म Karmma, Action. अकारणम् Akāraṇam, not cause. उक्तम् Uktam, said.

31. Under the topic of causes in general, Action has been stated to be not a cause of Substances and Actions.—31.

The word ' Kâraṇasāmānya ' denotes the topic of causes in general. Thus in the topic of the statement of causes in general, Action has been said to be not a cause of Substance and Action, and not that it is altogether a not-cause only, whereby the aphorism " Conjunctions and Disjunctions also are individually the products of Actions " might be destroyed.—31.

Here ends the first chapter lesson of the First Book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara on the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms.



BOOK FIRST, CHAPTER SECOND.

Causation.

Upaskāra.—Well, in the previous section the Resemblance of the three Predicables has been stated as constituted by the identity or sameness of their effects and causes. But this is not established as the relation of effect and cause itself has not been proved. Therefore the author says :

कारणभावात् कार्यभावाः ॥ १ । २ । १ ॥

कारणभावात् Kāraṇābhāvāt, from the non-existence of cause **कार्यभावाः** Kāryābhāvaḥ, non-existence of effect.

1. Non-existence of effect (follows) from the non-existence of cause.—32.

Whereas it is seen that in spite of earth, wheel, water, potter, thread, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the pot, if there is non-existence of the potter's staff, and that in spite of earth, water, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the shoot if there is non-existence of the seed ; it (*i. e.*, non-existence) cannot be explained without the relation of effect and cause between the potter's staff and the pot or between the seed and the shoot. Otherwise there will be non-existence of the pot even on the non-existence of the loom, etc., and there will be non-existence of the shoot even on the non-existence of pieces of stone, etc. Moreover it is seen that the pot, a piece of cloth, etc., exist for a time only. That even cannot be explained without the relation of cause and effect. For they being non-existent at one time, their temporariness in the form of existence at another time is not possible but by the dependence of existences upon causes. For if there were no dependence upon causes, then a thing could only be or not be; but could not be for a time only; since an existing thing cannot be non-existent, nor can it come into existence from that which is not its cause, nor can it come into existence from one knows not what, nor can it come into existence from unreal things such as the horn of a hare, etc., but from a really existing limit or beginning like the potter's staff, the loom, etc., as is seen in such effects as a pot, a piece of cloth, etc. Now the limit or beginning is nothing but the cause.

Thus if the relation of effect and cause did not exist, there would be no inclination or disinclination to activity. Then the world would become desireless, inert. For there can be no activity without the knowledge that this is the means of attaining that which is desired ; nor can there be forbearance without the knowledge that this is the means of avoiding that which is not desired.—1.

Vivṛiti—The Sāṅkhya thinkers argue as follows : " A water-jar, etc., existing in an enveloped state in earth, etc., from before, develop into visible existence, and again by being struck with a cudgel, etc., are enveloped therein and exist. So that production and destruction are not real, but merely development and envelopment. This being so, why should not a water-jar be produced from yarns ? It cannot be said that the existence of effect in causes prior to their production is without evi-

dence, for the proof is supplied by such texts of Veda as 'Only the existent, O Dear One, was at the beginning,' (Chandogya 6, 2, 1,) etc."

This view should be considered. The admission of the development of development will entail non-finality. If on the other hand, development be previously non-existent, then it will be necessary to admit production from the non-existent, and hence the supposition of the prior existence of the water-pot, etc., will become groundless. Thus causality is the belonging to the class of invariable and unconditional antecedents which cannot be otherwise accounted for, or the quality of that which fails to produce an effect on account of defect in the contributories, or an additional Predicable, being a particular relation arising out of its own nature.

Bhāṣya.—Predicables called Substance, Attribute, and Action have been mentioned. Their *Sāmānya* or common characteristic has been stated. Their *Viśeṣa* or distinctive characteristic, again, follows from its contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for the production of *tattva-jñāna*. The Supreme Good results from *tattva-jñāna*. This is *apavarga*, Salvation. But what is its characteristic form? How does it appear?—All this is now here described.

Non-existence of the effect, *e. g.* the *faults* (namely, desire, aversion, and infatuation), etc., (results) from non-existence of the cause, *e. g.*, false knowledge (*e. g.*, the idea of the Self in the Not-Self), etc. "Thus, Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false knowledge,—on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before the other," (*Nyāya Sūtram*, I. i. 2), the ultimate consequence being Emancipation, the return of the Self into its own nature.

Above continued.

Upaskṛta.—It may be objected that only the existent is produced, and not the non-existent, according to the authority of the Veda, *e. g.*, "Verily the existent was at the beginning, O calm one!" etc. Otherwise in the case of undifferentiated non-existence there will be no such uniformity that a piece of cloth is produced from threads only and not from potsherds. If it is so then, we reply, this uniformity must be accepted by the advocates of the doctrine of transformation (*परिवर्तनादः*) who admit the theory of causes; otherwise how it happens that the manifestation of the pot is only in the potsherds, and not in thread? Moreover if the manifestation or development also really existed from before, then that too being eternal, it comes to this that production and destruction are merely development and envelopment. Now, development and envelopment depend upon causes. Therefore it results that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc., also surely depend upon causes and also that there is production of that which was not before. The objection that there is no proof of the uniformity towards the cause is answered by the uniformity of the nature of the cause, and this uniformity of the nature of the cause (to produce the effect) becomes known by the method of agreement and difference. For it is a universal experience that no pot is produced without a potter's staff and that a pot is produced when there is the potter's staff. Thus causality is the quality of that which belongs to the class of invariable and unconditional antecedents, which cannot be otherwise established or explained, or the characteristic of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause. Although there is no invariable antecedence in such places as "one should perform sacrifice with barley or with paddy," etc., because the sacrifice with paddy is not an antecedent of the result producible by the sacrifice with barley, still a cause ordained in the alternative is truly a cause, as causality is proved in the case of both even though the results are similar in kind. Thus the characteristic of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause, forms the causality which is common to both secular and scriptural practices; whereas invariable antecedence known by the method of agreement and difference is the causality which is secular only. For in such

cases as "He who desires heaven should perform sacrifice," etc., the difference or negative side is not required, because knowledge of the agreement or positive side alone is sufficient to induce activity. For this reason also, if the alternative is assumed, then both lose their significance in the code, for the result of the same kind being secured by one alone, the performance of the other becomes futile. Hence also it has been rightly said: "The result necessarily follows from practices taught in the Veda, if performed in all their parts." When the Āchāryya (preceptor) says "And this object proceeding from the Veda, breach of uniformity is no fault," he only means to refer to ordinary objects. In the case of grass, igniting wood, and jewel, however, heterogeneity of effect is necessary; because there causality being inferred by agreement and difference, non-existence of the effect is necessary from non-existence of the cause. If heterogeneity of effect is supposed in alternative cases, causality will be in the alternative in Rājasūya, Vājapeya, and other sacrifices. For these reasons he goes on establishing the same law of the relation of effect and cause.

न तु कार्यभावात् कारणाभावः ॥ १ | २ | २ ॥

न Na, not. तु Tu, but. कार्यभावात् Kāryyābhāvāt, from non-existence of effect. कारणाभावः Kāraṇābhāvaḥ, non-existence of causes.

2. But non-existence of cause (does) not (follow) from the non-existence of the effect.—33.

If the law of the relation of effect and cause do not exist, the non-existence of cause will follow also from non-existence of effect. Non-existence of effect is not instrumental towards the non-existence of cause; but non-existence of cause instrumental towards non-existence of effect. Thus the application of this introductory section of two aphorisms is that persons desirous of *mokṣa* (salvation) are concerned in non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain, in non-existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth, in non-existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in prevention of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults, and in spiritual intuition of the Self for the sake of prevention of false knowledge.—2.

Bhāṣya: The aphorism is meant for them who think that *apavarga* is mere absence of pain.

Non-existence of the cause, *viz.*, birth, etc., does not follow from non-existence of the effect, *viz.*, pain. Birth, etc., therefore, may still take place even when no pain exists. If birth, etc., are thus possible, then there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of the causes of pain. *Apavarga*, accordingly, does not lie in the mere absence of pain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting in the order of the successive non-existence of false knowledge, etc.

Genus and Species relative to understanding.

Upaskāra.—After the marks of the three Predicables in the order of their enumeration, he now states the mark of the Predicables, Genus, which has also been mentioned:

सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् ॥ १ | २ | ३ ॥

सामान्यं Sāmānyam, Genus. विशेषः Viśeṣaḥ, Species. इति Iti, these. बुद्ध्यपेक्षं Buddhyapekṣam, relative to understanding.

3. The notions, Genus and Species, are relative to the Understanding.—34.

Genus is two-fold, high and low, of which the first is Existence and the second is Substanceness, etc., pervaded by Existence. The Understanding itself is the mark of Genus and its Species: the cognition of re-appearance or recurrence, of Genus, and the cognition of disappearance or reversion, of species. The word '*iti*' takes them singly, and hence the word '*buddhyapekṣam*' has been used in the neuter gender. The writer of the *vṛitti* however applies it to species only and explains its use in the singular number and neuter gender by the rule. "A word in the neuter gender used with a word not in the neuter gender optionally entails neuter gender and singular number." '*Buddhyapekṣam*' means that of which the understanding or cognition is the mark or the definition. 'Genus' in the aphorism means that which is external and resides in more individuals than one. Or, Genus, whether high or low, is, while it is eternal, co-existent in the same substratum with the mutual non-existence of its own situation or foundation. Moreover Genus also takes the name of Species, as for example, at the same time that there is the cognition of re-appearance or recurrence, namely, 'This is Substance,' 'This is Substance,' and so on, there is the particular cognition that it is not Attribute, that it is not Action, etc. So that the nature of species belongs to the genera themselves, *e. g.*, substanceness, etc.

It may be objected, "Genus (*i. e.*, the Universal), as an objective reality, is a non-entity, since the consciousness of recognition can be explained (without it) by the absence of reversion or divergence. For the object of the cognition. "It is a cow," is that it is not different from a cow. Even the advocate of the doctrine of kinds (*jāti*) admits that this is the subject-matter of the concrete cognitions of bovineness, etc.; for concreteness or particularity is not something other than absence of difference from itself; it is the absence of divergence from a cow, etc., which is also the occasion of the use of the words cow, etc. Moreover, where does the Genus of bovineness reside? Not surely in the bovine animal, because the animal is non-existent prior to the appearance of bovineness. Nor in a non-bovine animal, because there will be then contradiction. Whence does bovineness come to reside in the body of a bovine animal when such a body is produced? It did not surely remain in that locality, for that place also will then possess bovineness. Nor is bovineness even produced then and there, for it (a Genus) has been observed to be eternal. Nor can it come from elsewhere, for it (a Genus) possesses no activity. Nor again does one eternal possess the characteristic of appearing in many individuals, for there is no proof that it (a Genus) optionally appears in part and as a whole. For the whole does not appear in a single place, since then it would follow that there would be no concrete cognition of it in other places. Nor does it appear in part for a 'class' is not confined to one part. So it has been said. "It does not move, nor was it there. Nor is it produced, nor ~~has~~ it parts. Nor does it leave its former residence. Alas! the succession of difficulties." Genus exists and that is manifested by situation or organisation only like bovineness, potness, etc. But it

does not belong to Attribute and Action also." Such is the quarrel of kindred thinkers.

To this it is said, "Genus is eternal and pervasive; and pervasiveness consists in being related to all place by its own form. It does not arise that places should be treated in the terms of bovineness, for the use of bovineness is obtained by the relation known as combination; as 'Time possesses form or colour'—such cognition and use do not arise, because Time does not possess form or colour, etc. Nor can it be said that Time verily does not exist, since it is found that it is only a different name for the "five heads" (*i. e.*, of the Bauddhas, *e.g.*, Perception, Feeling, Conception with Naming, and Impression); because Time will be established later on. Thus bovineness which pervades a particular spot, combines with the organism which is produced in that very place, as it is found that 'it is produced' and 'it is combined (with bovineness),' refer to the same moment of Time. Hereby "where does it reside?" is answered by "where it is perceived;" "where is it perceived?" by "where it resides;" and "what sort of a body it was prior to the appearance of bovineness?" by "It did not exist at all." Similarly "It does not move, nor was it there, etc.," is so much cry of despair. The Genus of bovineness is nothing but non-divergence of cognition from what it has been,—this is obstructed or contradicted by the real or positive cognition "It is a cow or ox." For the cognition also is not explained, as it has been said that the cognition of a real existence does not help the understanding of negation, nor does divergence from a cow or ox come to light in the cognition "It is a cow or ox." The option of whole and part can arise only if a single Genus appear as a whole or as a part. Wholeness means multitude and infinity, and it is not proved in an individual. " 'This is a cow or ox'—such cognitions arise in respect of non-entities and are not capable of establishing entities"—to this the reply will be given afterwards.

The followers of *Prabhākara* (a thinker of the *Mīmāṃsā* School) however say that Genus is manifested by its situation (*i. e.*, the organism where it resides). If it is evidenced by recognitive understanding, then what offence has been committed by Genera belonging to Attribute and Action? For there arises consciousness of recognition or knowing again in respect of Colour, Taste, etc.; and this consciousness surely establishes a 'class' (*jāt*), since there is no obstruction. As it is in the case of Ether-ness, identity of the individual is not the obstruction in the class attributes of Colour, etc. Nor is co-extension the obstruction here as it is in the case of Understanding and Knowledge or in the case of the classes of water-pots and water-jars, because of the multiplicity of individual Colours, Tastes, etc. For co-extension is denotation of neither more nor less individuals; and the class attributes of colour, etc., have a narrower denotation than Attribute-ness, and have a wider denotation than blue-ness, etc. For this reason also, there is no overlapping or intermixture (which is also an obstruction to the existence of Genus), as there is in the case of the characteristics of being material and ponderable substances, because although their mutual absolute non-existences co-exist in the same substratum, yet there is no co-existence with any other class. Nor is here instability or infinite regression, because other Genera included in Colourness, etc., are not

recognised. Nor is here loss of form or transformation as in the case of species. If species, while residing in substances, possess classes or *jāti* then they will become either Attributes or Action ; if while appearing in Universals (e. g., Time, Space, Ether, and Soul) they possess classes or *jāti*, then they will become Attributes. The transformation which thus takes place in the case of the Predicable, Species, is absent in the case of the subject under enquiry. Nor is here non-relation, as in the case of Combination. Let there be non-relation in the case of Combination, seeing that the supposition of Combination of Combination will entail infinite regression ; but in the case of the subject under enquiry the relation of Combination itself is recognised. Although identity of the individual itself is an obstruction to Combination being a Genus, yet the view of those also should be considered, who hold that Combinations are many in number and undergo production and destruction. Or it (absence of combination or identity of the individual) is the obstruction to Non-existence, etc., being Genera.

The learned writer of the *Vṛitti* has said : “ The point in dispute, namely, recognitive understanding, because it is an unobstructed, recurrent consciousness, is explained by a recurrent property, as the consciousness, ‘ garland-flowers ’ (covers all the flowers making up a particular garland and is explained by the common property of belonging to that garland, which recurs in every one of those flowers).” This requires consideration.—3.

Vṛitti :—The Nyāya teachers have recited the obstructions to Genus : “ Identity of the Individual, Similarity or Co-extension, Overlapping or Intermixture, Instability or Infinite Regression. Transformation, and Non-relation,—this is the collection of the obstructions to Genus.” Now, Ether-ness is not a Genus, as it denotes only one individual. Pot-ness and Jar-ness are not two genera, because the individuals denoted by the one are neither more nor less than by the other. Material-ness and ponderableness are not genera, because, by appearing in the same individual, the substrata of their respective absolute non-existence would then intermix. Genus-ness is not a Genus, on account of infinite regression. The transformation of Species which is by nature exclusive, is an obstruction to its being a Genus. If Particularity be a Genus, then, itself possessing Genus, it will not be possible for it to distinguish itself and therefore its special property of self-distinction will suffer. Therefore Particularity or Species is not a Genus. Or transformation may mean change of nature. So that if Species, while appearing in ponderable things, possess Genera, then they would be either Attributes or Actions. If while appearing in the universals (e. g., Ether, Space, Time, and Soul) they possess Genera, then they would be Attributes. In this way change of nature of the Species is the obstruction to Species possessing the characteristic of Genus. Combination or Co-inherence is not a Genus, as the relation of combination does not exist in it, since the admission of combination into combination would entail infinite regression. This applies to the view that combinations are many in number and undergo production and destruction. Otherwise from the identity of the individual also Combination cannot be a Genus. Similarly the absence of the relation of Combination is an obstruction

to Non-existence being a Genus ; and other instances should be understood.

Existence is Genus only.

Upaskāra.—Proving the two-foldness which has been stated above of Genus and Species, he says :

भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव ॥ १ । २ । ४ ॥

भावः Bhāvaḥ, existence, being. **अनुवृत्तेः** Anuvṛtṭeḥ, of recurrence, assimilation or extensive denotation. **एव** Eva, only. **हेतुत्वात्** Hetutvāt, being the cause. **साम न्य** Sāmānyam, Genus. **एव** Eva, only.

4. Existence, being the cause of assimilation only, is only a Genus.—35.

‘Bhāvaḥ,’ i.e., existence, is the cause of assimilation only, and not of differentiation also. Therefore it does not take the name Species.—4,

Genera-Species.

Upaskāra.—What Genera take the name of Species ? To meet this expectancy he says :

द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्मत्वञ्च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च ॥ १ । २ । ५ ॥

द्रव्यत्व Dravyatvam, substance-ness. **गुणत्वं** Guṇatvam, attributeness. **कर्मत्वं**, Karmmatvam, action-ness. **च** Cha, and. **सामान्यानि** Sāmānyāni, Genera. **विशेषाः** Viśeṣaḥ, species. **च** Cha, also.

5. Substance-ness, and Attribute-ness and Action-ness are both Genera and Species.—36.

The word ‘cha’ collects Earth-ness, and other genera belonging to Substance, Colour-ness, and other genera belonging to Attribute, Throwing-up-ness, and other genera belonging to Action. ‘Substance-ness, etc.,’ have been left uncompounded in order to indicate the absence of the relation of that which pervades and that which is pervaded, from amongst them. ‘Genera and Species have not been compounded so that it may be understood that these are Species also even while they possess the characteristics of Genera. Otherwise (if the words were compounded) there might be a mistake that the compound was a genitive one and then the being Species would not have been perceived in the presence of Genus-ness.

It might be objected, “Substance-ness cannot be something which penetrates into or inheres in the forms of substance and is beyond the cognizance of the senses, because if it somehow exists in Earth, etc., its existence is impossible in the case of Ari, Ether, etc. It cannot be established as something which constitutes the combinative cause of an effect

determined by Attribute-ness, because Attribute-ness, as it appears in eternal and non-eternal objects, is not the determinant of being an effect. The rejoinder that it is required for the sake of Attribute-ness does not improve the situation." The objection however does not arise, for Substance-ness is established by the way of constituting the combinative causality of an effect determined by the characteristic of Conjunction. This causality cannot be constituted by the class attribute of Earth-ness, which is of a narrower comprehension, nor by Existence which has a wider denotation; and there must be something to constitute or define it, as otherwise suddenness or chance would be the result. Now Conjunction must necessarily be recognized in the case of ultimate atoms, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of two atoms; in the case of molecules of two atoms each, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of three atoms; in the case of the four universals (e.g., Time, Space, Ether, and Soul), through their being its conjunction with all ponderable things; in the case of Mind; as the ground for the conjunction of Mind and the Senses; in the case of Air, as the support for the movement of grass, etc.; in the case of perceptible Substances, through their very perceptibility. On the other hand, there is no un-originated Conjunction so that it could be said that the quality of Conjunction even, appearing in effects and not-effects, could not be the determinant of being an effect. In like manner, it is easily demonstrable that substance-ness is established also by the way of constituting the combinative causality of Disjunction also. Attribute-ness again, it has been already said, is proved by its being the determinat of the causality which exists in a thing possessing Genus and not containing the non-combinative causality of the combinative causality of Conjunction and Disjunction. The class attribute of Actions also, is, in the case of perceptible Substances, cognizable by the cognition, 'It moves,' but in other places can be inferred from Conjunction and Disjunction, for Action-ness is required to be established also by its being the determinant of the non-combinative causality of both Conjunction and Disjunction. For this reason also it is possible to infer the movement of the sun from its reaching another place. Here although the other place, e.g., of Sky, etc., is beyond the reach of the senses, yet the Conjunction and Disjunction of the solar rays are perceptible by the solar zone, and it is from these Conjunctions and Disjunctions that the inference of the movement of the sun can be drawn. The learned *Uddyotakāra* has said: "The inference of the movement of the sun is by its reaching a different place, which again is also a matter of inference in the following way: The sun which is perceived by a man when facing eastwards, is also perceived by him when facing the west, and is recognised by him. This fact together with the fact that the sun is a substance and is not destroyed and produced again at every moment, is proof that the sun has reached a different place from where it was before."—5.

Final Species excluded.

Upaskīra.—But is it the same Species which has been enumerated as a Predicable, which is here described as both Genus and Species? Removing this curiosity of the disciples he says :

अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः ॥ १ । २ । ६ ॥

अन्यत्र Anyatra, elsewhere. अन्त्येभ्यः Antyebhyaḥ, final. विशेषेभ्यः Viśeṣebhyaḥ, than species.

6. (The statement of Genus and Species has been made) with the exception of the final Species.—37.

The meaning is that the statement of Genus and Species is to the exclusion of those final Species* residing in eternal substances, which have been mentioned above. 'Antyaḥ,' i. e. 'final,' means those which exist or appear at the end (of the division or dissolution of compounds.) The teachers say that they are 'final,' because after them there is no other principle of differentiation. According to the *Vṛttikāra* they are 'final Species,' because they exist in eternal Substances, i. e. Substances which exist at the end of production and destruction. They are really Species only, the causes of the consciousness of differentiation, and not of the form of Genus also.—6.

Existence defined.

Upaskāra.—A good many men doubt that Existence is a Genus. So he gives its proof :

सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु सा सत्ता ॥ १ । २ । ७ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. इति Iti, thus. यतः Yataḥ, whence. द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु Dravyaguna-karmasu, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. सा Sā, that. सत्ता Sattā, existence.

7, Existence is that to which are due the belief and usage, namely '(It is) existent,' in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action.—38.

By the word 'iti' he teaches the mode of belief and usage. Thus Existence is that which causes the belief in this way that this is existent, that that is existent, in the case of the triad of Substance, etc., or on which depends the application of the words in the from of 'it is existent,' 'it is existent.'—7.

Existence not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.

Upaskāra.—But Existence is not perceived as being separate from Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore Existence is nothing else than one or other of Substance, etc. Because that which is different from something else is perceived by means of its difference from that, as a water-pot from a piece of cloth. But Existence is not perceived by means of its difference from them. Therefore it is identical with them. To meet this objection he says :

द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता ॥ १ । २ । ८ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यः Dravya-guṇa-karmabhyaḥ, from Substance, Attribute, and Action. अर्थान्तरं Arthāntaram, a different object. सत्ता Sattā, existence.

* It is the introduction of these "final species," which is the reason why the system of Kaṇāda is called the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy of final species.

8. Existence is a different object from Substance. Attribute, and Action.—39.

Substance, etc., are non-assimilative but Existence is assimilative. Thus 'Existence is a different, etc.,' because its difference from them is established by the consideration of the opposite properties characterised by assimilativeness and non-assimilativeness. That, however, it is not perceived elsewhere than in them, is due to the virtue of their primary or natural inter-relation, whereas the relation of a pot and a piece of cloth is derivative or artificial.

The intrinsic form of the individual is not Existence, for individuals do not assimilate themselves or form themselves into classes. If the inner nature be assimilative, then the same is nothing but Existence. If non-assimilative inner natures or essences be the means of classification, then the class attributes of bovineness, etc., are also gone. This consideration also dismisses the objection, "When the practice of classification is established by those very objects in which as substrata Existence inheres, then what is the use of Existence?" For the same reason also it is not valid to hold that Existence is the property which makes an object and its action possible, or that Existence is reasonableness or reliability; for the cognition 'It is existent,' arises even in the absence of any enquiry in those respects.—8.

Bhaṣya.—Existence is a different 'object' from Substance, Attribute, and Action. Substance, Attribute, and Action are called objects (VIII. ii. 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it is not contained in the ascertained classes of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Hence it is said to be a different object from them known classes).

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He points out another differentia:

गुणकर्मसु च भावान्न कर्म न गुणः ॥ १ । २ । ६ ॥

गुणकर्मसु Guṇa-karmmasu, in Attributes and Actions च Cha, and. भावात् Bhāvāt, from Existence. न Na, not कर्म Karmma, Action. न Na, not गुणः Guṇaḥ Attribute.

9. And as it exists in Attributes and Actions, therefore it is neither Attribute nor Action.—40.

"Neither Attribute nor Action"—this being the matter to be expressed, their individual mention (i. e., the words being not compounded) indicates that Existence is not Substance also. For an Action does not exist in Actions, nor an Attribute in Attributes, nor does Substance exist in an Attribute or Action. Existence however resides in Attribute and Action. Therefore on account of its Difference from Substance, Attribute, and Action, Existence is really different from them.—9.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He mentions another differentia:

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १० ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvena, by reason of the absence of Genus-Species च Cha, and.

10. (Existence is different from Substance, Attribute, and Action), also by reason of the absence of Genus-Species in it.—41.

If Existence be Substance, Attribute, or Action, then it would contain in it Genera which are Species also. But in Existence these Genera-Species, namely, Substance-ness, etc., are not perceived. For nobody ever has the perception that Existence is Substance, Attribute, or Action.—10.

Substance-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

Upaskāra.—Having thus stated the distinction of Existence from Substance, Attribute, and Action, he states the distinction of Substance-ness from them.

अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । ११ ॥

अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन Aneka-dravya-vattvena, by means of its containing more than one Substance. द्रव्यत्वं Dravyatvam, Substance-ness. उक्तम् Uktam, explained.

11. Substance-ness has been explained by means of its containing more than one Substance.—42.

'Anekadravyavat' means that to which belong more than one Substance as its combinative causes. The term 'more than one' here denotes all. Hence it is distinguished from Earth-ness, etc. Its 'eternality' is obtained simply from its being a Genus; hence its distinction from wholes made up of parts. And 'anekadravyavattvam' means the being combined with more than one Substance in general; hence its distinction from Existence. Therefore Substance-ness is eternal and combined with more than one Substance in general, Hence it is implied that conjunction is not desired. And Substance-ness also has been verily established. 'Substance-ness explained', means that Substance-ness also has been explained in the very same way as Existence.—11.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But Substance-ness is also a 'class,' and can be quite non-distinct from its own ground. What is the fault here? So he says.

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १२ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. च Cha, and.

12. (Substance-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—43.

If the 'class' of Substance-ness be really identical with Substance,

etc., then in it will exist Earthness, Waterness, Fireness, and other Genera which are also Species. The senso is that nobody has the perception that Substance-ness is Earth, Water, or Fire. Hence it is distinct, etc.—12.

Attribute-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

Upaskāra.—He states Attributeness.

तथा गुणेषु भावाद् गुणत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । १३ ।

तथा Tathā, in like manner. गुणेषु Guṇeṣu, in Attributes. भावाद् Bhāvāt, from its existence. गुणत्वं Guṇatvam, Attribute-ness. उक्तं Uktam, explained.

13. (That Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Attributes.—44.

The meaning is that in the very same way as Existence, Attribute-ness is explained to be distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action, from its existence in (i. e., combination with) Attributes only.—13.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He points out another differentia :

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १४ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. च Cha, and.

14. (Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—45.

If Attributeness be not something over and above Substance, Attribute, and Action, then it should be perceived as containing Substance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness, and their sub-classes. This is the meaning.—14.

Action-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.

Upaskāra.—He points out that which distinguishes Action-ness from Substance, Attribute and Action :

कर्मसु भावाद् कर्मत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । १५ ॥

कर्मसु Karmasu, in Actions. भावाद् Bhāvāt, from its existence. कर्मत्वं Karmatvam, action-ness. उक्तं Uktam, explained.

15. (That) Action-ness (is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Actions.—46.

Like Existence, Action-ness also, which is another 'class,' is explained as distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action from its existence in (i. e., combination with) Action only.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He mentions another differentia :

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १६ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. **च** Cha, and.

16. (Action-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—47.

The meaning is that if Action-ness be identical with Substance, etc., then the Genus-Species of Substance-ness, etc., will combine in it.

It should be noted that these four aphorisms identical in form, are, stated so as to form one section for explaining the distinction from Substance, Attribute, and Action, of the four classes Existence, Substance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness.—16.

Existence is one.

Upaskāra.—But why should not Existence which is present in Substance, Attribute and Action, be rendered different by the difference of the determinants of Substance-ness, etc. ? So he says :

सदिति लिङ्गाविशेषाद् विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्चैको भावः ॥१२१७॥

सत् Sat, existent. **इति** Iti, this. **लिङ्गाविशेषाद्** Liṅgāviśeṣāt, from the non-particularity or uniformity of the mark. **विशेषलिङ्गाभावाद्** Viśeṣa-liṅgābhāvāt, from the absence of a particular or distinctive mark. **च** Cha, and. **एकः** Ekah, One. **भावः** Bhāvaḥ, Existence.

17. Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the mark *viz.*, that it is existent and because of the absence of any distinguishing mark.—48.

The knowledge or the use of words in this form that it is existent, is the mark of Existence. And it is the same, *i.e.*, non-particularized, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore one and the same Existence resides in them. Otherwise, Existence having the same denotation or manifestation as Substance-ness, etc, either it would not exist or they would not exist. 'Viśeṣāliṅgābhāvāt Cha,'—means that there is no difference, as inference which is the mark of *viśeṣa*, *i. e.* difference, does not here exist. As in the judgment, 'This lamp is verily that,' the mark of distinction is the difference of measure such as length, shortness, etc., so here there is no such mark of distinction. This is the idea.—17.

Bhāṣya.—reads I, ii, 17, with the omission of the word *liṅga* in *viśeṣa-liṅga-abhāvāt*.

Here ends the second chapter of the First Book in the Commentary by Śaṅkara, on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda of great powers

BOOK SECOND—CHAPTER FIRST.

Characteristics of Earth.

Upaskāra.—The subject-matter of the First chapter of the Second Book is the description of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections : description of Earth, Water, and Fire ; proof of God ; and inference of Ether. Of these the author states the characteristic of Earth which has been mentioned first of all.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी ॥ २ । १ । १ ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती Rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatî, Possessed of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. **पृथिवी** Prithivî, Earth.

1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch.—49.

Manifold Colour such as blue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone. Thus the characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with blue colour. Similarly manifold Taste such as bitter, sour, etc., resides in Earth alone. Thus the (second) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with bitter Taste. In like manner other characteristics should be understood by the substitution or interpolation of the words 'sour,' etc. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant. Thus the (third) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore seen that Earth is a Substance which is the substratum or location of 'class' which is co-extensive with Smell but not co-extensive with an Attribute which is not co-extensive with Smell. It must not be objected that as Smell and Taste are not perceived in a stone, etc., therefore both of them fall short of being universal here. For, though Smell and Taste are not perceived there in the first instance, still they are found to be present in their ashes ; and the very same parts which originate the stone do also originate its ashes. Hence there is no want of universality. How then is there such perception as "The air is fragrant," "Water mixed with '*Karavella*' (*Momardica Charantia*, Hairy Mordica) is bitter?" The question does not arise, because that Smell and Taste are due to the external condition formed by (particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold and which is produced by the action of heat, belongs to Earth only. Thus the (fourth) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Touch produced by the action of heat. And the quality of being produced by the action of heat, which is revealed by a distinctive peculiarity, belongs to the Touch of Earth alone ; and 'a distinctive peculiarity' is very manifest in the peculiar Touch of the flowers of *Śirīṣa* (*Acacia Lebbec*) and *Lavangi* (clove-creeper) ; but it is not so in the Touch of Water, etc. Although in a whole made up of parts Touch, etc., are not produced directly through the conjunction of Fire, from heating, yet there too a particular heterogeneity should be recognised by the way of its being the product of a series of parts and wholes.

"But," it may be objected, "this mark or characteristic is what is called a mark of disagreement or a negative mark which is the proof of its difference from others or of the mode of its treatment. Now, Earth is distinguished from others because it has Smell. That which is not

different from others, does not possess Smell, *e. g.*, Water, etc. And Earth is what has Smell which is the counter-opposite of the non-existence of the pervader of the non-existence of the difference from others than itself. Therefore it is different from others than itself. Here supposing that the major term, the *quæsitum*, namely, difference from others, is a well known object, if the mark of inference disagree with it, then the inference will have the fault of incommensurability, as the minor term will in that case fall outside the class of ascertained similar objects and of un-ascertained objects; and if it does not disagree, then the mark will be what is called a mark of agreement or a positive mark. On the other hand, if the major term is not well known, then the minor term will contain an unknown major term. In that case there can be no expectation, nor any desire for inference, nor again any inference in the shape of knowledge in particular about it. Moreover, absence of the mark or the middle term and absence of the *quæsitum* or major term are universally related by agreement. Thus there will arise the contradiction that the absence of the major term will not have the characteristic of being the mark nor will the mark have the characteristic of being the absence of the major term. By this alone the futility of the minor premiss is explained, but not the object, the universal relation of which has not been obtained. So it has been said: "The faults of an inference by disagreement or by the method of difference, are ignorance of the major term, contradiction, futility of the minor premiss, and proof by the method of agreement." So also if the mark is intended to establish usage. Here the usage consists in being the object of reference of the word Earth, and that belongs also to the class of Earth-ness and therein the mark Earthness does not exist. Although therefore incommensurability may appear to exist here, yet there is no incommensurability, the *quæsitum* or major term being the characteristic of being the object of reference of the word Earth, which is the occasion of the significance of Earth-ness. Or again Earth-ness being, as a class, proved in a general way, like pot-ness, to be the occasion of the significance of an accidental word, the word Earth contains the occasion of the significance of Earthness. If it contains the occasion of not signifying others—not-Earth-ness,—then as it appears together with that which is the occasion of the significance, it should be proved in the way, *viz.*, 'That which is not so, is not so.' Thus here too there is surely the fault of ignorance of the *quæsitum*, etc."

It is not so, the author replies, difference of others such as Water, etc., being manifest in the pot itself, because the difference, *i. e.*, the mutual non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects also is proved by sense-perception itself in the pot, etc., in as much as only the fitness for the location or ground or substratum governs the apprehension of mutual non-existence, as is seen in cases like "The column is not a *piśāṇa* (a ghost-like being)."

It should not be said, "This is not the case. Let then the pot only be the analogue or example. What is the use of a negative mark? Who will prove in a roundabout fashion a conclusion arrived at in a straight way?" If the non-negative mark be not a mere simulacrum,

then this path too is unobstructed to him who is described as arguing in a round-about way ; because with the removal of the fault of ignorance of the quæsitum, all other faults which arise out of it, are also removed. There is no contradiction, because the positive pervasion or the relation in agreement is apprehended along with the negative relation or because the positive pervasion is inferred by the negative pervasion. Nor is there futility of the minor premiss, because the very mark of which the pervasion has been obtained, is proved in the minor term ; as has been said : “ Whatever relation of the determinable and the determinant subsists between two existences, just the reverse of it is to be understood in the case of the corresponding non-existences.” Usage again follows from the teaching “ Earth possesses Smell,” in the same way as what possesses a narrow, twisted neck, etc., is the object of reference of the word ‘ pot.’ Thus that by which, anywhere and everywhere, in the case of clarified butter, etc., clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force of the word Earth is derived, from the above teaching, in Earth-ness by means of the indication, namely, the possession of Smell, also operates as a negative mark in this way that that which is not this, is not this, because everything which possesses Smell is the object of reference of the word Earth, through its possession of Smell, by means of Earth-ness which is the occasion of the force of the word.

The objector cannot say “ In the case of the negative mark or pervasion which will prove difference, the difference must be either difference in property, or difference in nature, *i. e.*, otherness, or mutual non-existence. Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known by sense perception itself. Nor can it be the third, because when the difference of non-existence also comes to be the quæsitum, its mutual non-existence is not present there, and therefore the difference of that which is other than non-existence coming to be the quæsitum the quæsitum is not found.” For mutual non-existence, of which the counter-opposite is non-existence, is also a quæsitum. So that if it is something additional then it verily exists ; if not then being reduced to itself, it is in reality something different, because its difference in property is pervaded by its mutual non-existence. And here there is unsteadiness or want of no finality, because the non-finality remains only so long as there is perception or cognition, whereas in other cases finality is obtained by perception.

It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well known in thirteen cases are jointly proved in Earth. This is nonsense, because the knowledge of every one of them being not in point, the knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence with counter-opposition determined by non-odorlessness should be proved, because the difference of non-existence by means of the difference of that which determines counter-opposition is necessary and because it has been already said that this difference of non-existence is proved by sense-perception in the pot etc., also.

If it is asked “ What is the solution in the case of Ether, etc., ?” the author replies that Ether is different from others than itself, by being

the seat of Sound. Although in "That which is not thus, is not thus," and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the quæsitum, i. e., the major term, is not well known, still that which possesses difference in property from something else, possesses the mutual non-existence of which that something is the counter-opposite. So that by virtue of the pervasion brought into play in this general way, the mutual non-existence the counter-opposite of which possesses the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound, having been already proved, here it is only shown as being connected with the minor term, like fire being connected with the mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference in quality being pervaded by its mutual non-existence. If it is said that only the possession of the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound is not found in objects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of Sound is neither the definition nor the description, because it is attacked with the fear of belonging to unascertained objects.—I.

Virtù.—The revered Śaṅkara Miśra himself knows what the necessity was of carrying the investigation here, leaving aside the possession of Smell, up to the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness co-extensive with Smell.

Characteristics of Water.

Upaskāra.—He states the characteristic of Water mentioned after Earth :

रूपरसस्पर्शवत्य आपो द्रवाः स्निग्धाः ॥ २ । १ । २ ॥

रूपरसस्पर्शवत्यः Rûpa-rasa sparśavatyaḥ, possessed of Colour, Taste, and Touch. **आपः** Āpaḥ, Waters. **द्रवाः** Dravâḥ, Fluid. **स्निग्धाः** Snigdhâḥ, Liquid, viscid.

2. Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid and viscid.—50.

The Colour, Taste, and Touch are respectively White, Sweet, and Cool only. Fluidness is constitutional but Viscidity is by nature or essential.

Objection. But it is not correct to say that the Colour of Water is only White, because blueness is observed in the water of the river *Yamunâ*, etc. That the Taste is only the sweet is also not correct, because acidness, bitterness, etc., are observed in the juice of the blackberry, *karavîra*, etc., That the Touch is only the Cool one is also not proved, because at mid-day hotness also is observed. Constitutional Fluidity again is too limited, as it is absent in ice, hail-stone, etc. Viscidity also is not proved as essential and is too wide, as it is not perceived in Water, and is perceived in clarified butter and other terrene objects. Moreover Water-ness is not a class even, which may be the characteristic of Water, because it is not proved on account of the non-existence of that which will establish it. Nor is it proved by the characteristic of the determinant of its being the combinative cause of Viscidity, because the nature of Viscidity, appearing in both the effect and what is not the effect, is not the determinant of the state

of being the effect. Therefore in the absence of a differentia, Water is not differentiated.

Answer. All this objection cannot be raised. For non-luminous white colour alone is really the differentia of Water, the blueness in the Water of the river *Yamunā*, etc., is due to the condition or environment formed by the receptacle, and whiteness is observed in the Water of the *Yamunā* when thrown up in the sky. Hence the characteristic of Water is the possession of the class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness and which is present in colour which is not co-existent with other than non-luminous white Colour. The Taste also is only the sweet one; the bitterness, acidity, etc., in the juice of the blackberry, *karavīra*, etc., are due to the condition or environment supplied by the presence of particles of Earth. It should not be said that sweetness is not at all perceived in Water, since it is revealed after the eating of some astringent substance. Nor does this sweetness belong to the yellow myrobalan itself and is capable of being revealed by Water, because only the astringent Taste is observed in it. As in *āmalakī* so in yellow myrobalan, only the astringent is the Taste, the same alone being perceived. Nor again is there non-production of Taste on account of the conflict of Attributes, because the parts also there possess astringent Taste. The tradition of six Tastes is due to its producing the respective effects of those Tastes. Manifold Taste again is removed simply by the absence of proof. In the case of manifold colour however the observation of the canvas itself is the proof. The origination of fragrant and non-fragrant parts is removed by the conflict of Attributes. In the case of manifold Smell, there is absence of proof. Therefore the sweetness which is observed in Water immediately after the eating of yellow myrobalan, belongs to Water only. Its manifestation however depends upon the proximity of some particular Substance, as the manifestation of coolness in water arises from its association with sandalwood. The bitterness that is perceived immediately after the eating of *karkatī* (a cucumber-like fruit) belongs to the *karkatī* alone, because bitterness is observed in its parts even without the drinking of water, or it may be that the bitterness of the bilious Substance present at the tip of the tongue is felt there. Hence the second characteristic of water is the possession of the class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with Taste which is not co-existent with other than sweet Taste. In like manner the third characteristic of water is the possession of the class which is pervaded by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with cool Touch. The hotness that appears at mid-day is really of Fire, as it depends upon its presence and absence. Similarly constitutional Fluidity is by itself the fourth characteristic; in other words, Water-ness is the possession of the class which is pervaded by Substance-ness and which is present in what possesses constitutional Fluidity. Liquidity or Viscidity, however, is a particular Attribute, and not a Genus which is also a Species, like milk-ness and curd-ness; because the distinction of viscid, more viscid, and most viscid, is observed, but such distinction is not possible in the case of a class. It cannot be said "Let Viscidity be an Attribute. But what is the evidence that it is present in water?" for it is inferred from the mixing or compounding of barley, sand, etc., by water. A compound is a particular combination or conjunction

caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. It is not due to Fluidity alone, because no compounding is established by the Fluidity of glass or gold ; nor is it due to Viscidity alone, because no compounding is established by condensed clarified butter, etc. Therefore by the method of agreement and difference it is proved to be caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. And this compounding, being seen to take place in barley, sand, etc., by water, confirms Viscidity in Water. This argument is based upon wide experience itself, as Viscidity is an object of sense-perception. Viscidity which however is found in clarified butter, etc., is of the Water which is the occasional cause of that clarified butter, and it appears as though belonging to the clarified butter through combination with the conjoint. So also in the case of oil, juice, etc. And Water which is the occasional cause of clarified butter, contains a preponderance of Viscidity ; therefore owing to this very preponderance of Viscidity, this Water does not counteract Fire. If Viscidity were a particular Attribute of Earth, then, like Smell, it would have been present in all terrene objects. Lastly, Water-ness is a class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness, because it has been proved that a class which determines the being the combinative cause of the conjunction present only in objects possessing Viscidity, is common to the ultimate atoms.—2.

Characteristics of Fire.

Upaśāra.—Following the order of enumeration, he states the characteristic of Fire :

तेजो रूपस्पर्शवत् ॥ २ । १ । ३ ॥

तेजः Tojas, fire. रूपस्पर्शवत् Rupa-sparsavat, possessed of Colour and Touch.

3. Fire possesses colour and Touch.—51.

The meaning is that Fire possesses Colour which is luminous, and Touch which is hot. If it be objected, "Luminousness is the being the illuminator of other bodies, and such Colour is not found in heat or in Fire as it exists in gold, in a frying-pan, or in Water. White Colour also is found nowhere in these, nor is hot Touch found in moonlight or in gold. How then is this so ?" We reply that there can be no such objection, because luminous Colour may be inferred in hotness, etc., by means of Fire-ness. If it be objected that Fire-ness itself is not proved there as such, we reply that it is inferred in them by their possessing hot Touch. If it be asked, "How is it proved in gold ?", our reply is that the author desires to say that it is moved because, even in the absence of luminous Colour in it, Fire-ness is inferred by the negative mark, *viz.*, the characteristic of being the substratum or ground of Fluidity which is produced but not destroyed by the closest Conjunction of fire. And in the case of Fire as existing in the frying-pan, etc., Fire-ness is inferred from their possession of hot Touch.

Fire is four-fold : that in which both Colour and Touch are partly developed, as the solar, etc.; that in which Colour is partly developed but Touch is undeveloped, as the lunar; that in which both Colour and Touch are altogether undeveloped, as the ocular ; and that in which

Colour is undeveloped and Touch is developed, as of the summer season, and also Fire present in Water, frying-pan, etc. He will prove the ocular Fire later on.—3.

Characteristic of Air.

Upaskāra.—He states the characteristic of Air which is the next in order:

स्पर्शवान् वायुः ॥ २ । १ । ४ ॥

स्पर्शवान् Sparśavān, possessed of Touch. वायुः Vāyuh, air.

4. Air possesses Touch.—52.

The characteristic of Air is the possession of the 'class' co-existent with Touch which does not co-exist with Colour, or the possession of the 'class' co-existent with Touch which is neither hot nor cold and which does not co-exist with Taste, or the possession of the 'class' co-existent with Touch which is neither hot nor cold and which does not co-exist with Smell, or the possession of the 'class' co-existent with a distinctive Attribute which does not co-exist with any distinctive Attribute other than Touch.—4.

The above characteristics do not belong to Ether.

Upaskāra.—But why is not the possession of Colour, etc., the characteristic also of Ether, Time, Space and Soul? He replies.

त आकाशे न विद्यन्ते ॥ २ । १ । ५ ॥

ते Te, these. आकाशे Ākāśe, in Ether. न Na, not. विद्यन्ते Vidyante, are observed or found.

5. These (characteristics) are not in Ether.—53.

Here the root 'vid, in vidyante' means to perceive. The meaning then is that because they are not perceived therefore they do not exist, in Ether, and other substances, either uniformly or by nature, or collectively, or accidentally. If it be asked, "How does the perception arise that Ether is as white as curd?" we reply that it is due to the impression created by the perception of the white colours of the rays of the sun. If it be asked, "How then does the perception arise that Ether is blue?" we reply that it is due to the impression created in the minds of the observers who are looking at the radiance of the emerald peak lying largely extended over the south side of Sumeru mountain. It has been opined that it is due to the impression created by the eye when after travelling to a long distance it turns back and reaches its own pupil. This is not a sound opinion, because those who possess jaundiced eyes also have such impressions.

From the perception, "Here now there are Colour, etc.," it cannot be argued that Colour and the three other Attributes belong to Space and Time also, because they have been already stated to be the characteristics of Earth, etc., only by the relation of combination and not by any other relation also. "Here now there is absolute non-existence of

(colour)--from this perception again it follows that Space and Time are the substrata or grounds or foundations of all things.—5.

Objection to Fluidity being a characteristic of Water, answered.

Upaskāra.—If it be argued that it is not correct to say that Fluidity is the characteristic of Water, because Fluidity is observed even in Earth ; so he replies :

सर्पिर्जतुमधूच्छिष्टानामग्निसंयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्भिः सामान्यम् ॥२१६॥

सर्पिर्जतुमधूच्छिष्टानां Sarpir-jjatu-madhūchchhiṣṭānām, of clarified butter, lac, and wax. अग्निसंयोगात् Agni-samyogāt, through conjunction of Fire. द्रवत्वं Dravatvam, Fluidity. अद्भिः Advibh, with Waters. सामान्यम् Sāmānyam, similarity, Commonness.

6. The Fluidity of clarified butter, lac, and wax, through conjunction with Light is similar to that of Water.—54.

The Fluidity which belongs to clarified butter, etc., results from conjunction of Fire which is its occasion, and is not constitutional ; whereas constitutional Fluidity is the characteristic of Water. Therefore the similarity of Earth to Water is in respect of mere Fluidity, and not in respect of constitutional Fluidity also. Hence the characteristic or the definition is not too wide. This is the meaning.—6.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But still, because that condition, i. e., Fluidity, appears in tin, lead, iron, and other modifications of Fire, therefore that condition itself is an instance that the definition is too wide. To this objection he replies :

त्रपुसंसिद्धो ह्यस्तसुवर्णानामग्निसंयोगाद् द्रवत्वमद्भिः

सामान्यम् ॥ २ । १ । ७ ॥

त्रपुसंसिद्धो ह्यस्तसुवर्णानां Trapu-sīsa-loha-rajata-suvārṇānām, of tin, lead, iron, silver, and gold. अग्निसंयोगात् Agnisamyogāt, through Conjunction of Fire. द्रवत्वं Dravatvam, Fluidity. अद्भिः Advibh, with Waters. सामान्यम् Sāmānyam, similarity.

7. The Fluidity of tin, lead, iron, Silver, and gold, through conjunction with Fire, constitutes their similarity to Water,—55.

This is an indication ; bell-metal, copper, brass, etc., are also implied. The characteristic which is common to those which have been mentioned and those which are implied, is that they are the foundation of the Fluidity which is produced but is not destroyed by the closest Conjunction of Fire. Thus the Fluidity of gold, etc., also is only occasional, the occasion which is the Conjunction of Fire, being proved by the method of agreement and difference. Moreover there is this distinction ; in the last aphorism the word 'agni' denotes Light —tejas—possessing an excess or abundance of heat, but here it denotes fire.

If it be objected, " Gold, etc., also must be either modifications of Earth or different Substances ; because yellowness, weight, etc., establish

terreneness, and because the non-annihilation of Fluidity which constitutes their difference from Earth, is perceived in them, and because this is capable of establishing of Substance." We reply that gold is a modification of Fire, and its fieriness is proved in the negative way, namely, "That which is not thus, is not thus, as Earth," by the characteristic of its being the foundation of Fluidity which is not annihilated even at the closest Conjunction of Fire.

Again there is no contradiction in the ultimate atoms of Water, because Fluidity should be qualified as being non-eternal. Nor is there incommensurability, as the mark does not appear in the lamp and other objects of the ascertained class, because the fact which is to be proved is that gold is not a modification of Earth. Nor is there any obstacle to the receptacle of weight becoming the minor term here; the foundation or substratum will not be proved if something else were the minor term, as the minor term must be foundation of Fluidity. Nor is it hard to ascribe ultra-finality or absoluteness, because it is desired to be said that it is the foundation of temporary Fluidity which is not annihilated even at the closest Conjunction of Fire for three hours. If it be objected that the annihilation of Fluidity must be concluded from the destruction of the foundation and the perception of more and less; we reply that it is not so, because the mark of inference is the possession of the Fluidity containing the Genus of Fluidity which does not appear in the counter-opposite of the annihilation produced by that Conjunction of Fire which is not combined with the totality of non-existent Fluidity. Or the foundation of yellowness and weight, conjoined as it is with Fluid Substance which excludes all Colour different from yellow Colour, does not therefore become the foundation of any Colour different from yellow Colour even at the Conjunction of Fire for three hours, like a piece of yellow cloth placed inside Water which is conjoined with Fire. If it be objected, "The Colour of gold will then be visible in darkness as there will be nothing to cloud or overpower its Colour, because, overpowering means the non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object," we reply that overpowering denotes the mere relation with a like object which is more powerful by the power of the effect produced by it. So it has been said, "Other Colour does not at all shine under the influence of the association of the earth." This is our view.—7.

Use of Inference.

Upaskāra.—Having thus finished the section on the characteristic of the four Substances which possess Touch, the author, seeing that the characteristic of Air is not proved by its foundation or with a view to avoid this, at the outset introduces the method of proof by inference, and then first of all establishes the probative force or value of inference itself, according to experience, and thereby begins the section of demonstration of Air :

विषाणी ककुद्धान् प्रान्तेबालधिः सास्त्रावानिति गोत्वे दृष्टं
लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । ८ ॥

विषाणी Viṣaṇī, possessing horns. ककुद्धान् Kakudvān, possessing a hump.
प्रान्तेबालधिः Prānto-vāladhib, with a tail hairy at the extremity. सास्त्रावान्

Sāsnāvān, possessing a dewlap. इति Iti, such. गोत्वे Gotve, in cow-ness, of being a cow. दृष्टं Dṛiṣṭam, observed admitted. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

8. That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity, and a dewlap—such is the admitted mark of being a cow.—56.

The import is that as horns, etc. are the marks, the pervasion, or universal or invariable relation of which is well-known or recognised, towards the proof of cow-ness, so also the commonly-observed marks of the five super-sensuous Substances,, Air, etc., assume the form of proof. Here although the mere possession of horns is not the mark of cow-ness, since it is also found in the buffalo, etc.; nor is the possession of the dew-lap, etc., the distinction or differentia, since in that case the name will become senseless; still with them who can discern in the horn of the cow difference in characteristic in comparison with the horns of the buffalo, the sheep, etc., all those distinctions truly assume the nature of marks. And all those distinctions such as straightness, crookedness, hardness, softness, shortness, length, etc., which are capable of being known by observers of superior skill, do really exist in horns also. Thus in respect of the body of a cow at a distance standing by itself, the inference is altogether unobstructed that it is a cow because like the body of a cow which has been previously perceived, it possesses peculiar horns. Similarly, the possession of a hump also is a mark of being a cow. The possession of a tail hairy at the extremity, is also a truly independent mark of being a cow. 'Prāte-vāladhiḥ' means that in which hair are placed at the extremity, that is, a particular tail. From the use of the *aluk* compound (*i. e.*, that form of compound words in which the inflection of the first word is not elided), the tail of the cow only is denoted by the word 'Antevāladhiḥ.' For the characteristic of the tail hairy at the extremity, which is found in the tails of cows, does not belong to the tails of the horse, sheep, etc., as these tails are covered with hair all over. In the tail of the buffalo, etc., there is not so much prolongation. From this difference in characteristic, the possession of a tail hairy at the extremity is also a mark of being a cow. The dropping of the inflection conveying the sense of possession (*i. e.*, the use of the word tail only instead of tail-bearing) shows that only the body of the cow has been in view. Thus (the inference) "It is a cow" because, like the body of the cow which has been previously perceived, it possesses a tail which is hairy at the extremity. The possession of a dew-lap, again, is simply a well-known mark of being a cow.—8.

Touch infers Air.

Upaskāra.—Having thus pointed out, according to observation, the probative value of inference by which all human affairs are carried on, he, intending to begin the section of proof of Air, says:

स्पर्शश्च वायोः ॥ २ । १ । ६ ॥

स्पर्शः Sparsaḥ, Touch. च Cha, and वायोः Vāyoḥ, of air.

9. And Touch (is a mark) of Air.—57.

'Līṅgam,' mark, is the complement of the aphorism. By the word 'cha' Sound, upholding, and quivering are brought forward.

It cannot be said, "The Touch which is being perceived must be of Earth itself of which the Colour is not yet developed," because the developed Touch of Earth cannot be separated from developed Colour. Hence the Touch which is perceived, being Touch, must reside somewhere, like the Touch of Earth, etc. Some foundation of Touch being thus proved by inference, by analogy, (*Sāmānyato dṛiṣṭam*), the foundation of Touch is not identical with the triad of Earth, etc., because it does not possess Colour, nor is it identical with the pentad of Ether, etc., as it possesses Touch. Therefore by the inference together with the exclusion of others a Substance over and above the eight Substances is proved. In like manner a particular Sound also is a mark of Air. Thus in the absence of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, the series of Sounds (arising in leaves, etc.) which is heard amongst leaves, etc., must be occasioned by the impact of substances possessing Touch and Impetus, like the series of sounds produced in a drum by the percussion of the drumstick, because it is a series of sounds which is in relation to a substance the parts of which are indivisible. The absence of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, is, again, known by the non-perception of what might be expected or the co-relative. And from exhaustion that Substance possessing Touch and Impetus is verily an addition to the group of the eight substances. Similarly, a particular upholding also is a mark of Air. Thus the steadiness or flotation of grass, cotton, cloud, and air-ship in the sky, is due to the conjunction of some substance possessing Touch and Impetus, since it is the flotation of substance which are not presided over by a conscious being, like the flotation of grass, wood, boat, etc., on a stream ; whereas in the flotation of poison, etc., caused by thought directed towards it, human and other influence is without doubt present. So also in the upholding of the bird, the branch of a tree, etc. Nor is the distinctive mark not proved on account of its being influenced by God, because by the word 'conscious' all else except God is meant. Similarly, quivering too is a mark of the existence of Air. Thus this Action in grass, etc., without the impact of Substances possessing Colour, is due to the impact of some Substance possessing Touch and Impetus, because it is an Action which is not produced by Weight and Conjunction of Soul exercising Volition, like the Action of a cane-bush when struck by the waves of a river. The word 'weight' implies Conjunction of Soul attended with *adṛiṣṭam* (invisible after-effects of past acts), Fluidity and Impression ; hence the being an action not produced by them is the mark.

r It cannot be said, "Air is only an object of sense-perception and that therefore there is no need of the investigation of its marks ;" for, Air is not perceptible ; only its supersensuousness is proved by the inference : "Being a colourless external Substance, it is like Ether." It cannot be replied "Its perceptibility is inferred in this way that being the seat of Touch Air is perceptible like the water-pot ;" for the possession of developed Colour is here the condition, *upādhi*. If it be objected, "In the case of Colour, etc., as well as Soul, it is not pervasive of the major term, since it pervades the major term when the latter is determined by the being the external substance which is the minor term

containing the middle term, or is determined by the middle term which is the means of inference. Nor does it govern a body's being an object of visual perception, because it is there that its presence and absence are observed as a rule. On the other hand, a body's being an object of tactual perception is governed by the mere possession of an adequate Touch." We reply, that both the presence and absence of Colour govern here; for perceptibility only by means of Touch proved by both positive and negative marks, has not been observed without the perception of Colour. Moreover, if Air were an object of sense-perception, then it would govern also the apprehension of general Attributes, e.g., Number, etc. If it be objected, "Perceptibility does belong to Number in blowing by the mouth, etc., to Measure or Extension, e.g., cubit, span, etc., and to Separateness as well as to Priority and Posteriority of two Airs existing on both sides. On the other hand, it is not the rule according to you also that they are perceptible by means of there being individual masses of Air, because they are not observed in the cloth, etc., lying on the back." We reply, that it is the rule that they are perceived by means of there being individual masses of Air. Number, etc., are obtained in the cloth, etc., fixed upon the back, if they lie straight; if they are not obtained, it is because of the defect that the latter do not lie straight. "Developed Colour and Touch govern the perceptibility of external substances, only when they operate jointly. Light, the yellow substance within the eye, and the radiation or heat of the moon are not perceptible because their Touch is undeveloped. Hotness as in summer, heat and Watery Substances the parts of which have been dispersed (steam) are not perceptible, because Colour is undeveloped there." This is the view of the commentator of Nyāya-Vārtikas. "But light, etc., are really perceptible although Touch is undeveloped. Therefore the Conjunction and Disjunction of the bird and the branch of the tree are really perceptible in the sky under moonlight." So say those who know the traditions of the system. Nor can it be said that the possession of developed Touch (universally) excites to the perceptibility of universally external Substances, for then the light of the emerald would be non-perceptible. Nor is only the possession of the developed distinctive Attribute the governing condition, for then Ether too would become perceptible. Nor again is the possession of the developed distinctive Attribute co-existent with the ensuant or resulting magnitude, such condition, for the bilious substance existing at the tip of the tongue is imperceptible in spite of the development or manifestation of bitterness. Therefore only the possession of developed or manifested Colour governs the perceptibility of all Substances except Soul. And this is not present in Air. Hence Air is not an object of sense-perception.—9.

Touch which infers Air, cannot be explained by visible objects.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, "Here there is no mark which can be known by sense-perception. For here the pervasion or universal relation is not obtained by sense perception like that of fire and smoke. Moreover this will be also the Touch of one or other only of Earth etc." Therefore he says,

न च दृष्टानां स्पर्शं त्यदृष्टलिङ्गो वायुः ॥ २ । १ । १० ॥

न Na, not. च Cha, and. दृष्टानां Dṛṣṭānām, of the observed or visible

or seen. **स्पर्शः** Sparśaḥ, touch. **इति** Iti, hence. **अदृष्टलिङ्गः** A-dṛṣṭa-liṅgaḥ, not-containing-the-mark-of-the-visible **वायुः** Vāyuḥ, air.

10. And it is not the Touch of the visible (Substances) ; hence the mark (of the inference) of Air is not the mark of the visible (Substances).—58.

The Touch which is made the subject of enquiry does not belong to visible Substances, *viz.*, Earth, Water, and Fire, because it is not accompanied by Colour. Therefore the inference is that this Touch resides somewhere. Hence in virtue of the middle-term, *i. e.*, the mark of inference, being contained somewhere, we get Air although the mark is not the mark of the visible Substances, *i. e.*, although the mark is observed in analogous Substances. This is the meaning. Although only the quartet of observed Touch, etc., are the mark, yet because their relation with Air is not apprehended, therefore it is said that the mark of Air is not the mark of the visible Substances. For it is not possible to prove Air after first proposing that this which possesses this or that property is Air. Therefore the import is that the proof of Air is by inference from analogy together with the exclusion of (possible) others (*i. e.*, by hypothesis).—10.

Air is a Substance.

Upaskṛta.—Having proved Air as a whole made up of parts, which is the foundation of Touch capable of being perceived, he says, with a view to prove Air characterised as ultimate atoms :

अद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यम् ॥ २ । १ । ११ ॥

अद्रव्यवत्त्वेन A-dravya-vattvena, by not containing Substance (as its support). **द्रव्यम्** Dravyam, Substance.

11. Air is a Substance, because it does not contain or reside in Substance.—59.

'Dravyavat' means that which has Substance as its support. 'Adravyat,' *i. e.*, not 'dravyavat,' means not resident in or supported by Substance. Thus like Ether, Air characterised as ultimate atom is a Substance, because the other Predicables reside in substances, because it has been stated that the being resident, *i. e.*, 'dependence, applies elsewhere than in eternal Substances, and because the origination of a large whole made up of parts is capable of being demonstrated by the evolution of dyads, etc., from the formation of a dyad by two ultimate atoms, and so on.—11.

Air is a Substance.—continued.

Upaskṛta.—Bringing forward two (more) marks or grounds of establishing the Substance-ness of the ultimate atoms of Air, he says :

क्रियावत्त्वात् गुणवत्त्वाच्च ॥ २ । १ । १२ ॥

क्रियावत्त्वात् Kriyā-vattvāt, because of possession of Action. **गुणवत्त्वात्** Guṇavattvāt, because of possession of Attribute. **च** Cha, and.

12. (Air is a substance), also because it possesses Action and Attribute.—60.

‘The ultimate atom of Air is a Substance’—this is the complement of the aphorism. Although there is this mutual dependence or correlation that Substance-ness being proved, the possession of Action and the possession of Attribute are also proved and in their proof the proof of Substanteness lies, yet the possession of Action is proved by this that the ultimate atom which is the constituent element of the composite whole which is the foundation of the Touch which is being perceived, cannot be established otherwise than by the Conjunction of the non-combinative cause ; and the possession of Attribute is proved by the rule that the Touch, Colour, etc., of the composite whole are preceded by like Attributes in its cause ; and by these two Substance-ness also is proved ; so that here there is no fault, namely repetition or vicious circle. Of these the possession of Action extends to a portion of the objects of the same ascertained class, while the possession of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class, which the possession of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class. The word ‘cha’ brings forward the characteristic of being combinative cause, which proves Substance-ness.

If it be objected, “There is no proof (of the existence) of ‘the ultimate atoms themselves. Then the Substance-ness of which is being proved ?,” we reply that by the maxim of the division, etc., of the action of dense effects, a body which is being divided and sub-divided becoming smaller, smallest, etc., that than which no smaller unit can be obtained, the same is the ultimate atom. If the relation of part and whole were unlimited, then it would follow that the mountain Sumeru and a mustard seed, etc., will have the same Measure or Mass, because in that case they would resemble one another in possessing infinite parts, and because without the distinction of the number of causes (*i. e.*, constituent elements), measure and magnitude, mass and volume, do not rule the difference of Measure. It cannot be said that this relation of part and whole continues only up to the limit of destruction for that which remains at the end having no parts, its destruction is not possible ; and if it contains parts, then non-finality will be the result, and its defect has been already pointed out. If it is said, “*Truṭi* (*i. e.*, a minute part) is the limit, because it is visible and there is no reason for the supposition of something invisible,” we rejoin that as it is a visible Substance it must possess extension or largeness and many Substances.

Hence as in the case of Earth, etc., so also in the case of Air, the part of the part of a combination of three atoms, is really the ultimate atom. Thus the ultimate atom of Air is proved.—12.

Air is eternal.

Upaskāra.—It may be said that because Air possesses Action and Attribute, therefore, like the water-pot, etc., it should be inferred to be non-eternal. Hence he says :

अद्रव्यत्वेन नित्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ २ । १ । १३ ॥

अद्रव्यत्वेन *Adravyatvena*, by not residing in or combining with other Substances. *नित्यत्वं* *Nityatvam*, eternity. *उक्तम्* *Uktam*, said.

13. The eternity (of Air) is evident from its not combining with other Substances.—61.

"Of Air characterised as ultimate atom" this is the complement of the aphorism. A Substance is destroyed by the destruction of the one or the other of its combinative and non-combinative causes. But the ultimate atom containing no parts, both of these causes do not belong to it. Therefore there being nothing to destroy it, it is not liable to destruction. Where the possession of Action and Attribute is the cause of non-eternality, there the possession of parts is the condition, *upādhi*, and this condition pervades the major term which is determined by the Substanceness of the minor term; whereas the condition which is pervasive of the major term as such, is the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence.—13.

Vivṛiti.—Some read the first word of the aphorism as 'adravyadravyatvena' (instead of 'adravyatvena'), (meaning "by its being a Substance which does not contain any other Substance").

Air is manifold.

Upaskāra.—In order to prove, in a different manner also, the plurality of Air which has been already proved in the proof of its origination by the course of dyas etc., he says :

वायोर्वायुसंमूर्च्छनं नानात्वलिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । १४ ॥

वायोः, Vāyoḥ, of Air. वायुसंमूर्च्छनं Vāyusaṁmūrccchhanam, concurrence or collision with Air. नानात्वलिङ्गं Nānātva-liṅgam, mark of diversity or plurality.

14. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its plurality.—62.

'Vāyusaṁmūrccchhanam' means the collision, *i. e.*, a mode of conjunction, of two or more Airs. It is the co-incidence, the falling in together, of two Airs of equal Impetus, flowing in opposite directions and producing contrary Actions. And it is inferred from the flying upwards of grass, cotton, etc., because the flowing upwards and also the falling in together of two Airs, are beyond the reach of the senses, whereas the perceptible Action characterised as flying upwards of grass, etc., which are perceptible, is inferred to be produced either by the impact or the vibration (*i. e.*, the molar or the molecular movement) of Substances possessing Touch, and Impetus. Thus the flowing upwards of Air the nature of which is to flow obliquely, not being capable of proof or possible without mutual collision, proves the mutual collision, the same being observed in the case of the water and the wave of the river. Their going upwards also is to be inferred by the going upwards of grass, etc. For the going upwards of grass, etc., is not possible without either the collision or the internal vibration of Substances possessing Touch and Impetus.—14.

No visible mark of Air.

Upaskāra.—It has been stated that the mark of Air is not like the mark of the visible Substances. But how is it so? Hence he says :

वायुसन्निकर्षे भ्रत्यभावाद् दृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ २।१।१५॥

वायुसन्निकर्षे Vāyu-sannikarṣe, in contact or association with Air. प्रत्यक्षाभावात् Pratyakṣābhāvāt, from the absence of perception. दृष्टं Dṛiṣṭam' visible. लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

15, There being no preception of the association (*i. e.*, universal relation) with Air, there is no visible mark (of the existence of Air).—63.

There the mark is said to be visible where the universal relation is grasped by perception, as smoke is of fire. But in the case of association with Air, there is no perception of the appearance of the mark in accompaniment with Air. For Air itself not being an object of sense-perception, nobody can have the perception. "Things which give Touch, quivering, etc., are Air." Therefore the meaning is that no such mark exists the pervasion of which can be grasped by perception.—15.

Air is inferred not as such but as a Substance in general.

Upaskṛta.—How then can there be any inference at all of Air? Hence to strengthen what has been already stated, he says :

सामान्यतो दृष्टाञ्चाविशेषः ॥ २ । १ । १६ ॥

सामान्यतोदृष्टात् Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭāt, from the method of inference known as general inference or inference by analogy. च Cha, and अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ not in particular, General.

16. And, by inference by analogy, (Air is proved) not as a particular substance, (but as Substance only).—64.

Inference is three-fold : from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and from the commonly observed to the unobserved, or from analogy. Thus this Touch which is being felt, must reside somewhere, because it is a Touch or because it is an Attribute. From this analogy or common observation or experience, accompanied by the exclusion of other possibilities, its residence in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances, is proved. This is the meaning.

It cannot be said that the inference from effect to cause is then gone. For after the exclusion of other possibilities, where analogy prevails, there proceeding upon the proved qualification of the minor term that it does not reside in the eight Substances, the proposition that this) Touch which does not reside in the eight Substances must reside somewhere, does not result except on the assumption of its being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances. Therefore the proposed object being not explained otherwise, it is proved by inference from cause to effect alone. But where analogy arises from the appearance of exclusion at the very beginning, there the proposed object results at last and the mode of inference is found to be inference from effect to cause. It is not sound to hold that inference from effect to cause only shows the manner, for in the case of being accompanied by the exclusion of other possibilities, inference from cause to effect itself comes to show the manner. The rule also that inference merely shows the manner which determines the pervasiveness, is not valid, for the appearance of a different manner is possible from the association of particular materials.—16.

The name Air is derived from Scripture.

Upaskāra.—But if it is intended to be said that according to “not as a particular Substance” in the last aphorism, there is no inference in the form, “This is Air,” but that Air is inferred by way of the mark being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances, then what is the evidence of that Substance being called by the name of Air? So he says:

तस्मादागमिकम् ॥ २ । १ । १७ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore **आगमिकं** Āgamikam, proved by revelation, i. e., the Veda.

17. Therefore the name, Air, is proved by the Veda.—65.

Because there is no inference in the particular form, therefore the name Air is proved by *āgama*, i. e., the Veda. This is the meaning. “Air is the moving deity,” “One should offer a white goat to Air,” “And this Air is all colour, the carrier of all smells, and pure,”—from these and other recommendation, which have acquired the force of regulations, the name, Air, is obtained. As the name, heaven, is obtained from the recommendation “That which is not pierced with pain nor is clouded afterwards;” the name, barley, from the recommendation, “The leaves of all crop-plants fall off in spring. But the barley plants possessing ears of corn thrive in it as if with joy;” the name, cane, from the recommendation, “cane is born in water;” and the name, bear, from the recommendation, “cows run after the bear.” Otherwies, in the case of such instructions as “He who desires heaven should perform sarifice,” etc., in the non-appearance of the particular happiness for the time being, men desiring heaven will not be inclined towards the performance of sacrifice, etc. Nor will there be any arrest of activity according to the usage of the Mlechchhas, i. e. the impure, in respect of “His becomes a mess of barley.” “He kindles the creative fire on a cane mat.” “Shoe of bear-skin,” etc., for the Mlechchhas apply the words barley, bear, and cane, to yellow paddy, crow, and black-berry (of jackal,) respectively. Thus there will be room for doubt without those recommendations. Therefore their respective meanings are known from the Veda only. This is the import. Only the name is proved by the Veda; the proof of the Substance, however, is really by analogy.—17.

Existence of God.

Upaskāra.—Having thus finished the section on Air, he establishes that the Veda is the revelation by the All-knower, in order to answer the objection, “Is then the name, Air, also, like the names, *dittha* and *davittha* (i. e., the gibberish or abracadabra), uttered by a mad man?”, and with a view to open the section on *Iśvara* or God, he says,

संज्ञा-कर्म त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । १८ ॥

संज्ञा-कर्म Sañjñā-karmma, name and effect. **तु** Tu, on the other hand. But. **त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां** Asmad-viśiṣṭānām, beings distinguished from, other than, or superior to ourselves. **लिङ्गम्** Liṅgam, mark.

18. But name and effect are the mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves.—66.

The word 'tu' has the sense of differentiating from such other marks as Touch, etc. 'Smjñā' i. e., name, 'karmma' effect, e. g., Earth, etc.—both of them are the mark of the existence also of beings distinguished from ourselves, namely, Īśvara and great sages.—18.

Existence of God.—continued.

Upaskāra.—He explains how it is so :

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात् संज्ञाकर्मणः ॥ २ । १ । १६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात् Pratyakṣa-pravṛtṭvāt because they follow from perception, **संज्ञाकर्मणः** Sañjñā-karmmaṇaḥ, of name and effect.

19. Because name and effect follow from perception.—67.

Here also the singular form or the resolution into one, of 'name' and 'effect,' from the copulative compound meaning collection, is intended to indicate the identity of the author of the name and the author of the universe. Thus he only is competent to give the names 'heaven,' *apārva* (i. e., that which was not before, that is to say, *adṛṣṭam*), etc., with whom 'heaven,' *apārva*, etc., are objects of sense-perception, as in the giving the names, 'Chaitra,' 'Maitra,' etc., to the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., which are perceptible, by their father and others. Similarly, the application of the names, 'pot,' 'cloth,' etc., is only under the direction of Īśvara. The word which has been directed by Īśvara in a particular place, the same is appropriate there; e. g., 'all those herbs which have been touched by the edge of the mon-goose's tooth, counteract the venom of the snake.' Such direction is the mark, i. e., the means of inference, of beings distinguished from ourselves. And the name, 'Maitra,' etc., which the father gives to the son, that also is surely directed by Īśvara by such rules as "The father should give a name (to the son) on the twelfth day."

Thus it is proved that naming is a mark of the existence of Īśvara.

In like manner action, i. e., effect, also is a mark of the existence of Īśvara; for, thus, Earth, etc., must have a creator, because they are effects like a pot, etc.

Here Earth, etc., do not mean a product producible by the body, nor a product producible by the volition of another product; nor a product which has become the subject-matter of dispute as to whether it has been produced by an agent or not, nor a product the production of which by an agent has been the subject of doubt, because Earth, etc., also are producible by the volition of another product by means of *adṛṣṭa* (i. e., invisible after-effects of voluntary acts), and because dispute and doubt, being too wide, do not determine the minor term. Moreover, if by the expression that they have a creator, it is meant that they are the products of an active principle, then production in question may be explained by reference to ourselves, etc., for the causality of ourselves also is productive of Earth, etc., by means of *adṛṣṭa* (the invisible after-effects of past acts). It is the same also if the product be producible by an active principle operating upon given materials, for the acts or ourselves, etc., also are relative to some given

material. Then if the being effect, on the other hand, means the being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence (or potential existence), then it will include annihilation also. But notwithstanding all this, earth must have a creator because it is an effect. Here the having a creator means the being the product of an active principle independently of *adriṣṭa*, and being an effect means the being the counter-opposite of existence determined by prior non-existence. In the case of sprouts, etc., there is no fault of doubtfulness or multifariousness, for these faults arise where there is doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the middle term when the non-existence of the major term has to be ascertained; for otherwise all inference will have to be abandoned. Nor should it be said that this is the fault beyond the minor term, for it will entail the command of the king; for it is not the glory or a fault that it does not attack the minor term. Therefore at the stage of sprouting, the proof of the existence of the major term (in the minor term) by the mark or middle term the universal relation of which is well ascertained, being unobstructed, where is the doubtfulness or multifariousness? And *a fortiori* at the stage of non-sprouting, those faults verily do not exist. Thus in brief.--19.

Marks of Ether, according to Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Upaśāra.—Having thus finished the section on Īvara, by the last two aphorisms, and desiring to begin the section Ether, he says :

निष्क्रमणं प्रवेशनमित्याकाशस्य लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । २० ॥

निष्क्रमणं Niskramanam, egress, प्रवेशनं Praveśanam, ingress. इति Iti, such, आकाशस्य Ākaśasya, of Ether लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark.

20. Egress and Ingress—such is the mark (of the existence) of Ether.--68.

The word 'it' signifies manner and brings forward Actions, namely, Throwing upwards, etc., also. Egress and Ingress are the movement of Substances possessing Touch. That is the mark of the existence of Ether, which is not an effect. This is the view of the Sāṅkhya philosophers--20.

The above are no marks.

Upaśāra.—To discredit this view he says :

तदलिङ्गमेकद्रव्यत्वात् कर्मणः ॥ २ । १ । २१ ॥

तत् Tat, that, i. e., movement or egress and ingress. अलिङ्गं Aliṅgam, no mark एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravyatvât, having but one Substance. कर्मणः Karmṇaḥ, of an action.

21. That is no mark, as an Action has but one Substance (as its combinative cause).—69.

Actions such as egress, ingress, etc., do not at all infer Ether as their combinative cause, because Action 'has but one Substance,' in other words, has only corporal Substance as its combinative cause.

Action also, it has been already stated, does not simultaneously appear in more than one place, nor does it appear in non-corporal Substances.—21.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Lest it might be said that egress, ingress, etc., will infer Ether as their non-combinative cause, so he says :

कारणान्तरानुक्लृप्तिवैधर्म्याच्च ॥ २ । १ । २२ ॥

कारणान्तरानुक्लृप्तिवैधर्म्यात् Kāraṇāntarānu-klṛiptivaidharmyāt, on account of difference from the characteristic or sign of another cause. **च** Cha, and.

22. And also because they differ in property from the characteristic of another (*i.e.*, the non-combinative) cause.—70.

‘Anuklṛipti’ means characteristic or sign, by the etymology ‘that by which a thing is made known.’ The meaning is : on account of difference from that which is the characteristic of another cause, *i.e.*, the non-combinative cause.

Substance does not surely at all become a non-combinative cause. Now non-combinative causality arises by proximity in the same object with the cause, or by proximity in the same object with the effect. The first is illustrated in the case of the colours of the yarns towards the colour of the cloth. And this non-combinative causality is called ‘great,’ as it produces a larger effect. The second is as that of the conjunction of Soul and Mind towards knowledge, or cognition, etc. And this non-combinative causality is called ‘small,’ as it produces a smaller effect. But Ether is neither the combinative cause nor, again, the non-combinative cause of egress, ingress, and other Actions. Hence Action is not a mark of the existence of Ether.—22.

Virṛiti.—He says that Action does not infer Ether even as its non-combinative cause.

On the maxim that a verbal affix signifies an object, ‘anuklṛipti’ (agreement) means ‘anuklṛipta,’ *i.e.*, that which is agreed to by the opposite disputants ; and such a different caused is the non-combinative cause, *viz.*, Attribute and Action. Therefore the meaning is that egress, etc., do not warrant the inference of Ether as their non-combinative cause, because difference from Attribute and Action (which are non-combinative causes), in the form of Substance-ness, exists in Ether.

The above are no marks—continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be said, “Let Ether be the occasional cause of Action, for the movements of birds and arrows, etc., are seen in Ether.” So he says :

संयोगादभावः कर्मणः ॥ २ । १ । २३ ॥

संयोगात् Samyogāt, on account of Conjunction. **अभावः** Abhāvaḥ, non-production. **कर्मणः** Karmmaṇaḥ of Action.

23. Action is not produced on account of Conjunction.—71.

The non-production of Action is due to the obstruction of Impetus, Gravity, etc., which are the causes of Action, by Conjunction with corporal substances, and is not due to the non-existence of Ether which is all-pervasive. Therefore the meaning is that the presence of or agreement with Sky which should be really explained otherwise, does not prove that Ether is the occasional cause of Action.—23.

Inference of Ether by Sound.

Upaskāra.—Having thus discredited the Sāṅkhya view, and going to prove Sound as the mark of Ether he prepares the ground for inference by exhaustion, by saying :

कारणगुणपूर्वकः कार्यगुणो दृष्टः ॥ २ । १ । २४ ॥

कारणगुणपूर्वकः Kāraṇa-guṇā-pūrvvakah, preceded by the Attributes of the cause. **कार्यगुणः** Kāryya-guṇāḥ, Attribute of the effect. **दृष्टः** Dṛiṣṭah, is seen or observed.

24. The Attribute of the effect is seen to be preceded by the Attribute of the cause.—72.

The particular Attributes such as colour, etc., which exist in the effect characterised as Earth, etc., are found to be preceded by like Attributes in their causes. Sound also is a particular or distinctive Attribute, for in spite of its being a 'class,' it is, like colour, etc., apprehended by only one of the external senses. Thus the meaning is that such effect is not observed in which sound preceded by a like Attribute in the cause thereof may appear.—24.

Sound not an Attribute of tangible things.

Upaskāra.—It might be said that Sound is observed in a lute, flute, tabour, conchshell, drum, etc., which are effects and that consequently it is preceded by a like Attribute in their causes. So he says :

कार्यान्तराप्रादुर्भावाच्च शब्दः स्पर्शवतामगुणः ॥ २ । १ । २५ ॥

कार्यान्तराप्रादुर्भावत् Kāryyāntarāprādurbhāvat, because of the non-appearance of another or a different effect. **च** Cha, and. **शब्दः** Śabdaḥ, sound. **स्पर्शवतः** Sparśavatām, of thing possessing Touch. **अगुणः** Aguṇah, not attribute.

25. Sound is not an Attribute of things possessing Touch, because of the non-appearance of (similar) other effects.—73.

It would have been so, if, as when Colour, Taste, etc., are observed in yarns, potsherd, etc., other Colour, Taste, etc., homogeneous with the former, are also observed in a cloth, pot, etc., so the congener of the sound which is observed in the constituent parts of a lute, flute, tabour, etc., were also observed in the wholes made up of those, i. e., lute, flute, tabour, etc. But this is not the case ; for, in fact, it is seen that a lute, etc., are originated by constituent parts which are destitute of all Sound, whereas it is not seen that a cloth, a pot, etc., have their origin in yarns, potsherds, etc., which are destitute of Colour. Moreover if Sound were a particular Attribute of tangible things, then the relation of high and low and lower tones, etc., would not be observed

in it. For Colour, etc., which appear in a single composite whole are not observed to be varying in degree. Therefore Sound is not a distinctive Attribute of tangible things.—25.

Bhāṣya.—reads II. I. 25 as two sphorisms, viz., Also because of the non-appearance of different effects (*Kārya-antara-aprādurbhāvāt cha*), and Sound (is) not an attribute of tangible things (*Śabdah śharsavatām agnāḥ*),—the meaning, however, remaining the same.

Nor of Soul, nor of Mind.

Upaskāra.—But, it might be said, Sound will be either an Attribute of Soul or an Attribute of Mind. So he says :

परत्वं समवायात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च नात्मगुणो न मनोगुणः ॥ २ । १ । २६ ॥

परत्वं Paratra, elsewhere, with other objects. *समवायात्* Samavâyât, because of combination. *प्रत्यक्षत्वात्* Pratyakṣatvât, because it is an object of sense-perception. *च* Cha, and ; also. *न* Na, not. *आत्मगुणः* Ātma-guṇah, an Attribute of Soul. *न* Na, not. *मनोगुणः* Mano-guṇah, an Attribute of Mind.

26. Because it combines with other objects, and because it is an object of sense-perception, therefore sound is neither an Attribute of Soul nor an Attribute of Mind.—74.

If sound were an Attribute of Soul, then there would be such states of consciousness as “ I am filled (with Air),” “ I am sounded,” “ I give out Sound,” etc., as there are such state as “ I am happy,” “ I try,” “ I know,” “ I desire,” etc. But it is not the case, on the contrary, the experience of all men is that a conch-shell is filled with Air, a lute is played upon, etc. Moreover, Sound is not an Attribute of Soul, because, like colour, etc., it is apprehended by the external sense. Also if Sound were a particular Attribute proper to Soul, then it would be, like pain, etc., perceived by a deaf man also. Therefore it has been rightly said, “ Because it combines with other objects.” He states the reason of its not being an Attribute of Mind, by saying “ Because it is an object of sense-perception.” The fact that the words *ātman* and *manas* have not been compounded, as they could have been, in the form “ *naātmanamanasor guṇah*,” indicates that, by the logic or law of similars, the very same reason, “ Because it is an object of sense-perception,” excludes the idea that Sound might be an Attribute of Space or of Time even.—26.

Therefore of Ether.

Upaskāra.—He states why this method of exhaustion has been applied :

परिषेवालिङ्गमाकाशस्य ॥ २ । १ । २७ ॥

परिषेवात् Pariśeśât, from exhaustion, *लिङ्गं* Liṅgam, mark. *आकाशस्य* Ākaśasya, of Ether.

27. By the method of exhaustion (Sound) is the mark of Ether.—75.

‘ Sound ’ is the complement of the aphorism. Here too a Substance, over and above the eight Substances, is proved by analogous inference,

in this way that, being an Attribute, Sound, like Colour, etc., must reside somewhere. And it is an Attribute, because, like Colour, etc., it belongs to a 'class' capable of being apprehended by only one external sense. Being non-eternal, it resembles knowledge, etc., both of which are combined with 'Universal Substances.' And its non-eternality will be shown later on. The Substance, proved by exhaustion, is eternal, as there is no reason for the supposition of constituent parts in it, and is also universal, because Sound is observed in all places.—27.

Bhāṣya.—The idea of *Kaṇāda* is that Time as well as Space are really identical with Ether.

Ether is a Substance, and is eternal.

Upaśkāra.—To prove, by analogy or over-extension, the Substance-ness and eternality of Ether of which the mark is Sound, he says :

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुनाव्याख्याते ॥ २ । १ । २८ ॥

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. **वायुना** Vāyunā, by Air **व्याख्याते** Vyākhyāto, explained.

28. The Substance-ness and eternality of Ether have been explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—76.

As Air is eternal because it does not possess any other Substance as its combinative cause, so also is Ether. As Air is a Substance because it possesses Attributes, so also is Ether. This is the meaning.—28.

Ether is one.

Upaśkāra.—Is there then one Ether or are there many Ethers? To this he replies :

तत्त्वन्भावेन ॥ २ । १ । २९ ॥

तत्त्वं 'Tattvam, that-ness. O-ness. Unity. **भावेन** Bhāvena, by existence.

29. The unity (of Ether is explained) by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—77.

The agreement of the words in the aphorism is with 'vyākhyātam' (or explained), i. e., the same word, as in the last aphorism, with the inflection changed. The meaning is that as 'Bhāvaḥ,' i. e., Existence, is one, so also Ether is only one and not many.—29.

Above continued.

Upaśkāra.—It may be asked, "The unity of Existence is proved by the virtue of a similitive experience. How will unity be proved in Ether, by comparison with that?" So he says :

शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषाद्विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्च ॥ २ । १ । ३० ॥

शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषात् Śabdalingāviśeṣāt, because there is no difference in Sound which is the mark. **विशेषलिङ्गाभावात्** Viśeṣalingābhāvāt, because there exists no distinguishing mark. च Cha, and.

30, (Ether is one), because there is no difference in Sound which is its mark, and because there exists no other distinguishing mark.—78.

The sense is that the unity of Ether is proved. Ether being ubiquitous or universal, all Sounds are explained by their having that one and the same foundation or seat. Therefore to suppose a different basis will be shewing an exuberance of imagination. Besides the very same Sound must be the mark of the different Ether which is to be supposed, and that, *i. e.*, Sound, is undifferentiated; nor is there any other mark which can prove the differentia or the difference or division. It will be stated afterwards (III. ii-20) that although the mark, *e. g.*, knowledge, etc., of Souls is really non-differentiated, still the plurality of Souls is proved by other marks, according to 'difference of conditions' or circumstances.—50.

Virtuti. Plurality of Souls is proved by the differences of the products of the Soul, *viz.*, pleasure and pain, seeing that at one and the same time an effect in the form of pleasure is produced in one Soul, while in another Soul an effect in the form of pain is produced. But in the case of Ether there is no differentiation of Sound which is its mark, whereby a multiplicity of Ether might be established. Nor is there any other mark which can establish a plurality of Ether. So that no account of the absence of proof, and no account of simplicity, Ether is one and not many.

Individuality of Ether.

Upaskara.—It may be said, "Let unity by all means belong to Ether. Let it also have extreme largeness as it is universal. Let Conjunction and Disjunction also belong to it as it is the non-combinative cause of Sound. But how can individuality belong to it?" So he says :

तदनुविधानादेकपृथक्त्वञ्चेति ॥ २ । १ । ३१ ॥

तदनुविधानात् Tad-anu-bidhānāt, because it follows or accompanies that, *i. e.* unity. **एकपृथक्त्वं** Eka-prithaktvam, separateness of one individuality. **च** Cha, and. **इति** Iti, finished

31. And individuality also belongs to Ether, since individuality follows unity.—79.

Individuality is proved by this that individuality regularly goes together with unity. 'Iti' indicates the end of the chapter.

The subject-matter of the chapter is the definition or statement of the characteristics possessing particular Attributes and which are not the objects of mental perception or perception by the internal organ. Hence the characteristics of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether and, in passing, of the divine Soul also, are stated in this chapter. Thus Earth possesses fourteen Attributes, and these Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Measure, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity, and Impression. Exactly the same number of Attributes, with the exception of Smell and addition of Viscidity, belong to Water. These same Attributes, with the exception of Taste, Smell, Viscidity, and Gravity

belong to Fire, and with the exception of Smell, Taste, Colour, Gravity, Viscidity, and Fluidity, belong to Air. With the addition of Sound, the five Attributes beginning with Number, belong to Ether. Only the five Attributes beginning with Number belong to Space and Time. The five Attributes beginning with Number, together with Priority, Posteriority, and Impetus, belong to Mind. The five Attributes beginning with Number, and Cognition, Desire, and Volition belong to Īśvara.—31.

Here ends the first chapter of the second book in the Commentary given by Śāṅkara to the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇāda of great powers.

Vṛitti.—The subject-matter of this chapter is the definition of Substances possessing particular Attributes which do not appear in that which possesses 'bhāvanā,' i. e., impression or meditative understanding. Substances are the five elements and God.

BOOK SECOND—CHAPTER SECOND.

Smell may be essential or accidental.

Upaskāra.—Now the author desires to examine the characteristics, such as Smell, etc., of the “elements” (bhūta). Therefore, by way of establishing that Smell, etc., may be essential or natural as well as accidental or conditional, he says :

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः सति सन्निकर्षे गुणान्तराप्रदुर्भावो वस्त्रे

गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् ॥ २ । २ । १ ॥

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः Puṣpa-vastrayoh, of a flower and a cloth. सति Sati, existing. सन्निकर्षे Sannikarṣe, contact. गुणान्तराप्रदुर्भावः Guṇāntarāprā-durbhāvaḥ, non-appearance from another Attribute. वस्त्रे Vastre, in the cloth. गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् Gandhābhāva-liṅgam, mark of the non-existence of Smell.

1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived in the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from the Attribute (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the mark of the non-existence of smell in the cloth.—80.

Where Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are produced from the corresponding Attributes in the cause, there they become essential and so acquire the nature of being characteristic marks, and not otherwise. For, the fragrance which is perceived in the breeze, or the cold which is perceived in a tablet of stone, or the warmth which is perceived in water, does not become a characteristic. Therefore he says. ‘Of a flower and a cloth.’ For the fragrance of the golden *ketaki* (Pandanus Odoratissimus), which is perceived in the cloth when the cloth has been brought into contact with the golden *ketaki* flower, does not belong to the cloth, because it is not produced according to the (corresponding) Attribute of the cause (i. e., yarns). What, then? It is accidental or conditional, because due to the proximity of the golden *ketaki*; for the non-existence of Smell in the *ketaki* is not the mark of the non-existence of Smell in the cloth. What is the mark? So it has been said, “Non-appearance from another Attribute,” i. e., non-production from the Attribute of the cause. For, if the Smell, which is perceived in the cloth, were essential to it, then it would be perceived in the cloth also before the constituent parts, i. e., the yarns of the cloth, are brought into contact with the *ketaki*; but it is not so. This is the meaning. Thus the Smell in question is not inherent in the cloth, because, like cold and hot Touch, etc., it is a particular Attribute which is not produced by the Attribute of the constituent parts.—1.

Vivṛiti.—It has been already stated that the possession of Smell, etc., are the marks of Earth, etc. But this would not be proper. For Smell being perceived of Air, etc., combined with fragrant parts, the mark becomes too wide. For this reason he shows that the perception of Smell, etc., in Air, etc., is accidental.

Smell is essential in Earth.

Upaskāra.—He says that essential Smell is the mark of Earth :

व्यवस्थितः पृथिव्यां गन्धः ॥ २ । २ । २७ ॥

व्यवस्थितः Vyavasthitaḥ, established. **पृथिव्यां** Prithivyām, in Earth.
गन्धः Gandhaḥ, Smell.

2. Smell is established in Earth.—31.

'Established in the Earth'—i. e., determined by absence of connection as well as connection with other objects.* The meaning is that Smell is the mark, because it serves to differentiate Earth from objects of similar and dissimilar classes. For Earth has Smell only and only Earth has Smell. It is therefore established that Smell which differentiates Earth from the eight similars beginning with Water, and the five dissimilars beginning with Attribute, is essential to Earth.—2.

Vivṛiti.—'Established,' i. e., ascertained or undoubted, as there is nothing to oppose it.

Heat may be essential or accidental.

Upaskāra.—Extending the mode of establishing Smell as an essential Attribute, to Hotness also, which is the characteristic of Fire, he says :

एतेनोष्णता व्याख्याता ॥ २ । २ । ३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. **उष्णता** Uṣṇatā, Hotness. Warmth. **व्याख्याता** Vyākhyātā, explained.

3. By this hotness is explained.—82.

This extension or analogy should be understood also in the case of coldness, etc., which are the characteristics of Water, etc.—3.

Heat is essential in Fire.

Upaskāra.—He examines the characteristic of Fire :

तेजस उष्णता ॥ २ । २ । ४ ॥

तेजसः Tejasaḥ of Fire. **उष्णता** Uṣṇatā, Hotness.

4. Hotness (is the characteristic) of Fire.—83.

The meaning is that natural or essential Hotness is the characteristic of Fire. Colour, white and luminous, is also implied.—4.

Coldness is essential in Water.

Upaskāra.—He examines the characteristic of Water :

अप्सु शीतता ॥ १ । २ । ५ ॥

अप्सु Apsu, in Waters. **शीतता** Śītatā, Coldness.

* "Absence of connection as well as connection with other objects." i. e., Smell is always found in essential agreement with Earth and in essential difference from Non-Earth.

5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water.—84.

The meaning is that natural or essential coldness is the characteristic of water ; so that it is not too wide by over-extending to a stone-tablet, sandal-wood, etc. Colour and Taste also are said to be the characteristics of Water in the same way as coldness which also implies Viscidity and constitutional Fluidity.

It cannot be asked, " Why is there this breach in the order of the characteristics according to the enumeration of Earth, etc ? " Because it is intended to indicate that the Touch of Fire overcomes or overwhelms the Touch of Earth and the Touch of Water, and so the examination of Fire should of course come in between them. Or, the order has not been observed in order to introduce the examination of Air. Thus it should be inferred that Touch, which is neither hot nor cold and is not due to be the action of fire or heat, is essential to Air, and, as such, is its characteristic. This is the import.—5.

Vivṛiti.—The order of enumeration has been abandoned with the object of indicating that the mark of Air, i. e., the possession of a heterogeneous Touch, should be investigated in the same way. The explanation, given by the learned writer of the Upaskāra, namely that the violation of the order is intended to show that the Touch of Fire overcomes the Touches of Earth and Water, is not satisfactory. For it is known to all that in gold as well as in moon-light, etc., the Touches of Earth and Water overcome the Touch of Fire.

Marks of Time.

Upaskāra.—Thus it has been stated that particular Attributes such as smell, etc., of tangible things, which are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, are the characteristics of Earth, etc., Now he begins the section on the characteristic of Time, brought in by the order of enumeration, by saying :

अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपत् चिरं क्षिप्रमिति काललिङ्गानि ॥ २।२।६॥

अपरस्मिन् अपरस्मिन्, in respect of that which is posterior, अपरं Aparam, posterior. युगपत् Yugapat, simultaneous. चिरं Chiram, slow. क्षिप्रं Kṣipram, quick. इति Iti, such. काललिङ्गानि Kala-liṅgāni, marks of Time.

6. 'Posterior' in respect of that which is posterior, 'simultaneous', 'slow,' 'quick,'—Such (cognitions) are the marks of Time.—85.

The word ' iti ' which shows the mode of cognition, relates to each individual word ; so that the meaning is that the cognition ' it is posterior ' the cognition ' it is simultaneous,' the cognition ' it is slow or late,' the cognition ' it is quick or early,'—are the marks of Time. By ' posterior in respect of that which is posterior,' we are also to understand ' prior, in respect of that which is prior.' Therefore the sense is this : If we make a youth our point of view of starting point, then the cognition of Priority is produced in an old man, whose birth has been distanced by a large number of the revolutions of the sun ; and this

Priority depends upon some non-combinative cause. Now. Colour, etc., cannot be the non-combinative cause, owing to their variable presence. The three, beginning with Smell, do not produce Priority in respect of Air. Touch also, rendered different by the difference of hot, etc., is in each case variable in its presence. Nor is a fixed Measure the non-combinative cause, for it does not originate a heterogeneous object. Therefore it remains at last that, the revolutions of the sun being connected with a different substratum, conjunction with a Substance determined by those revolutions is really the required non-combinative cause. And that Substance, being conjoint both with the lump of matter on earth (*e. g.*, the body of a youth) as well as the sun, must be universal. If the characteristic of that Substance be supposed to be belonging to Ether, then it would follow that the beating of a drum at any place will produce Sound in all drums everywhere. Thus the Conjunction of Time alone, which is conjoint with the sun, with the lump of matter in question, is the non-combinative cause of Priority. It is Time which demonstrates the action of the sun, because, for the purpose of the determination of a different Substance in the case of the properties of a different Substance, the Soul is dependent upon an affinity in addition to its own propinquity, otherwise the redness of a *kusumbha* flower at Vārānasi (Benares) would entail redness in a crystal at Patna also. But Time being supposed to be of that very nature, this (*i. e.*, dependence upon another affinity) is no fault here. If it be asked, why Time also would not transmit colour, we reply, it is because Time has been established only as that which always demonstrates action.

In the same way, the production of Posteriority should be ascertained in a youth, with an old man as the starting point. 'Simultaneous': 'They are born simultaneously,' 'They exist simultaneously,' 'They act simultaneously,'—in such cognitions, 'simultaneously' means at the same time, during the same movement of the sun, in other words, at the same time as determined by the movement of the sun. It is not unconnected movements of the sun, which undergo the qualifications, *e. g.*, 'simultaneously born,' etc.; nor are these connected by their own nature. Therefore, these specific cognitions being incapable of a different proof, the Substance which establishes the specification, is Time.—6.

Like Air, Time is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskṛta.—It may be said, "Let Time be proved. But there is no proof that it is a Substance, nor that it is eternal." So he says :

व्यत्वानेत्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ । २ । ७ ॥

द्रव्यत्वानित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, substanceness and eternality. वायुना Vāyunā, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyākhyāte, explained.

7. The Substance-ness and eternality (of Time) are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—86.

The meaning is that, as the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance,

because it possesses Attributes, and is eternal, because it is a Substance which does not contain any other Substance, so also is Time.—7.

Like Existence, Time is one.

Upaskāra.—"Even then," it may be said, "there may be a plurality of Times." So he says :

तत्त्वभावेन ॥ २ । २ । ८ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvam, unity. भावेन Bhāvena, by Existence.

8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—87.

The aphorism has grammatical connection with the word 'vyākhyāte' in the last aphorism, reduced to the form 'vyākhyātam.' The meaning is : Time, like Existence, is one, because, in spite of their multiplicity, the marks of Time, viz., the cognition 'it is slow or late,' etc., are the same in all places, and because no distinguishing mark, like those of Souls, exists.

It may be objected, "Time is manifold according to the difference of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How then can it be one?" We reply that it is not so, because the appearance of difference is due to *upādhi* or an external condition. For, it is found, that as the self-same crystal appears to be different according to the reflection thrown upon it by the external condition or *upādhi* of a China rose, *tapiñja* (Xanthochymus Pictorius), etc., so also does the one and indivisible Time appear to be different according to the limit set by the movement of the Sun, etc., as well as according to the limit imposed by their respective effects. Thus moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the external condition of Time, which does not pervade or cover another external condition of Time, or it is Time which is not the receptacle of the counter-opposite of the prior as well as posterior non-existence of what is placed or contained in it ; and this should be understood from the production of something and the destruction of something at every moment. It is proved by the Veda that a 'lava,' is an aggregate of two moments, and so on.

"Yet," it may be objected, "Time must be at least three-fold, according to the difference of the past, the future, and the present ; for it is heard, 'The three times return,' 'The three Times are not accomplished or proved,' etc." We reply, it is not, for the use of three-fold Time is due to the limits of (the existence of) a thing, its prior non-existence, and its total destruction. The Time which is determined or delimited by a thing, is its present ; the Time which is delimited by the prior non-existence of a thing, is its future ; and the Time which is delimited by the total destruction of a thing, is its past. Thus the use of the threefoldness of Time depends upon the threefoldness of the determinant or that which delimits.—8.

Time, a cause of non-eternal Substances.

Upaskāra.—Here he says that Time is the cause of all that is produced.

नित्येष्वभावादनित्येषु भावात् कारणे कालाख्येति ॥ २।२।६॥

नित्येषु Nityeṣu, in eternal Substances. अभावात् Abhāvāt, because it does not exist. अनित्येषु Anityeṣu, in non-eternal Substances, भावात् Bhāvāt, Because it exists. कारणे Kāraṇe, in the cause. कालाख्या Kālākhyā, the name of Time. इति Iti, hence.

9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal substances.—88.

The word 'iti' is used in the sense of 'because.' For this reason the name Time is applicable to 'cause,' i. e., the cause of all that is produced. He states the reason :—"Because it does not exist in eternal, and because it exists in non-eternals." The meaning is this : Because in the case of the eternal such as Ether, etc., there do not arise the cognition, "produced simultaneously," "produced slowly or late," "produced quickly or early," "produced now," "produced during the day," "produced at night," etc., whereas cognitions of simultaneity, etc., do arise in the case of the non-eternals such as the pot, cloth, etc. ; therefore, by the methods of agreement as well as difference, Time is proved to be a cause. It is to be understood that Time is the occasional or efficient cause of all that is produced, not only in virtue of the cognitions of simultaneity, etc., but also in virtue of the application of the terms, hibernal, vernal, pluvial, etc., to flowers, fruits, etc.—9.

Vivṛiti.—In fact, scriptural texts such as "All is produced from Time," etc., are proof that Time is the cause of every thing that is an effect.

Mark of Space.

Upaskṛta.—Having finished the section on the mark of Time, and going to begin the section on the mark of Space, he says :

इत इदमिति यतस्तद्वियं लिङ्गम् ॥ २।२।१०॥

इत Itat, from this. इदम् Idam, this. इति Iti, such. यतः Yataḥ, whence तत् Tat, that. तद्वि Diśyam, relating to Space. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

10. That which gives rise to such (cognition and usage) as "This (is remote, etc.) from this,"—(the same is) the mark of Space.—89.

'Diśyam'—that which belongs to Space, i. e., is the mark of the inference of Space. The meaning is this : 'Space' is that substance 'from which,' in respect of two simultaneously existing bodies which are also fixed in (direction) and place, 'such' cognition and usage arise that 'this,' i. e., the ground or substratum of the conjunctions of a comparatively large number of conjoint things, is prior 'to,' (other than or distinct from) this i. e., the substratum of the conjunctions of a comparatively small number of conjoint things, and also that 'this,' i. e., the substratum of the comparative smallness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint; is 'posterior' to 'this,' i. e., the substratum of the

comparative largeness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint. For, without the existence of such a substance, there is no other means of establishing a comparatively large or small number of the conjunctions of the conjoint in the two bodies; nor, without such establishment, can there be any particular or concrete understanding about them respectively; nor, without such understanding, can Priority and Posteriority arise; nor, without their appearance, can there be concrete cognition and usage about them.

It cannot be said, "Let Time be the means also of establishing the conjunctions. What is the use of another Substance?" For Time is proved only as the means of establishing constant or unchangeable actions. If, on the contrary, it is supposed to be the means of establishing the inconstant or changing property of Remoteness, then it would establish the colouring of the paste of the saffron of Kāśmīra (Cashmere) on the breasts of the women of Kārṇāta (the Carnatic). The same will be the implication if Ether and Soul also are similarly made to be the means of communicating the property of Remoteness. Whereas Space being proved only as the invariable means of communicating the property of Remoteness, there is no such absurd implication. In this way Space, which establishes conjunctions, is really separate from Time, which establishes actions.

Moreover, these cognitions, namely "This is east of that," "This is south of that," "This is west of that," "This is north of that," "This is south-east of that," "This is south-west of that," "This is north-west of that," "This is north-east of that," "This is below that," "This is above that,"—are brought together by the statement "This from this," because it is not possible for these cognitions to have another occasional or efficient cause. Further, Time establishes external conditions or *upadhis* which are constant, while Space establishes external conditions or *upadhis* which are not constant. For, when one thing is 'present' (in Time) with reference to another thing, that other thing also is 'present' with reference to the former: but in the case of the external condition or *upadhi* of Space, there is no such rule or fixity, because that which is east in relation to a person, the very same sometime becomes west in relation to the same person. The same is to be observed with regard to north, etc., also. The direction or quarter which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun rises, with reference to another direction, is east in relation to the latter; the direction which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun sets, with reference to another direction, is west in relation to the latter. Nearness, again, is the fewness of the conjunctions of the conjoint; and these conjunctions with the sun, whether they be a few or many, are to be established by Space. In like manner, the direction, which is determined by the portion of Space falling on the left of a person facing towards east, is north; the direction determined by the right division of such a person, is south; while rightness and leftness are particular 'classes' residing in the constituent parts of the body. The direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is produced by an act of which Weight is the non-combinative cause, is below; and the direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is produced by the conjunction of Soul possessing *adṛiṣṭam* (invisible

consequences of conduct) or by the action of fire, is above. In this way, from their reference as east, etc., they are also otherwise referred to, as in the statement, "Directions are ten in number, as marked out by their being presided over by Indra, Agni, Yama, Nirṛita, Varuṇa Vāyu, Soma, īśāna, Nāga, and Brahmā."—10.

Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal.

Upaskāra.—Substance-ness and also eternity belong to Space in the same way as to the ultimate atom of Air. So he says :

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ । ११ ॥

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternity.
वायुना Vāyunā, by Air. **व्याख्याते** Vyākhyāte, explained.

11. The substanceness and eternity (of Space are) explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternity of) Air.—90.

The meaning is that it possesses Substance-ness, because it possesses Attributes, and eternity, because it is independent of or non-resident in any other substance.—11.

Like Existence, Space is one.

Upaskāra.—Extending or attributing unity (to Space), he says :

तत्त्वभावेन ॥ २ । २ । १२ ॥

तत्त्व Tattvam, unity. **भावेन** Bhāvenā, by Existence.

12. The unity (of space is explained) by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—91.

Unity is proved in Space, as in Existence, by the absence of difference in the marks of Space together with the non-existence of any differentiating mark. Separateness of one, i. e., individuality, also belongs to Space, because individuality constantly follows unity.—12.

Bhāṣya.—According to *Kaṇāda*, it appears, there is but one Substance, variously called as Ether, Time, and Space. For, he has taken much pain to establish the difference of Ether from tangible things, Self, and Mind, but he has made no attempt to prove the difference of Ether from Time and Space as well. Nor has he attempted to prove the difference of Time and Space themselves from any other Substance. It may be, therefore, considered that with the difference of Ether, the difference of Time and Space also has been established. But it may be asked, if there be one Substance only, how does it come to be variously called as Ether, Time, and Space? He replies that this is due to the variety of effects produced by it (II ii. 13) and also to the variety of external conditions attending it (II, ii, 14, 15, and 16.)

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked, "If Space is only one, how then can there be its cognition and use as ten quarters or directions?" So he says :—

कार्यविशेषेण नानात्वः ॥ २ । २ । १३ ॥

कार्यविशेषेण Kāryya-viśeṣeṇa, owing to difference or distinction of effects. नानात्व Nānātvam, multiplicity or diversity.

13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of effect—92.

The meaning is that the attribution of multiplicity is due to the divergence of effects.—13.

Directions explained.

Upaskāra.—Showing the aforesaid divergence of effects, he says :

आदित्यसंयोगाद्भूतपूर्वार्द्धविष्यतो भूताच्च प्राची ॥ २ । २ । १४ ॥

आदित्यसंयोगात् Âditya-sāmyogât, from the conjunction of the sun. भूतपूर्वाद् Bhûta-pûrvât, past and gone. भविष्यतः Bhaviṣyataḥ, future. भूताद् Bhûtât, what has taken place or come into existence; present. च Cha, and. प्राची, Prâchî, east (*lit.* Orient).

14. (The direction comes to be regarded as) the east, from the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun—93.

The east (prâchî) is so called, because the sun first (prâk) moves (añchati) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first conjunction of the sun took place, or will take place, or is taking place in the course of its circulation round Mount Meru.

Here the reference to the three times rests upon the difference, of the conceptions of the present (*i. e.*, the observer). For with some one on the morning of the previous day, the conjunction of the sun first took place in this direction; therefore it is the east; so the use of the word, east. With some other, the next day, the conjunction of the sun will first take place in this direction; so, in view of this, the use of the word, east. With some other, again, at this moment, the conjunction of the sun is taking place in this direction; so, in view of this, the use of the word, east. In the word, 'bhûtât,' the affix, 'kta,' is used in the sense of incipient action. Therefore, no fixed point being invariably necessary, the repetition of the use of the word, east, is proved also in those cases, even where there is no conjunction of the sun, as at night, or at mid-day, etc. This is the import.—14.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Extending the same method to the use of the other directions also, he says :

तथा दक्षिणा प्रतीची उदीची च ॥ २ । २ । १५ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similarly. दक्षिणा Dakṣiṇâ, south. प्रतीची, Prâtîchî, west. उदीची Udîchî, north. च Cha, also.

15. South, West, and North also are similarly (distinguished).—94.

In the very same way, the use of the term, South, arises from the past, or future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountain situated in the south direction. The use of the West and North also is to be similarly understood. Rightness and leftness (have their technical or recognised meanings, or) have been explained above.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Extending the very same method to the intervals of direction also, he says :

एतेन दिगन्तरालानि व्याख्यातानि ॥ २ । २ । १६ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. दिगन्तरालानि, Digantarālāni, intervals of Space or Direction. व्याख्यातानि, Vyākhyātāni, explained.

16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained.—95.

The use of South-East arises from the intermixture of the mark of the East and the South direction. South-West, West-North, and North-East are to be similarly understood.

It has been explained at length in *Kaṇāda-Rahasyam* (lit., the secret of Kaṇāda) that Space or Direction is that universal Substance by which the above conjunctions of the sun are established.—16.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief.

Upaskāra.—It has been already established that the characteristics, *e. g.* Colour, etc., of the four 'elements' are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the 'universal substances' which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now, the mark of Ether, *i. e.*, Sound, should be examined. And here we meet with the contradictory conclusions of the Tāntrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call it an Attribute. Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to some, while according to others it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound another Sound, which they call by the name, "*Spṛṣṭa*." Accordingly, to begin the examination of Sound, he first of all establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element or member of an examination, by its characteristic and cause, and says :

सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषा प्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषस्मृतेश्च संशयः ॥ २ । २ । १७ ॥

सामान्यप्रत्यक्षात् Sāmānya-pratyakṣāt, from the perception of the Genus or general property. विशेषाप्रत्यक्षात् Viśeṣa-pratyakṣāt, from the non-perception of the Species or special property or differentia. विशेषस्मृतेः, Viśeṣa-smṛiteḥ, from the recollection of particulars, *i. e.*, alternatives. च, Cha, and. संशयः Saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object containing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection of the alternatives; all at once or in one act of thought.—96.

'Sāmānyapratyakṣāt' means from the perception, *i. e.*, apprehension, of the object which possesses the general property, the affix 'matup,' signifying possession, having been elided. 'Viśeṣa-pratyakṣāt' means from the non-perception or non-apprehension of the property which is the means of mutual differentiation, *e. g.*, crooked, hollow, etc.,

and also head, hand, etc. 'Viśeṣasmṛiteḥ' means from the recollection of the particulars, *i. e.*, the alternatives characterised as a trunk and as a person. Recollection also includes apprehension by sense, because, in some instances, bodies which are being perceived also become the alternatives. The word 'cha' brings together *adriṣṭam* (invisible consequences of voluntary conduct) etc., which are also the causes of Doubt.

It has not been said that an individual or particular property is the source of uncertain knowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular or special property, being the means of discrimination, is such a cause, and that this differentiation from similar and dissimilar objects is really the common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two propositions arising from two opposite conclusions; one being 'Sound is eternal,' and the other being 'Sound is non-eternal.' Both of them as well as both the forms of knowledge produced by them, do not together become the source of Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously. Hence it has not been separately stated that there the cause of Doubt is either the non-common property, such as Soundness, or the common property, such as the being existent, the being the subject of proof, etc.

Uncertain knowledge finds no place in the kindred system of Gautama (*i. e.*, Nyāya Philosophy), and so a non-common property has been mentioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, *i. e.*, two opposite propositions, containing as a rule a positive and a negative statement, has been mentioned as a cause of Doubt. In the commentary on Nyāya, Doubt has been described as five-fold, according as the fact that something is being perceived, or the fact that something is not being perceived, is the cause of Doubt. Thus Doubts may arise whether what is being perceived be existent, whether what is being perceived be non-existent, whether this thing which is being perceived be existent or non-existent, whether what is not being perceived be existent, such as a radish, a latch, etc., and whether what is not being perceived be non-existent, as a lotus in the air. But all these are really of the same kind, being explained in the very same way by the expression 'from the perception of the common property.' Again, the three-foldness of Doubt, according to differences in its cause, as taught in the Nyāya-Vārttika, is also not possible, as the three, *viz.*, common property, etc., themselves cannot be causes on account of their variability. For heterogeneity should not be supposed here, like heterogeneity in fire produced from grass; a strike-stick (*araṇi*) (*i. e.*, where fire is kindled by striking two sticks against each other), and a gem, because *ex hypothesi* the causality consists of the common property of producing an effect defined by the characteristic of Doubt. The heterogeneity which is said to appear in the form of referring primarily to the positive alternative, or primarily to the negative alternative, etc., does not serve the purpose of a *differentia*, as it is not sufficiently extensive, or wide.

Thus Doubt is neither three-fold nor five-fold, but is of one kind only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its two-foldness in another respect.

* 'Universal Substances' are Ether, Space, Time, and Soul.

It may be objected, 'Doubt is knowledge which produces the desire to know.'—This is not the definition, as it overlaps uncertainty. Doubt is knowledge which does not produce impression (*samskāra*).—This too is common to unmodified or undifferentiated knowledge or state of consciousness ; for, if it is a concrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces an impression. Again though it is a 'class,' yet the quality of Doubt is not a characteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the object containing the property (the perception of which is the occasion of the Doubt), the 'class' also does not appear there, since it is not found that a 'class' appears elsewhere than in what it classifies." To this our reply is that from the definition of Doubt it follows that Doubt is knowledge of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same object.—17.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief—continued.

Upaskāra.—Doubt is two-fold : that which relates to external objects, and that which relates to internal objects. And that which relates to external objects, is also two fold : where the object is visible, and where the object is not visible. Of these, Doubt, in which the object is visible, may be illustrated as the uncertainty whether it be a post or a person, which arises on seeing some object distinguished by height ; and Doubt, in which the object is not visible, is such as when on seeing the horns only in the body of a cow or a gayal (*Bos gavæus*), etc., which is concealed by the intervention of a bush, etc., the uncertainty arises, "whether it be a cow or a gayal." In fact, in the latter case also the Doubt really relates to the property of the horn, *i. e.*, whether the horns are the horns of a cow or of a gayal. The statement of the two-foldness of Doubt is however, a figure of speech. Now, the Genus (*i. e.*, Common property) which is the source of Doubt, raises Doubt by being observed either in more than one-object or one object. He explains the first kind :

दृष्टञ्च दृष्टवत् ॥ २ । २ । १८ ॥

दृष्टं *Dṛṣṭam*, that which is seen. च *Châ*, and दृष्टवत् *dṛṣṭa-vat*, Like that which was seen.

18. And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen—(this also is the source of Doubt.)—97.

Height, which is seen, is the source of Doubt. 'Dṛṣṭavat' is formed by 'vati,' *i. e.*, the affix of similarity. Thus, something similar to the previously seen post and person, lies before. The meaning is that the height, which is observed in what lies before, is a source of Doubt, because it has been previously observed (in more than one object).—18.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief—continued.

Upaskāra.—He illustrates the observed common property which relates to one object :

यथादृष्टमयथादृष्टत्वाच्च ॥ २ । २ । १९ ॥

यथादृष्टं *Yathâ-dṛṣṭam*, that which has been seen in a certain form यथादृष्टत्वाच्च *A-yathâ-dṛṣṭatvât*, because it is not seen in that form. च *Châ*, and.

19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been seen in one form, is seen in a different form.—98.

"The source of Doubt"—this completes the aphorism. The word 'cha' understands what has been said before. The meaning is that

because an object is seen in a different form, therefore that which was seen in a certain form, also gives rise to Doubt, as Chaitra who was seen in a certain form, *i. e.*, with hair on his head, is at another time seen not in that form, *i. e.*, with the hair removed. Then afterwards when the very same Chaitra is seen with his head covered with a piece of cloth, Doubt arises whether this Chaitra has hair or not. Here the identity of Chaitra is the common property which gives rise to Doubt, and it is seen in one object only. Therefore what is here the source of Doubt is seen in one, undifferentiated object.—19.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the object of thought is the cause of Doubt :

विद्याऽविद्यातश्च संशयः ॥ २ । २ । २० ॥

विद्याऽविद्यातः Vidyā-a-vidyāta, from science and nescience. च Cha, and. संशयः Saṁśayaḥ, Doubt.

20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience.—99.

Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience. For instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly, eclipses of the moon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge is sometimes science, and sometimes nescience, *i. e.*, wanting in proof; and, consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, inas-much as it is known, it be existent or non-existent.

The retention of the word, 'Doubt,' in the aphorism, indicates that here, too, Doubt arises only from the perception of the common property, and not from any other source. Thus the opinion held by some that the uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded to in the definition of Gautama, "Doubt is deliberation in expectation of a differentia, due to the proof of the common properties as well as of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of, or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also the uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition," (Nyāya-Sūtras I. I. 22), is a different source of Doubt, is hereby refuted.—20.

Vivṛiti.—Here the affix 'tasi' in 'vidyā-avidyātaś' is used in the genitive sense. Therefore the expression means "of true knowledge and false knowledge." And the doubt is whether it be true knowledge or false knowledge. From the word 'cha,' 'and,' it follows that Doubt as regards the object of knowledge also arises from the perception of the common property. Thus, 'The mountain contains fire,' 'The lake contains fire,' in these and other causes of true or false knowledge, the Doubt, whether such knowledge be true or false, arises from the knowledge of the common property of their both being knowledge. In like manner, after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountain contains fire or not, whether the lake contains fire or not, etc., from the knowledge of the common property of their being objects of knowledge. Now, a contrary certainty, the proof of which has not been obtained, is opposed to Doubt, and the Doubt whether it be true knowledge or false

knowledge operates to dispel such contrary certainty. And not that such Doubt of itself gives rise to Doubt about the object of knowledge.

Sound—what ?

Upakīra.—Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt which is the first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the subject matter of examination, and says :

श्रोत्रग्रहणो योऽर्थः स शब्दः ॥ २ । २ । २१ ॥

श्रोत्रग्रहणः Śrotra-grahaṇaḥ, of which ear is the organ of apprehension.
यः Yaḥ, which, अर्थः Arthaḥ, object. सः Saḥ, that. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, sound.

21. Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the Ear.—100.

‘Śrotragrahaṇaḥ’ means that of which ear is the organ or instrument of apprehension. ‘Arthaḥ’ means that which contains properties. So that the definition has not the defect of over-extending to Soundness, loudness, etc., Attribute-ness, Existence, and other properties residing in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the word ‘arthaḥ’ meaning that which contains properties, the possession of a class property is intended ; hereby it is indicated that Sound called ‘*Sphoṭa*’ (i. e., by which the words of a sentence can convey a complete sense), inherent in Sound, does not exist.

It may be argued as follows ; *Sphoṭa* must be postulated on the strength of the intuitions, ‘one word,’ ‘one sentence.’ for the intuition, of unity does not arise in a word composed of several letters, nor in a sentence composed of several letters. And the word *sphoṭa* forms a name or nominal on which the elucidation of the sense depends. The letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning of the whole sentence ; their combination again is impossible, because they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker ; therefore the intuition of the sense of the whole arises from *sphoṭa* only, because elucidation of the sense does not take place without the knowledge of it. And this *sphoṭa*, although it is present in one and all the letters standing as words, yet becomes manifest in the last letter.” We reply that it is not so. Conventional letters form words. Thus the sense being intuited from the word in virtue of convention alone, what is the use of *sphoṭa* ? The use of the expression ‘one word’ is a pretence, intended to denote the one property of making up one sense, possessed by a large number of letters. So also in the case of a sentence. If some inner meaning of the word, beyond that of its component letters, could be apprehended by perception, then the same might have been admitted to be *sphoṭa*. Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlooked this doctrine of *sphoṭa* as being of no consideration.—21.

Causes of Doubt with respect to Sound.

Upakīra.—Sound having thus appeared as an object which contains properties, its being the mark or Ether depends solely on its being an Attribute. Therefore to establish its Attribute-ness, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says :

तुल्यज्ञातायेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु विशेषस्य उभयथा दृष्टत्वात् । २१ । २२ ॥

तुल्यजातीयेषु Tulya-jātiyeṣu, in homogeneous things. अर्थान्तरा Arthāntārabhūteṣu, in heterogeneous things विशेषस्य Viśeṣasya, of the particular, *i. e.*, the difference, or differentia. उभयथा Ubhayāthā, in both. दृष्टत्वात् Dṛṣṭatvāt, the being observed ; because it is observed.

22. (Doubt arises in respect of Sound), because its difference is observed both in (from) homogeneous objects and in (from) heterogeneous objects.—101.

“Doubt arises in respect of sound,”—is the complement of the aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, or a Substance, or an Action, because the ‘particular,’ *i. e.*, difference or divergence is observed both in homogeneous objects, namely the twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Substances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.

It may be said, “A non-common property cannot be the cause of Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Sound-ness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-common property.” We say : Truly its difference or divergence is common to homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and so only this common difference or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is the common property ; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness, is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said : “From the observation of the difference in both.” Here the observation of particular, *i. e.*, the difference, in both, *i. e.*, in homogeneous and heterogeneous things, constituting the cause of Doubt, it becomes really the common property.—22.

Sound not a Substance.

Upaskāra.—Showing Doubt in this way, he says, in order to eliminate the alternative of Substance-ness :

एकद्रव्यत्वान्न द्रव्यम् ॥ २ । २ । २३ ॥

एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravyatvāt, because it resides in one Substance. न Na, not. द्रव्यं Dravyam, Substance.

23. (Sound) is not a Substance, since it resides in one Substance only.—102.

‘Ekadravyam’ is that which has one Substance only as its combinative cause. And no Substance whatever contains a single Substance as its combinative cause. Therefore, owing to this difference in property from Substances, this Sound is not a Substance. This is the meaning.—23.

Nor an Action.

Upaskāra.—It may be said, "Action is surely uni-substantial. Therefore Sound may be an Action." So he says :

नापि कर्माऽचाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । २४ ॥

न Na, not. अपि Api, also कर्म Karmma, action. अचाक्षुषत्वात् Achākṣuṣatvāt, not being visible.

24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an object of visual perception.—103.

Because the intuition of perception of Sound is not visual, *i. e.*, is produced by an external sense-organ other than the eye. So that the import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness also does not reside in Actions, because it is a 'class' which does not reside in the objects of visual perception.—24.

Sound is transient, and not eternal.

Upaskāra.—If it is said that, as it speedily disappears, like Throwing upwards, etc., therefore Sound is an Action ; so he says :

गुणस्य सतोऽपवर्गः कर्मभिः साधर्म्यम् ॥ २ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणस्य Guṇasya, of Attribute. सतः Sataḥ, being. अपवर्गः Apavargah, speedy destruction. कर्मभिः Karmmaभिः, with Actions. साधर्म्यं Sādharmyam, resemblance.

25. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an Attribute, with Actions, consists in its speedy destruction.—104.

'Apavargah' means speedy destruction. And this, even in the case of Attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing destroyer, in the same way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only its resemblance to Actions, and not its Action-ness. The quality of undergoing rapid destruction which you (*i. e.*, the objector) advance as an argument, is not one-pointed *i. e.*, multifarious, because it is found in Duality, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This is the import.—25.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be said, "Let Sound be proved as an Attribute. Still it cannot be the mark of the existence of Ether. For it would justify the inference of Ether, if it were an effect of it. But it is eternal instead. Its occasional non-cognition, however, is due to the absence of something which could reveal it." With this apprehension, he says :

सतोलिङ्गाभावात् ॥ २ । २ । २६ ॥

सतः Sataḥ, of (Sound as) existent. लिङ्गाभावात् Liṅgābhāvāt, from the absence of mark.

26. (Sound does not exist before utterance), because there is no mark of (Sound as) existent (before utterance),—105.

For, if Sound were existent (before and after utterance), then there would be found some 'mark,' i. e., additional proof, of it as existent. But in the state of non-hearing, there is no proof that Sound exists. Therefore it is only an effect, and not something which requires to be revealed only.—26.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He says that for this reason also, it (Sound) is not something which only requires to be made known :

नित्यवैधर्म्यात् ॥ २ । २ । २७ ॥

नित्यवैधर्म्यात् Nitya-vaiadharṁmyāt, owing to difference in property from what is eternal.

27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be brought to light), because it differs in property from what is eternal.—106.

The difference of Sound from what is eternal, is observed. Whereas, as in "Chaitra speaks," the existence of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., even though they are covered from view, may be inferred from their voice; and whereas that which reveals, e. g., the lap, etc., is never inferred by that which is revealed, e. g., the water-pot, etc.; therefore Sound is only a product, and not something which requires to be brought to light. This is the sense.—27.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Pointing out the objections to its being something to be revealed only he now states the ground of its being non-eternal :

अनित्यश्चायं कारणतः ॥ २ । २ । २८ ॥

अनित्यः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. च Cha, and. अयं Ayam, it. कारणतः Kāra-nataḥ, from its having a cause.

28. And Sound is non-eternal, (because it is observed to be produced) by a cause.—107.

"Because its production is observed,"—this is the complement. For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because it has a production (or beginning). Or "From a cause" may imply the reason that it has a cause.—28.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Lest it might be said that the possession of a cause is disproved in Sound by its very nature, so he says :

न चासेद्विकारात् ॥ २ । २ । २९ ॥

न Na, not. च Cha, and. असिद्धं Asiddham, disproved. विकारात् Vikārat from change.

29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause) disproved by its modifications.—108.

From observing the loudness, softness, and other modifications, it should not be concluded that the possession of a cause by Sound is thereby disproved. For a loud or soft sound is perceived according to the hardness or softness of the beating of the drum with the drum-stick, and the like; whereas the loudness, etc., (i. e., the intensity) of that which is made known, is not dependent on the loudness, etc., (i. e., the intensity) of that which makes it known. Hence from its undergoing modification according to the modification of the cause, it is inferred to be a product, and not something to be revealed only.—29.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be argued, "It is the virtue of that which reveals, that it reveals in the form of intensity, softness, etc. And it is Air impelled by the drum and the drum-stick, etc., which, being intense and soft or slow (in velocity and volume), produces like perceptions," Hence he says :

अभिव्यक्तौ दोषात् ॥ २ । २ ३० ॥

अभिव्यक्तौ Abhivyaktau, in (the theory of the) manifestation or revelation (of Sound). **दोषात्** Doṣāt, from defect. Because there will be a defect.

30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it requires to be revealed only, will entail a defect.—109.

On the theory of the revelation of Sound, the defect will arise that (in each case) an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed will have to be admitted in respect of things co-existent and capable of being perceived by the same sense. But the invariable relationship of the revealer and the revealed is nowhere observed of such things. If it be not assumed here, then it will follow that on the manifestation of one letter, say *ka*, all the letters will become manifest. The rejoinder that an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed is in fact observed to obtain among the characteristic of being existent, the characteristic of being a man, and the characteristic of being a Brāhmaṇa, which are also co-extensive and are revealed by their individual difference, situation, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in being co-extensive, inasmuch as the extension of the characteristic of being a man, or of the characteristic of being a Brāhmaṇa, is not so large as that of the characteristic of being existent.—30.

Above continued (Production of Sound.)

Upaskāra.—He says that for the following reason also Sound is not something which requires to be revealed only :

संयोगाद्विभागाच्च शब्दानेव्यपत्तिः ॥ २ । २ । ३१ ॥

संयोगाद् samyogāt, from Conjunction. **विभागाच्च** Vibhāgāt, from Disjunction. **च** Cha, and. **शब्दाद्** Śabdāt, from Sound. **च** Cha, and. **शब्दानेव्यपत्तिः** Śabda-nīṣpattiḥ, production of Sound.

31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Disjunction, and from Sound also.—110.

‘From Conjunction’—i. e., from Conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick. ‘From Disjunction’—i. e., when a bamboo is being split up. Here Conjunction is by no means the cause of the first Sound, because there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two halves of the bamboo is the efficient or conditional cause, and the Disjunction of the halves and Ether is the non-combinative cause. And where Sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, there Sound which is produced in the order of a current, reaches the portion of Ether limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard. Therefore Sound is produced from Sound also.—31.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He brings forward another ground of its being non-eternal :

लिङ्गाच्चानित्यः शब्दः ॥ २ । २ । ३२ ॥

लिङ्गात् Liṅgāt, from its mark. च Cha, and. अनित्यः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, Sound.

32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark.—111.

The meaning is that Sound, consisting of letters (i. e., articulate Sound), is non-eternal, because, while possessing a ‘class,’ it is capable of being perceived by the ear, like the Sound of a lute, etc.—12.

Arguments for the eternity of Sound.

Upaskāra.—Now, in order to confute the arguments, advanced by the conclusionist (the Mīmāṃsā thinker), in support of the eternity of Sound, he says :

द्वयोस्तु प्रत्ययोरभावात् ॥ २ । २ । ३३ ॥

द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both. तु Tu, but. प्रत्ययोः Provrityyoh, of the activities or occupations. अभावात् Abhāvāt, from the non-existence or absence.

33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occupations of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out of existence.—112.

The word ‘tu’ cuts off connection with the context, and introduces the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or employment ‘of both,’ i. e., of the teacher and the pupil in teaching and learning respectively, is observed. “From its non-existence or absence,” i. e., from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The second party may say, “A cow, and the like which are being given away, are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee; whereas the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation.” Our (i. e., the first party’s) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the

teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover, the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in "He sees the colour for five times," the recurrence or persistency of colour which is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency of Sound in "The *anuvāka* or paragraph has been read ten times, twenty times," is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle "What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this time?" This is the import.—33.

Arguments for the eternality of Sound—continued.

Upaskāra.—He translates another reason urged in favour of the eternality of Sound :

प्रथमाशब्दात् ॥ २ । २ । ३४ ॥

प्रथमाशब्दात् Prathamāśabhāt, from the word 'the first.'

34. From the word, 'the-first,' (it follows that Sound is eternal).—113.

The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last *mantra* for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, "The first should be recited three times, the last three times," is not justified or accountable without the steadiness of Sound.—34.

Bhāṣya—reads II. ii. 34 as *Prathama-ādi-Śabdāt* while the meaning remains unchanged. (Ādi=and others, e. g., the second).

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He translates another reason advanced by the conclusionist for the eternality of Sound :

सम्प्रतिपत्तिभावाच्च ॥ २ । २ । ३५ ॥

सम्प्रतिपत्तिभावात् Sampratipatti-bhāvāt, from the possibility or existence of recognition. च Cha, and.

35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the possibility of recognition.—114.

'Sampratipatti-bhāvāt'—i. e., from the existence of recognition. The word 'pratipatti' (cognition) alone would have conveyed the sense of recognition which is a particular kind of the former ; therefore the prefix 'Sam' (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus, "He is reciting the very same poem which was recited by Maitra," "He is reading the same verse over and over again," "You are repeatedly saying the same thing which has been said before," "You are even now making the very same statement which was made by you last year and the year before," "It is that same letter *ga*,"—on the strength of the recognition of Sound in such cases, the steadiness or permanence of Sound is proved.—35.

The same refuted.

Upaskāra.—Confuting all these reasons, he says :

सन्दिग्धाः सति बहुत्वे ॥ २ । २ । ३६ ॥

सन्दिग्धाः Sandigdhāḥ, Doubtful. Uncertain. Inconclusive. **सति** Sati, existing. **बहुत्वे** Bahutve, plurality.

36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments are) inconclusive.—115.

‘Sandighāḥ,’ *i. e.*, not one-pointed. So it has been said, “Kaśyapa taught that a contradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was no mark.” Thus it is observed that there can be learning, repetition, and also recognition, also if there is a plurality of diversity of Sound, therefore these arguments are inconclusive. For, “He learns dancing,” “He practises dancing.” “He danced the same dance twice,” “You are dancing the same dance to-day, which you danced the other day,” “This man also is dancing the same dance which was danced by another dancer,”—in these cases, learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) are observed. But you (the conclusionist) too do not on this account admit the permanence (or eternality) of dancing which is a particular kind of Acting.—36.

Bhāṣya :—reads II. ii. 36 as simply *sandigdhaḥ*, supplying for himself the reason for the declaration there, and *joins* the latter part of it to II. ii. 37, and *interprets* it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types.

Counter objection stated and answered.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, ‘Fifty letters ; an eight-lettered *mantra* ; a three-lettered *mantra* ; the eight-lettered *metra*, *anustubh* ; etc.—How can there be such uses of members, when, the letters being non-eternal, there is a possibility of their being infinite in number according to the difference of utterance ?’ So he says :

संख्याभावः सामान्यतः ॥ २ । २ । ३७ ॥

संख्याभावः Saṁkhyābhāvaḥ, the existence or application of Number. **सामान्यतः** Sāmānyataḥ, from Genus.

37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with reference to the Genus.—116.

The meaning is that the existence of the number, fifty, etc., arises from the class notion of *ka*, *ga*, etc. Although there might be an infinity of *ka*’s, etc., the letters determined by the notions of *ka*, *ga*, etc., are fifty, three, or eight, in the same way as Substances, Attributes, etc., are nine, twenty-four, etc., although there may be an infinity of them according to differences within the group of each of them. This is the import.

The objector may say: "This is that *ga*,"—This recognition itself proves the permanence of Sound. Nor is it opposed by the perception, 'Loud *ga*, soft *ga*,' which conveys, contrary properties; because loudness, etc., are there due to external conditions. Nor is it to be maintained that there cannot appear any difference from the difference of the external condition also; for, then, the crystal also will not shine as different, developing in the form of blue, yellow, etc., from the conjunction of the China rose *tapiñja*, etc., nor will the face also, when reflected as elongated, etc., in the sword-blade, jewel, and looking-glass, appear to be different. If it be asked, To what does this property of loudness, etc., belong, which influences *ga*? We reply: It may be the property of Air, or of utterance, or of resonance. What is the use of fixing upon the particular one amongst them? You also admit that loudness, etc., are natural distinctions, as the relation of high and low amongst them cannot be established or explained by the notions of *ka*, *ga*, etc."

We reply: It is not so. Because even when such contrary perception exists, *viz.*, ' *ga* is produced,' ' *ga* is destroyed,' ' *ga* which was just heard, does not exist,' ' the noise has stopped, etc., if this recognition does not then cease, then it must be supposed to relate to class-notions. Otherwise such recognition coming to rest upon the permanence or steadiness of individual Sounds, the above contrary perceptions themselves would not be produced. Nor is this the property of Air, because the properties of Air are not the objects of aural perception. Nor again is it the property of the utterance; for if utterance is only Air, then the defect has been already pointed out; if it is something else, then nobody can say what it is. Nor again is it the property of resonance, for loudness, etc., are perceived also in the resonance from the conch, etc., even though *ga* is not found there. The naturalness of loudness, etc., however, does not involve an intermixture of classes, for its diversity is obtained from its being pervaded by the class-notion of *ga*, etc.,. Moreover, there is a very distinct mode of distinguishing forms in the *ga*'s, etc., uttered by male and female parrots and man, as also in those uttered by a male and a female, as well as in those uttered by those who are neither males nor females; by which a parrot, etc., concealed from vision by branches, a screen, etc., are inferred. But their being produced by external conditions does not arise from external conditions which can be perceived, as in "a young woman looking yellow with saffron." Nor is their being produced by external conditions proved by argument, for no proof of such a conclusion exists. So far in brief.—37.

Here ends the second chapter of the second book in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms.

Vivṛtti.—Some explain the production of Sound on the principle of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced from the impact of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of that particular Space. Then outside that circle and within the confines of the ten quarters the second Sound is produced from the first, and extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines of the ten quarters, the third Sound is produced from the second. And

in the same way the production of the fourth and other Sounds should be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound takes place on the principle of the ball of the *kadamba* flower. In their view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to the ten quarters taken together, but are produced ten-fold in ten-quarters. (Thus the one is the theory of the successive production of single Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of multiple Sounds). This is the difference.

BOOK THIRD—CHAPTER FIRST.

Objects of the senses.

Upaskāra.—Having thus in the second book completed the examination of the external Substances, the another following the order of enumeration, now proceeds to construct a basis for an inquiry respecting the Soul.

प्रसिद्धा इन्द्रियार्थाः ॥ ३ । १ । १ ॥

प्रसिद्धाः Prasiddhāḥ, universally known, perceived. इन्द्रियार्थाः—Indriyārthāḥ object of the senses.

1. The objects of the senses are universally known.—117.

The objects of the Senses, *e. g.*, Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and Sound, are capable of being apprehended by the several external sense-organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of Sound having been shown by the aphorism, "Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the ear" (II. ii. 21). it is in like manner demonstrated that Smell, etc., ending with Touch (*i. e.*, Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch) are universally known. Thus Smell is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the olfactory organ; Taste is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of taste; Colour is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the eye alone; Touch is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of touch alone. And by the word, 'object' there is, in all these cases, denoted a real entity possessed of properties, and therefore the definitions cannot be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., and to the non-existence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession of a sub-class of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the olfactory organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently, supersensuous Smell, etc., are not left out.—1.

Vivṛiti.—'Prasiddhāḥ,' means subject of ascertainment by perception.

Mark of supersensuous object.

Upaskāra.—He explains the application of the universal experience of the objects of the senses to the inquiry respecting the Soul.

इन्द्रियार्थप्रसङ्गधिरिन्द्रियार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्य हेतुः ॥ ३ । १ । २ ॥

इन्द्रियार्थप्रसङ्गः Indriyārtha-prasiddhiḥ, the universal experience of the objects of the senses. इन्द्रियार्थेभ्यः Indriyārthebhyaḥ, from the senses and their object. अर्थान्तरस्य Arthāntarasya, of a different object. हेतुः Hetuḥ, mark.

2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) object different from the senses and their objects.—118.

'Hetuḥ,' *i. e.*, Mark, 'Arthāntarasya,' *i. e.* of the Soul. 'Indriyārthebhyaḥ,' *i. e.*, from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning is that it is the mark of the Soul which is a different object from Colour,

etc., as well as from those which possess them. Though it is implied here that only knowledge is the mark of the existence of the Soul, yet inasmuch as there being a universal experience of the objects of the senses, the immediate presentation to the mind of Colour, etc., is more commonly known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted by that universal experience. Now this universal experience must reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an Attribute, or as an Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in the same manner as cutting is an act, must be produced by an instrument. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the senses; and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an agent, as an axe and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this universal experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other organs for its instruments, is the Soul.—2.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception.

Upaskāra.—Lest it be said, "Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the universal experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest as determining perception. What is the use of the supposition of any other foundation? Thus, consciousness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, like its Colour, etc. The same should be understood in the case of its being an attribute of the senses;" so he says:

सोऽनपदेः ॥ ३ । १ । ३ ॥

सः Saḥ, that, i. e., perception. अनपदेशः Anapadeśaḥ, the semblance or simulacrum of a mark; a false mark.

3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as its substratum) (is) a false mark.—119.

'Anapadeśaḥ' means the appearance or semblance of an 'apadeśa,' i. e., mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or the senses is the mere semblance of a mark, inasmuch as such an argument applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not one-pointed, i. e., multifarious.—3.

Bhāṣya.—The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the Self.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be rejoined, "By 'the being an effect of the body or the senses' is meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the characteristic of consciousness; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp, etc. Therefore there is no indeterminateness of fluctuation." So he says:

कारणाज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ४ ॥

कारणाज्ञानात् Kāraṇājñānāt, 'because' the causes or constituents are devoid of cognition or consciousness.

4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because there is no consciousness in the causes (i. e., the component parts, of the body).—120.

It is meant (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc., or in their parts, which are the causes, *i.e.*, components of the body. For it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that consciousness may exist also in the components of the body; for it would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It would then also follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will be no more recollection of that which was experienced within the limit of the hand, according to the maxim, "One does not remember that which has been experienced by another." Moreover, the supposition would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no experience of the consequences of the acts performed by the body, *e. g.*, causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences of the sins committed by Chaitra. And hence there would be an annihilation of acts performed, and an accession of acts not performed.—4.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be added in objection that consciousness exists in a minute degree in the components of the body, whereas it is manifest in the body, and that therefore it cannot be said that it is not preceded by a like attribute in the cause, nor does there arise the impossibility of uniformity. Anticipating this, he says :

कार्येषु ज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५ ॥

कार्येषु Kāryeṣu, in the effects. ज्ञानात् Jñānāt, because there would be consciousness.

5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the effects.—121.

If, as a matter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes of the body, namely the ultimate atoms, then it would also exist in the water-pot, etc., which are the effects originated by them also. Moreover, consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots, etc., also because the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene existence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these products.—5.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

Upaskāra.—In anticipation of the further rejoinder that consciousness may in reality exist, in an imperceptible degree, in the water-pot, etc., also, he says :

अज्ञानाच्च ॥ ३ । १ । ६ ॥

अज्ञानात् Ajñānāt, because it is not known. च Cha, and.

6. And because it is not known (that any minute degree of consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc.).—122.

The meaning is that there is no consciousness in the water-jar, etc., inasmuch as it is not known by any means of knowledge. If you admit that which is beyond the range of all means of knowledge, then you will have to admit also that a hare has horns, and so on. For, by no kind of evidence, is it known that consciousness exists in the water-jar, etc.—6.

Vivṛiti.—It is more proper to conceive some one other substance as the seat of consciousness than to imagine a plurality of consciousness in various portions of matter. This is the import.

On the theory that consciousness resides in the body, recollection of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible in youth, etc., because of the non-existence of that which had the experience, since the destruction of the infant-body must be observed by the destruction of its material. Similarly, there would be no activity at sucking the breasts on the part of a child just born, because of the impossibility at that stage of the understanding that this is the means of attaining the desirable which is the cause of activity. According to the advocate of the existence of a separate conscious being, the activity explained by the possibility of reminiscence due to the impression produced by the understanding in the previous birth that this is the means of attaining the desirable. Recollection of other experiences in the previous birth does not take place owing the absence of appropriate external stimuli.

Bhāṣya.—reads III. i. 5 and 6 as one aphorism, and explains it in the sense that as cognition is found within one effect, *e. g.*, the body, and is not found within another effect, *e. g.*, a jar, therefore, it follows that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must be same in both cases).

Fallacious mark.

Upaśāra.—It may be urged, "It has been affirmed that an employer (a presiding soul) is inferred from the organ of hearing and other instruments. But this is not a legitimate inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced by, the Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there is no proof of the universal concomitance or inseparable existence of these organs and the Soul; and, unless there be such inseparable existence, there can be no inference." So he says in reply :

अन्यदेव हेतुरित्यनपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । ७ ॥

अन्यत् Anyat, something else. एव Eva, certainly. हेतुः Hetuḥ, make. इति Iti, hence. अनपदेशः Anapadeśaḥ, no mark.

7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all).—123.

The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that which is to be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be proved; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be proved, would have no difference from the means of proof. Therefore, a means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, is no means of proof, *i. e.*, no mark at all.—7.

Bhāṣya.—Something quite different is the mark of inference of the Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this 'something quite different' is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism of this chapter.

Faltacious mark—continued.

Upaskāra.—It be may said, "As the Soul is not identical with the auditory and other organs of sense, so there is no production of the latter from the former. For the senseorgans of hearing, etc., are not produced from the Soul, as smoke is produced from fire" So he says :

अर्थान्तरं ह्यर्थान्तरस्यानपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । ८ ॥

अर्थान्तरं Arthāntaram, any one thing : हि Hi, because. अर्थान्तरस्य Arth-āntarasya, of any other thing. अनपदेशः Anapadeśa, not a mark.

8. (Although a mark is quite different from that of which it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected), for, any one thing cannot be a mark of any other thing.—124.

Because, as the effect, *e. g.*, smoke, etc., is a different thing from an ass, so it is also a different thing from its cause, *e. g.*, fire, etc. So that in the absence of any distinction in respect of being a different object, a particular nature is the regulative principle here, whereby the smoke does not infer an ass, but only fire. And if that nature belongs to any thing other than the effect, then that too really becomes a mark. Thus an effect cannot be a mark, if it is devoid of the particular nature intended here. Thus, identity and causation only constitute inseparable existence or universal concomitance ; these two are reduced into inseparable existence ; or, it is co-ordinate with them as the principle of inference ; or, its apprehension is dependent upon the apprehension of the above two only. Hence the aphorism is only the statement of an argument for causing confusion to the disciples in the above way. This is the import.—8.

Marks of inference.

Upaskāra.—Now, in order to make it clear that universal concomitance or inseparable existence may be found elsewhere than in the cases of identity and causation, he says :

संयोगि समवाय्ये-कार्थसमवायि विरोधि च ॥ ३ । १ । ९ ॥

संयोगि Saṁyogi, the conjunct. समवायि Samavâyi, the combined or inherent. एकार्थसमवायि Ekârthasamavâyi, the combined together in one thing, or co-inherent. विरोधि Virodhi, the contradictory.

9. The conjunct, the combined, the con-combined, and the contradictory also (are marks of inference).—125.

"The body has skin, because it is the body"—here the mark is the conjunct or the contiguous. For skin is described as a natural integument of matter capable of growth and decay. And it is neither an effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the body and in invariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is also a mark. For instance, "Ether possesses Magnitude or extension, because it is a Substance, like a water-pot, etc." ; here Magnitude or

extension which is to be proved is proved by the property of Substance-ness which is in essential combination with Ether. Or, to take another example. The extension of an atom, a particular form or limit of extension or Magnitude is proved by this that the relativity or degree of extension or Magnitude must somewhere cease ; whereby the ultimate atom is inferred as that in which the limit of extension rests.

The inference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inference of the Soul by knowledge, etc., are inferences of the cause by the effect ; so that they are not instanced here.—9.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskāra—The author of the aphorisms illustrates the co-inherent or co-existent mark.

कार्यं कार्यान्तरस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १० ॥

कार्यं Kāryam, an effect. कार्यान्तरस्य Kāryāntarasya, of another effect.

10. One effect (may be the mark of inference) of another effect.—126.

An effect *e. g.*, Colour, is the mark of another effect, *e. g.*, Touch. This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which is not an effect, *e. g.*, the unity of Ether, is a mark of the individual separateness of Ether, and so in the case of its extreme largeness.—10.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He illustrates the contradictory mark.

विरोध्यभूतं भूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । ११ ॥

विरोधि Virodhi, the contradictory. अभूतं Abhūtam, the non-existent, or non-product, or that which has not taken place. भूतस्य Bhūtasya, of the existent, or that which has taken place.

11. The opposite, *i. e.*, the non-existent (is a mark) of the existent.—127.

That which has not taken place, *e. g.*, a shower, is a mark of that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the conjunction of air and clouds, (where clouds being dispersed by air, showers do not take place). So also is the recitation of a *mantra* which is the contradictory or counter-agent of a tumour, etc. Thus that which has not taken place, *i. e.*, has not been produced, *e. g.*, a tumour, etc., is the mark of that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the recitation of a *mantra* or sacred text, (where a tumour is prevented by the recitation of the appropriate *mantra*).—14.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskāra.—He gives another illustration of a contradictory mark :

भूतमभूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १२ ॥

भूतं Bhūtam, that which has taken place. अभूतस्य Abhūtasya, of that which has not taken place.

12. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which has not taken place.—128.

That which has taken place, *e. g.*, a tumour, etc., is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, the recitation of a *mantra*. So also that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the conjunction of air and clouds is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, a shower. Similarly that which has taken place, *e. g.*, a burn, is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, the application of a gem, etc., to destroy the burning power of the fire. Similar instances should be understood.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He illustrates another contradictory mark :

भूतो भूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १३ ॥

भूतः Bhūtaḥ, that which has taken place भूतस्य Bhūtasya, of that which has taken place.

13.—That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which has taken place.—129.

There is sometimes inference of an existing contradictory from another existing contradictory ; as when, on seeing a snake swelling with anger, it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this case, the snake excited is that which is, existent, and the ichneumon hidden by the bush is also in existence. Therefore, an existent, as the mark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower cannot exist at the same time as the conjunction of air and clouds, nor can tumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of *mantras*.—13.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskāra.—Now he shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation :

प्रसिद्धपूर्वकत्वादपदेशस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १४ ॥

प्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् Prasiddhipūrvakatvāt, because preceded by (the recollection of) the 'pervasion' or universal relation. अपदेशस्य Apadeśasya, of the mark.

14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the) universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark).—130.

'Prasiddhī' means recollection of universal relation. 'Apadeśa' denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction ; so that the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal relation. Thus universal relation, (*i. e.*, a true major premiss) exists in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments such as the organ of hearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by the

attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal relation in the inference by which you (*i. e.*, the opponent) have sought to establish knowledge as an attribute of the body, through the mark that it is an effect of the body. This is the import.

It may be asked, what is this universal relation ? It is not merely inviolable relation ; for, in the case of inference from cause to effect, it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of that which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved.

Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence of the mark in the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be proved. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference are intended here ; because the very same uniformity is the subject of enquiry.

Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the middle term to the major term ; but this is impossible, for there does not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major term. Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the major and the middle term are related each to each. And in the case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want of pervasion or universal relation.

Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself). Now, if the nominal affix which converts 'essence' into the form 'essential,' has the sense of production thereby, then the definition will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, *i. e.*, depend upon, anything whatever ; and also because even Conjunction neither resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the properties of the middle term.

Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-conditional. For an *upādhi*, accident or external condition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it easy to conceive, it would still involve 'mutual dependence' or

'reciprocity' or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation.

Nor is universal relation mere relation. For, though variable relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to particular place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to determine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become the means of inference.

Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaining to that which contains the middle term, (*i. e.*, the minor term). For fire also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, present in that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is not the absolute non-existence of volcanic fire. In such an instance as "This has conjunction, because it is a Substance," the definition would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot be said, Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the counter-opposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short of being the contradictory of the counter-opposite." For the absolute non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter-opposite; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of delimiting circumstances for differences of delimitations are not imagined for the purpose of showing the states of being produced and non-eternal.

Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum of non-co-extension with the major term; for in the inference from cause to effect, there is not known any such non-co-extension with the major term. It is in fact another form of being the foundation of that which is not the foundation of the major term.

Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic of fire also has the function of determining relation to or the co-extension of smoke. It cannot be said that because of wider extension this is not the case; for it is observed that, that which determines the pervasion (*e. g.*, fire) has a wider extension (in other words, fire exists where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface of the sky *e. g.*, in clouds). If therefore, a qualification be added for the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed that, that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term (*vyāpṛā*) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (*ātmdāra-ya*). The view also that two things are universally related, when the one possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a common substratum, is fallacious in the same way.

In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation;

while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same substratum with a variably present *sadhya* or that which has to be proved (i.e., the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the conclusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum with a *sadhya* co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counter-opposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The meaning of the two expressions is co-existence in the same substratum with the *sadhya* which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade the *sadhana* or the middle term; in other words, it is the characteristic of being pervaded by all that which is pervasive of the *sadhya*. It may be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative compound which has been employed here. For this reason there is need of observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, *vyāpti*, is co-existence in the same substratum with the *sadhya* which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the *sadhana*. By absolute non-existence is intended that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke. Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of the characteristic of being in conjunction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not conjunct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is itself pervasive.

Objection.—But the being non-accidental implies the absence of accident or adjunct, *upādhi*; and *upādhi* itself is difficult to obtain.

Answer.—It is not so. Because the characteristic of *upādhi* belongs to that which does not pervade the *sadhana*, i. e., the middle term, while it does pervade the *sadhya*, i. e., the major term. So it has been said, “*upādhi* is that which is dependent upon another *upādhi*, (for determining non accidentality), in the case of the *sadhana*, and which is not dependent upon another *upādhi*, (for determining non-accidentality), in the case of the *sadhya*.”

Objection.—But the definition does not include an *upādhi* which is only non-pervasive of the *sadhya*. For example, Air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession of developed colour is such an *upādhi*. So also is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in, “He is black, because he is the son of Mitrā” (a low-born woman). For, the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility, since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attribute and Action; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the blackness of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.

Answer.—The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-pervasive of the *sādhana*, while it is pervasive of the *sādhya* as finally determined,—the same is intended as the *upādhi*. And a *sādhya* becomes finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determination by which the pervasiveness of the *upādhi* remains unbroken. In the instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of perceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality, and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Charaka, Suśruta, and other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs is pervasive towards the *sādhya* determined by the blackness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases should be similarly understood.

Objection.—Still it is not the meaning of the word, *upādhi*. An *upādhi* is something the property of which shines in another object, e.g., a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an unequally pervaded *upādhi*, there being absence of the characteristic of that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved *sādhana*.

Answer.—This is true. The primary use of the word, *upādhi*, is only where it is equally pervaded (as the *sādhya*), e. g., in the possession of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such fire, there is smoke, and *vice versa*). In other places, its use is secondary. The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also deviates from that thing. And there exists *sādhana* which deviates from the *upādhi* which is pervasive of the *sādhya*. Hence, that the *sādhana* deviates from the *sādhya*, and that, that which is not pervaded by that which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or brings forward a contrary argument, *satpratipakṣa*,* there being proof of the non-existence of the *sādhya* from the non-existence of the *upādhi*, which is pervasive of the *sādhya*, in the *pakṣa*, i. e., the subject, which is the minor term). So it has been said, "The disputant may bring forward an *upādhi*, governing the *sādhya* finally determined, even though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the *sādhya* maintained by the speaker, such *upādhi* being equally (a means of discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of *satpratipakṣa*." And such *upādhi* is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of arguments in favour of *bādha* obstruction, (i. e., the certainty of the non-existence of the *sādhya*), and deviation (i. e., the non-co-existence of the *sādhana* with the *sādhya*).

It has been held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-co-existence of the *sādhana* with the *sādhya* arises, the same is *upādhi*. But here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument, nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed thus, By the non-co-existence of which *being known*, the non-co-existence of the *sādhana* with the *sādhya* becomes known; for the definition, not

* *satpratipakṣa* has been defined as "an argument which contains a counter-mark capable of demonstrating the non-existence of that which has to be proved," (vide *Tarka-saṃgraha*).

applying to an unknown *upādhi*, would not apply to *upādhis* in obvious cases of non-co-existence. It is difficult to ascertain it (*i. e.*, *upādhi*) significatively or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate or invent, an *upādhi* without (first) establishing the characteristic of being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteristic of being other than the *pakṣa* (or the subject of the conclusion), again, though suffering from the characteristic of an *upādhi*, is yet not an *upādhi*; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, *e. g.*, dubiousness and not-one-pointedness in the *pakṣa*. For if there is no doubt about it, then it is not a *pakṣa*; if it is a *pakṣa*, then doubt is necessary, and consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointedness become certain. That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the *Mayūkha*.—14.

Enumerration of fallacies.

Upaskāra.—Now, with a view to distinguish (logical) marks (of inference) which have gone before as well as those which will come hereafter, from fallacious marks, he begins the section of fallacies, and says :

अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः । ॥ ३ । १ । १५ ॥

अप्रसिद्धः Aprasiddhaḥ, unproved. अनपदेशः Anāpadeśaḥ, a fallacious mark. असन् Asan, non-existent. सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, dubious. च Cha, and. अनपदेशः Anapadeśaḥ, A fallacious mark.

15. The unproved is a false mark ; the non-existent and the dubious also are false marks.—131.

‘ Aprasiddhaḥ, means that which is not pervaded or in universal relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed, and that which is in opposite universal relation, *i. e.*, the contradictory. The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal relation or being pervaded, and the contradictory. ‘ Asan ’ means non-existent in the *pakṣa* or the minor term, *i. e.*, that which has not the property or possibility of residing in the *pakṣa* or subject. And this is due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove ‘as’ in the proof of that which has been already proved. ‘ Sandigdhaḥ ’ means that which causes the doubt whether the *sādhya* be existent or non-existent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the mark accompanying the *sādhya* as well as its non-existence. The first is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the third is inconclusive.—15.

Bhāṣya.—splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: “ Aprasiddhaḥ anapadeśaḥ ” and *Asanasandigdhaḥ cha anapadeśaḥ*. ”

Fallacy illustrated.

Upaskāra.—Of the above-mentioned false marks, he gives an illustration or a mark which is fallacious because it is not pervaded by the denotation of the major term, also because it is contradictory, and also because it is not known to exist in the form attributed to it :

यस्मादिषीणी तस्मा - श्वः ॥ ३ । १ । १६ ॥

यस्मात्—Yasmât, because. विषाढी Viṣāṇi, (It) has horns. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. अश्वः Aśvaḥ, a horse.

16. Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a horse.—132.

Where, the body of an ass becoming the *pakṣa* or subject of the conclusion, such confusion, as "This is what is a horse, because it has horns," due to the observation of the negative co-existence (or, simply, disagreement) that that which is not a horse is not horned as a hare, a jackal, a man, a monkey, etc., prevails, there it is an example of the not-pervaded, the unreal, and the contradictory marks (i. e., the fallacies of non-pervasion, unreality, and contradiction).—16.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He illustrates multifariousness :

यस्माद्विषा गी तस्माद्गौरिति चानैकान्तिकस्योदाहरणः ॥३११७॥

यस्मात् Yasmât, because. विषाढी Viṣāṇi, (it) has horns. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. गौः Gauḥ, a cow. इति Iti, such, this. च Cha, and. अनैकान्तिकस्य Anaikāntikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark. उदाहरणम् Udāharaṇam, an example.

17. And, "Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a cow," such is the example of a many-sided (mark).—133.

Where, taking a buffalo as the *pakṣa* or subject, it is concluded that it is a cow because it has horns, there is general many-sided-ness. But when it is concluded that Ether is eternal because it is the seat of Sound, then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also in such examples as "Sound is non-eternal because it is sound," there being no universal relation, there is only particular many-sided-ness. But when the *sādhya* or the middle term is proved (to exist) only in the *pakṣa* or the minor term, by bringing forward arguments which exclude *vipakṣa** or contrary instances, it is then, that is, when co-existence with *sapakṣa*† (or objects of the same class as the *pakṣa*), becomes known, that the mark of inference is a valid mark, for a *pakṣa*‡ also must be a *sapakṣa*.

There, (i. e., in the fifteenth *Sātram* above), the unproved is that which is not proved by pervaded appearance in the *pakṣa*. And it is three-fold : (a) unproved in point of being pervaded, (b) unproved as such or by itself, (i. e., in respect of the form attributed to it), and (c) unproved by substratum or situation. Of these, the unproved in point of being pervaded, is that of which the pervasion or invariable co-existence has not been observed, whether from the non-observation of actually existing pervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion. Hence the non-existence of favourable arguments, etc., are different kinds of the unproved. And this invalid mark has a thousand divisions according to the diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of

* *Vipakṣa* is that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.

† *Sapakṣa* is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.

‡ *Pakṣa* or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is doubtful.

subject, impossibility of both, uncertainty and impossibility of predicate, uncertainty and impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility of both, and so on. And in all these cases, only absence of proof can be discerned.

Here the idea is this : The mark of inference is of three kinds only, according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and-negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, the purely positive is an attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (i. e., objects) ; e. g., knowableness, nameableness, qualificability, predicability, absolute non-existence of annihilation in attributes etc., destructible by the destruction of the substratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these attributes do not exist. The characteristic of the purely positive, therefore, is that it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence. Though these exist in themselves also, (and so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and the contained, is violated), that is no fault ; for it has been said, " In the case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse should be had to proof, and not to that which establishes difference and non-difference."

That mark is purely positive, of which the *sādhya* is purely positive. Of this there are four forms, namely, existence of the *pakṣa*, existence of the *sapakṣa*, unobstructedness, and the not being confronted with a *satpratipakṣa* or equally valid argument to the contrary, which are the means of leading to inference. The same, together with the non-existence of the *vipakṣa* are the five forms of the positive-and-negative. With the exception of the existence of the *sapakṣa* the remaining are the four forms of the purely negative. That mark, therefore, is a mere semblance, i. e., a false mark, which is void of one or another of all the forms which, as a true mark, it might possess as the means of leading to an inference. Accordingly, the characteristic of being a false mark or fallacy, is the being void of one or another of the forms which are the means of leading to an inference. Hence doubt also, like certainty, about the voidness of one or another of these forms, is an obstruction to inference, and proof of the inconclusiveness of the mark put forward by the speaker. But the purely positive and purely negative mark, do not become fallacies by being void of one or another of their forms ; because, in the case of the purely positive, non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, and in the case of the purely negative, existence of the *sapakṣa*, lack the characteristic of being the means of leading to an inference. Similarly, the unproved by situation (e. g., a castle in the air), the unproved by itself (e. g., a golden lion), and the unproved in part, are fallacies by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the *pakṣa* ; the unproved in point of being pervaded, the contradictory, and the general many-sided, are fallacies by reason of defect in that form which is non-existence of *vipakṣa* ; the particular many-sided and the inconclusive are fallacies by reason of defect as regards existence of the *sapakṣa* ; the obstructed and the confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary, are fallacies by reason of the absence of the characteristics of not being obstructed and of not being confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary. So also, accidental-

ness and inapplicability do not lead to inference, because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*; absence of favourable argument, and unfavourable argument, also do not lead to inference because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*. In like manner, apparent (but fallacious) examples, inadequate in regard to the *sādhya*, or in regard to the *sādhana*, or in regard to both, if invalid as being fallacies, are so through the uncertainty of the existence of the *sapakṣa*. If they are fallacious by themselves as being examples in appearance only, yet they are so immediately through the mark which is the same uncertainty of existence of the *sapakṣa*.

Marks of which the positiveness or agreement is not manifest, and marks of which the negativeness or difference is not manifest, however, are resolved only into the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground of defeat.

Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and infinite regression, by unsettling the certainty of universal relation or pervasion, become deficient in respect of one or the other of the forms of existence of the *sapakṣa* and non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, and thereby acquire the nature of fallacies.

Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence, which causes doubt alternating between the existence and the non-existence of the *sādhya*. The contradictory is that fallacy which produces certainty of the non-existence of the *sādhya*. The unproved is that which is void of pervasion, existence in the *pakṣa* and proving. According to Kāśyapa, obstruction and an equally valid argument to the contrary are not independent fallacies. Of these, obstruction resolves itself either as the unproved by situation, or as the many-sided; as it has been said, "In obstruction (*badha*), the mark is either non-existent in the *pakṣa*, or is many-sided." An equally valid argument to the contrary, also by causing doubt in respect of pervasion or invariable co-existence, etc., in other places, really resolves itself into the many-sided, etc.

The writer of the *vṛitti*, however, says that the word, 'cha,' in the Sūtram, अप्रसिद्धोऽनप्रदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः (III, i, 15, *ibid*), has the sense of bringing forward *badha* (obstruction) and *satpratipakṣa* (an equally valid argument to the contrary), and thereby follows the view of Gautama as expressed in the *sūtram*, "Fallacies are five, that which is accompanied with non-co-existence, the contradictory, that which is identical with the *pakṣa* that which is identical with the *sādhya* and that which is post in time," (Nyāya Sūtram, I. ii.4). But, from such statements as "The contradictory, the unproved, and the dubious, declared Kāśyapa, are no marks," it appears that the Sūtrakāra, i. e., Kaṇāda, himself was inclined to uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word 'cha,' however, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before.

This is the idea. I have not dilated upon it for fear of increasing the bulk of the book. More details should be sought in *Mayūkha*.—17.

Mark of Inference of Soul.

Upakāra.—He now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies :

आत्मेन्द्रियाथसन्निकर्षाद्यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ॥ ३ । १ । १८ ॥

आत्मेन्द्रियाथसन्निकर्षात् *Ātmā-indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt*, from contact of the soul, the sense, and the object. यत् *Yat*, which. निष्पद्यते *Niṣpadyate*, is produced. तत् *tat*, that. अन्यत् *Anyat*, other, different.

18. That (*i. e.*, knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark).—134.

From the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, it is knowledge that is produced. And it is a mark of the existence of the soul, and, as such a mark, is different from the unproved, the contradictory, and the many-sided, that is to say, is not a fallacy. Thus, knowledge is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul; either by the inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect, like colour, etc., or by assuming the form of recognition, *e. g.*, "I who saw am the same as I who am touching." In the former case, effectness belonging to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion "(that) which is produced;" nor it is contradictory, for here, as in all other instances of analogous inference or inference from a *sādhya-todriṣṭa* or commonly-observed mark, there can be no contradiction; nor is it many-sided, for the very same reason. So that by means of the commonly observed characteristic, appertaining to it, *viz.*, of being an effect or an attribute, knowledge truly becomes a mark of the existence of the soul. Recognition, again, resiling from other agents, resolves into having but one agent or cause.

(The Bauddha theory criticised.)

Objection.—Recognition may be also due entirely to the relation of effect and cause subsisting between understanding and consciousness.

Answer.—This cannot be, as it would entail recognition also, of the understandings of the disciple and the preceptor.

Objection.—But relation of the matter (*i. e.*, knowledge which causes activity or inclination) and the form does not exist there; and that relation is the exciting cause of recognition.

Answer.—'Matter,' having the property of Substance, cannot possibly exist in the understanding (which is an attribute). Even if its existence were possible, understandings being momentary, recognition of what was perceived before, would not be possible. For, no impression is thrust into subsequent understandings by a previous understanding, since you do not admit the existence of an abiding impression. And if it consists of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, it cannot be the cause of recollection at another time, nor of recognition.

Objection.—The stream of subjective consciousness, which is really different from the stream of objective consciousness, is that which collects as well as that which recognises.

Answer.—If it is permanent, then our object is fulfilled. If it is of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, then it has not yet freed itself from the fault already pointed out; for then even there can be no permanent impression. Moreover, proof is wanting that it is something different from objective consciousness.

Objection.—Proof is supplied by the stream of understandings, 'I am,' 'am,' and so on.

Answer.—May be. But if here states of objective consciousness take in or receive as their matter, only the subjective consciousness, then, in the absence of the characteristic of being the matter, from the states of objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will disappear; for efficient causality is derived from the characteristic of being pervaded by the characteristic of the material cause.

Objection.—Let there be no efficient causality also.

Answer.—In that case, their existence also is gone. For the characteristic of an entity or real substance is that it is the means of serving necessary purposes.

Objection.—Both the streams are received, as material, jointly by the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective consciousness.

Answer.—If it is so, then what fault has been committed by conjunction of wholes made up of parts, etc., when you also admit that a cause can operate at a different place?

Therefore, recognition proves, as being permanent, the soul which is inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains unproved.

Or, the *sūtram*, आत्मवेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् यद्विषयते तदन्यत् is calculated to refute the Sāṃkhya theory that the understanding, being eternal, is not fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted thus: what you call the principle or entity, viz., the understanding, is nothing but knowledge; for, there is the statement of synonyms, namely, "understanding, comprehension, knowledge." And it is produced from the contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than the inner sense the existence of which you admit. This is the meaning. The import, therefore, is that that does become the mark of the existence of the soul.—18.

Vivṛiti.—He gives another proof of the existence of the Soul:

From 'contact, i.e., of the mind with the 'object of the sense,' which is the 'soul,' in other words, from the conjunction of the soul and the mind, the 'knowledge which is produced,' in the form of "I am happy," etc., is 'different,' i.e., other than inference, as a proof of the existence of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge produced by the cognition of the soul and the mind, is perceptual, since the definition of perception is knowledge produced from the contact of the senses and objects. Although such perception does not prove the soul as different from the body, etc., yet, as it proves the soul in general, it is unobstructed. This is the import.

Or, the *sūtram* states that the mark which infers the soul, is not a false mark.

Marks of Inference of other Souls.

Upaskāra.—Having described the inference of one's own soul, he now shows the inference of other souls :

प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति च प्रत्यगात्मनि दृष्टे परत्र लिङ्गम् ॥ ३ । १ । १६॥

प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति Pravṛitti-nivṛitti, activity and inactivity, occupation and withdrawal. **च** Cha and. **प्रत्यगात्मनि** Pratyag-ātmani, in the in-going or in-dwelling soul, in one's own soul. **दृष्टे** Dṛiṣṭe, observed. **परत्र** Paratra, elsewhere, of other souls. **लिङ्गम्** Liṅgam, mark.

19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one's own soul, are the marks of (the existence of) other souls.—135.

'Pratyag-ātmani' means in one's own soul. 'Pravṛitti-nivṛitti' are particular volitions caused by desire and aversion. By them are produced bodily actions, characterised as **चेष्टा** or muscular motion, of which the objects are the acquisition of the agreeable and the avoidance of the disagreeable. So that, on observing muscular motion in another body, the inference of another soul takes place in the following manner. This muscular motion must have been produced by volition, because it is muscular motion, as is my muscular motion. And that volition, is the product of a soul, or is seated in a soul, because it is volition, as is my volition.—19.

Here ends the first chapter of the third book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms,



BOOK THIRD—CHAPTER SECOND.

Mark of the existence of Mind.

Upaskāra.—Distinction of real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the (preceding) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Soul to a close, the author, by a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (*vide I. i. 5*), introduces the examination of the Mind, and says :

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे ज्ञानस्य भावोऽभावश्च मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥३।२।१॥

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे Ātmendriyārthasaunnikarṣe, on contact of the Soul with the senses and their objects. **ज्ञानस्य** Jñānasya, of knowledge. **भावः** Bhāvaḥ, existence, production, appearance. **अभावः** Abhāvaḥ, non-existence, non-production, non-appearance. (*Bhāṣya.*—reads the words ‘bhāvaḥ’ and ‘abhāvaḥ’ in a compounded form as bhāvabhāvaḥ.) **च** Cha, and. **मनसः** Manasaḥ, of the Mind. **लिङ्गम्** Liṅgam, Mark.

1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.—136.

He will say that the movement of the Mind is the mark (of the Soul). If, therefore, Mind is found on examination to be the instrument or means of knowledge, and as being dense, moulded, or ponderable (सृष्टि), then it becomes proved that the Soul is that, being directed by which, the Mind comes to be connected with the sense apprehensive of the desired or agreeable object, rather than with any other sense. This is the reason of the violation of the order of enumeration. The meaning is that the Mind is that which, while there is contact of the soul with the sense and its object, being connected with the sense, there is production of knowledge, and which not being so connected with the sense, there is non-production of knowledge.

Objection.—Mind is all-pervading or universal. Nevertheless, non-simultaneity of knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind possesses the property of an instrument. Moreover, Mind is universal because, like Time, it is a substance void of any distinctive attribute; because, like the Soul, it is the substratum of Conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge; and because, like Ether, it possesses the absolute non-existence of Touch; and there are similar other proofs of its universality.

Answer.—It is not so. If Mind were universal or all-pervading, then as it would be connected with all the senses, there would be only one cognition including all the senses (i. e., omni-sensuous). If it be replied that (*objection*) such is not the case, because there is a contrariety amongst the effects; we deny this, (*answer*) for a complete cause does not take notice of contrariety and non-contrariety whereby it might be apprehensive of the contrariety of the characteristics of belonging to perception by the eye, organ of taste, etc. It cannot be said, (*objection*) “Or, it (cognition) may be of a variegated form like variegated colour, as it is in the case of eating some pudding,” (where perceptions of taste, flavour, etc., take place all together); for (*answer*) even there

attention or attachment to a particular object (*i. e.*, taste or flavour, etc.) is observed. Nor can it be asked, (*objection*) "How then does the complex belief arise, *viz.*, 'I perceive Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch simultaneously'?" ; for, (*answer*) it is merely a sense of simultaneity in respect of the five cognitions, produced by the swiftly moving Mind and presented in memory. It cannot be objected that attention to particular objects is also dependent upon the property of the instrument, for the answer has already been given. If it be maintained (*objection*) that attention depends upon the desire to understand ; we deny this, for, (*answer*) on that supposition, it would follow that when there was a desire to understand all, there would be a total presentation of all objects, whereas the only result of a desire to understand is connection of Mind with the sense percipient of the object desired. Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility. Consequently, the marks of universality are obstructed by proof which comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-pervading, then there would not be such local character of pleasure, etc., as in "pleasure in my foot," "pain in my head," etc. ; for, the effects of 'universal substances' uniformly appear in places delimited by their non-combinative causes. It cannot be said that in our view also it follows that pleasure, etc., are confined to the place of the atom ; for, the rule is that a non-combinative cause really produces an extensive effect at its own place, so that there is no opposition to their production even beyond the limits of their instrumental causes, *e. g.*, sandalwood, etc. It cannot be urged, "Mine too is request for remoteness from the instrument causes ;" for, it would entail a breach of the above uniformity. Further, how will there be conjunction of the universal Mind with the Soul ? It cannot be replied that it is without beginning, for then disjunction will also necessarily become beginningless. It cannot be said that owing to the difference of their limitations (*i. e.*, substrata wherein they take place), both of them remain uncontradicted ; for, the difference of the limitations of conjunction and disjunction depends upon their own causes, whereas in the case of the difference of things which have no beginning, such dependence does not exist. This is the direction.—1.

Mind is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskāra.—Now, it may be asked, "The perception of pleasure, etc., is producible by an instrument, because it is an act, like the perception of Colour : from inference in this way, or by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, Mind is proved as the instrument of that perception. But whence does it derive its Substance-ness, and eternality?" Hence he says:

तस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ३ । २ । २ ॥

तस्य Tasya, its, of the mind. द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vāyunā, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyākhyāte, explained.

2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—137.

As the ultimate atom of Air, inferred from Substance made up of parts, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute and action; so Mind, inferred by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute. For it is not productive of cognition, without conjunction with the sense, whereby it might appear that possession of attribute does not belong to it. Moreover the presentation of pleasure, etc., (to the Soul) must have a sense as its instrument, because it is a presentation, like the presentation of Colour, etc. Hence Mind is proved as an instrument or sense. And the being a sense means the being the foundation or seat of the conjunction of the Mind which is the instrument of cognition; so that the Substance-ness of Mind is proved without much ado. And its eternality follows from its not being made up of any other Substance. And this latter characteristic follows from the absence of any proof for the supposition of its being made up of parts.—2.

Mind is one.

Upaskāra.—Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than one Mind, existing in each individual body. He states the means of decision :

प्रत्यायौगपद्यात् ज्ञानायौगपद्याच्चेकः ॥ ३ । २ । ३ ॥

प्रत्यायौगपद्यात् Prayatnāyāugapadyāt, from the non-simultaneity of volitions. **ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्** Jñānāyāugapadyāt, from the non-simultaneity of cognitions **च** Cha, and. **एकम्** Ekam, one.

3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non-simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one (Mind) (in each organism).—138.

“ Mind in each organism ” is the complement of the Sūtram.

If there were many Minds in a single organism, then cognitions and volitions would be simultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that many volitions are produced at one and the same time, because simultaneous actions are observed in the fingers of the hands and the toes of the feet of a dancing girl; for, that being explained or possible by the swift movement alone of the Mind, simultaneity of necessary or corresponding particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state, is not obtained. Hereby (i. e., by the necessary particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state), the theory that in one and the same body there are five Minds, and that on the conjunction of two, three, four or five of them with their respective senses, two, three, four or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted, as it would entail a superfluity of supposition; while the sense of simultaneity is upheld (as an illusion). The implication of the simultaneity of two cognitions, e. g., the cognitions “bitter treacle,” produced by the connection of the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, under the limitation of the sense-organ of Taste, also does not exist in view of the property (i. e., of rapid transition) of the instrument or internal sense, (i. e., Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into two or three pieces, arises from the impact of the chopper, etc., or the rapid transition of the Mind, or the invisible operation of another (and barren) Mind which has just slipped off from a liberated Soul.

The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a leech, and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of a leech, simultaneity and non-simultaneity of cognitions are respectively produced, is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the supposition of its parts. This is the direction.—3.

Marks of the existence of the Soul.

Upaskāra.—Now, showing the purpose of the violation of the order of enumeration, he says, with a view to complete the enquiry into the Soul :

प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुख-
दुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि ॥ ३ । २ । ४ ॥

प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः Prāṇa-Apāna-Nimeṣa-Unmeṣa-Jīvana-Manogati-Indriyāntaravikāraḥ, ascending life-breath, descending life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the movement of the Mind, and affections of the other senses. सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाः Sukha-Duḥkha-Ichchhā-Dveṣa-Prayatnâ, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition. च Cha, and. आत्मनः Ātmanah, of the Soul. लिङ्गानि Liṅgāni, marks.

4. The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the existence) of the Soul.—159.

It must not be imagined that cognition itself is the only mark of the Soul. There are also the ascending life-breath, etc., which are the marks of the Soul. Thus that is surely the Soul in consequence of the volition of which the upward and downward motions in the air moving within the body and characterised as the ascending and the descending life-breath, take place, not being possible otherwise than by volition, just as the throwing upward and the throwing downward of a pestle, etc., (in a mortar, etc.), are not possible without volition. For, Air, the nature of which is to blow obliquely, cannot undergo such change of nature without volition. It cannot be said that two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions and producing different effects may, like two similar bodies of water, have an upward motion. For, were this the case, there would be then the upward motion only but not the downward motion, nor oblique motion as in exsufflation or blowing by the mouth. There is then a being, who, by his volition, impels the air upwards or downwards. I cannot be asked how there could be upward and downward motions of the ascending and descending life-breaths in a state of deep or dream-less sleep; for, at that time, though volition proper does not exist, there exists another kind of volition which is called volition the source of vitality. In like manner, the closing and the opening of the eye-lids also infer a presiding agent in the organism. Thus the closing of the eye-lide (*nimeṣa*) in an action which produces the conjunction of the lids of the eye; *unmeṣa* or the opening of the eye-lids is an action

which produces their disjunction. These two actions, being constantly produced without any visible cause such as molecular motion, impact, etc., are not produced otherwise than by volition. As the dancing of a wooden manikin depends upon some one's volition, so also does the dancing of the eye-lids. Thereby an entity, possessing volition, is inferred. Similarly, life also is a mark of the Soul. Thus by the word 'life' the effects of vitality, such as growth, the building up of wounds, fractures, etc., are indicated by implication. So that as the owner of a house builds up a broken edifice or enlarges a building which is too small, so the presiding agent of the organism effects, by food etc., the increase of enlargement of the organism which is to him in the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like, causes what is wounded to grow again, and broken hands and feet to grow together again. Thus like the master of a house, a guardian of the body is also proved. In the same way, the movement of the Mind also is a mark of the Soul. Thus it has been proved, in the foregoing section, that the Mind is something moulded or ponderable (*mūrta*) and that it is indivisible. Its application to a sense percipient of the desired object is dependent upon desire and attention. So that the inference is that the Soul is that being whose desire and attention direct the Mind, as a boy standing at the corner of a room sends a top or ball of lac hither and thither within the room itself.

It may be objected, "The dancer of the wooden manikin, the master of a house, or the boy (referred to above) is not different from his body, so that he could be adduced as an example. Moreover, it is the body which is the seat of consciousness inasmuch as it is the object of the sense of I-ness (*ahamkāra*); for, there are "I am fair," "I am stout," and the like intuitions which are co-extensive with I-ness. It may be urged that, on this theory, a man would not recollect in his youth or old age what he perceived in his boyhood, because as in the case of a difference of bodies, like those of Chaitra and Maitra, so here too there would be no recognition, on the maxim, "One does not remember what another saw." Here we may point out that Chaitra and Maitra being two different currents, there may not be any correlation, whereas (in the case of a single individual) in spite of the differences of boyhood and youth, the current being the same, correlation by means of the relation of cause and effect will be possible." To this argument we will reply that it would follow, on the above theory, that the son also would remember what was perceived by the father. If it be rejoined that perception of the difference of body prevents this, we reply that correlation (in the form of recollection) will not be possible also in the case of an old man who perceives his present body only as different from the body which he had as a boy, and also that there is no perception of the difference of body for a boy who has never known his father. In "My body," the sense of I-ness appears as identical with the sense of 'My-ness' (and not as identical with the intuition of the body). If it be replied that the same holds good in the case of "My Soul" also; we reply that it does not, because the use of 'My' is there topical, since the genitive may be used even where there is no difference, as in "The head of Rāhu" (Rāhu being all head). The consequences of killing, etc., (i. e., Merits and Demerits) also will not result to the agent or doer, as his body will be different and different (at every

stage of transmigration). Further, (on your theory), consciousness being limited to the *bhūtas* or elements (which constitute the body and are different at every new birth), if a man desires a sinful act, he will escape the consequences of his own acts, and there will be also the defect of the acquisition of the results of acts not done by him who experiences them. This is the point.

"From the affections of the other senses."—For surely is observed an overflow of the salivary juice, induced by a strong desire for the taste, of one who, after experiencing the particular taste, accompanied by the particular colour, of an orange or a *chira-vilva*, observes such fruit again. Now, this cannot take place without the inference of the acid taste; nor the inference, without the recollection of the universal relation or invariable co-existence (of the taste and the colour); nor the recollection, without impression (*Samskāra*); nor the impression, without the experience of the universal relation; nor the experience, without repeated observation. This concatenation of cognitions, standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect, cannot be possible without (the existence of) a selfsame agent. Thus there is the *Sūtram* of Gautama. "From the affections of the other sense." (*Nyāya-Sūtram*, III. i. 12).

Pleasure and the like also are to be regarded, like cognition, as marks of the Soul. Thus pleasure and the like must reside somewhere or must reside in some substance, because they are things which are produced, or qualities like colour, etc. Hence an inference by analogy, accompanied by an exclusion of other possibilities, takes for its subject inherence or residence in a Substance other than the eight Substances. For the proposition that desire which does not reside in Earth and seven other Substances, resides in a Substance, is not complete unless it assumes as its mood the being resident in a Substance other than the eight Substances. Where, however, exclusion of other possibilities does not appear at first, there the being resident in a Substance other than the eight substances, will have to be proved by argument from effect to cause or negative reasoning. This is the distinction. It is absurd to say that inference has only the mood of that which determines the universal relation; for that alone is the mood there without which the intuition or inference would not result. Otherwise, in "A dyad not being resident in an effect, must reside somewhere, because it is a whole made up of parts," and such other cases, there would be no inference having for its mood the being resident in a noneffect.—4.

Soul is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskāra.—Well, granted that there is proof of a fixed Soul. But whence is it eternal, and whence is it a Substance? To meet this objection, he says:

तस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ३ । २ । ५ । ॥

तस्य Tasya, its, of the Soul. द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vāyunā, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyākhyāte, explained.

5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—140.

As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate atom of Air, and therefore Air is eternal, so also in the case of the Soul.

As the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance, because it possesses attributes, so also is the Soul. This is the meaning.—5.

Objection : I. Mark of the Soul, not visible.

Upaskāra.—He cites an objection of the opposite party to the foregoing conclusion :

यज्ञदत्त इति सन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावादृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ ३ । २ । ६ ॥

यज्ञदत्तः Yajñadattaḥ, He is Yajñadatta. **इति** Iti, this. **सन्निकर्षे** Sannikarṣe, there being contact. **प्रत्यक्षाभावात्** Pratyakṣābhāvāt, from the absence of perception. Because there is no perception. **दृष्टं** Dṛiṣṭam, visible. **लिङ्गं** Liṅgam, mark. **न** Na, not. **विद्यते** Vidyate, exists.

6. There is no visible mark (of the existence of the Soul), because there being contact (of the senses with the body of Yajñadatta), perception does not arise that this Soul is Yajñadatta).—141.

There being contact, if no such perception take place as "This is Yajñadatta," then there is no visible mark, *i. e.*, no mark the universal relation of which with the *sādhyā* or what has to be proved, has been grasped by perception. The meaning is that as smoke, perceived as accompanying fire which is perceptible, is a visible mark in the case of fire, so there is no such visible mark which can establish the existence of the Soul.—6.

2. Analogy does not prove Soul as such.

Upaskāra.—Lest it might be urged, "Although no visible mark exists, the universal relation of which has been observed by perception, yet a *sāmānyatadṛiṣṭam*, or commonly-observed or analogous mark, will be the mark, for it is not that there can be no inference from that," therefore the objector says :

सामान्यतो दृष्टाच्चाविशेषः ॥ ३ । २ । ७ ॥

सामान्यतो दृष्टात् Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭāt, from a commonly-observed or analogous mark. **च** Cha, and. **अविशेषः** Aviśeṣaḥ, non-particular. Not a thing in particular or as such.

7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no (inference of anything in) particular.—142.

A commonly-observed mark also becomes a mark of inference. But it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above the eight Substances. It would only prove that desire, etc., must be resident somewhere. And this does not suggest the thought of a Soul. This is the meaning. Therefore it is stated, "Not a thing in particular."—7.

3.—Therefore Soul proved by Revelation.

Upaskāra.—Are then the texts of the Vedas, for instance, "He is the Soul, in whom all sins are killed," etc., meaningless? Apprehending this, the same objector says :

तस्मादागमिकः ॥ ३ । २ । ८ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by reasoning. अगमिकः Āgamikaḥ, scriptural, proved by the revealed texts.

8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation.—143.

The Soul is really proved by Revelation only, but not by inference, since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore, mental vision of the principles or essences of things results from the proper hearing of the *Upaniṣads*, and not from the course of intellection. So that this Regulation (*i. e.*, the Vaiśeṣika system), which teaches intellection, is no regulation. For, it is observed in the case of "ten ghosts, swimming across the river," etc., that the cognition of the person who has representation of these things in his consciousness, arises only from the very instructions that ten ghosts dwell on this tree, that such and such an object floats across the river, etc.)—8,

Objections answered.

Upakāra.—To this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing sūtras, the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies :

अहमितिशब्दस्य व्यतिरेकान्नागमिकः ॥ ३ । २ । ९ ॥

अहम् Aham. I. इति Iti, this, शब्दस्य Śabdasya, of the word. व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekāt, exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence, न Na, not, आगमिकम् Āgamikam, Scriptural. Proved by Revelation.

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word 'I' (to other designates or objects).—144.

Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word 'I,' or the word 'Soul,' must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says, "Because of non-application," in other words, because of the non-application or divergence of the word 'I' from Earth, etc. For, there never arises any such use of language or intuition as "I am Earth," "I am Water," "I am Fire," "I am Air," "I am Ether," "I am Time," "I am Space," "I am Mind." If you object that such intuition or use arises with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others ; if, that it arises with respect to one's own body, we reply that it is not so, for 'one's own' or one's self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, "My body," proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (*objection*) "Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ;" for, (*answer*) in the word 'I,' I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or distinction. So that on the strenght of the property of its being an

attribute of the subject of the argument (*pakṣa*), it follows that I-ness is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in particular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object, from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompanied with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been made, namely, "From 'hearing' alone results realization or intuition of the Soul; what is the need of all this proof?", is not sound. For, without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering minds cannot be purged away; without this purification, there can be no aptitude in them for constant meditation; and without constant meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direction in Space, etc. This is the import.

If it be asked, "Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence) be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible?", we reply, "Who has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible? On the contrary, the Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of conjunction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as 'I am happy,' 'I know,' 'I desire,' 'I will,' 'I feel pain,' etc? For these intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marks, for they arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow upon enquiry for that." If it be urged that they are appearances of perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have then for their object something which is not apparent (*i.e.*, real), for it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon, another object.—9.

Vivṛiti.—The *sūtram* is illustrative. It should be known that inferences, as described above, by the marks of knowledge, etc., are also proofs of the existence of the Soul.

Counter-objection stated.

Upakāra.—"If this be so (*i.e.*, if the Soul can be known by sense-perception), the objector says, "then what is the need of inference?"

यदि दृष्टमन्वक्षमः देवदत्तोऽहं यज्ञदत्त इति ॥ ३ । २ । १० ॥

यदि *Yadi*, if. दृष्ट *Dṛiṣṭam*, observation. अन्वक्ष *Anvaksam*, sensuous. अहं *Aham*, I. देवदत्तः *Devadattaḥ*, Devadatta. यज्ञ *Aham*, I यज्ञदत्तः *Yajñadattaḥ*, Yajñadatta. इति *Iti*, such.

10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions) as 'I am Devadatta,' 'I am Yajnadatta,' (then there is no need of inference).—145.

The word 'iti' marks the form of knowledge, In 'dṛiṣṭam,' the affix 'kṭā' is used in a passive sense. 'Anvākṣam' means sensuous or perceptual. Therefore the meaning is : if there is perceptual or sensuous observation in the form of 'This is Devadatta,' 'This is Yajñadatta,' then what is the use of taking the trouble of making an inference ? "For an elephant being in sight or observation, those who infer. do not infer it by its screaming."—10.

Above answered.

Upaskāra.—To this the advocate of Inference says :

दृष्ट्यात्मनि लिङ्गे एक एव दृढत्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रत्ययः ॥ ३।२।११॥

दृष्टे Dṛiṣṭe, (lit. Seen), grasped by perception. **आत्मनि** Ātmani, the soul. **लिङ्गे** Liṅge, being accompanied with marks. **एकः** Ekaḥ, one. **एव** Eva, only. **दृढत्वात्** Dṛiḍhatvāt, because it becomes more firm or fixed. **प्रत्यक्षवत्** Pratyakṣavat, like other percepts or perceptions. **प्रत्ययः** Pratyayaḥ, intuition. Belief.

11. As in the case of other percepts, so, if the Soul, which is grasped by perception, is also accompanied with, or comes at the top of, marks (from which it can be inferred), then, by means of, confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one object.—146.

'Dṛiṣṭe,' i. e., grasped by perception ; 'ātmani' ; 'liṅge,' i. e., having all its marks or causes developed ; eka eva,, i. e., having one object only as its matter ; 'pratyayaḥ.' 'Pratyayaḥ' implies the expulsion of all apprehension of error. "How can it be so ?" Hence he says, 'dṛiḍhatvāt,' i. e., because the current of proof is capable of removing the apprehension of its being otherwise. He gives an example, 'pratyakṣavat' ; i. e., as even when there is perception of water from a distance, yet inference of water by the mark of the *balakās* (water birds) is made for the purpose of corroboration. So it has been said, "Skilful logicians desire to understand by inference even what is grasped by perception." The import here is this : Although at times the Soul really shines in mental perception, yet, like knowledge, produced by the flash of lightning, it does not derive so much fixity or permanence being overclouded by such other conflicting perceptions as "I am fair," "I am lean," and the like. Here another form of knowledge produced by marks which cannot but lead to their proper inference, confirms or fixes the very knowledge previously obtained from perception. Moreover, inference must be applied to the Soul owing to the desire to infer the knowledge that intellection of the Soul as taught in the precepts "(The Soul) should be heard about, reflected upon," and the like, is a means towards the realization of that which is desirable, i. e., the Supreme Good. Because if there be no intellection of the Soul, then constant meditation would be impossible, and consequently there would be no realization of the Soul in the understanding, and so salvation would be impossible. This is the purport.

The statement of the two separate intuitions, 'I am Devadatta,' and "I am Yajñadatta," in the foregoing Sūtram, is intended to show that there can be only individual intuition of every Soul.—11.

Counter-objection stated and answered.

Upaskāra.—"Well," it may be objected, "if the intuition, 'I am Yajña/latta' refers to the Soul, then the appearance (of the notion Yajñadatta) as co-existing in the same substratum with Going, as in 'Yajñadatta goes,' is impossible." So he says :

देवदत्तो गच्छति यज्ञदत्तो गच्छतीत्युपचाराच्छरीरे प्रत्ययः ॥ ३ । २ । १२ ॥

देवदत्तः Devadattaḥ, Devadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. यज्ञदत्तः Yajñadattaḥ, Yajñadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. इति Iti, such. These. उपचारात् Upachârât, by transference. शरीरे Śarîre, in the body. प्रत्ययः Pratyayaḥ, intuition. Belief.

12. 'Devadatta goes,' 'Yajñadatta goes,'—in these cases, the belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference.—147.

For there are such intuitions as "I am fair," "I am stout," and there is also such differential intuition as "My body." Now, in "Devadatta goes," the perception of co-existence with motion, and the use of language to express it, are topical, whereas the intuition "my" is real as carrying its own meaning. Although the property of being Devadatta is a *jāti*, kind or genus, existing in the body whereby the use of language as Devadatta goes "is in the primary sense and the intuition is true in its own meaning, yet if the term Devadatta be applied to the Soul delimited by it, it is then to be understood as a transferred epithet.

Another objection.

Upaskāra.—Here he apprehends (an objection):

सन्दिग्धत्पचारः ॥ ३ । २ । १३ ॥

सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, doubtful. तु Tu, however. उपचारः Upachâraḥ, Transference.

13. The transference, however, is doubtful.—148.

The word 'tu' points out the opponent's view. The intuition and the use of the word, 'I,' are observed both in respect of the Soul and body. Therefore the doubt arises which intuition and expression be the primary, and which the secondary ones.—13.

Above answered.

Upaskāra.—He solves the doubt:

अमिता प्रत्यगात्मनि भावात् परब्रह्माभावाच्चान्तरप्रत्ययः ॥ ३ । २ । १४ ॥

अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, this. प्रत्यगात्मनि Pratyag-âtmani, in the in-going or individual Soul. भावात् Bhâvât, because it exists. परब्र Paratra, other-

where. अभावाद् Abhāvāt, because it does not exist. अर्थान्तरप्रत्यक्षः Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of perception.

14. Because the intuition 'I' exists in one's own soul, and because it does not exist elsewhere, therefore the intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.—149.

'Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ' is that intuition in which 'arthāntaram,' i. e., the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows : Since the intuition 'I' arises in respect of 'pratyagātma,' i. e., one's own Soul, and since it does not arise 'paratra' i. e., in respect of other Souls, therefore it is proper to regard the reference to 'arthāntaram' or one's own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary reference were to the body, then the intuition would be produced by the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, and the intuition 'This is I' is mental being produced even without the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the form of 'I am happy,' 'I know,' 'I will,' 'I desire,' This intuition is not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is only mental ; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one's own Soul, it would also refer to the Souls of others ; we deny this, for the Soul of one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or relation to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appropriate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only, but of every Substance. For Substance becomes perceptible only by the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the ear were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour, we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that possession of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word 'pratyag,' in-going, points out divergence from others.—14.

Another objection.

Upaskāra.—He apprehends another objection :

देवदत्तो गच्छतीत्युपचारादभिमानात्तावच्छेदोऽहङ्कारः

॥ ३ । २ । १५ ॥

देवदत्तः Devadattah, Devadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. इति Iti, this. उपचारात् Upachârât, from transference. अभिमानात् Abhimânât, from fancy,

reference to Soul, Conceit, Egotism, or Self-identification. तावत् Tāvat, because, therefore. शरीरप्रत्यक्षः Śarīrapratyākṣaḥ having the body as the object. अहंकारः Ahaṅkārah, ahaṁkāra. The intuition of I. I-ness.

15. The intuition of 'I' has the body for its object. Therefore to say that, in 'Devadatta goes,' there is a transference (of epithet), is a mere fancy.—150.

'Ahaṅkārah,' i. e., the intuition of 'I.' It is 'Śarīrapratyākṣaḥ,' i. e., that which has the body as the percept or subject-matter. You have determined that the intuition or, for the matter of that the expression, "Devadatta goes," is due to transference. Now, this transference is a fancied one, because such intuitions and expressions as "I am fair," "I am lean," "I am fortunate, my birth is a mere repetition," and the like, cannot be reconciled on the theory of transference. This is the meaning.—15.

Above answered.

Upaskāra.—He gives the solution:

सन्दिग्धत्पचारः ॥ ३ । २ । १६ ॥

सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, doubtful. तु Tu, but. उपचारः Upachārah, transference.

16. The transference, (as characterised by you), however, is doubtful.—151.

The word 'tu' here points out the solution (of the foregoing objection). The meaning is that there is doubt even in what has been said (by you, i. e., the opponent), namely that the transference is a fancied one, whereas the intuition of 'I' is in respect of the body itself. Since, therefore, the intuition is a false witness on either side, we must endeavour to find out a distinction. Since on making this endeavour, we observe that even a man, whose eyes have been closed, still has the intuition of 'I,' we must hold that it refers to an object different from the body, and beyond the cognizance of the external senses. If it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and also would not take place in independence of the eyes. If it be asked how there can be such common measure or co-extension as in "I who am stout or thin, am happy;" we reply that in this case it is possible that the body would appear as the condition of pleasure, etc., as in "This forest is resonant with the roar of a lion" (there is such appearance). Mere I-ness, presented by the Mind, is superimposed upon the body, just as heat, presented by the organ of touch, in the judgments, "The water is hot," "The body is hot," etc.—16.

Above answered—continued.

Upaskāra.—By elaborating the solution he says :

न तुशरीरविशेषाद् यज्ञदत्तविष्णुमिह योर्ज्ञानं विषयः ॥ ३ । २ । १७ ॥

न Na, not. तु Tu, but. शरीरविशेषाद् Śarīra-viśeṣāt, perceiving the difference of bodies. यज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रयोः Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrayoḥ, of Yajña-

datta and Viṣṇumitra. ज्ञान Jñānam, knowledge, thought. विषयः Viśayaḥ, object

17. But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra do not become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an attribute of the body).—152.

‘Jñānam’ implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of the Soul. As the bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are mutually different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like, different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajñadatta, so also, though no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in Yajñadatta, will the knowledge, etc., “I feel pleasure,” “I know” “I will,” “I desire,” be objects (of perception); because the sensible body being an object of perception, knowledge, etc., which are (*ex hypothesi*) its properties, like its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this is impossible. Therefore (such is the import), it should be said that the seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from the body. ‘Śariraviśeṣāt’ means from difference of body. The fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception, while difference of body is being perceived.—17.

Proof of Soul not from Revelation only.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected as follows :—“The Soul is not perceptible, since, like Ether, it is a colourless Substance, or a Substance without component parts. Therefore the body itself should be affirmed to be the object of the cognition “I am thin, pale.” If occasionally there arises also the consciousness “I feel pleasure,” it is proper to suppose that pleasure and the like becoming manifest without a substratum, are transferred to or superimposed upon the body. As in “Hot, fragrant water,” heat and fragrance appearing without a substratum are superimposed upon water, but for the sake of this the intuition of water also does not contain as its object anything except common water; so I-ness in “I am” is real only in reference to the body, whereas pleasure and the like are sometimes superimposed upon it. There is then, in respect of the Soul, no knowledge of it in the form of perception. That which has to be supposed as the substratum of pleasure, etc., must be established by revelation. There is no perception of it.” In reply to this objection, he says :

अमिति स्वययोग्याभ्यां शब्दवद्व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचाराद् विशेष-
सिद्धेर्नागमिकः ॥ ३ । २ । १८ ॥

अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, this. स्वययोग्याभ्यां Mukhya-yogyābhyām, by innate or self-evident and perceptive or sensible cognition. शब्दवत् Śhbdavat, like sound. व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचारात् Vyatirekābhyabhichārāt, from the invariability of absence or divergence. विशेषसिद्धेः Viśeṣa-siddheḥ, from proof in particular. न Na, not. आगमिकः Āgamikāḥ, scriptural, proved by revelation.

18. (The soul is) not proved (only) by Revelation, since, (as Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in particular, by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of ‘I,’ accompanied by the invariable divergence (of such cognition from all other things), as is the case with Sound.—153.

This is the meaning. The cognition, "I feel pleasure," or "I am in pain," is neither scriptural, nor verbally communicated, nor inferential, since it arises even without the help of verbal communication or of marks of inference. Whereas it has been said that colourlessness and simplicity (or the not being an aggregate of component parts) are obstacles to the perception of the soul, this holds true in the case of perception by external senses, for of this the possession of colour and the possession of more than one substance are the necessary conditions or exciting causes, while mental perception is independent of these. It may be objected that this would be the case were there proof of the existence of the Soul, but that there is none. Accordingly it has been said, "From proof in particular by invariable divergence, as is the case with Sound." As in the Substances, Earth, etc., the absence of Sound is invariable, i. e., uniform, and there is thereby proof of a particular Substance, namely Ether, in addition to the eight Substances, as the Substratum of Sound, so on account of the invariable divergence of desire from Earth, etc., the substratum of desire also must be different from the eight Substances. Lest it be argued that all this goes to show only that the Soul is a subject of inference, not an object of perception, the words "by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of 'I' are employed. By the word 'iti' the form of the cognition is indicated. Therefore the cognition, in the form of 'I,' which is produced, without the help of verbal communication and mark of inference, in one whose eyes are closed, should be explained by the innate idea of Egoity or I-ness and its sensible or perceptible attributes, and not by reference to the body, and the like, since the divergence or absence of desire is invariable there. After "by the innate as well as the sensible cognition" the words "Should be established" are to be supplied. There are many proofs of the existence of the Soul. They are omitted here for fear of increasing the volume of the treatise. They should be sought in the *Mayākha*.—18.

Vivṛiti.—Vedāntins, however, hold that the soul is nothing but eternal knowledge (*viñāna*) according to the *Śruti*, अविनाशीवदरेऽयमात्मा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, "Lo! the Soul, imperishable, is truth, knowledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (*Bṛihadārṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV. v. 14). Although, in reality, it is one, yet, owing to the diversity of its *Upādhi* or adjuncts in the form of the inner sense, which are products of *Māyā*, i. e., limitation, it appears as manifold. That it is so, follows from such *Śrutis* as एकमेवाद्वितीयम् "One only, without a second," *Chhândogya Upaniṣad*, VI. ii. I), एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तर्मात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपोऽयम् "So the one inner Self of all beings, for every form, became its counterform" (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. v. 9.)

He discredits this view.

The words, 'object of perception' are the complement of 'aham iti,' 'I'—this. Thus, the object of such popular mental perceptions as 'I feel pleasure,' etc., is not 'āgamika,' i. e., identical with *Īśvara*, the *probandum*, of such 'āgama' or text of the Veda as "truth, knowledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (*Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, II. i. 1). He states the reason of this by ह्यवयवोऽयम् etc. विशेषतः because difference in *Īśvara* is established by pleasure and pain, which, though primary

or instinctive or original or innate, are yet sensible. The instinctiveness of pleasure lies in agreeables or desirables, since it is there the object of desire which is not dependent upon any other desire ; whereas the instinctiveness of pain lies in disagreeable, since it is there the object of aversion which is not dependent upon any other aversion. Sensibleness, again, is the being the object of perception (*i. e.* by the inner sense). This is mentioned for the purpose of removing the (possible) apprehension that the mark is an unproved or unknown mark, and also to prevent overextension, in the case where eternal bliss is attributed to *Īśvara*, because eternal bliss can never be an object of perception. Pleasure and pain, therefore, being products, are proof of the difference between the *Jīva* and *Īśvara*. This argument is illustrative : it should be observed that knowledge, volition, desire, and also aversion, as products, establish difference from *Īśvara*.

It may be urged that in such inferences as, " The soul which is the object of the perception, ' I am,' is different from *Īśvara*, because it possesses pleasure which is a product," there being no example, and consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances, knowledge of the universal relation is impossible. For this reason, it has been said *व्यतिरेकान्यभिचरात्* *i. e.*, from the uniformity of difference. The use of the ablative inflexion has the object of denoting the (necessary) condition leading to the inference, and the syntactical connection of the word is with the word *विशेषसिद्धेः*. The import, therefore, is, that, even though there is no example by way of agreement, yet, *Īśvara* being an example by way of difference, an inference with respect to the matter in hand is possible, through the observation of the universal relation of difference, dependent upon the concomitance or congruity of difference.

It may be urged, again, that that a mark can establish difference from *Īśvara*, by the universal relation of difference, has not been known before. To remove this apprehension, it has been stated *शब्दवत्* *i. e.*, like Sound, etc. The meaning is this : As the difference of Ether from *Īśvara* is proved by the mark, namely Sound, which is known by the method of the universal relation, or uniformity, of difference, so the difference of the soul from *Īśvara* is proved by the possession of pleasure, etc., which are products.

Bhāṣya.—In III. ii. 6—17, the author gives, in the form of a dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the Self be an object of perception only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own conclusion in III. ii. 18.

Unity of Soul, as an objection.

Upaskāra.—Having thus finished the section on the investigation of the Soul, he now begins the section on the plurality of Souls. Therein the following aphorism sets forth an adverse doctrine.

सुखदुःखज्ञाननिष्पत्त्यविशेषादैकात्म्यः ॥ ३ । २ । १२ ॥

सुखदुःखज्ञाननिष्पत्त्यविशेषाद् *Sukha-duḥkha-jñāna-niṣpatti-aviśeṣāt*, because there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. *एकैकत्वं* *Aikātmīyam*, identity or unity of Soul.

19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.—154.

There is only one Soul, in spite of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others. Why ? Because of the non-distinction in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, *i. e.*, because the origin of pleasure, pain, and knowledge is really undifferentiated in this that it is determined by, or confined to, the body as a whole. If there were another mark to prove the difference of the Soul, the difference of the Soul might be proved, but there is no such mark. As Ether is only one, in spite of the production of Sounds within the limits of particular spaces, since there is no distinction in Sound which is its mark ; as Time is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of simultaneity, etc., which is its mark ; as Space is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of East, West, etc., which is its mark ; (so the Soul is only one).—19.

Vivṛiti.—It may be urged that the identity of Jīva and Īśvara must be admitted, on the strength of the texts of the Veda, " One only, without a second. त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो, " Thou, O Śvetaketu, art that," (Chhândogya Upaniṣad VI. viii. 7), etc. It cannot be held that difference is proved by the aforesaid inference ; because, pleasure, pain, etc., being properties of the internal organ, are unproved by themselves (*i. e.*, have no independent existence). Thus says the Brihadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I. V. 3., कामं संकल्पो विचिकित्सा भ्रडाभ्रडा धृतिरधृतिर्द्विर्धीर्भिरित् सर्वं मन एव, " Desire, Intention, Doubt, Faith, Unfaith, Patience, Impatience, Modesty, Intelligence, Awe,—all this is verily Mind." Here the word Desire denotes pleasure, and the word Intelligence denotes knowledge in the form of a faculty. Moreover, pain, also, appearing, as it does, in co-existence with pleasure, cannot be an attribute of the Soul.

This he apprehends :

The meaning is that, अविशेषात् *i. e.*, because the difference of the Jivâtma (embodied Soul) from Īśvara is not proved, निष्पत्त्या, *i. e.*, by the certainty or ascertainment, सुखदुःखज्ञानानां, *i. e.*, of pleasure, pain, and knowledge ; in other words, they, being proved in the mind by the above Śruti or Vedic text, are thereby disproved in the Soul.

Its diversity explained.

Upakāra.—He states the solution or conclusion :

व्यवस्थातो नाना ॥ ३ । २ । २० ॥

व्यवस्थातः Vyavasthâtaḥ, from status. नाना Nānā, many.

20. Plurality of Souls is proved by status.—155.

Souls are many. Why ? Because of status. Status means several conditions, as one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another unhappy, one is of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another ignorant. These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of Souls, prove a diversity of Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the states of one and the same Soul is diversified by the difference of birth

or by the difference of childhood, youth and old age, so also it will be in the case of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others, for it is possible to impose contradictory attributes (on one and the same subject) by means of change of Time (*i. e.*, at different times).—20.

Vivṛiti.—He removes the apprehension. नाना means non-identity of the Souls, in other words, that the Jivâtma is not identical with Īśvara. Whence? व्यवस्थानः, because of the certainty of the existence of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc., are not properties of the mind, because the mind not having largeness or large size, pleasure etc., would be imperceptible; and minuteness or atom-ness or subtleness must be affirmed of the mind as determining the non-simultaneity of acts of knowing. The Śruti, "Desire, Resolution, etc.," however, like "Life is clarified butter," etc., demonstrates that the mind is the cause of desire, etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that it is identical with them.

Its diversity explained—continued.

Upaskāra.—He gives another proof :

ऽास्त्रसामर्थ्याच्च ॥ ३ । २ । २१ ॥

ऽास्त्रसामर्थ्यात् Śāstra-sāmarthyāt, from the authority (or force or significance) of the Śāstras. च Cha, and.

21. (Plurality of Souls follows) also from the authority or significance of the Śāstras.—156.

‘Śāstram’ means Veda or revelation. Because difference of Soul is proved by it also. For it is heard. "Two Brahman (*i. e.*, Souls) have to be known," etc.; and also "Two birds, friends and kindred, embrace the same tree, etc." (Mundaka Upaniṣad III, i. I).—21.

Here ends the second chapter of the third book in the Commentary of Śrī Śāṅkara on the Aphorisms of Kaṇāda.

Vivṛiti.—It cannot be asked. "What then will be the fate of these texts, *viz.*, "Thou art that, O Śvetaketu!" "One who knows Brahman, verily becomes Brahman," etc.? For the text, "Thou art That," conveys the sense of identity in this sense that what is devoted to, or, belongs to, That, is not different from That. The text, "One who knows Brahman verily becomes Brahman," does not convey the sense of identity, but that, of simily of the Jīva (*i. e.*, the embodied Soul), to Īśvara (*i. e.*, the Great Soul), in point of freedom from suffering etc.; for, otherwise, the text. "The stainless one attains to supreme similarity," can have no meaning. In popular language also there is the topical use of identity in the sense of resemblance, as when there is an abundance of wealth, it is said, "this priest has become a king," and so on. Nor should it be maintained that identity is produced in the state of salvation, on the cessation of ignorance or false knowledge, since difference, being eternal, is incapable of destruction, and even if we admit the destruction of difference, then since there is necessity for the existence of two individuals. So much in brief.

Bhasys:—Interprets III. ii. 19, 20, and 21 in the monistic sense namely, that there exists only one Self, variously differentiated on the phenomenal plane, as witnessed by such texts as "One only, without a second," "One shining Being is immanent in all created things," "All Selves become one," "All Selves emanate from this, Same Self," "Two birds," etc.

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BOOK FOURTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

The eternal defined.

Upaskāra.—Having finished the enumeration, definition, and examination of the nine Substances, Earth, etc., and desiring to refute the doctrine, held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers, that *prakṛiti* or Matter is the prime cause, and to establish that ultimate atoms are the prime cause and enter into the composition of earth, etc., the author first of all gives the definition of the Genus, eternity.

सदकारणवन्नित्यम् ॥ ४ । १ । १ ॥

सद् Sat, existent. अकारणवत् Akāraṇavat not having a cause, uncaused, *causa sui*. नित्यं Nityam, eternal.

1. The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused.—157.

‘Akāraṇavat,’ means not having a precedent cause, on the maxim of the purity of words (which excludes other interpretations of the term). Hereby the water-pot, and the like are excluded. Still the definition may be too wide by including previous non-existence; so he says, ‘existent’ i. e., having connection with existence. In the case of the Predicables, Combination and Species, connection with existence is nothing but combination or inherence in one and the same object with existence. In the case of any other Genus and of existence connection with existence consists only in being the object of the cognition that it exists. This cognition is not in respect of a thing as such. “Let it be so;” it cannot be objected, “in other cases also. What is the use of existence?” For, existence has already been proved as the cause of assimilative understanding.—1.

Vijṛiti.—Some hold that the existent is produced from the non-existent. What they have in view is this. Seeds, etc., are not productive of effects such as shoots, etc. Were this the case, then seeds, etc., lying in a granary, would also produce shoots, etc. But since shoots appear only after the destruction of seeds sown on a field, by the disjunction of their parts, it follows that it is the destruction of seeds, etc., which is the cause of shoots, etc., So we have the *sūtram* of Gautama, stating the argument of an opponent, “Production of existence (is) from non-existence, as there is no appearance without destroying.” (Nyāya-Sūtram, IV. i. 14).

Only to refute this view, he strengthens the theory of progressive origination by the series of ultimate atoms, etc.

‘Sat,’ means something in the form of existence; ‘akāraṇavat’ means a non-product; ‘nityam’ means an entity which opposes annihilation. The meaning is: the primary cause of compound bodies is not non-existent, that is to say, because, if causality of destruction were admitted, then it would entail the production of shoots even from powdered seeds.

Mark of existence of ultimate atoms.

Upaskāra.—After describing the Genus, eternal, he now says with reference to ultimate atoms:

तस्य कार्यं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४ । १ । २ ॥

तस्य Tasya, its. Of the ultimate atom. कार्यं Kāryyam, effect. लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark.

2. The effect is the mark (of the existence) of the ultimate atom.—2.

‘Tasya,’ i. e. of the ultimate atom ; kāryyam,’ e. g., the water-pot and the like ; ‘liṅgam.’ Accordingly the *sūtram* of Gautama. “From the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the evidence of (experience by) perception,” (Nyāya-sūtram IV. i. II). Now the inter-relation of parts and wholes is perceived. If it were unlimited, there would be no difference in size of measurement between mount Meru and a grain of mustard seed ; for, they would be without distinction, both being originated by infinite parts. Nor can it be said that difference will be caused by the differences of the size of each part, and of the aggregation of parts ; for, without a difference of number, these also would be impossible. If it be said that *pralaya* or destruction of the creation may be the limit (of the series of parts and wholes) ; (we reply that) the final something *ex-hypothesi* having no parts, *pralaya* itself would be impossible, for it is only disjunction and destruction of parts which can destroy substances. Nor is disjunction the limit, for it is impossible for it to have only one substratum. Therefore, a substance without parts, must be the limit, and this the ultimate atom. A mote is not the limit ; for, being a visible substance, it possesses magnitude, and is composed of more substance than one ; magnitude, as the cause of visual perception, presupposes, or is dependent upon, multiplicity of substance ; else there would be no magnitude even, what then would be the cause ? Nor are the constituent parts of the mote atoms, for we must infer that they also, as originative of a substance possessing magnitude, are composed of parts, like thread, and like potsherd. Therefore, whatever substance is an effect, is composed of parts, and whatever substance is composed of parts, is an effect. So that from whichever part the nature of being an effect goes away, from it goes away also the nature of being made up of parts. This is the proof of the existence of indivisible ultimate atoms. So it has been said by Professor Prāśastadeva, “Earth is twofold, eternal and non-eternal.—2.

Law of Causation.

Upakṣāra—Now he states an argument or proof, to prove that there are colour, etc., in the ultimate atom :

कारभावात् कार्यभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ३ ॥

कार्यभावात् Kāraṇa-bhāvāt, from existence in the cause. कार्यभावः Kāryabhāvāḥ, existence in the effect

3. The existence (of colour, etc.) in the effect, (follows) from (their) existence in the cause.—159.

The existence of colour, etc., in the effect, is due to their existence in the cause. For the attributes of the effect result from the attributes

of the cause, the same being observed in the case of the water-pot, canvas, etc. This is the meaning.—3.

Vivṛiti.—He points out an objection to the primary causality of nonexistence.

‘Bhāvah,’ *i. e.*, the existence, of the ‘effect,’ *i. e.*, compound bodies, follows from the existence of the ‘cause,’ *i. e.*, the primary cause (*viz.*, ultimate atoms). Otherwise, like the quality of being clayey, of that which is made of clay, it would follow that effects, *i. e.*, compound bodies would be non-existent, because they are constituted by what is non-existent.

The eternal exists.

Upaskṛta.—With a view to silence the advocate of the doctrine of the transiency of all things, he now says :

अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ४ ॥

अनित्यः Anityah, non-eternal. इति Iti, such, *i. e.*, such intuition and expression. विशेषतः Viśeṣataḥ, of the particular, *i. e.*, the eternal. प्रतिषेधभावः Partīśedha-bhāvah, the form of negation.

4. “Not-eternal”—such (intuition and expression) can be accounted for only as the negation of the eternal.—160.

In ‘viśeṣataḥ’ the affix ‘tasi’ is used in the genitive sense. There would be negation of ‘viśeṣa’ *i. e.*, the eternal, if there were not such intuition, and application of the word as ‘non-eternal,’ because the prefix *nañ* (non) has the force of negating the meaning of the word next to it. Therefore how can there be the intuition and expression, ‘non-eternal,’ in the absence (of that) of the eternal? Hence it is proved that the eternal exists. Or, (the meaning of the *Sātram* may be), the negation of the eternal must be made by you in this way that (it is) “not eternal,” *i. e.*, that the ultimate atom is not eternal. But negation in this way is not successful, since it is frustrated by proof and disproof. (In this interpretation), the *sātram* should be rendered thus : The word अ (not) will be a negative term by itself, as the rule, “अ, मा, नी, and ना are negative terms.” Thus “non-eternal” will mean not eternal. ‘Pratiśedha-bhāvah,’ means the nature or form of negative. Hence “not eternal”—this is the form of the negation of viśeṣa, ; *i. e.*, the eternal, and it is not possible. This closes the argument.—4.

Vivṛiti.—He refutes the view that all is non-eternal, that there is nothing which is eternal.

अ (in the aphorism) is an indeclinable, having the same meaning as नन (non). Thus, ‘not eternal’—such negation is ‘viśeṣataḥ,’ *i. e.*, with reference to particular things. So that, there may be the negation that compound bodies are not eternal, but such whole-sale negation as everything is not eternal, is not possible, because the eternal, which is the counter-opposite, is frustrated by proof and disproof. This is the whole meaning.

The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected as follows : The ultimate atom is not eternal, since it is corporal of ponderable, like a water-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the possession of taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by simultaneous conjunction with six (other ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts ; so that from its possession of parts, and from its being the substratum of the conjunction appearing in objects which it cannot pervade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not eternal). Moreover, if there be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must have parts ; if there be no Ether inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not penetrate every where. Further, (the ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow, and possesses circulation. Again, the non-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also from the inference which establishes transiency, e.g., the inference, that all that exists is momentary. If then there be such a series of inferences, how can it be maintained that the ultimate atom is eternal ?

To meet these objections, he says :

अविद्या ॥ ४ । १ । ५ ॥

अविद्या Avidyā, ignorance, error.

5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom is not eternal).—161.

Every inference, which has for its subject the non-eternality of the ultimate atom, is ignorance, i.e., is of the form of error, since it springs from a fallacy. This fallacy is occasionally obstruction or opposition to the proof which comprehends the subject ; always absence of the characteristic of being pervaded (or being the mark), due to want of evidence preventive of its existence in the *vipakṣa* (i.e., in which the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain) ; sometimes unproof by itself ; and others which should be learnt from the kindred system (i.e., the Nyāya-Sūtram of Gaṇṭama).—5.

Bhāṣya.—Reads IV. i. 3. 4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, viz., *kāraṇa-bhāvāt kāryabhāvo, nitya it'*, and *Viśeṣataḥ pratiseḍhabhāvo 'vidyā'*, and interprets them to mean, respectively, "The nature of the effect, (though) following from the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is non-eternal" and "It is an error to suppose that because things (e.g., atoms) exist as effects (e.g., compound bodies), therefore they cannot exist in the causal (or atomic) state",—in order to explain the application of the word "non-eternal" in, I. i. 8 where the reference is to things which are products.

Requisites of perception.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, "Well, if the ultimate atom exists, why is it not perceived by the senses ? It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the possession of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility." Hence he says :

महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वा. रूपाच्चोपलब्धः ॥ ४ । १ । ६ ॥

महति Mahati, in respect of an object possessing magnitude. **अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात्** Aneka-dravya-vattvāt, by means of its possession of what is composed of more than one substance. **रूपात्** Rupāt, by means of colour. **च** Cha, and. **उपलब्धिः** Upalabdhīḥ, perception.

6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its colour.—162.n

‘ Mahati ’ means in respect of a substance possessing magnitude, the affix, *matup*, denoting possession, among affixes denoting quality, being elided after the word, *mahat*, denoting measure. ‘ Anekadravyatvât ’ means from the nature or state of containing that of which more substances than one are the substrata. This being so, Air also would be perceptible. Hence he says, “ And by means of Colour,” i. e., as will be later on said, developed and uneclipsed or unobscured colour. “ Uṣalabdhiḥ ” is complemented by the words, “by the external sense.” Therefore it goes without saying that there is no external perception of the ultimate atom, since it does not possess magnitude. “The possession of that which is composed of more than one substance ” means either the being constituted by a compound of more than one substance, or the being the substratum of the magnitude which is due to a multiplicity of component parts.

It cannot be said that the possession of that which is a compound of more than one substance, is rendered futile (as a condition precedent of perception), by the very possession of magnitude ; since the reverse is also possible. Nor can it be said, “Futility of the producer is caused by the producible, but not that of the producible by the producer ;” for the agreement and the difference of the producible and the producer being simultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise it would follow that the futility of the staff, etc., will be caused by the whirling of it, etc. Nor can it be said that there is a development of, or rise in, perceptibility at a distance due to development of, or rise in, magnitude; for a development of, or rise in, the possession of a compound of more substances than one being also possible, there can be no discrimination. Moreover, while a spider’s web measuring four cubits, etc., is not perceptible from a distance, the perceptibility of the spider itself is certainly due to a development of the possession of a compound of more substances than one, since a preponderance of magnitude exists in the web. So also it should be observed that while a piece of cloth, constituted by five yarns, is not perceptible at a distance, is in spite of a preponderance of magnitude in it, a club of a very small magnitude is perceptible there.—6.

Cause of non-perception

Uṣākāra.— Such being the case, there should, it might be urged, also be perception of the light of a shooting star at midday, of the light of the eye, or of Air, as well as of magnitude which can bines with colour by means of its combination with Touch. Hence he says:

सत्यपि द्रव्यत्वे महत्त्वे रूपसंस्काराभावाद्वायो ह पलब्धिः

॥ ४ । १ । ७ ॥

सति Sati, there being. अपि Api, even, in spite of. द्रव्यत्वे Dravyatve, substance-ness, महत्त्वे Mahatve, magnitude. रूप Rûpa, colour. संस्कार Saṁskāra, impression, evolution, reformation. अभावाद् Abhāvāt, on account of the absence or non-existence of. वायो Vāyoh, of Air. अनुपलब्धिः Anupalabdhiḥ, non-perception.

7. The non-perception of Air, in spite of there being substance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of the evolution of colour.—163.

By the term "evolution of colour" are intended combination or inhesion of colour, the development of colour to the degree of appreciability, and the non-obscuration of colour. Though, therefore, in the case of Air, the selfsame combination of touch is also the combination of colour, yet it is not qualified or determined by colour, for there is in it absolute non-existence of colour. In the light of the eye, there is no evolution, that is, appreciability, of colour. In the light of the shooting star at midday, there is no evolution, that is, non-obscuration, of colour. Of these, therefore, there is no perceptibility. In like manner, evolution of colour is to be analogously applied to the heat of the summer, the fire in a frying pan, gold, etc.

The writer of the *Vṛitti* has, however, said that *रूपसंस्कार* is a compound of the words *रूप* and *रूपसंस्कार*, formed by the elision of one of the two *रूप*'s, and that, therefore, the non-perception of Air is in consequence of the non-existence of colour in it, while the non-perception of the ocular light, etc., is due to the non-existence of the evolution of colour.—7.

Requisites of perception of colour.

Upaskāra.—In this way having, immediately after the section on the eternality of the ultimate atoms, finished the section on the perceptibility of external objects, as a subsidiary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to set forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes, he says :

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥ ४।१।८ ॥

अनेक Aneka, more than one. **द्रव्य** Dravya, substance **समवायात्** Samavāyāt, from combination in. **रूप** Rūpa, colour. **विशेषात्** Viśeṣāt, from some special characteristic of. **रूप** Rūpa, colour. **उपलब्धिः** Upalabdhiḥ, perception.

8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with a compound of substances more than two, and from (its possession of) some special characteristic of colour.—164.

'Rūpaviśeṣa' means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour, and that consists of the characteristics of being developed to the degree of appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From this, perception of colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such being the case, the colour of the ultimate atom as well as of the dyad would be perceived, so it has been added—'anekadravya-samavāyāt.' The word 'aneka' denotes multitude; hence 'anekadravya' means that to which many substances belong as its substratum, *e. g.*, a molecule of the atoms, and the like. To term 'anekadravya-samavāyāt' therefore, means from combination with such a compound substance. The water-pot, etc., although they are originated by two parts, (*i. e.*, potsherds, etc.), really contain a multitude of substances as their substratum, in the serial arrangement of the parts of these parts, and so

on. As taste, touch, etc., lack in the characteristic of colourness, so there is no ocular perception of them. In the case of ocular fire or light, non-visibility is due to the absence of the degree of appreciability. Development or appreciability is only a particular universal entity or 'class' belonging to the particular attributes of colour, etc., and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness, etc.

Objection :—This being so, no relation of higher and lower (classification) will be at all established even by whiteness, fragrantness, sourness, etc. If, however, you suppose a manifoldness of development or appreciability, pervaded by, or included in, them respectively, then there will be a redundancy of supposition, and the term development or appreciability, उद्भव also will have various meanings.

Answer :—It is not so ; for, development or appreciability denotes the *upādhi* or condition, namely, the characteristic of the attribute capable of being apprehended by each individual external sense, while non-development or non-appreciability denotes only the absence of the *upādhi* or condition. Some say that appreciability is simply the non-existence of non-appreciability. This should be considered, since non-appreciability also cannot be similarly established. It may be said that non-appreciability is a particular attribute beyond the cognizance of the senses. If it be so, then it would follow that appreciability is a particular attribute within the reach of the senses. If it be asked, "What is the determinant of sensuousness?" we reply that both of us, (i. e., the disputants) are equally at a disadvantage here. They also say that appreciability is the one and only one 'class' present in all particular attributes, and that the non-establishment of the relation of higher and lower is no fault in the case of the class inhering in attributes.—8.

Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch.

Upaskāra.—Of the attributes other than Touch, co-existence in the same substratum with colour is itself the necessary condition of their being perceptible by the external senses. For this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he now extends them to other cases, and says :

तेन रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातः ॥ ४ । १ । ६ ॥

तेन Tena, by this, रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु Rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu, in respect of taste, smell, and touch. ज्ञानं Jñānam, knowledge. व्याख्यातम् Vyākhyātam, explained.

9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case of Taste, Smell, and Touch.—165.

'Tena' means by the preceptual knowledge of colour. As preception of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour, viz., colourness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of taste arises from some particularity of taste, characterised as tasteness, non-obscuration, and appreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Combination with a compound of more than two substances, should be also extended. From inappreciability to the organs of the ear, the tongue,

and the skin, result non-apprehension of smell, taste, and touch. Being undeveloped or inappreciable, smell and taste are not perceived in a stone, etc.; for they are perceived in their ashes. Some maintain that they are perceived indeed in the stone, etc., but not distinctly. The non-apprehension of the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which have been disjoined from one another, is due to non-development of the colour. So also is the non-apprehension of taste. In hot water, there is non-apprehension of the colour of the fire, in consequence of its non-development, and of touch, in consequence of its obscuration. In comminuted camphor, the *champaka* flower, etc., non-apprehension of colour, taste, and touch is due to their non-development or inappreciability. In gold, and the like, colour is indeed developed, but whiteness and luminousness are obscured. Some hold that colour also is obscured, whereas the apprehension of gold takes place with the help of other colour. Obscuration, again, is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, and not merely relation or connection with a powerful like object. For, since connection with a powerful like object has to be ascertained by non-apprehension it is the non-apprehension which is of primary importance. Whereas the powerful like object is not of primary importance, as the necessary condition of non-apprehension; because neither non-apprehension, nor antecedent non-existence of apprehension, nor its absolute non-existence is subject to its operation, while the annihilation of apprehension does not exist there. If it be objected, "Then your proposition also, that obscuration is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, is not proved," we reply, "Let it be so. Still apprehension and non-apprehension alone are the necessary conditions of the strength or weakness of a like object, or of the existence of such a relation; and the same is the meaning of the word, obscuration."—9.

Gravity, not perceptible.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked, "Since Gravity also is combined with a compound of more than two substances (*i. e.* atoms), and appears in the same substratum with colour and magnitude, why then it is not perceptible?" Hence he says:

तस्याभावादव्यभिचारः ॥ ४ । १ । १० ॥

तस्य *Tasya*, of this, *i. e.*, the genus of colourness, etc., and development or appreciability. अभावात् *Abhāvāt*, because of the non-existence व्यभिचारः *Avyabhichārah*, non-deviation. No breach of uniformity or the rule.

10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is no violation (of the above law of perceptibility in the case of Gravity.)—166.

Gravity is not perceptible, because of the non-existence, in Gravity, of this, *viz.*, the genus of colourness, etc., and development or appreciability. It might be said that granted that, colourness, etc., do not exist there, yet there may be perception of Gravity. To prevent this, he adds 'avyabhichārah.' There is 'non-deviation' *i. e.*, unbroken uniformity of the five 'classes' or universals, *e. g.*, colourness, etc., towards

apprehensibility by each individual sense. Whenever there exists one or another of the pentad of colourness, etc., there also exists apprehensibility by the respective external senses, as shown by the method of difference (that where the former are not, there the latter does not exist). This is the meaning.

Gravity, by reason of its being left obscure in the sūtram, as the topic of discussion, by Praśastadeva classed among things supersensuous, is by Vallavāchārya said to be perceived by touch.—10.

Where Numbers, etc., are objects of visual perception.

Upaskāra.—Having thus stated objects perceptible by the senses individually, he now enumerates objects perceptible by two senses jointly :

**संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे
कर्म च रूपिद्रव्यसमवायात् चाक्षुषाणि ॥ ४ । १ । ११ ॥**

संख्याः Saṁkhyāḥ, numbers. परिमाणानि Parimāṇāni, magnitudes, extensions. पृथक्त्वं Prithaktvam, separateness. संयोगविभागौ Saṁyoga-vibhāgau, conjunction and disjunction. परत्वापरत्वे Paratva-apatatve, priority and posteriority. कर्म Karmma, action. च Cha, and. रूपिद्रव्यसमवायात् Rūpi-dra-vya-samavāyāt, through combination with substances possessing colour. चाक्षुषाणि Chākṣuṣāṇi, visible, objects of visual perception.

11. Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, and Action become objects of visual perception, through their combination with Substances possessing colour.—167.

The words have not been formed into a compound in order to indicate their mutual independence in respect of their visual or tactual perceptibility. Although there is dependence upon महत्त्व, *i. e.*, largeness, yet it is not as upon a mode of extension or magnitude. The word 'cha' has the force of involving the addition of Viscidity, fluidity and Impetus. The word चाक्षुषाणि implies tactual perceptibility ; or the word 'cha' should be applied after the word चाक्षुषाणि also. The plural number in Numbers, comprehends all numbers, from unity upwards. If it be held that unity is only a Genus, and not an Attribute, then if it appear in substances only, its denotation will be neither more nor less than that of substanceness ; if, on the other hand, it be present in attributes and actions also, then its denotation will be neither more nor less than that of existence. " How, then," if it be asked, " can there be perception of unity, etc., in attribute, etc. ?," it may be answered that it is by means of attributed unity ; or that by reason of the proximity known as combination or co-inherence in one and the same object, the perception of unity is quite justified. This unity is eternal in eternal substances, and in non-eternal substances it has causal unity for its non-combinative cause. On the other hand, duality, etc., are the product of relative understanding. Relative understanding is the mental basis or support of various unities, when two homogeneous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye.—11.

Here they are not.

Upaskāra.—Having in view all the above things up to action, he says :

अरूपिष्वचाक्षुषाणि ॥ ४ । १ । १२ ॥

अरूपिषु Arûpiṣu, in substances not possessing colour. **अचाक्षुषाणि** Achakṣu-
ṣāṇi, not objects of visual perception.

12. In substances not possessing colour, they are not objects of visual perception.—168.

Numbers, etc., up to action, are not objects of visual perception, when they are present in substances which are devoid of colour. It should be observed that they are not objects of tactual perception also. It has not been said that they are imperceptible ; for, if it were so, then the unity of the Soul also would not be an object of perception.—12.

Attribute-ness and existence perceptible to all the senses.

Upaskāra.—Colour, etc., are uni-sensuous or perceptible by the senses individually. Numbers, etc., are bi-sensuous or perceptible by two senses jointly. Pleasure, etc., are mental or perceptible by the inner sense. So that it results that the two Genera, Attribute-ness and existence, are omni-sensuous. So he says :

एतेन गुणत्वे भावे च सत्त्वेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४ । १ । १३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. **गुणत्वे** Guṇatve, in regard to attributeness. **भावे** Bhāve, in regard to existence. **च** Cha, and. **सत्त्वेन्द्रियं** Sarvvendriyam, omni-sensuous. Relating to all the senses. **ज्ञानं** jñānam, knowledge. **व्याख्यातम्** Vyākhyātam, explained.

13. By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to attributeness and existence, is omni-sensuous or of all the senses.—169.

Capability to apprehend the individuals, is itself the capability to apprehend the class. And if the individuals are respectively apprehended by all the senses, then it results that also the classes, viz., Attribute-ness and Existence, are apprehensible by all the senses. This is the meaning.—13.

Here ends the first chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.



BOOK FOURTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Three-fold division of Earth, and other products.

Upaskāra.—In the fourth book, of which the subject-matter is the examination of tangible substances, intending to examine only tangible substances by their effects, immediately after the examination of the ultimate atoms which are the root causes, he says :

तत्पुनः पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषय-

संज्ञकम् ॥ ४ । २ । १ ॥

तत् Tat, that. पुनः Punaḥ, again. पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्रव्यं Pṛithivī-ādi-kārya-dravyam, earth, and other product-substance. त्रिविधं Trividham, three fold. शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम् Śarīra-indriya-ṣaya-sañjñakam, named as body, sense, and object.

1. The aforesaid product-substance, Earth, etc., is, again, three-fold, under the names of body, sense, and object.—170.

Here corporeity or the characteristic of the body is a kind of *upādhi* or adjunct, namely, the characteristic of being constituted by final parts (*i.e.*, atoms), possessing activity, of which the non-combinative cause is the conjunction of the soul exercising volition. But corporeity is not a class or universal entity, since in that case Earthness, etc., will establish no relation of higher and lower divisions. The characteristic of being a sense, is the being the seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge which produces no reminiscence, or the being a seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge, while at the same time it is not a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound. On the other hand, the light of the eye of animals that prowl at night, is really another kind of light. In regard to its being treated as forming the visual sense, the words “not being a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound and colour” should be added. The characteristic of being a sense, however, is not a ‘class,’ for then the characteristic of Earth, etc., will not establish the relation of higher and lower divisions without entailing cross-division). And objectivity, or the characteristic of being an object, although it is the being the means of phenomenal experience, that is to say, the being the object of ordinary perception, common to substance, attribute, action, genus, and non-existence—yet should be, in accordance with the aphorism, observed to be the characteristic of being a product-substance which is the object of ordinary perception, for the aphorism is this only that Earth and other product-substances are three-fold. Objectivity also, therefore, is not a class or universal entity.—1.

Body is not a compound of five elements.

Upaskāra.—Now, in order to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three elements or four elements, he says :

प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां संयोगस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात् पञ्चात्मकं न

विद्यते ॥ ४ । २ । २ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादप्रत्यक्षाणां Pratyakṣa-apratyakṣāṇām, of perceptible and non-perceptible objects. संयोगस्य Saṁyogasya, of conjunction. अप्रत्यक्षत्वात् Apratyakṣatvāt, on account of imperceptibility. पञ्चात्मकं Pañchātmakam, Penta-substantial. Constituted by five elements. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

2. (Nothing exists, which is constituted by five elements, or) the body is not constituted by five elements, for the conjunction of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible.—171.

Were the body, by reason of its odour, moisture, digestive heat, breath, and porosity, composed of five elements, then it would be imperceptible. In the same manner as the conjunction of perceptible and imperceptible objects, *e. g.*, air and trees, is imperceptible, the body also would be imperceptible. Thus the aphorism employs an example. The word 'body' is the complement of "penta-substantial does not exist." Moisture, digestive heat, etc., however, belong to the efficient causes or conditions of the body, namely, water and fire. The theory that the body is composed of four elements should be also similarly understood. Let it then, it may be urged, contain three elements, as there is perception of three elements. This cannot be, for an origination not of heterogeneous elements is denied. One attribute in a whole made up of parts is not originative of similar other attributes. If, therefore, the production were from Earth and Water, then that which they originate would be void of smell and taste. In like manner, if it originated in Earth and Fire, it would not possess smell, colour, and taste; if in Earth and Air, it would be destitute of smell, taste, colour, and touch. Other cases should be similarly understood.—2.

Nor a compound of three elements.

Upaskāra.—He continues the same topic :

गुणान्तराप्रारुर्भावाच्च न त्र्यात्मकः ॥ ४ । २ । ३ ॥

गुणान्तराप्रारुर्भावात् Guṇa-antara-aprādurbhāvāt, by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute. च Cha, and. न Na, not. त्र्यात्मकम् Tri-ātmakam, tri-substantial. Composed of three elements.

3. And by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute, it is not composed of three elements.—172.

A body originated by Earth, Water, and Fire only, which are objects of perception, might be perceived, if there were manifested in it another attribute having for its antecedent a like attribute in the cause. But this can never be the case, as it has been already stated that a single smell, etc., is not originative. Therefore the body is not composed of even three elements, *i. e.*, is not originated by the three elements possessing colour.—3.

Bhāṣya—reads IV. ii. 3 as two aphorisms, *viz.*, "Guṇāntarāprādurbhāvāchcha," and "Na tryātmakam."

Conjunction of various atoms, not denied.

Upaskāra.—How then is there perception of digestive heat, etc., in one single body? He gives the answer :

अणुसंयोगस्त्वप्रतिषिद्धः ॥ ४ । २ । ४ ॥

अणुसंयोगः Anusamīyogaḥ, conjunction of atoms. तु Tu, but. **अप्रतिषिद्धः** Apratiṣiddhaḥ, not denied.

4. But a conjunction of atoms is not denied.—173.

A mutual conjunction of the five elements as (the basis or) conditional causes of one another, is not denied. But it is not desired that the conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms can be the non-combinative cause of a substance. Thus, as its conditional or efficient causes, digestive heat, etc., are perceived in the body. If it be asked, then, of what nature the human body is, the answer is given by the aphorism of Gautama :—“(The body is) terrene, the distinctive attribute of Ether being perceived (in it).” Nyāya-Sūtram III. i. 28(?) . Smell which is the distinctive attribute of Earth, is observed in the human body as not departing from it till its dissolution, whereas digestive heat, etc., are not observed in the decayed body. These attributes, therefore, are accidental, while Smell is essential. Hence its terreneness is established.—4.

Body is two-fold: sexually produced, and asexually produced.

Upaskāra.—He divides the body :

तत्र शरीरं द्विविधं योनिजमयोनिजञ्च ॥ ४ । २ । ५ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, amongst terrene, aqueous, and other bodies. **शरीरं**, Śarīram, body, terrene body. **द्विविधं** Dvividham, two fold. **योनिजं** Yonijam, sex-begotten, sexually generated. **अयोनिजम्** Ayonijam, not sexually generated. **च** Cha, and.

5. Of these, the body is two-fold :—sex-born and not sex-born.—174.

Of these, i. e., among terrene, aqueous, and other bodies, the terrene body is two-fold. What are the two kinds? In answer, he says, ‘sexborn and not-sex-born.’ Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies, well-known in the spheres of Varuṇa, Āditya, and Vāyu, are entirely a-sexual. A-sexuality means independence of the commixing of semen and blood. The bodies of gods and sages are also a-sexual, according to the text of revelation, “Manu and others, the mind-born or desire-born of Brahmā.” If it be asked how there can be an effect without a cause, we reply that the female organ of generation is not a cause essential to or determining corporeity, as it does not apply to the bodies of worms, mosquitoes, etc., produced by warmth. The possession of a particular constitution also is not proved, since our bodies are different in appearance in comparison with the bodies of gods and sages.

The sexual body, again, is two-fold, womb-born and egg-born. Womb-born are bodies of men and animals, wild and domestic, the womb being the name given to the receptacle of the embryo. The bodies of birds and reptiles are egg-born. Snakes, worms, fishes, etc., also are really reptiles, since it is their nature to crawl about.

Trees and the like also are no doubt so many kinds of bodies, being the seat of experience (*i. e.*, the field wherein particular souls reap the consequences of their acts in previous births). For without the characteristic of being the seat of experience, life, death, sleep, waking, use of medicine, propagation of the seed, approaching the agreeable, avoiding the disagreeable, etc., would be impossible. And growth and the healing up of wounds and fractures, which prove experience, are manifest in them. There is also the sacred text :

नर्मदातीरसम्भूताः शरज्जर्जनपाद्याः ।

नर्मदातोयसंस्पर्शे ते यान्ति परमां गतिम् ॥

"The Śārālā and Arjuna trees, which grow on the banks of the Narmadā from contact with the waters of the Narmadā, attain to the highest state hereafter," etc. And also,

श्मशाने जायते वृक्षः कङ्कगृध्रादिसेवितः ।

"In the cemetery grows a tree haunted by herons and vultures, etc.," etc. Yet germinant bodies do not evidently possess activity or movement and senses, and they are therefore not treated as bodies.—5.

Vivṛiti.—That trees, etc., are bodies (*i. e.*, ground of the experience of the consequences of acts) is evidenced by the text of Manu, *viz.*, "A man acquires the condition of an immovable existence, by faults of action, born of the body."

A-sexual bodies, how produced.

Upaskāra.—He states the cause from which asexual bodies are produced :

अनियतदिग्देशपूर्वकत्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ६ ॥

अनियतदिग्देशपूर्वकत्वात् A-niyata-dik-deśa-pūrvakatvāt, because it (*i. e.*, a-sexual body) has for its antecedent ultimate atoms which are not constant in direction and place.

6. Because a-sexual bodies are formed by ultimate atoms inconstant in direction and place.—175.

Ultimate atoms, inconstant in direction and place, possess activity or movement produced by a particular *dharma* or virtue. And they are the antecedents of a-sexual bodies.—6.

Vivṛiti.—In the words of Varuṇa, etc., there exist a-sexual, aqueous, igneous, aerial, and mental bodies, which are not dependent, for their production, upon semen, blood, etc. Whence come the ultimate atoms which originate them? In the case of sexual bodies, it is observed that only the ultimate atoms of semen and blood are their originators. To remove this apprehension, the present aphorism has been

formulated. Terrene, aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms exist in all directions and in all places. Since there is nothing to confine them to direction and place, there can be no scarcity of ultimate atoms in the production of a-sexual bodies. For it is not the case that ultimate atoms other than the ultimate atoms of semen and blood, are not originative of bodies, seeing that in that case there would be no production of gnats, mosquitoes, trees, shrubs, etc.

A-sexual bodies, how produced—continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, how there can be production of a substance (i. e., a body), without conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of substance, seeing that there can be no conjunction without the action of the ultimate atoms. Hence he says :

धर्मविशेषाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ७ ॥

धर्मविशेषात् Dharmma-viśeṣāt, from a particular *dharma* or virtue. च Cha, and.

7. And (the action of the ultimate atoms arises) from a particular *dharma* or virtue.—176.

The sense is that, at the beginning of creation, action or motion arises in the ultimate atoms in consequence only of the conjunction of the soul carrying with it the invisible (*adriṣṭam*) consequences of its previous acts, and the ultimate atoms, having by that action come together, originate, in the order of binary atomic aggregate, etc., the a-sexual bodies of gods and sages.

The aphorism is illustrative. It should be also observed that, in consequence of particular *adharma* or vices, the tortured bodies of mosquitoes and other small insects, generated by heat, are produced.—7.

Proof of their existence.

Upakāra.—He gives another proof that the bodies of gods and sages are a-sexual :

समाख्याभावाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ८ ॥

समाख्याभावात् Samākhyā-bhāvāt, because name or definitions exist. च Cha, also,

8. Also because names or definitions exist.—177.

Samākhyā means a significant name, or definition, such as is well-known in Śruti, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, etc. Thus, Durvāsas, and other sages were born from the mind (of Brahmanā); Aṅgiras was produced from *ahamkāra* (the sense of 'I'); and so on. From this also it is known that there are a-sexual bodies of gods and sages.—8.

Vivṛiti.—But whence do a-sexual bodies derive their names, in the absence of parents, etc. ? For it is observed on earth that the names Chaitra, Maitra, etc., are affixed by parents, etc. Lest there be such an apprehension, so he says :

'Bhāvāt,' i. e., from the existence, of 'Samākhyā,' i. e., the name ; 'even in the absence of the procreative parents, etc.' is the complement.

For, all names are not affixed only by parents, etc., as it is not the case with the names, water-pot, canvas, etc. Therefore, the import is that the names, Manu, Marichi, etc., have been put upon a-sexual bodies, by the very same Īśvara by whom names have been affixed to the water-pot, canvas, and other unconscious objects.

A-sexual bodies, how produced.—continued.

Upaskāra.—He gives another proof :

संज्ञाया आदित्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ६ ॥

संज्ञायाः Sañjñāyāḥ, of name. **आदित्वात्** Âditvât, because of the primitiveness.

9. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) from the primitiveness of the name.—178.

By means of the name, Brahmâ, etc., which came to be the beginning, *i. e.*, primordial, at the beginning of creation, it is known that a-sexual body exists. For then there were not parents of Brahmâ, by whom the name Brahmâ, etc., should be given.—9.

Vicrīti.—But there being no proof of the existence of Īśvara, how can it be affirmed that the names of the water-pot, the canvas, etc., have been given by Him ? So he says :

Because Īśvara, which is the complement of the aphorism, is the beginning (âdi), *i. e.*, the cause or source, of names. Thus the proof of Īśvara having been already stated, by the characteristic of His being the author of names, in the aphorism, “ But name and effect are the mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves ” (II. i. 18 Ibid), being the author of names remains unobstructed. This is the sense.

Conclusion : A-sexual bodies exist.

Upaskāra.—He concludes :

सन्त्ययोनिजाः ॥ ४ । २ । १० ॥

सन्ति Santi, exist. **अयोनिजाः** Ayonijāḥ, a-sexual bodies.

10. A-sexual bodies exist.—179.

The words “ particular forms of bodies ” are the complement of the aphorism.—10.

Another proof that a-sexual bodies exist.

Upaskāra.—In order to strengthen the above conclusion all the more, he gives another proof :

वेदलिङ्गाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ११ ॥

वेदलिङ्गात् Veda-liṅgât, from the texts which throw light upon the *mantra* portion of the Veda, *i. e.*, from the Brâhmaṇa portion of the Veda. **च** Cha, and.

11. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) also from the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda.—180).

‘Veda’ means mantra. That by which it is *liṅgyate*, i. e., made known, is ‘veda-liṅgam,’ i. e., *Brāhmaṇam*. From this also a-sexual body is proved. This is the meaning. Thus there is the *Brāhmaṇam* :

प्रजापतिः प्रजा अनेका असृजत्, स तपोऽतप्यत प्रजा सृजयामिति, स मुखतो ब्राह्मणमसृजत्
बाहुभ्यां राजन्यमूर्ध्भ्यां वैश्यम् पद्भ्यां शूद्रमिति

“Prajāpti (i. e., the lord of creation) created numerous creatures : He practised penance, with the desire, “I may be able to create creatures.” He created the Brāhmaṇa from His mouth, King from his arms, the Vaiśya from His thighs, the Śūdra from his feet.”

There is also the Veda :

ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासीत् बाहू राजन्यः ऊरु तस्य यद्वैश्यः पद्भ्यां शूद्रोऽजायत इत्यादि।

“His mouth became the Brāhmaṇa ; the arms were made the King i. e., Kṣtriya) ; it was His thigh, which became the Vaiśya ; the Śūdra was born from the feet, etc.”

Thus terrene body, sexual and a-sexual, has been described in the above way. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies can be only a-sexual, since semen and blood are, as a rule, terrene, and a terrene substance does not originate an aqueous one.

The terrene sense is the organ of smell, common to all living beings. The organ of smell is originated by terrene particles unoverpowered or unobscured by water, etc. The organ of smell is terrene, because it causes manifestation of smell, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like the excrement of the fowl which causes the manifestation of the perfume of the musk. Similarly, the organ of taste, the tongue, is the aqueous sense, as it causes the manifestation of taste only, while it does not cause the manifestation of colour, etc., like water which causes the manifestation of the taste of the pudding. In like manner, the eye is the igneous sense, because it causes the manifestation of colour only, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like light. The skin is the aerial sense, because it causes the manifestation of touch only, while it does not cause the manifestation of smell, etc., like the wind blown by the fan which causes the manifestation of the coolness of the water (perspiration) sticking to the body.

The object which is terrene, is characterised as earth, stone, and the immoveable. Therein the modifications of earth are the divisions of the land, wall, brick, etc., Stones are the mountains, jewels, diamond, red-chalk, etc. The immoveable are grass, herbs, trees, shrubs, creepers, and trees bearing fruits without flowers. Aqueous objects are rivers, seas, dew, hail-stone, etc. Igneous object is four-fold, differentiated as terrestrial, celestial, abdominal, and mineral. The terrestrial is that which is produced from fuel, such as wood. The celestial is not produced from fuel ; e. g., lightning, etc. The abdominal is the stomachic, capable of extracting the juice of rice, etc. And the mineral is gold, etc. The aerial object is the wind which is the seat or support of touch which can be felt. The fourth effect of Air, which is called

Prāṇa; i.e., the life-breath, and which is the means of disposing of the essences (*rasa*), excreta; and the humours or vital fluids (*dhatu*) within the body, though it is one, still acquires the names of *Apāna* (i.e., the air which throws out)' etc., according to the diversity of its functions.—11.

Here ends the second chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda.

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BOOK FIFTH—CHAPTER FIRST.

Action in the hand, how produced.

Upaskāra.—The subject of the fifth book is the investigation of Action. The investigation of Action, producible by volition, is the subject of the first chapter. In this there are sections treating of (1) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition, (3) action which has virtue or merit as its cause, and (4) actions, goods, bad, and indifferent.

आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्यां हस्ते कर्म ॥ ५ । १ । १ ॥

आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्यां Ātma-samyoga-prayatnābhyām, by means of conjunction with, and volition of, the soul. हस्ते Haste, in the hand. कर्म Karmma, action.

1. Action in hand (is produced) by means of conjunction with, and volition of, the Soul.—181.

With reference to a particular form of muscular or bodily action, (e. g., in using a pestle and mortar), the author says :

By means of conjunction and volition of the soul, Action (is produced) in the hand which is its combinative cause. And of this Action, conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative cause, and volition is the efficient or conditional cause. It is this which is called muscular action, for muscular action is action which has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising volition, or action producible by volition of something other than, that which possesses touch and which is not combined with, and is additional which to that in which the action appears (e. g., hand).—1.

Vivṛiti.—Here हस्ते 'in the hand,' is an illustration. The meaning is that by the conjunction, and volition, of the soul, action, in the form of muscular motion, is caused in the body as well as in the parts thereof. So it has been said.

आत्मजन्म्या भवेद्विच्छा इच्छाजन्या भवेत् कृतिः ।

कृतिजन्या भवेच्छेष्टा तज्जन्यैव क्रिया भवेत् ॥

That which is produced by the Soul, may be called Desire. That which is produced by Desire, may be called first Impulse or stir. That which is produced by impulse, may be called muscular motion. It is that which is produced by muscular motion, that may be called Action or physical change.

Action in the pestle described.

Upaskāra.—After describing the throwing upwards of the hand, he describes the throwing upwards of the pestle, which depends upon the former :

तथा हस्तसंयोगाच्च मुषले कर्म ॥ ५ । १ । २ ॥

तथा Tathā, similar. हस्तसंयोगात् Hasta-samyogāt, from conjunction with the hand. च Cha, and. मुषले Muśale, in the pestle. कर्म Karmma, action.

2. And, from conjunction with the hand, a similar Action appears in the pestle.—182.

The word 'cha' implies 'gravity,' which is another efficient cause. 'Tathâ' means 'like that,' i. e., of the form of throwing upwards. Or 'tathâ' and 'hasta-samyogât' may be taken as constituting a single term, which will then mean 'from conjunction with hand possessing upward motion.' Here, again, conjunction of the pestle with the hand conjoined with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative cause; the pestle is the combinative cause; volition and gravity are the efficient causes.—2.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He states the cause of the sudden motion upward which is produced in the pestle when struck by the mortar :

अभिघातजे मुषलादौ कर्मणि व्यतिरेकादकारणंहस्त-
संयोगः ॥ ५ । १ । ३ ॥

अभिघातजे Abhigâta-je, produced by impact. मुषलादौ Muṣatadau, in the pestle, etc. कर्मणि Karmmani, in action. व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekât, because of absence (of volition). अकारणं Akâraṇam, not cause. हस्तसंयोगः Hasta-samyogaḥ, conjunction with the hand,

3. In the action, produced in the pestle, etc., by impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence (of volition).—183.

Here, though there is also conjunction of the hand with the rising pestle, yet that conjunction possesses no causality. On the other hand, the impact of the mortar only is the non-combinative cause. It may be asked, "Why so?" Therefore he adds, 'vyatirekât,' which means because of the absence of operativeness of volition." If there were volition at that moment, there would surely be no sudden upward motion in the pestle. By a volition to hold fast, there would be rather sustention of the pestle; or, the upward motion again of the pestle would be caused by muscular action. This is the import.—3.

Vivṛiti.—Conjunction with the hand is not the combinative cause. 'Conjunction' is indicative. Volition and muscular action also, it should be understood, are not the efficient causes.

Action in the hand.

Upaskâra.—With a view to specify a particular cause of the action of the hand, as it flies upward with the pestle, and for the purpose of disproving the non-combinative causality of conjunction with the soul exercising volition, he says :

तथात्मसंयोगः हस्तकर्मणि ॥ ५ । १ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathâ, the same, i. e., not a cause. आत्मसंयोगः Âtma-samyogaḥ, conjunction with the soul. हस्तकर्मणि Hasta-karmmani, in the action of the hand.

4. In the case of action of the hand, conjunction with the soul is not a cause.—184.

In the case of the action of the hand, as it springs upwards with the pestle, 'conjunction with the soul,' i. e., conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is 'the same, i. e., not a cause. The term 'not-a-cause' which appears in the preceding aphorism, is carried over here by 'tathā,' the same.—4.

Vivṛiti.—This too is illustrative. It should be understood that that volition also is not a non-common efficient cause.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—"Whence then at that time the upward motion in the hand"? In answer to this, he says :

अभिघातान्मुषलसंयोगाच्चे स्ते कर्म ॥ ५ । १ । ५ ॥

अभिघातान् Abhigātāt, from impact. मुषलसंयोगात् Muṣala-saṁyogāt, from conjunction with the pestle. हस्ते Hoste, in the hand. कर्म Karmma, action.

5. The action (i. e., upward motion) in the hand is from impact, and from conjunction with the pestle.—185.

As, when the pestle flies upwards, the iron-ring at the end of the pestle rises upwards, so the hand also at that time springs upwards. Here by the word, 'impact,' re-action (i. e., recoil) produced by impact, is expressed by transference. By the vigorous action of the up-going pestle, accompanied with the impact, re-action or recoil is produced in the pestle itself which is the substratum of that substratum of that action. Subject to the re-action so effected, upward motion appears in the hand also, in consequence of the conjunction of the hand and the pestle, as its non-combinative cause; and not that this upward motion has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together with the pestle. This is the idea.—5.

Action in the body.

Upaskāra.—"well," it may be asked, "conjunction with the soul exercising volition is the cause of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body. Why is it not so in the present instance"? Hence he says :

आत्मकर्म .स्तसंयोगाच्च ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

आत्मकर्म Ātma-karmma, action of the body, and its members. हस्तसंयोगाच्च Hasta-saṁyogāt, from conjunction with the hand. च Cha, and, also.

6. Action of the body and its members is also from conjunction with the hand.—186.

The word 'Ātmā,' by transference, means the body and its parts. For, impossibility of order or coherence in the text, is the germ of a transference of epithet. Thus the action which appears in a part of the body also, that is, in the hand, arises from the conjunction of the hand and the pestle. The word 'cha' implies also impetus. In the action of the hand, conjunction with the hand is really the non-combi-

native cause. There is no deviation or breach of uniformity in this respect. This conjunction is sometimes conjunction with the soul exercising volition, and sometimes conjunction of the hand with pestle, etc., possessing impetus, as is the case with the action of the body and its parts, of a mad man.—6.

Falling how produced.

Upaskāra.—He begins the section on action independent of volition :

संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वा. पतनम् ॥ ५ । १ । ७ ॥

संयोगाभावे Saṁyoga-abhāve, in the absence of conjunction. गुरुत्वात् Gurutvāt, from gravity. पतनम् Patanam, falling.

7. In the absence of conjunction, falling (results) from gravity.—187.

By the term, 'conjunction,' every kind of impediment is indicated. Hence in the absence of impediments, in consequence of gravity as its non-combinative cause, falling *i. e.*, an action resulting in conjunction below, is produced. Here in fruit, etc., possessing gravity, the impediment is conjunction ; in a bird, etc., however, volition to hold up is the impediment to falling ; in an arrow, etc., when discharged, it is the re-action that is the impediment to falling. The meaning is that, in the absence of these, falling is caused by gravity. In the case of holding up of poison, etc., in the air, by thought-transference, etc., conjunction with the soul endowed with *adriṣṭam* (invisible after-effects of previous acts), or *mantra*, and the like are really the impediments. These also are included by the term 'conjunction.'—7.

Bhāṣya.—reads *Saṁskāra* in the place of *Samyoga*.

Falling how produced—continued.

Upaskāra.—Will, if falling is caused by gravity, then how can there be sometimes an upward, and sometimes a sideward motion in a stone, etc., when thrown up ? To meet this objection, he says :

नोदन्विशेषाभावात् नोद्व्यं न तिर्यग्गमनः ॥ ५ । १ । ८ ॥

नोदन्विशेषाभावात् Nodana-viśeṣa-abhāvāt, owing to the absence of a particular movement or impulse. न Na, not. उद्व्यं Urdhvam, upward. न Na, not. तिर्यक् Triyak, oblique, sideward. गमनम् Gamanam, going.

8. Owing to the absence of a particular molecular movement, there arises no upward or sideward motion (in the fruit, bird, and arrow).—188.

The upward or sideward motion which takes place in a stone, arrow, etc., though they possess gravity, results from a particular *i. e.*, a violent, molecular movement. So that in the case of the falling of a fruit, a bird, an arrow, etc., in the absence of conjunction, volition, and re-action, there does not exist a particular movement, and consequently there is no upward or sideward motion. This is the sense.—8.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But whence is particular molecular movement itself produced? He gives the answer :

प्रयत्नविशेषान्नोदनविशेषः ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

प्रयत्नविशेषात् Prayatna-viśeṣāt, from a particular volition. नोदनविशेषः Nodana-viśeṣaḥ, particular molecular movement or impulse.

9, Particular molecular movement (results) from particular volition.—189.

Particular volition is caused by the desire “I will throw sideward, upward, far, or near.” By this, particular *nodana* or molecular movement is produced, from which upward or sideward motion is possible produced in a substance possessing gravity, *e. g.*, a stone, etc.—9.

Throwing far away, how produced.

Upaskāra.—‘ Udasanam ’ means throwing far upwards.

नोदनेविशेषादुदसनविशेषः ॥ ५ । २ । १० ॥

नोदनविशेषात् Nodana-viśeṣāt, from a particular molecular movement. उदसनविशेषः Udasana-viśeṣaḥ, particular throwing away.

10. From particular molecular movement, (results) particular throwing away.—190.

Vivṛiti.—नोदनविशेषात्, *i. e.*, from a heterogeneous molecular movement produced by the aforesaid volition, उदसनम्, *i. e.*, throwing high upwards, going upwards, भवति, *i. e.*, takes place, which completes the aphorism. Thus, by agreement and difference, the causality of particular molecular movement toward upward motion, is proved. उदसनम्, going upwards, is an indication. Sideward motion, etc., also should be understood.

Non-volitional action, not a cause of virtue or vice.

Upaskāra.—The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle, by the impact of the mortar, is not at all preceded by volition, nor is it the source of virtue and vice. He extends a similar nature to the playful movements of the hands and feet, etc., of a child :

हस्तकर्मणा दारककर्म व्याख्यातः ॥ ५ । १ । ११ ॥

हस्तकर्मणा Hasta-karmmaṇā, by the action of the hand. दारककर्म Dā raka-karmma, the action of a child. व्याख्यातम् Vyākhyātam, explained.

11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child (has been) explained.—191.

Although a child’s movement of its hands, feet, etc., is surely preceded by effort, it has not for its result the acquisition of the good and the avoidance of the evil, nor is it consequently a source of virtue and vice. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy.—11.

Vivṛiti.—But how is action, in the form of sideward and upward motion, of the hands and feet of a child lying on the lap, produced, in

the absence therefrom of the particular molecular movement or impulse? So he says;

By the action of the hand, of the form of throwing upwards, etc., simultaneous with the throwing upwards of a stone, the action, *i. e.*, the throwing upwards of the hands and feet, of a child, is explained, *i. e.*, proved. Thus, a particular molecular movement is not the cause of all throwing high upwards, but only of particular acts of throwing high upwards. Hence the throwing upwards of the hands and feet of a child is not unproved. Otherwise, the throwing upwards of the hands of one who throws up a stone, etc., will be also unproved.

Certain volitional action also, not a cause of virtue or vice.

Upaskāra.—Now, extending similarity to the action of a child to action which, though preceded by volition, is yet not the cause of a virtue and vice, he says :

तथा दग्धस्य विस्फोटने ॥ ५ । १ । १२ ॥

तथा Tathā, the same. दग्धस्य Dagdhasya, of a burnt person. विस्फोटने Visphotane, in the case of a boil.

12. The same (is action directed towards the killing of a felon), when (a house being set on fire by him) the body of a person burnt therein, is torn open by fire.—192.

A house being set on fire by a felon and in it boils being caused to a person burnt by the fire, action which is produced in the hand, etc., by volition directed towards the killing of that felon, is neither a cause of virtue nor a cause of vice ; as it has been said, "In the slaying of a felon, there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly : wrath encounters wrath. An incendiary, a poisoner, an assassin, a thief, a ravisher of wife and field,—these six are felons."—12.

Vivṛiti.—Sometimes throwing upwards, etc., result also from particular molecular movements which are not dependent upon particular volition produced by the desires, "I throw upwards," etc. This he points out :

दग्धस्य, of a burnt body, building, fruit, etc. ; विस्फोटने, in the going sideward and upward of their parts ; तथा, molecular movement, caused by a particular volition, is not the cause. This is the meaning.

Non-volitional action in the body described.

Upaskāra.—Now, he points out actions which take place without volition.

यत्नाभावे प्रसुप्तस्य चलनम् ॥ ५ । १ । १३ ॥

यत्नाभावे Yatna-abhāve, in the absence of volition. प्रसुप्तस्य Prasuptasya, of the sleeping. चलनम् Chalanam, movement.

13. Movement of the sleeping (takes place) in the absence of volition.—193.

The word 'prasuptasya' implies the state of absence of consciousness. Therefore, the movement caused by air in the unconscious state of a person in swoon, while living, should be observed here.—13.

Vivṛiti.—Even in the absence of volition caused by the desire, “I throw up,” etc., ‘movement’ of the body, i. e., action such as the side-ward and upward movements of the limbs of a person ‘sleeping’ or attended with deep sleep, is produced. Therefore, a particular volition is not everywhere the cause. This is the import.

Action in things other than the body.

Upaskāra.—Having explained the actions of the body, he treats of other actions :

तृणे कर्म वायुसंयोगात् ॥ ५ । १ । १४ ॥

तृणे Triṇe, in the grass. कर्म Karma, action. वायुसंयोगात् Vāyu-saṁyogāt, from conjunction with air.

14. Action in the grass (arises) from conjunction with air.—194.

By the term ‘grass,’ he implies trees, shrubs, creepers, and all such other objects —14.

Vivṛiti.—He points out similar other actions also.

Even in the absence of a particular volition, from conjunction with air, action is produced in the grass.

Action produced by adriṣṭam.

Upaskāra.—Enumerating actions dependent upon *adriṣṭam*, he says :

मणिगमनं सूच्यभिसर्पणमदृष्टकारणकम् ॥ ५ । १ । १५ ॥

मणिगमनं Maṇi-gamanam, movement of the jewel. सूच्यभिसर्पणं Sūcī-abhisarpanam, approach of the needle. अदृष्टकारणकम् Adriṣṭa-kāraṇakam, have *adriṣṭam*, (i. e., the invisible consequences of previous acts) as their cause.

15. The movement of the jewel, and the approach of the needle, *adriṣṭam* as their cause.—195.

By the term ‘jewel,’ bell-metal, etc., are implied. In the going, which takes place, therefore, of the jewel, bell-metal, etc., informed with *mantra* or incantation, towards the thief, there, of that movement, the jewel, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction of the jewel with the Soul of the thief possessed of *adriṣṭam*, is the non-combinative cause, and the vice of the thief is the efficient or instrumental cause. By the word, ‘needle,’ in ‘the approach of the needle,’ all metal as well as grass are implied. Thus, in the case of the movement of the needle, etc., towards that which is attractive of iron (i. e., the magnet), and of the movement of grass towards that which is attractive of grass, the needle, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction with the soul of the person possessed of *adriṣṭam*, who is affected for good or for bad by that movement of the grass, the needle, etc., is the non-combinative cause, and his very *adriṣṭam*, is the instrumental cause. Other instances, e. g., the flaming upwards of fire, the sideward motion of air, the action of the ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation, etc., should be similarly understood.—15.

Vivṛiti.—By the term, 'jewel,' are intended vessels made of gold, etc., and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is this. The vessel is set on the ground, and some other person lays his right hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, in consequence of the efficacy of the incantation, moves towards the spot where the stolen property has been deposited, and on reaching that place, stops.

The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or the demerit of the thief. The non-combinative cause is conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing such *adṛiṣṭam* (or results of actions done in previous states of existence); and the combinative cause is such a vessel. In like manner, *adṛiṣṭam* is also the cause of the attraction towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles, i. e., iron-rods, when in proximity with the magnet. If it be asked, in consequence of whose *adṛiṣṭam* motion takes place in needles, etc., the reply, is that it is the *adṛiṣṭam* of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion, that is the cause. The term, 'needle,' is indicative, iron in general attracted by the load-stone being intended. It is to be understood that *adṛiṣṭam* is the cause of the motion of grass attracted by that which is attractive of grass (amber?), of the upward flaming of fire, of the sideward motion of air, and of the action of the ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation.

Plurality of action.

Upaskāra—It may be doubted whether an arrow, a bird, a wheel of burning charcoal, etc., have only one action, or many, till they come to a stop. To remove this doubt, he says :

इषावयुगपत् संयोगविशेषाः कर्मान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ ५ । १ । १६ ॥

इषौ Iṣau, of the arrow. *अयुगपत्* Ayugapat, non-simultaneous. *संयोगविशेषाः* Saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ, peculiarities of conjunctions. *कर्मान्यत्वे* Karmmanyatve, in respect of diversity of action. *हेतुः* Hetuḥ, cause. Mark

16. Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions of the arrow, are the mark of the diversity of its action.—195.

In 'iṣau' the locative inflection has been used in the sense of the genitive. The sense of the aphorism is as follows : After conjunction with a wall and the like, of an arrow, etc., moving with impetus, a cessation of motion is observed, even though the arrow, etc., still exist. Here it is not the destruction of the substratum which causes the destruction of the motion, for the substratum continues to exist. Any contradictory attribute is also not observed. It is, therefore, inferred that it is conjunction produced by itself, that destroys the action. And this conjunction, produced at the fourth moment, destroys action of the fifth moment. Thus, first there is production of action, then disjunction, next destruction of the previous conjunction, after it subsequent conjunction, and lastly destruction of action. The meaning, therefore, is that peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions make known the diversity of the action. 'Saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ' means

peculiarity in conjunction, which is nothing but self-produced-ness. Otherwise, were conjunction, as such, destructive of action, action could not abide anywhere.—16.

Action produced by Samskāra.

Upaskāra.—After the section on Action producible by impulse, he begins the section on Action producible by resultant energy.

नोदनाद्यभिः कर्म तत्कर्मकारिताच्च संस्काराद्भुतं

तथोत्तरं तत्र ॥ ५ । १ । १७ ॥

ने इनात् Nodarāt, from impulse of molecular movement. आद्यं Ādyam, original, first. इषोः Iṣoḥ, of the arrow. कर्म Karmma, action. तत्कर्मकारितात् Tat-karmma-kāritāt, produced by that action. च Cha, and. संस्कारात् Samskā-rāt, from resultant energy. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. तथा Tathā, similarly. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. च Cha, and.

17. The first action of the arrow is from impulse ; the next is from resultant energy produced by that (*i.e.*, the first) action ; and similarly the next, and the next.—197.

Of the first action, which is produced in an arrow, when discharged from a bowstring, drawn by the volition of a person, the arrow is the combinative cause, volition and gravity are the efficient causes. And by this first action, resultant energy, called impetus, and having the same substratum, is produced. It is proved even by perception, *viz.*, "It (*i.e.*, the arrow) moves with velocity." By that resultant energy, action is produced in that arrow ; of which the non-combinative cause is the resultant energy, the combinative cause is the arrow, while the efficient cause is an intense form of molecular movement. In like manner, a succession of actions one after another is produced by the resultant energy which continues until the arrow falls.

Since, on an action being destroyed by subsequent conjunction produced by (the action) itself, another action is produced by resultant energy, therefore, a single resultant energy only is productive of a succession of actions ; whereas, on the ground of redundancy, it is not proper to assume a succession of resultant energy, similar to the succession of actions. To point out this, he says "similarly the next, and the next," and also uses the singular number in "from resultant energy produced by that action." In the Nyāya doctrine, however, which admits a succession of resultant energies like the succession of actions, there is redundancy. The reason, again, that of two arrows, simultaneously discharged, the impetus of the one is swift and that of the other slow, is the swiftness and slowness of the impulse or molecular movement.—17.

Vivṛiti.—The original action itself of a discharged arrow, etc., destroys, at the third moment from its own origin, its cause, *viz.*, molecular movement or impulse, given by the bow. Therefore, there

being absence of impulse, how will other actions be produced at the fifth, and succeeding moments? In view of this objection, he states the aphorism.

Falling of arrow, how caused.

Upaskāra.—But if only a single resultant energy be productive of a succession of actions, then there would be, under no circumstances whatever, a falling of the arrow, because of the existence of the resultant energy which is productive of action. To this objection, he replies :

संस्काराभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ ५ । १ । १८ ॥

संस्काराभावे Saṁskāra-abhāve, in the absence of resultant energy (or propulsive energy generated by action). गुरुत्वात् Gurutvāt, from gravity. पतनम् Patanam, falling.

18. In the absence of propulsive energy generated by action, falling (results) from gravity.—198.

Gravity, which is the cause of falling, invariably follows (the arrow), at every moment. That gravity, being counter-acted by resultant energy, could not cause the falling (of the arrow). Now, in the absence of the counter-active, the very same gravity causes falling. This is the meaning.—18.

Here ends the first chapter of the fifth book in Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK FIFTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Causes of action in Earth.

Upaskāra.—This is the section on the examination of Action producible by impulse, etc., Therein he says:

नोदनाभिघातात् संयुक्तसंयोगाच्च पृथिव्यां कर्म ॥५।२।१॥

नोदनाभिघातात् Nodana-abhigātāt, from molecular movement or impulse, and from impact. संयुक्तसंयोगात् Samyukta-Samyogāt, from conjunction with the conjunct. च Cha, and. पृथिव्यां Prithivyām, in Earth. कर्म Karma, action.

1. Action in Earth (results) from impulse, impact, and conjunction with the conjunct.—199.

नोदनं is a particular form of conjunction : conjunction, action produced by which does not become the cause of the disjunction of conjoint things from each other ; or, conjunction which does not become the efficient cause of Sound. That particular form of conjunction is called impact, which becomes the efficient cause of Sound, and action produced by which becomes the cause of disjunction of conjoint things from each other. By each of them also action is produced in Earth called clay. In Earth action is produced from impulse given by the foot, as well as from the impact of the foot. Here clay is the combinative cause ; impulse and impact are respectively non-combinative causes ; gravity, impetus, and volition are, so far as they are necessary, efficient causes. “ From conjunction with the conjunct : ” Because action is simultaneously observed in a water-pot, etc., lying on clay, when action is produced in that clay from impulse or from impact.—1.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But what is the non-combinative cause of earthquake, etc., which take place without the intervention of impulse and impact ? He gives the answer :

तद्विशेषेणादृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । २ ॥

तत् Tat, that, i. e., action in Earth. विशेषेण Viśeṣeṇa, with a particular consequence. अदृष्टकारितं Adṛṣṭa-kāritam, caused by *adṛṣṭam* or destiny.

2. (If action in Earth happens) with a particular consequence, it is caused by *adṛṣṭam*.—200.

‘Tat’ alludes to action in Earth. Action in Earth alone, if it happens with a particular consequence, i. e., under the tendency (*vāsanā*) of transmigratory souls towards birth, life, and experience (*bhoga*), is then caused by *adṛṣṭam*. Therefore, the non-combinative cause of earthquake is conjunction of the soul, possessing *adṛṣṭam*, of a person whose pleasure or pain is produced by the earthquake ; the earth is the combinative cause ; and *adṛṣṭam* is the efficient cause.

'Or' 'tat' alludes to impulse and impact. 'Viśeṣaḥ' means absence. So that, the meaning is, action in Earth, which is produced in the absence of impulse and impact, is caused by *adrīṣṭam*.—2.

Bhāṣya.—explains *adrīṣṭa* in V. ii. 2 in the sense of unseen natural force, the causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the terrestrial globe round the sun, and of other actions in Earth.

Cause of rain.

Upaskāra.—Now, in the section on the examination of action combined with fluid (which includes liquid) substance, he says :

अपां संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥५१२३॥

अपां Apām, of waters. संयोगाभावे Saṁyoga-abhāve ; in the absence of conjunction. गुरुत्वात् Gurutvāt, from gravity. 'पतनम् Patanam, falling.

3. The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is due to gravity.—201.

The falling of waters, in the form of a shower, is caused by gravity, which is its non-combinative cause. It takes place in the absence of conjunction, *i. e.*, conjunction with the cloud. Therefore, absence of conjunction is the efficient cause. This is the meaning.—3.

Causes of flowing of water.

Upaskāra.—But how is action, productive of mutual conjunction amongst the drops of water themselves, produced ? He gives the answer.

द्रवत्वात् स्यन्दनम् ॥५१२४॥

द्रवत्वात् Dravatvāt, from fluidity. स्यन्दनम् Syandanam, flowing.

4. Flowing (results) from fluidity.—202-

By the mutual conjunction of drops of water fallen on earth, a large body of water, in the form of a stream, is produced. And the flowing or distant progression, which takes place in it, is produced from fluidity as its non-combinative cause, and from gravity as its efficient cause, in water drops which are its combinative causes.—4.

Cause of evaporation of water.

Upaskāra.—But the falling in rain, due to gravity, would be possible, if water lying on earth went up. But how does this take place ? So he says :

नाड्यो वायुसंयोगादारोऽगम ॥५१२५॥

नाड्यो Nādyah, the sun's rays. वायुसंयोगात् Vāyu-saṁyogāt, through conjunction with air. आरोहणम् Ārohaṇam, ascent.

5. The sun's rays (cause) the ascent (of water), through conjunction with air.—203.

The word, 'cause' (verb), is the complement of the aphorism. The rays of the sun cause the going up of water, through conjunction with air.

In the summer, the sun's rays, being impelled by air, cause the ascent of water. This is the meaning.

Where the reading is नञ्चवायुसंयोगात् there it should be interpreted as conjunction with air related to the sun's rays.—5.

Cause of evaporation of water, continued.

Upaskāra.—But how do the sun's rays come to possess such power that they carry up water lying on the earth? Hence he says.

नोदनापीडनात् संयुक्तसंयोगाच्च ॥ ५ । २ । ६ ॥

नोदनापीडनात्—Nodana-āpīdanāt, from concussion, or being violently shaken by or through the impulse. संयुक्तसंयोगात् Saṃyukta-saṃyogāt, from conjunction with the conjunct. च Cha, and.

6. (Particles of water fly upwards), by means of concussion with impulse, and of conjunction with the conjunct.—204.

Particles of water fly up, being conjoined with the sun's rays, which are, in turn, conjoined with air, through concussion with the impulse of strong wind; in the same way as the rays of fire, bestirred by air, carry up particles of water boiling in a cauldron. The word 'cha' conveys the sense of 'as.' And here only particles of water boiling in a cauldron should be observed to be the simile.—6.

NOTE: *Upaskāra* compares the two processes of evaporation and ebullition of water

Cause of circulation of water in trees.

Upaskāra.—Water poured at the root, goes up in all directions, through the interior of a tree. Neither impulse and impact, nor the sun's rays prevail there. How, then, is it caused? He gives the answer.

वृक्षाभिसर्पणमित्यदृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । ७ ॥

वृक्षाभिसर्पणं Vṛkṣa-abhisarpaṇam, circulation in trees. इति Iti, this. अदृष्टकारितम् Adṛiṣṭa-kāritam, caused by *adṛiṣṭam* or destiny.

7. The circulation (of water) in trees is caused by *adṛiṣṭam*. —205.

'Abhisarpaṇam' means flowing towards or all over. That takes place in a tree, of water poured at its root. It is caused by *adṛiṣṭam*, i. e., of those souls whose pleasure or pain is produced by the growth of the leaves, branches, fruits, flowers, etc. The meaning, then, is that action by which water rises up and causes the growth of trees, arises from conjunction with the above-mentioned souls, possessing *adṛiṣṭam*, as its non-combinative cause, and from *adṛiṣṭam*, as its efficient cause, in water which is its combinative cause.—7.

Cause of condensation and dissolution of water.

Upaskāra.—Constitutional fluidity has been stated to be the characteristic of water. Upward, downward, and sideward motion of such water only has been proved. The aqueousness of snow, hail, etc., also are proved without a dispute, since they possess coldness. Therefore, how do these possess condensation, i. e., hardness, and how dissolution? Hence he says.

अपां सङ्घातो विलयनश्च तेजःसंयोगात् ॥ ५ । २ । ८ ॥

अपां Apām, of waters. सङ्घातः Saṅghātaḥ, condensation. विलयनं Vilaya nam, dissolution. च Cha, and. तेजःसंयोगात् Tejaḥ-samyogāt, from conjunction with fire.

8. Condensation, and dissolution, of water, are due to conjunction with fire.—206.

Aqueous ultimate atoms, originating a binary atomic aggregate, in consequence of being impeded by celestial fire, do not originate fluidity in these binary atomic aggregates. Snow, hail, etc., void of fluidity, are thus originated, in the course of binary and others atomic aggregates, by constituent parts void of fluidity. Therefore hardness is observed in them.

Such being the case, it may be asked, what proof is there that snow, hail, etc., are modifications of water? Accordingly it has been said, "Dissolution also from conjunction with fire." By a more powerful conjunction with fire, action is produced in the ultimate atoms originative of snow, hail, etc. Action produces disjunction. From the successive destruction thereby of originative conjunctions follows the destruction of the larger compounds, snow, hail, etc. In consequence of the departure therefrom of conjunction with fire, which was an impediment to fluidity, the very same ultimate atoms originate fluidity in binary atomic aggregates; whence dissolution takes place of snow, hail, etc., thus endowed with fluidity. Here also the subsequent ingress of a more powerful fire is the efficient cause.—8.

Bhāṣya.—splits up V. ii. 8 into two aphorisms, viz., *Apām Saṅghātaḥ*, and *Vilayaiṅcha tejaḥ samyogāt*.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But what is the proof that there is subsequent ingress into water of a more powerful fire present in ether? So he says :

तत्र विस्फुर्जथुर्लिङ्गम् ॥ ५ । २ । ९ ॥

तत्र Tatra, there, i. e., in the case of the ingress of fire into water. विस्फुर्जथुः Visphurjjathuḥ, the pealing of thunder. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

9. The pealing of thunder is the mark of that.—207.

'Tatra,' i. e., in the matter of the subsequent ingress of fire, present in ether, into water floating in ether, 'visphurjjathuḥ liṅgam,' i. e., the pealing of thunder itself is the mark. This is the meaning. Far-reaching flash of lightning is clearly perceptible; thunder which immediately follows it, is also really perceptible. By this it is inferred that fire present in ether, in the form of lightning, has entered into the cloud from which hailstones appear. By its presence, as a condition, impediment is caused to the fluidity of water-particles originative of hailstones.—9

Cause of condensation of water, continued.

Upaskāra.—Of this he gives yet another proof.

वैदिकश्च ॥ ५ । २ । १० ॥

वैदिकं Vaidikam, Vedic, Derived from Veda. च Cha and.

10. (There is) Vedic (proof) also.—208.

The meaning is that the ingress of fire into water is proved by the Veda also. Thus :—

“आपस्ता अग्निं गर्भमादधोरन्,
या अग्निं गर्भं दधिरे सुवर्णं” इत्यादि ।

“Those waters held fire in their womb, which held fire in their womb,” etc.—10.

Cause of thundering.

Upaskāra.—But how is thundering produced, since conjunction and disjunction, which are the causes of Sound; are not observed ? Hence he says :

अपां संयोगाद्विभागाच्च स्तनयित्तोः ॥ ५ । २ । ११ ॥

अपां Apām, of waters. संयोगात् Samyogāt, from conjunction. विभागात् Vibhāgāt, from disjunction. च Cha, and. स्तनयित्तोः Stanayitnoḥ. of cloud.

11. (Thunder-clap results) from conjunction with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud.—209.

“Visphurjjathuḥ ” is the complement of the aphorism. Conjunction with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud, by becoming efficient causes, produce sound, i. e., thundering, in ether as the combinative cause, through the conjunction of the cloud itself with ether, as the non-combinative cause. Sometimes, again, conjunction with, and disjunction from, air, of the cloud, are the efficient causes, and conjunction of the cloud with ether, and its disjunction therefrom, are the non-combinative causes. This is collaterally mentioned in the topic of the causes of action. Or, since action is the leading topic here, it is indicated that, conjunction of the cloud and ether, or their disjunction, being the non-combinative cause of sound, the (efficient) cause is action produced from the impulse and impact of water alone—11.

Vivṛiti.—Thundering takes place from the conjunction of water, i. e., from the impact of air with it, and from its disjunction from the cloud.

Causes of conflagration, tempest, etc.

Upaskāra.—It has been stated that conjunction with soul possession *adṛiṣṭam* is a cause of earth-quake. As there, so in the case of the action which is produced in fire which causes sudden conflagration, and in air which causes a sudden agitation of trees and the like, conjunction with soul possessing *adṛiṣṭam* is also the non-combinative cause ; air and fire are the combinative causes ; and *adṛiṣṭam* is the efficient cause. This is the meaning.

पृथिवीकर्मणा तेजःकर्म वायुकर्म च व्याख्यातः

॥ ५ । २ । १२ ॥

पृथिवीकर्मणा Prithivi-karmmanâ, by the action of Earth. तेजःकर्म Tejah-karmma, action of fire. वायुकर्म Vâyu-karmma, action of air. च Cha, and व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

12. The action of Fire, and the action of Air are explained by the action of Earth.—210.

The twice recurrence of the word action in the aphorism, has the object of indicating the action of meteors, etc.—12.

Causes of initial action of fire, air, atoms, and mind.

Upakâra.—He mentions other actions of which conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣṭam* is the non-combinative cause.

अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यक्पवनमणूनां मनसश्चाद्यं
कर्मादृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । १३ ॥

अग्नेः Agneh, of fire. ऊर्ध्वज्वलनं Ūrddhva-jvalanam, flaming upward. वायोः Vâyoh, of air. तिर्यक् 'Tiryyak, sideward. पवनं Pavanam, blowing. अणूनां Aṇunâm, of atoms, मनसः Manasaḥ, of mind. च Cha, and. आद्यं Âdyam, initial, first. कर्म Karmma, action. अदृष्ट कारितम् Adriṣṭa-kâritam, caused by *adriṣṭam*.

13. The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms, and of mind are caused by *adriṣṭam*.—211.

‘Âdyam’ means contemporaneous with, or existing at, the beginning of creation. At that stage, impulse, impact, etc., being non-existent, conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣṭam* is in these cases the non-combinative cause. The adjective, ‘initial,’ qualifies upward flaming, and sideward blowing also. It is proper to hold that impetus is the non-combinative cause of other (than initial) actions of fire and air, for there being a visible or known cause there is no occasion for the supposition of an invisible or unknown cause—13.

Cause of action of mind.

Upakâra.—With reference to non-initial action, he says :

हस्तकर्मणा मनसः कर्म व्याख्यातम् ॥ ५ । २ । १४ ॥

हस्तकर्मणा Hasta-karmmanâ, by the action of the hand. मनसः Manasaḥ of mind or the internal organ. कर्म karmma, action. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

14. The action of mind is explained by the action of the hand.—212.

As in the throwing upward, etc., of the pestle, the action of the hand has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercising volition, so the action of the mind also, for the purpose of coming

into contact with the (external) sense receptive of the object desired, really has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercising volition. Although mind, the sense, is not directly subject to volition, still it should be observed that action is produced in mind by volition which can be reached by the nervous process by which mind travels. That the nervous process can be apprehended by the tactual sense-organ, however, must be admitted; for, otherwise, assimilation of food, drink, etc., also will not be possible by volition which can be reached by the nervous process through which life or the vital energy travels.—14.

Pleasure and pain are marks of action of mind.

Upaskāra.—But, it may be objected, there is no proof that action is produced in the mind. Hence he says :

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् सुखदुःखे ॥ ५ । २ । १५ ॥

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् Ātmā-indriya-manah-artha-sannikarṣāt, from contact of soul, sense, mind, and object. सुखदुःखे Sukha-duḥkhe, pleasure and pain.

15. Pleasure and pain (results) from contact of soul, sense, mind, and object.—213.

‘Pleasure and pain’ is indicative; cognition, volition, etc., are to be understood. The universality or ubiquity of mind has been already refuted and its atom-ness established. It has also been stated that the non-production of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of mind. There could, therefore, be no pleasure and pain at all, without the conjunction of mind with the respective localities of the senses. The meaning is that, did no action take place in mind, there could be no feeling in the form of “Pleasure in my foot,” “Pain in my head,” etc. Although all the particular attributes of the soul depend upon contact of mind, yet pleasure and pain are (alone expressly) mentioned, because, on account of their intensity, they are very manifest.—15.

Yoga described.

Upaskāra.—Well, if the mind is so fickle or restless, then there being no inhibition or restraint of the internal organ there can be no *yoga* or communion, and without *yoga* there can be no intuitive knowledge of the soul, and without it, there can be no *mokṣa* or salvation. Therefore, the undertaking of this treatise is futile. In anticipation of this objection he says :

तदनारम्भ आत्मस्थे मनसि शरीरस्य दुःखाभावः स योगः

॥५ । २ । १६ ॥

तदनारम्भः Tat-anārambhaḥ, non-origination of that, i. e., pleasure and pain, or action of mind. आत्मस्थे Ātmasthe, steady in the soul. मनसि manasi, mind being. शरीरस्य Śarīrasya, of body, i. e., of the embodied soul. दुःखाभावः duḥkha-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of pain. स Saḥ, that. योगः Yogah, *yoga*, communion.

16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind becoming steady in the soul ; (after it, there is) non-existence of pain in the embodied soul. (This is) that *yoga*.—214.

When the mind of an indifferent person who has come to believe in the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, comes to stay only in the soul, at that stage, owing to the absence of volition corresponding to its action, action is not produced in the mind which then becomes comparatively steady. It is this (state) which is (called) *yoga*, since the characteristic of *yoga* is the inhibition or restraint of the internal organ, *chittam*.

‘Tat-anārambhaḥ, means non-origination of action of mind. Or, by the word, ‘tat,’ only pleasure and pain are denoted, being in the context. ‘Duḥkha-abhāvaḥ’; Being the means of the non-existence of pain, *Yoga* itself is (spoken of as) non-existence of pain, as is the expression “Food is life.” Or, it is a relative compound word meaning where there is non-existence of pain. ‘Śarīrasya’ means the soul as limited or determined by the body. ‘Sah yogaḥ’: here the word, ‘that,’ refers to a universally known object, (the meaning being) this is that *Yoga*.

Or, by the word, ‘Ātmā,’ life is here denoted by transference, since soul is inferred by life. So that, by action in the nervous process which is the channel of the life breath, action of the life breath, (respiration), is also produced. Or, the action of the life breath has, for its non-combinative cause, conjunction of the life-breath with soul exercising volition the source of vitality. And volition, which is the source of vitality, is supersensible, and has to be inferred by the movement of the life-breath. Otherwise, how can there be inspiration of air, even in the state of deep sleep? This is the import—16.

Vivṛiti.—‘Ātmasthe manasi,’ i. e., when, quitting the senses, etc., in virtue of the six-limbed *Yoga*, mind abides in the soul alone, then, ‘tat-anārambhaḥ,’ i. e., ‘anārambhaḥ’ or non-production of action of mind. The mind then becomes fixed or steady. In this state, ‘Śarīrasya duḥkha-abhāvaḥ,’ i. e., pain in relation to the body is not produced. ‘Sah,’ i. e., conjunction of mind, residing from the outside, with soul, is called *Yoga*.

The following verses of *Skandapurāṇam* also prove the same thing :

वाताहतं तथा विचं तस्मात्तस्य न विश्वसेत् ।

अतोऽनिलं निरुन्धीत चित्तस्य स्थैर्यहेतवे ॥

मस्त्रिरोधनार्थाय पङ्कजं योगमभ्यसेत् ।

आसनं प्राणसंरोधः प्रत्याहारश्च धारणा ।

ध्यानं समाधिरेतानि योगाङ्गानि भवन्ति षट् ॥

“So also, (i. e. restless) is *Chitta*, (i. e., the internal organ), smitten with air. Therefore, do not trust it. Accordingly, restrain air, for the purpose of steadiness of *Chitta*. For the purpose of restraining air, practise *Yoga*, of which there are six *aṅgas* or limbs. Posture, Regulation of breath, Abstraction or Inhibition of the senses, Concentration of mind, Meditation, and Absorption,—these are the six *aṅgas* or limbs of *Yoga* or communion.”

Therefore, there being cessation of false knowledge, etc., brought about by the manifestation of intuitive knowledge of soul, after the attainment of *Yoga*, final emancipation remains unimpeded. Consequently a system of thinking about things (like *Kaṇāda Sūtras*) is not fruitless. This is the import.

*Other actions of mind, etc. independent of volition,
and dependent on adriṣṭam.*

Upaskāra.—But, if volition were the efficient cause of the action of life and mind, then, when life and mind go out from the body, in the state of death, and, on the production of another body, re-enter into it, there being no volition, both these actions would be impossible. How, again, can be produced action, productive of conjunction of even what is eaten and drunk, i. e., food and drink, which conjunction is the cause of the growth of the body and its limbs, as well as action which causes conjunction and disjunction during life within the womb? In anticipation of this objection, he says :

**अपसर्पणमुपसर्पणमशितपीतसंयोगाः कार्यान्तरसंयोगाश्चे-
त्यदृष्टकारितानि ॥ ५ । २ । १७ ॥**

अपसर्पणं Apasarpaṇam, going out, egress. उपसर्पणं Upasarpaṇam, coming into, ingress. अशितपीतसंयोगाः Aśita-pīta-saṁyogāḥ, conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk. कार्यान्तरसंयोगाः Kāryya-antara-saṁyogāḥ, conjunctions of other effects or products. च Cha, and. अदृष्टकारितानि Adriṣṭa-kāritāni, caused by *adriṣṭam*.

17. Egress and ingress (of life and mind, from and into, body), conjunctions (i. e., assimilation) of food and drink, and conjunctions of other products,—these are caused by *adriṣṭam*.—215.

Here the neuter gender in the word ‘*adriṣṭa-kāritāni*’ is according to the rule that word of the neuter gender, appearing together with a word of another gender, may optionally entail neuter gender in both. The word, ‘*Samyoga*,’ again, secondarily denotes action which is its cause. ‘*Apasarpaṇam*,’ i. e., the going out of life and mind from the body alone, on the wearing away of action which originated the body ; ‘*Upasarpaṇam*,’ i. e., the entrance of life and mind into another body as it is produced ; action which is the cause of the conjunction (i. e., assimilation) of food, drink, etc. ; and action which is the cause of the conjunction (i. e., pulsation, etc.) of another product, i. e., the foetus ;—all these have as their non-combinative cause conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣṭam*. The word, ‘*iti*,’ implies that the actions of the humours and excreta of the body are also caused by conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣṭam*, as their non-combinative cause.—17.

Vivṛiti.—He mentions other actions dependent on *adriṣṭam*.

‘*Apasarpaṇam*,’ i. e., egress of mind from the body at death ; ‘*Upasarpaṇam*,’ i. e., the ingress of mind into another body when it is produced ; action from which conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk, i. e., food and water, are produced ; action from which conjunctions of other effects, i. e., the senses and life, with the body, are produced :—all these are caused by conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣṭam*, as the non-combinative cause.

Mokṣa described.

Upaskāra.—But, it may be urged, if the production of another body were necessary, how would there be *Mokṣa*? Hence he says :

तदभावे संयोगाभावोऽप्रादुर्भावंश्च मोक्षः ॥ ५ । २ । १८ ॥

तदभावे Tat-abhāve, in the non-existence of that, *i. e.*, the causal body, or potential body, or the subtle body of impressions and tendencies, acquired during life, which becomes the cause of re-birth, and in re-birth, becomes encased, as it were, in the gross, physical body. संयोगभावः Saṁyoga-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of conjunction, *i. e.*, with the existing physical body. अप्रादुर्भावः A-prādurbhāvaḥ, non-re-appearance, or non-re-birth. च Cha, and. मोक्षः Mokṣaḥ, salvation. *Mokṣa*.

18. *Mokṣa* consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, when there is at the same time, no potential body existing, and consequently, re-birth cannot take place.—216.

Here the idea is as follows : The power of *Yoga* produces intuitive knowledge of the self ; false knowledge, attended with desire, is thereby annihilated ; consequently, attraction, aversion, stupidity or irrationality or spiritual blindness (*moha*), and other faults due to it, disappear ; then inclination or activity goes away ; birth, due to it, therefore, does not take place ; and, consequently, pain, bound up with birth, also vanishes away. This, then, is the nature of things. Now, in virtue of the power born of *yoga*, a *yogin*, considering the entire mass of virtues and vices, or merits and demerits, which are the uncommon or particular causes of pleasure and pain to be enjoyed, at particular places and times, in the bodies of a horse, an elephant, a serpent, a bird, etc., in accordance with those merits and demerits, and then going through those several forms of physical existence, thereby wears away or exhausts his previously produced merits and demerits by experiencing them. His faults being thus neutralised, when other merits and demerits are not produced, and when there is in consequence no production of another future or potential body, at that time, it is the non-existence of conjunction, which then exists, with the former body, that is (called) *mokṣa*. 'Tat-abhāve' means in the absence of conjunction, in the non-production of a future body.

To meet the objection that this state is common to all at *pralaya*, or periodical dissolution of creation, he adds 'apradurbhāvaḥ'. The meaning is, after which manifestation of body, etc., does not again take place. 'Saḥ mokṣaḥ : ' that is, annihilation of pain, which results in that state, is *Mokṣa*.—18.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected that the stream of bodies being without beginning and without end, the impossibility of emancipation is also the same. Hence he says :

'Tat-abhāve,' *i. e.*, in the absence of *adṛṣṭam*, that is to say, where future *adṛṣṭam* is exhausted by intuitive knowledge of self, and existing *adṛṣṭam*, by experience, *bhoga* ; 'saṁyoga-abhāvaḥ' *i. e.*, a severance

takes place from connection with the stream or succession of bodies ; following it, is 'aprādurbhāvaḥ ; i. e., non-production of pain, since the causes, viz., body and *adṛṣṭam*, do not exist. It is then and there that emancipation becomes possible. Therefore, emancipation is not chimerical like the horns of a hare. This is the import.

Darkness is non-existence.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected :—The action of a substance is observed also in darkness, there being the perception, "The shadow moves." Here there is no volition, no impulse or impact, no gravity or fluidity, no resultant energy. Therefore, another efficient cause should be enumerated ; but it does not fall within observation. Accordingly he says :

द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः ॥ ५ । २ । १६ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यात् Dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmmyāt, because of difference in production from Substance, Attribute, and Action. *अभावः* Abhāvaḥ, non-being, non-existence. *तमः* Tamaḥ, darkness.

19. Darkness is non-existence. because it is different in its production from Substance, Attribute, and Action.—217.

By this aphorism, the determination or delimitation that substances are nine only, also becomes established.

Now, the production of substance is dependent upon substances possessing touch ; but in darkness, touch is not felt. It cannot be that touch is only undeveloped here ; for development of touch is essential to development of colour.

Objection.—This is the rule in case of Earth, whereas darkness is the tenth substance.

Answer.—It is not. For no other substance is substratum of blue colour, and gravity is inseparable from blue colour, as also are taste and smell.

Objection.—As sound is the only distinguishing attribute of Ether, so also will blue colour be the only distinguishing attribute of darkness.

Answer.—It is not so, as there is contradiction to its visibility. For, if darkness were something possessing blue colour, or were it blue colour itself, then it would not be perceived by the eye without the help of external light.—19.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—What, then, causes the perception of motion (in darkness) ? He gives the answer :

तेजसोऽप्यान्तर्यावरणाच्च ॥ ५ । २ । २० ॥

तेजसः Tejasah, of light. *द्रव्यान्तरेण* Dravya-antareṇa, by another substance. *आवरणाद्* Āvaranāt, because of obscuration. *च* Cha, and also.

20. (Darkness is non-existence), also because (it is produced) from the obscuration of light by another substance.—218.

Light being obscured by another moving substance, non-existence of light is not observed in the places falling behind, and is observed in the places lying before. It is from this resemblance of the non-existence of light to the moving substance, that, motion is mistaken in it, but not that motion is real in it. This is the meaning, the perception appearing so (*i. e.*, erroneous) from agreement and difference. (That is, whenever a body in motion obscures light, the shadow caused thereby also moves; and where the obscuring body is not in motion, the shadow also does not move).

Darkness, (then), is non-existence of every trace of light possessing developed or appreciable colour.—20.

Space, Time, Ether, and Soul are void of action.

Upaskāra.—Having thus finished the parenthetical section on darkness, in two aphorisms, he begins the section on voidness of action :

इदक्कालावकाशश्च क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यान्निष्क्रियाणि ५ । २ । २१ ॥

इदक्कालौ *Dik-kālau*, space and time आकाशं *Ākāśam*, ether च *Cha*, and also. क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यात् *Kriyāvat-vaidharmyāt*, because of difference from that which possesses activity. निष्क्रियाणि *Niṣkriyāṇi*, inactive.

21. Space, Time, and also Ether are inactive, because of their difference from that which possesses activity.—219.

The word ' *Cha* ' brings in the soul. Difference from that which possesses activity lies in the imponderableness or incorporeity of space, etc., for activity always accompanies corporeity or form —21.

Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, and Combination are void of action.

Upaskāra.—He points out the inactivity of actions and attributes :

एतेन कर्माणि गुणाश्च व्याख्याताः ॥ ५ । २ । २२ ॥

एतेन *Etena*, by this. कर्माणि *Karmāṇi*, actions. गुणाः *Guṇāḥ*, attributes. च *Cha*, and. व्याख्याताः *Vyākhyātāḥ*, explained.

22. By this, Actions and Attributes are explained (as inactive).—220,

' *Etena* ' means by difference from that which possesses activity. Difference from that which possesses activity, in other words, incorporeity or imponderableness, belongs to attribute and action. They are, therefore, explained to be inactive.—22.

Vivṛiti.—The word ' *Cha* ' implies Genus, etc.

Combination has no beginning, and so is independent of action.

Upaskāra.—It may be urged :—If attribute and action are inactive, how then can there be relation of substance with them? Connection by conjunction may be possible; but that is dependent upon action. Hence he says :

निष्क्रियाणां समवायः कर्मभ्यो निषिद्धः ॥ ५ । २ । २३ ॥

निष्क्रियानां Niṣkriyāṇāṃ, of the inactive. समवायः Samavāyah, combination. कर्मभ्यः Karmabhyaḥ, from actions. निविद्धः Niṣiddhaḥ, excluded, beyond, independent.

23. (The relation) of the inactive (*i.e.*, Attribute and Action), (to Substance), is Combination, (which is) independent of actions. —221.

It is combination which is the relation of attributes and actions (to substance). It is excluded from actions. The meaning is that this relation, *i. e.*, combination, has no production even, and that its dependency upon action, therefore, remains at a long distance.—23.

Attributes are non-combinative causes.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected : If attributes, being imponderable, are not the combinative causes of action, then how are attributes and actions produced by attributes ? For causality, save and except in the form of combinative causality, is not possible. To meet this objection, he says :

कारणन्त्रसमवायिनो गुणाः ॥ ५ । २ । २४ ॥

कारणं Kāraṇaṃ, cause तु Tu, however. असमवायिनः A-samavāyinaḥ, non-combinative. गुणाः Guṇāḥ, attributes.

24. Attributes are, however, non-combinative causes.—222.

Attributes are non-combinative causes but not combinative causes also, whereby they might be receptacles or fields of action. And that non-combinative causality arises, in some cases, from combination in the same object with the effect, as that of the conjunction of soul and mind in the particular attributes of the soul, and of conjunction, disjunction, and sound in sound, and, in other cases, from combination in the same object with the cause, as that of the colour, etc., of potsherds, etc., in the colour, etc., of the water-pot, etc.—24.

Vivṛiti.—The use of ' cause ' instead of causes, is aphoristic.

Space is a non-combinative cause.

Upaskāra.— It may be objected :—Action is produced *here*. Action is produced *now*. On the strength of such perceptions, Space and Time also are surely combinative causes of action. How, otherwise, could they be assigned as the seat of action in these cases ? Accordingly he says:

गुणैर्दिग्व्याख्याता ॥ ५ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. दिक् Dik, space. व्याख्याता Vyākhyātāḥ. explained.

25. Space is explained by Attributes.—223.

The meaning is that gravity, and other attributes, being imponderable, are not the combinative cause of action, so space also, being imponderable, is not the combinative cause of action. As to being the seat or receptacle, however, it can arise even without combinative

causality, as in "cotton-seeds in a bowl," "curd in a bowl," "the roaring of a lion in the forest," and other instances.—25.

Time is an efficient cause.

Upaskāra.—With the same object, as already stated, he says :

कारणेन कालः ॥ ५ । २ । २६

कारणेन Kāraṇena, by cause, *i. e.*, by way of efficient causality. कालः Kālah., Time.

26. By way of (efficient) causality, (the reference of action to Time as its seat, being explained), Time (is explained to be inactive, so far as combinative causality is concerned).—224.

The syntactical connection of the aphorism is with "explained to be inactive,"—corresponding words in the preceding aphorism, with necessary changes. The use of 'Kāraṇena,' instead of 'nimittakāraṇena,' is an instance of denoting an object principally as an existence, (*i. e.*, without qualification). The meaning, therefore, is that Time, being the efficient cause, is only the seat of action, but is not its combinative cause.—26.

Here ends the second chapter of the fifth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Viśeṣika Aphorisms.

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BOOK SIXTH—CHAPTER FIRST-

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative.

Upaskāra.—The subject of the sixth book is the examination of *dharma*, virtue or merit, and *adharma*, vice or demerit, which are the root cause of transmigration, *Dharma* and *adharma*, again, have to be supposed on the strength of such precepts and prohibitions as “Let him who desire heaven, perform sacrifices.” “Let him not eat tobacco,” etc., and their existence depends upon the authoritativeness of these preceptive and prohibitive texts. And that authoritativeness can be possible or arise from the speaker's previously possessing the attribute characterised as knowledge of the meaning of the sentences as corresponding to objective reality since authoritativeness *per se* is excluded. Hence the author, in the first place, commences the demonstration of the attribute which clothes the Veda with authoritativeness.

बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे ॥ ६ । १ । १ ॥

बुद्धिपूर्वा *Buddhi-pūrvā*, preceded by understanding, वाक्यकृतिः *Vākya-kṛtiḥ*, composition of sentences. वेदे *Vede*, in the Veda.

1. In the Veda the composition of sentence has been preceded by understanding.—225

‘*Vākya-kṛtiḥ*,’ *i. e.*, composition of sentences, is ‘*buddhi-pūrvā*,’ *i. e.*, preceded by the speaker's knowledge of the meaning of the sentences as corresponding to objective reality because it is composition of sentences, like composition by ourselves and others of such sentences as “There lie five fruits on the bank of the river.’

‘In the Veda’ means in the aggregate of sentences. Here the composition of aggregated sentences is the *pakṣa* (*i. e.*, the subject of the conclusion). It cannot be otherwise established (as authoritative), namely by the characteristic of being preceded by the understanding of ourselves and others; for, in such instances as “Let him who desires heaven, perform sacrifices,” the fact that performance of sacrifices is a means of attaining the desired object, or that securing heaven is an effect, is beyond the reach of our and others’ understanding. It is, therefore, proved that the Veda, as an effect, has for its antecedent an Absolute or Independent Person. And the characteristic of the Veda is that, while the subject of its meaning is not certain knowledge produced by proof other than the proof supplied by words and all that which depends upon them, it is word of which the proof or authority is not produced by knowledge of the meaning of sentences produced by words.—1.

Vivṛiti.—By this aphorism, the doctrine of *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy, that word is eternal, is refuted.

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.

Upaskāra.—He shows in another manner that the sentences of the Veda have been preceded by understanding :

ब्राह्मणे संज्ञाकर्म सिद्धिलिङ्गम् ॥ ६ । १ । २ ॥

ब्राह्मणे *Brāhmaṇe*, in the portion of Veda, so called. संज्ञाकर्म *Samjñā-karma*, attribution or distribution of names. सिद्धिलिङ्गम् *Siddhi-liṅgam*, mark of knowledge of things named, or of the conclusion that the Veda is an intelligent production.

2. The distribution of names in the Brâhmaṇa (portion of the Veda) is a mark of knowledge, (on the part of the framer of the names), of the things named (therein).—226.

Here 'Brâhmaṇam' denotes a particular portion of the Veda. 'Samjñâ-Karmma,' *i. e.*, the distribution of names, which appears there, points to understanding on the part of the framer of the names, as in the world the distribution of such names as Long-ear, Long-nose, Long-neck, does.—2.

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative,
continued.

Upaskâra.—He mentions another form of proof :

बुद्धिपूर्वो ददातिः ॥ ६ । १ । ३ ॥

बुद्धिपूर्वः Buddhi-pûrvvaḥ, preceded by understanding. ददातिः Dadâtiḥ, gives, to give, gift.

3. (Precepts enjoining) gift (are) preceded by understanding.—227.

The injunction of gift (as a source of *dharma*), which has been established in such text as "Let him who desires heaven, give a cow," has been made from the knowledge that it is the means of attaining the object desired. The conjugated form, 'dadâtiḥ,' gives, topically denotes 'gift' which is the meaning of the root 'to give.'—3.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He gives yet another proof :

तथा प्रतिग्रहः ॥ ६ । १ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathâ, so, the same. प्रतिग्रहः Pratigrahaḥ acceptance.

4. The same is acceptance (of a gift).—228.

Texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of gifts, are also preceded by understanding. The word, "pratigrahaḥ" indicates a Vedic text of which it is the subject. Thus, texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of land, etc., imply its efficacy to the welfare of the acceptor. Texts of the Veda, of which the subject-matter is the acceptance of the skin of a black-and-white antelope, point out or bring to light its efficacy towards that which is not desired by the acceptor. And efficacy towards the desired and efficacy towards the undesired, or potencies for good and for evil, cannot, in these cases, appropriately fall within the cognizance of the understanding of persons later born.—4.

Viçti.—Although all these have been already explained by the first aphorism, still this much undertaking is for the purpose of pointing out some of the *dharma*s or duties.

Attributes of one soul do not produce effects in another soul : he reaps who sows.

Upaskāra.—Now, in justification of the aphorism of Jaimini, “Result (of action), indicated by the Śāstra, (accrue) to the performer,” (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtram) he says :

आत्मान्तरगुणानामात्मान्तरे ऽकारणत्वात् ॥ ६ । १ । ५ ॥

आत्मान्तरगुणानां *Atmā-antara-guṇānām*, of the attributes of one soul. आत्मान्तरे *Ātmā-antare*, in another soul. अकारणत्वात् *A-kāraṇatvāt*, because there is no causality.

5. [“Result (of action) indicated by the Śāstra, (accrues) to the performer”], because there is no causality of the attributes of one soul in (the attributes of) another soul.—229.

Because the attributes of one soul, *e. g.*, merits and demerits arising from sacrifice, slaughter, etc., are not causes of the attributes, in the shape of pleasure and pain, of another soul. This being the case, pleasure and pain are produced by *dharma* and *dharma* appertaining to each individual soul, and not by *dharma* and *dharma* existing in different substrata. Otherwise, the fruits of sacrifice, slaughter, etc., will accrue to him by whom these were not performed, and hence, loss of the fruits of acts done, and acquisition of the fruits of acts not done will be the result.

Objection.—There is no such universal rule since there is a violation of it in the sacrifice for the birth of a son, sacrifice in favour of the departed ancestors, etc. Thus, it is heard that the fruits of *Śraddha* or performance of obsequies, etc., performed by the son, accrue to the departed ancestor ; it is also heard that the fruit of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, performed by the father, accrues to the son. You cannot say that here is really in these cases the co-existence of the performance and its fruit is the same subject, the agent-enjoyer, by means of the fruit accruing to the son and the departed ancestor ; in the one case, the fruit of the *Śraddha* accrues to the son in this way that he becomes the son of departed ancestors participating in the enjoyments of heaven and in the other case, the fruit of the sacrifice accrues to the father in this way that he becomes the father of a vigorous son.

For this view his *adriṣṭam* becomes inoperative, conflicts with the Veda ; for, it is heard that the fruit is only the satisfaction, etc., of the departed ancestor, and the vigorousness, etc., of the son, the supposition of any other fruit being precluded by redundancy.

Answer.—Let then *apūrvam* or *adriṣṭam* accrue to the agent as the fruit, while heaven accrues to the departed ancestor.

Objection.—It cannot be so, since activity must in your theory, uniformly co-exist in the same subject with the fruit. Otherwise where, immediately after the performance of the *Śraddha*, the son is liberated and consequently, heaven will not accrue to the departed ancestor.

Objection.—It cannot be said that it “will not accrue,” since it is the same in the other way, for, when the departed ancestor is already liberated (i. e., freed from the bonds of all enjoyment and suffering whatever) (prior to the performance of the *Śraddha*) then no such fruit will issue from the *Śraddha*, however perfect it may be in all its parts.

Conclusion.—But this is not the case. For, the declaration that “Result (of action), indicated by the *Śāstra*, (accrues) to the performer, being a general rule, admits of exception, in the presence of a strong contradiction, and, in the matter in hand, it is the *Śruti*, or Revelation of the fruit accruing to the departed ancestor and the son, which is the contradiction.

Objection.—This being so, there is proving too much.

Answer.—Not so, for, the corresponding texts of the *Veda* themselves prevent any such too much proving.

Another objection.—In the case of the greatest gifts (*mahādānam*, a technical term which denotes sixteen kinds of specially meritorious gift), heaven only (i. e., heaven without the mention of the enjoyer) is fruit, and in the name of whomsoever person they declared to be performed, the fruit they produce, accrues to that person.

Answer.—This is an absurd argument. For, here there being no contradiction to the general observation, the general observation accompanied with the absence of contradiction or exceptional instance, becomes the rule, and hence, it would not follow that kings and such other persons need not observe fast, etc., though observance of such and such acts would be possible for them by means of other persons, with the intention or prayer that the fruit of those acts may accrue to the former. Moreover, it is the rule, that the thorough performance of the duties of a householder produces fruit in the form of attainment of the world of *Brāhma*, and thus the declaration in general terms has been made with the object of showing that fruit accrues to each individual agent.

The writer of the *Vṛitti*, however, says : “Result (of action), indicated by the *Śāstra*,” etc., is really a rule without an exception. On the other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departed ancestor, etc., results from the influence of benedictory *mantras* pronounced by *Brāhmaṇas* entertained at the *Śraddha*, etc., the *mantras* in question being in the case of sacrifice for the departed ancestor, “May thy *pitṛis* or departed ancestors have their objects fulfilled,” and, in the case of sacrifice for the son, “May a son be born unto thee, who will be vigorous, beautiful as the moon, and the feeder of all,” in the same way as neutralization of the effect of poison on the body of a person bitten by a snake, is produced from the recitation of *mantras* or incantation by foresters.—5.

Vivṛiti.—“Result (of action), indicated by the *Śāstra*, (accrues) to the performer,”—this aphorism of the system of Jaimini should be supplied at the end of the present aphorism ; for otherwise, the ablative in it will remain unconnected.

Entertainment of impure Brāhmaṇas at a Śrāddha is useless.

Upaskāra.—Those fruits accrue from the benediction of Brāhmaṇas who have been satisfied with the entertainment, and who are not wicked, in other words, whose conduct is in accordance with the *Śāstra*, but not from the benediction of the wicked who have been excluded from the category of recipients, e.g., an illegitimate son born during wedlock, an illegitimate son born after the death of the husband, etc. This is what he says here :

तद्दुष्टभोजने न विद्यते ॥ ६ । १ । ६ ॥

तद् Tat, that, i. e., the fruit of benediction. दुष्टभोजने Duṣṭa-bhojane, (Śrāddha) in which impure (Brāhmaṇas) are entertained. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists, accrues.

6. That does not exist where the impure are entertained.
—230.

‘Tat’ alludes to the fruit of benediction. The meaning is that where at a Śrāddha (i. e., the observance of obsequial rites) evil or impure Brāhmaṇas are entertained there the fruit of benediction does not accrue to the departed ancestor, or the meaning is this that the fruit of the Śrāddha itself does not accrue to the departed ancestor.—6.

Impure explained.

Upaskāra.—Who are they that are called impure ? Accordingly he states the characteristic of the impure.

दुष्टं हिंसायाम् ॥ ६ । १ । ७ ॥

दुष्टं Duṣṭam, wickedness, impurity. हिंसायाम् Himsāyām, in killing.

7. Impurity (lies) in killing.—231.

Here ‘himsāyām’ is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever. The meaning, therefore, is that a person, given to or occupied in a prohibited act, should be known as impure.—7.

Association with the impure is sinful.

Upaskāra.—He says that not only non-existence of fruit accrues from entertaining an impure Brāhmaṇa invited at a Śrāddha, but sin also accrues.

तस्य समभिव्याहारतो दोषः ॥ ६ । १ । ८ ॥

तस्य Tasya, his, of the wicked or impure Brāhmaṇa. समभिव्याहारतः Samabhiivyāhārataḥ, from companionship or association. दोषः Doṣaḥ, vice, demerit, adharma.

8. Demerit results from association with him.—232.

The meaning is that ‘doṣaḥ,’ i. e., sin, accrues, ‘Samabhiivyāhārataḥ,’ i. e., from association, characterised as eating in the same row, sleeping in company, reading in company, etc., with a Brāhmaṇa engaged in forbidden acts.—8.

Entertainment of a pure Brāhmaṇa is not sinful.

Upaskāra.—Does then sin accrue also from association with one who is not impure ? He says, No.

तददुष्टे न विद्यते ॥ ६ । १ । ६ ॥

तत् Tat, that, i. e., sin. अदुष्टे A-duṣṭe, in the case of (entertaining) one who is not impure. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists, accrues.

9. This does not accrue in the case of (entertaining) one who is not impure.—233.

The meaning is that 'tat,' i. e., sin, 'na vidyate,' i. e., does not accrue, where a Brāhmaṇa, whose conduct is in accordance with the precepts and prohibitions of the Śāstra, is entertained at a Śradhā—9.

Preference should be given to worthy recipients afterwards.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked, what should the rule of conduct be in a case where worthy recipients being not available, unworthy ones are at first invited, but gradually worthy recipients become available. To this he replies :

पुनर्विशिष्टे प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । १ । १० ॥

पुनः Punaḥ, again, afterwards. विशिष्टे Viśiṣṭe, in or to a superior, or a qualified or worthy person, i. e., recipient. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛttiḥ, inclination, attention, preference.

10. Preference (should be given), to a worthy recipient (who is available) afterwards.—234.

At a Śradhā, or where gifts have to be received, if qualified persons, i. e., those who do not transgress the rules of the Śāstra in their conduct, are obtained, then one should entertain them only, leaving aside the censurable ones, although invited. The rule, "One should not reject persons invited," refers to worthy recipients only. One should, however, gratify censurable persons, who have been invited, by giving money, etc.—10.

Vivṛiti.—But what is to be done where Śradhā, etc., have been performed through the services of an impure Brāhmaṇa? He gives the reply :

Attention should be given to the thing of quality, i. e., the re-performance of the Śradhā, etc., by a pure Brāhmaṇa, etc. The Śradhā, previously performed, is all useless. This is the import.

Equals or inferiors, if pure, should be accepted as guests or recipients.

Upaskāra.—He lays down the rule of conduct where, at a Śradhā, distribution of gifts, etc., recipients superior to the agent himself, are not obtained :

समे हीने वा प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । १ । ११ ॥

समे Same, in or to an equal. हीने Hine, in or to an inferior. वा Vā, or. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛttiḥ, inclination, attention, preference.

11. Preference (should be given) to an equal, or to an inferior, (if he is free from impurity or fault).—235.

The meaning is that at *Śraddha*, charity, etc., attention or preference should be given to a recipient, free from fault, who is equal, i. e., like oneself, or inferior, i. e., less than oneself, in point of merit, etc., because happiness accrues, to the departed ancestor, from blessings pronounced by them only. The import is that persons prohibited are by all means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether they be equals or inferiors.—11.

Reception of gift is also a source of dharma, or, stealing is not sinful, in certain circumstances.

Upaskāra.—Having described the production of *adharma* by the meritorious character of the donation at a *Śraddha* or charity, he extends production of *dharma* from reception also of a similar nature :

एतेन हीनसमविशिष्टधार्मिकेभ्यः परस्वादानं व्यख्यातम् ॥ ६ । १ । १२ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. हीनसमविशिष्टधार्मिकेभ्यः Hīna-sama-viśiṣṭa dhārmikebhyah, from inferior, equal, superior virtuous persons. परस्वादानं Parasvā-dānām, reception of property. व्याख्यातम् Vyākhyātam, explained.

12. By this is explained reception of property from virtuous persons who are inferior, equal, or superior (to oneself).—236.

The excellence of *dharma* is in the order of its mention. The meaning is that *dharma* accrues from the reception of a gift of land, etc., from a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal, or superior to oneself. 'Parasvādānām' means reception of property from another.

The writer of the *Vṛitti*, however, says : “ ‘Parasvādānām,’ i. e., the taking of another's property, by theft, etc., is explained. Thus, according to the *Śruti*, शूद्रात् सप्तमे वैश्यादग्रे क्षत्रियात् पञ्चदशे ब्राह्मणात् प्राणसंशये, to save himself or his family, suffering from starvation, a man may steal the food of a *Śūdra*, when he has not obtained food for seven days. Similarly, when he has not obtained food for ten days, or when he has not obtained food for fifteen days, or when life is in danger, to steal food from a *Vaiśya*, a *Kṣatriya*, or a *Brāhmaṇa* respectively, does not tend to *adharma* or sin.”—12.

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances.

Upaskāra.—Not only is the taking of another's property, when life is in danger, not forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do not give anything to take away, may even be put to death. By all this there is no loss of *dharma*, or appearance or production of *adharma*. This is what he says :

तथा विरुद्धानां त्यागः ॥ ६ । १ । १३ ॥

तथा Tathā, likewise. विरुद्धानां Virūddhānām, of those who stand in the way. त्यागः Tyāgaḥ, the making away with.

13. Likewise the making away with those who stand in the way, (is justified).—237.

The meaning is that they are to be put to death who act in the contrary manner, (i. e., who play the enemy), in such circumstances. So it has been said :

कर्मणा येन केनापि मृदुना दास्येत वा ।

उद्धरेद्दीनमात्मानं समर्थो धर्ममाचरेत् ॥

“ Let a man save his poor self by whatsoever deed, mild or cruel. When he is able, let him practise *dharma* or righteousness.”—13.

Vivṛiti.—He points out that certain censurable deeds also do not produce sin :

The meaning is that the killing of those who are about to take one's life, is likewise not forbidden, according to the saying “ Let one kill an aggressive felon without a second thought.”

Note.—The author of the *Upaskāra* gives up his own context, and here follows the *Vṛitti* quoted by him under the preceding aphorism.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—But is the making away with another to be resorted to with any distinction whatever ? He says, No :

हीने परे त्यागः ॥ ६ । १ । १४ ॥

हीने Hīne, in an inferior. परे Pare, in another. त्यागः Tyāgaḥ, making away with, killing.

14. Making away with another (is not sinful), if (he is) inferior (to oneself.)—238

If another who does not give anything to take away, is inferior to oneself, he, the Śūdra, or the like, may be put to death.—14.

Vivṛiti.—‘ Para ’ means an enemy, (and not one who does not give anything to take away).

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances, continued.

Upaskāra.—With reference to an equal, he says :

समे आत्मत्यागः परत्यागो वा ॥ ६ । १ । १५ ॥

समे Same, in the case of an equal. आत्मत्यागः Ātma-tyāgaḥ, self-abandonment. Suicide. परत्यागः Para-tyāgaḥ, destruction of another. वा vā, or.

15. In the cause of an equal, either suicide or destruction of the other (may be resorted to).—239.

Where it is a Brāhmaṇa, equal to oneself, who becomes the adversary, then destruction of oneself only by starvation, etc., is to be committed. Or, if there appear no other means of preserving oneself or one's family, and the opponent be an equal, he is to be then made away with.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—If, then, a person, superior to oneself, become the adversary, should he even be put to death ? He says, No :

विशिष्टे आत्मत्याग इति ॥ ६ । १ । १६ ॥

विशिष्टे Viśiṣṭe, in the case of a superior. आत्मत्यागः Ātmatyāgaḥ self-destruction. इति Iti, *finis*.

16. In the case of superior, self-destruction (is to be committed).—240.

In the case of a person, superior to oneself, *i. e.*, excellent by the study of the Veda, etc., becoming the opponent, destruction of oneself only is lawful. The meaning is that even when life is in danger, a man may design only his own death, but must not slay a Brāhmaṇa.

‘ Iti ’ indicates the end of the chapter.—16.

Here ends the first chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.



BOOK SIXTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Exaltation is the motive of actions of which no visible motive exists.

Upaskāra.—Thus, in the first chapter, because the proof, supplied by the Veda, is produced by some attribute or quality, therefore, in connection with its production, a description of the attribute or quality then the consideration that “Result (of action), indicated by the Śāstra, (accrues) to the performer,” and also the consideration of this that under certain circumstances there is non-production of demerit, even on the performance of forbidden acts, have taken place. Now, the author, with a view to explain the second aphorism, “*Dharma* is that from which (results) the attainment of exaltation and the Supreme Good” (I. i. 2, above), is going to make an examination of the production of *dharma* or merit, in particular cases, and accordingly he says :

दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोजनमभ्युदयाय ॥ ६ । २ । १ ॥

दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनानां *Dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-prayojanānām*, of which the motives are visible and invisible. दृष्टाभावे *Dṛṣṭa-abhāve*, where no visible motive exists. प्रयोजनं *Prayojanam*, motive. अभ्युदयाय *Abhyudaya*, for the purpose of exaltation or knowledge of reality.

1. (Of actions) of which the motives are visible and invisible, the motive, where no visible (motive) exists, (tends) to exaltation. —241.

Actions of which the motives are visible, are agriculture, commerce, service under the king, etc. Actions of which the motives are invisible, are sacrifice, charity, *brahmacharya* or celibacy and devotion to learning, etc. Amongst these actions, where no visible object is observed, there an invisible object has to be supposed. And that is conducive to ‘exaltation,’ i. e., knowledge of reality or truth. Or, in ‘*abhyudaya*,’ the dative has been used in the sense of the nominative. The meaning, therefore, is that the fruit (of the action) is exaltation. The invisible fruit is nothing but *adṛṣṭam* (or potential after-effects of past acts). If it is produced by *yoga* or holy communion, then the exaltation is spiritual intuition of the self. If it is produced by, sacrifice, charity, etc., then the exaltation is heaven. Here, again, unlike the actions milking, cooking, etc., which bear fruit then and there but like the actions sowing, ploughing, etc., which bear fruit after a while, the actions sacrificing, giving alms, practising *brahmacharya*, etc., by no means bear fruit then and there, for no such production of fruit is observed. Nor are gain, etc., through being known as virtuous, themselves the fruit ; for those who practise *brahmacharya* have no eye to such fruit. Therefore, heaven, etc., which will accrue in the distant future, are the fruit. And this is not immediately connected with action which by nature speedily vanishes out of existence. Hence it results that there is an intermediate common substratum of the action and the fruit, and this is *apūrvam* or *adṛṣṭam*.

Actions of which the motive is invisible.

Upaskāra.—He enumerates actions of which the fruits are invisible :

अभिषेचनोपवासब्रह्मचर्यं रुकुलवासः । नप्रस्थयज्ञदानप्रोक्ष-
णदिङ् नक्षत्रकालनियमा चादृष्टाय ॥ ६ । २ । २ ॥

अभिषेचनोपवासव्रतचर्यगुरुकुलवासवानप्रस्थयज्ञदानप्रोक्तयादिस्नानकालनियमाः Abhiṣechna--upavāsa--brahmacharyya--gurukulavāsa--vānaprastha--yajña--dāna--prokṣaṇa--dikāṣatra--kāla--niyamāḥ—Ablution, Fast, *Brahmacharya*, Residence in the family of the preceptor, Life of retirement in the forest, Sacrifice, Gift, Oblation, Direction, Constellation, Seasons and Religious observances. च Cha, and. अदृष्टाय Adṛiṣṭāya, conducive to *adṛiṣṭam*, or invisible fruit.

2. Ablution, fast, *brahmacharya*, residence in the family of the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice, gift, oblation, directions, constellations, seasons, and religious observances conduce to invisible fruit.—242.

‘Adṛiṣṭāya’ means for the purpose of the fruit characterised as *adṛiṣṭam*, or for the purpose of the fruit, characterised as heaven and salvation, through the gate of *adṛiṣṭam*. Hereby are included all actions or duties enjoined in the Veda and smṛiti and having *adṛiṣṭam* as their fruit. Here ‘abhiṣechnam’ means ablution as enjoined in such precepts as “One should bathe in the Gaṅgā (Ganges).” Fast denotes such as is enjoined in such precepts as “One should abstain from food on the eleventh day of the moon.” ‘Brahmacharyyam’ means cultivation of *dharma* in general. ‘Gurukulavāsaḥ’ is that of *Brahmacharins* or students for the purpose of studying the Veda the twelve-year vow called *Mahāvratā*, etc., ‘Vānaprastham’ means the duty of those who have retired to the forest on the ripening of age. ‘Yajñaḥ’ denotes *Rājaśūnya*, *Vājaṭpeya*, and other sacrifices. ‘Dānam’ is as enjoined by such precepts as “One should give away a cow.” ‘Prokṣaṇam’ is as enjoined by such precepts as “One should offer rice.” ‘Dik’ denotes such as is enjoined by the precepts., “One should perform sacrifice on an altar inclined towards the east,” “One should eat rice, etc., facing towards the east,” etc. ‘Nakṣatraṁ’ is such as *Maghā* (the tenth lunar asterism), etc., on the occasion of a *śāddha*, etc. ‘Mantraḥ’ denotes “O, ye waters, who are the sources of pleasures,” etc. (Rig Veda X. ix. 1), and other sacred hymns. ‘Kālaḥ’ is as is enjoined by such precepts as “Month after month food shall be given to thee” where one should offer food in the afternoon of the day of new moon, “In summer let one be surrounded with five fires,” “In spring let one deposit the sacrificial fires,” etc. ‘Niyamaḥ’ means conduct, in accordance with the Śāstra, of those who observe the distinction of caste and the four stages of holy living, i. e., *Varṇa* and *Āśrama*.

Now, it will be seen that of the *dharma*, so produced, the soul is the combinative cause, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non-combinative cause, and faith and the knowledge of the motives or objects characterised as heaven, etc., are the efficient causes.—2.

Other sources of dharma and sources of adharma.

Upaśāstra.—Having thus mentioned the sources of *dharma*, he now mentions them along with the sources of *adharma* also :

चा. राश्रम्य. पथा अनुपधाश्च ॥ ६ । २ । ३ ॥

चतुराश्रम्यं Châturâśramyaṁ, the observance of the four Âśramas or stages of holy living, viz., the life of continence and scholarship, the life of a householder, the life of retirement in the woods, and the life of absolute selfrenunciation, (*lit.* living on alms). उपधाः Upadhâḥ, defects in respect of faith, misbeliefs and disbeliefs. अनुपधा Anupadhâ, non-defects in respect of faith, beliefs. च Cha, and.

3. The observance of the four Âśramas (has been already mentioned). Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are also (sources of *adr̥ṣṭam* or *dharma* and *adharma*).—243.

That which is the means of *dharma*, common to the four Âśramas, has been, (and thus the sentence should be completed), exhaustively denoted by the preceding aphorism alone. 'Upadhâḥ' means defects of *bhâva* (i. e., sentiment) or faith; 'anupadhâḥ' means non-defects of *bhâva* or faith. They too should be understood to be the sources of *dharma* and *adharma*, according to themselves. By the word, 'upadhâḥ', all the means of *adharma*, have been included.—3.

Upadhâ and anupadhâ explained.

Upaskâra—Distinguishing *upadhâ* or impurity, and *anupadhâ* or purity, as regards their characteristic, he says :

भावदोष उपधाऽदोषोऽनुपधा ॥ ६ । २ । ४ ॥

भावदोषः Bhâva-doṣaḥ, defect of feeling, impurity of emotion, or of the soul. उपधा Upadhâ, (*ety.*) that which is placed, or settles, upon or near anything. Impurity. अदोषः A-doṣaḥ, non-defect. अनुपधा Anupadhâ, purity. Purity of emotion, or of the soul.

4. *Upadhâ* or Impurity (denotes) impurity of emotion, or of the soul ; *anupadhâ* (denotes) purity.—244.

Feeling, desire, attraction, inattention, unfaith, vanity, conceit, envy, and other impurities of the soul are denoted by the word *upadhâ* or impurity. Faith, complacence of mind, perseverance in the performance of prescribed actions, determination of what should be done in particular situation, (or presence of mind), and certitude are called *anupadhâ* or purity of the soul. The efficient causality of all these towards *dharma* and *adharma*, is here declared.—4.

What objects are pure or holy.

Upaskâra.—(Purity and impurity may be internal as well as external, that is, may relate to thought as well as to things. In the preceding aphorism, purities and impurities of the soul have been mentioned. With regard to external objects it is said as follows). Things pure and impure are also called *upadhâ* or purity and *anupadhâ* or impurity. Here he distinguishes between pure and impure objects :

यदिष्टरूप सगन्धस्पर्श प्रोक्षितमन्युक्षितञ्च तच्छुचि ॥ ६ । २ । ५ ॥

यत् Yat, which. इष्टरूपसगन्धस्पर्श, Iṣṭa-rûparasa-gandha-sparśaṁ possesses prescribed colour, taste, smell, and touch. प्रोक्षितं Prokṣitam, aspersed.

Sprinkled with water together with the pronunciation of *mantras* or sacred hymns. अभ्युक्षितं *Abhyukṣitam*, sprinkled with water without the pronunciation of *mantras*. The above rendering of the two words, 'prokṣitam' *abhyukṣitam* 'is in accordance with the view of Śaṅkara misra. But,

इत्तानेनैव हस्तेन प्रोक्षणं परिकीर्तितम् ।

न्यस्तताभ्युक्षणं प्रोक्तं तिरश्चावोक्षणं स्मृतम् ॥

"Sprinkling of water with the pronated hand is called *prokṣanam*; that with supinated hand is called *abhyukṣanam*; and the same with the inclined hand is known as *avokṣanam*."

From the above saying of the *Smṛiti*, it would appear that the correct translations would be, sprinkled with water with pronation, in the case of 'prokṣitam,' and sprinkled with water with supination, in the case of 'abhyukṣitam.' च *Cha*, and. तत् *Tat*. that शुचि *Śuchi*, pure, clean, holy.

5. The pure is that which possesses prescribed Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, and is sprinkled with water along with the recitation of sacred hymns, and also without it, or is sprinkled with water both with pronation and with supination.—245.

Whatever Substance possesses such colour, etc., as are 'iṣṭam,' i. e., prescribed by the Veda and the *Smṛiti*, the same is of that character (i. e., pure). Therein, Colour (is prescribed) in such texts as "He buys the *soma* drink for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny eyes;" "He should obtain a white goat," etc. 'Prokṣitam,' means sprinkled with water during the recitation of sacred hymns; 'abhyukṣitam,' means sprinkled with water without any sacred hymn. The word, *cha*, implies that which is lawfully acquired, and that is brought out by such restraining percepts as "A Brāhmaṇa, should acquire wealth by performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by receiving presents, etc.—5.

What objects are impure or unholy.

Upaskāra.—He states the characteristic of impure objects :

अशुचीति शुचिप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६ । २ । ६ ॥

अशुचि *Āśuchi*, impure. इति *Iṭi*, this Such. शुचिप्रतिषेधः *Śuchipratīṣedhaḥ*, the negation of exclusion of the pure.

6. Impure,—such is the form of the negation of the pure.—246.

The meaning is that the contrary of such substance as is pure, is impure. In other words, a substance of unpraiseworthy colour, taste, smell, and touch, or not aspersed, or not sprinkled, or sprinkled with forbidden water, or unlawfully acquired, as the substance of a Brāhmaṇa acquired by agriculture and commerce, is impure.—6.

What objects are impure or unholy, continued.

Upaskāra.—He mentions other impure objects :

अर्थान्तरञ्च ॥ ६ । २ । ७ ॥

अर्थान्तरं Arthāntarām, something else. Another thing. च Cha, and.

7. (It is) also something else.—247.

The meaning is that where a thing possesses praiseworthy colour, taste, smell, and touch, and is at the same time aspersed, sprinkled, and lawfully acquired, even there that thing also is impure, if it is vitiated by speech or vitiated by intention.—7.

To produce exaltation, purity must be coupled with self-restraint.

Upaskāra.—Now he points out another contributory cause of dharma and adharma :

अयतस्य शुचिभोजनादभ्युदयो न विद्यते नियमाभावात् विद्यते वाऽर्थान्तरत्वाद् यमस्य ॥ ६ । २ । ८ ॥

अयतस्य Ayatasy, of the unrestrained. शुचिभोजनात् Śuchi-bhojanât, from eating that which is pure. अभ्युदयः Abhyudayaḥ, exaltation. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists. Accrues. नियमाभावात् Niyama-abhâvât, owing to the absence of self-restraint. विद्यते Vidyate, exists. Accrues. वा Va, and. अर्थान्तरत्वात् Artha-antaratvât, being a different thing. यमस्य Yamasya, of self-restraint.

8. To the unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of self-restraint ; and it accrues, (where there is self-restraint), inasmuch as self-restraint is a different thing (from eating).—248.

‘Ayatasya’ means void of restraint, or unrestraint. The eating of one, void of the restraints brought out in such precepts as. “A man should take food after washing his hands and feet, and rinsing his mouth, restrained in speech, while taking food, though restrained, he should twice rinse his mouth,” does not tend to exaltation, but to sin. It may be asked, Why ? Hence he says, ‘niyama-abhâvât,’ i. e., owing to the absence of self-restraint, which is a contributory cause. That which takes place where self-restraint exists, is now stated. ‘Vidyate va,’ i. e., exaltation verily accrues from eating by means of the accompaniment of the self-restraint mentioned above. It may be asked, How ? So he says, ‘Artha-antaratvât yamasya,’ i. e., because self-restraint is something else than eating. Therefore the meaning is that without the contributory cause there is no production of the fruit, and that with it, there is production of the fruit.—8.

Bhāṣya.—reads Vidyateva’ rthāntaratvât yamasya as a separate aphorism.

Self-restraint alone, again, is not sufficient for the purpose.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected, “If self-restraint alone is the governing element, then eating is not a governing element at all,” Accordingly he says :

असति च अभावात् ॥ ६ । २ । ९ ॥

असति Asati, non-existing. च Cha, and. अभवात् Abhāvāt, because of non-existence.

9. (Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation), for there is non-existence (of exaltation), where (the eating of pure food) does not exist.—249.

‘Of exaltation’ is the complement of the aphorism. ‘Abhāvāt,’ *i. e.*, since exaltation does not exist, ‘asati,’ *i. e.*, where the eating of pure food does not exist, although there is self-restraint. The meaning, therefore, is that it is both of them, namely self-restraint and eating, which is the cause of merit. The word, eating, is illustrative *Yama* and *Niyama*, *i. e.*, self-restraint, external and internal, are accessories also of sacrifice, charity, ablutions, oblations, and other actions prescribed by the Veda and the Smṛiti.—9.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma.

Upāskāra.—Having thus stated self-restraint as a contributory towards the production of *dharma*, he now points out the origin of *fault*, with a view to specify *fault* as an accessory to *adharma* :

सुखाद्रागः ॥ ६ । २ । १० ॥

सुखात् Sukhāt, from pleasure. रागः Rāgaḥ, (*Lit.* Colouration), Desire.

10. From Pleasure (arises) Desire.—250.

‘Sukhāt,’ *i. e.*, from pleasure derived from the enjoyment of garlands, sandal-paste, women, and other objects. *rāgaḥ*, *i. e.*, desire, is produced successively for pleasure of a similar kind, or for the means of attaining it. It is also to be considered that from pain begotten by snakes, thorns, and the like, aversion arises with regard to such pain, or with regard to its source. Desire, aversion, and infatuation are called *faults*, inasmuch as they are incentives to activity (which serves to bind the agent down to this world). Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gautama, “Faults have for their characteristic incitement to activity (or worldly occupation).” (*Nyāya-Sūtram*, I. i. 18),—10.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma,
continued.

Upāskāra.—“Now,” it may be objected, “if only pleasure and pain produced desire and aversion, how then can the latter exist after the destruction of the former ?” Hence he says :

तन्मयत्वाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । ११ ॥

तन्मयत्वात् Tat-mayatvāt from transformation into, absorption, or entire occupation of mind with, or habituation to, that. च Cha, and.

11. (Desire and Aversion arise) also through habituation to that.—251.

‘Desire and aversion arise’—this is the complement of the aphorism. ‘Tat-mayatvaṁ’ means a particular kind of comparatively powerful impression produced by constant or habitual experience of objects,

through the influence of which, a sad lover, who does not win his mistress, sees his beloved in every object ; and he who has been once bitten by a snake, in consequence of the strong impression regarding that, sees snakes everywhere. So it has been said, "*Tat-mayatvam* (lit, full-of-that-ness) means the manifestation of that both internally and externally."—11.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He brings forward another source (of desire and aversion) :

अदृष्टाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । १२ ॥

अदृष्टात् *Adṛṣṭāt*, from destiny, or *adṛṣṭam*. **च** *Cha*, and. Also.

12. (Desire and Aversion arise) from *adṛṣṭam* also.—252.

'Desire and version'—this forms the complement of the aphorism. Although *adṛṣṭam* is a universal cause, still particular causality, towards desire and aversion, sometimes attends it. For instance, it should be inferred by such cases as of desire for a (mistress or) woman on the breaking forth of youth even in one who has not in that birth enjoyed the pleasures of love, and of aversion towards snakes even in those who have not experienced the pain of snake-bites. Nor is it only *samskāra* or impression produced in a previous existence (that is to say, instinct), which supplies the missing link in these cases. For there being no proof for the supposition of its existence, or for the supposition of its resuscitation, the supposition of *adṛṣṭam* becomes necessary.—12.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma, continued.

Upaskāra.—He mentions another contributory cause (of desire and aversion) :

जातिविशेषाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । १३ ॥

जातिविशेषात् *Jāti-viśeṣāt*, from particularity of race or racial distinction. **च** *Cha*, and.

13. (Desire and Aversion arise) also from racial distinctions.—253.

Thus, human beings have desire for rice, etc., animals of the deer class, for grass, etc. ; those of the camel class, for briars. In these cases also, *adṛṣṭam* which produces birth in such and such a race, is the governing principle, while race, i. e., distinction of birth, is only a means or medium. Similarly, pigeons, etc., possess desire for crops. In the same way, animals of the buffalo class possess aversion towards the horse ; dogs, towards the jackal ; ichneumons, towards snakes ; and from other instances, it is to be inferred (that racial distinction is a means of desire and aversion).—13.

Desire and aversion produce dharma and adharma through inclination.

Upaskāra.—Having thus enumerated the efficient causes of desire and aversion, desire and aversion being the efficient causes of *dharma* and *adharma*, he now points out that the causality of fault towards *dharma* and *adharma* operates through the medium of activity or inclination.

इच्छाद्वेषपूर्विका धर्माधर्मप्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । २ । १४ ॥

इच्छाद्वेषपूर्विका *Inchhâ-dveṣa-pûrvvika*, preceded by, or having for its antecedents, desire and aversion. धर्माधर्मप्रवृत्तिः *Dharma-adharma-pravṛtitiḥ*, Activity, tendency, inclination, or application to *dharma* and *adharma*.

14. Application to *dharma* and *adharma* has for its antecedents Desire and Aversion.—254.

‘*Pravṛtitiḥ*’ or employment in a prescribed action, is due to the link of desire, and in a prohibited action, *e. g.*, killing, is due to the link of aversion. Employment, due to the link of desire, in sacrifices, etc., begets *dharma*; employment, due to the link of aversion, in killing, etc., begets *adharma*. These same desire and aversion cause the wheel of transmigration to revolve. Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gauṭama, “*Pravṛtiti* or employment is the operation or exertion of speech, mind, and body,” (*Nyâya-Sûtram*, I. i. 17). Verbal employment is exertion of speech; it is meritorious, if it is for the expression of what is true, kind, and beneficial; it is sinful, if it is for the expression of what is nature, unkind, and baneful. By ‘*Buddhiḥ*,’ (mind), is meant that by which objects are cognised, *i. e.*, mind. Therefore mental employment is compassion towards all creatures, and other activities. Bodily employment, such as almsgiving, ministration, etc., is tenfold as sinful, and tenfold as meritorious.—14.

Vivṛiti.—The aphorism has been framed in a general way. Hence no harm has been done to the production of *dharma*, etc., also from chance contact with the water of the Gaṅgâ (the Ganges) and such other sources, even though desire and aversion do not exist here.

Dharma and adharma are causes of birth and death.

Upaskâra.—Now he states the end or object of *dharma* and *adharma*, *i. e.*, reappearance after passing away :

तत्संयोगो विभागः ॥ ६ । २ । १५ ॥

तत्संयोगः *Tat-saṁyogah*, conjunction produced by them. विभागः *Vibhâgaḥ*, disjunction.

15. Conjunction (of soul with body, sense, and life), produced by them (*i. e.*, *dharma* and *adharma*), (is called birth); Disjunction (of body and mind, produced by them, is called death).—255.

From these, namely *dharma* and *adharma*, conjunction, *i. e.*, birth, results. Connection with non-pre-existing body, sense, and life is here termed conjunction. ‘*Vibhâgaḥ*’ again, denotes disjunction of body and mind, characterised as death. The meaning, therefore, is that this system of births and deaths, *samsâra* or ceaseless flow of existences, otherwise termed *pretya-bhâva* or re-appearance after passing away, is caused by *dharma* and *adharma*. The Vedic name of this very *pretya-bhâva* is *ajarañjari-bhâva* or non-decrepit decrepitude.—15.

How mokṣa is attained.

Upaskāra.—To ascertain, therefore, what *mokṣa* is, in which there is an end of this re-appearance after passing away, of the system of births and deaths, he says :

आत्मकर्मसु मोक्षो व्याख्यातः ॥ ६ । २ । १६ ॥

आत्मकर्मसु *Ātma-karmmasu*, actions of the soul taking place. मोक्षः *Mokṣaḥ*, salvation. व्याख्यातः *Vyākhyātaḥ*, declared.

16. (It has been) declared that the actions of the soul taking place, salvation (results).—256.

This same disjunction of body and mind rises into *mokṣa* or liberation, when there exist the actions of the soul. This is the meaning. Now, the actions of the soul collectively are as follows : 'audition,' intellection, practice of holy communion, or *yoga*, constant meditation, posture, regulation of breath, (*lit.* lengthening of life, the acquisition of the control of the external senses and of the control of the internal sense, spiritual intuition of one's own soul and of the souls of others, accurate knowledge of previously produced *dharma* and *adharma*, which have to be experienced in other bodies and places the building up of various bodies suitable to such experience, the exhaustion of that *dharma* and *adharma* by experiencing them, and ultimate success or emancipation, characterised as cessation of pain, on the cessation of birth, when there is cessation of tendency to action, in consequence of the non-production of subsequent *dharma* and *adharma*, due to the overcoming of the mists of faults characterised as desire and aversion. Of these the prime action of the soul is knowledge of the real nature or essence of the six Predicables.—16.

Here ends the second chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary of Śāṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Vivṛiti.—Spiritual intuition of the reality of the self steals away false knowledge, sprung from spiritual blindness, of which the subject-matter is that the soul is not distinct from the body, etc. Thereupon there is cessation of *faults*, characterised as desire and aversion ; from which there follows destruction of activity or inclination productive of *dharma* and *adharma*. And from the non-existence of inclination results annihilation of birth in the form of the initial conjunction of life with a future body. And hence there results final annihilation of the threefold afflictions. It is in this that *mokṣa* consists. Therefore this treatise is useful, as a system of thought intended for the purpose of *intellection* or thinking about things.

BOOK SEVENTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Allusion to I. i. 6.

Upaskāra.—Having examined *dharma* and *adharma*, as the root causes of *Samsāra* or transmigration, as the efficient causes of all that has a production, as the means of *bhoga* or worldly experience, and as uniformly attaching to each individual soul, from their origin, as well as the *adviṣṭam* of others as conducive to fruits to be experienced by those others, the author now calls back to the mind of the disciples the enumeration and definition of Attributes with the intention of examining these Attributes.

उक्ता गुणाः ॥ ७ । १ । १ ॥

उक्ता : Uktāḥ, stated, mentioned, enumerated. गुणाः Guṇāḥ, attributes.

1. Attributes (have been) mentioned (above).—257.

The meaning is that Attributes have been enumerated and defined. Of these colour, etc., seventeen in all, have been verbally stated, and seven have been brought forward by the word *cha*, 'and'. Accordingly all the twenty-four Attributes have been mentioned. Now, Attribute-ness connotes possession of the 'class' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternal present in the eternal, or possession of the 'class' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternal which do not appear in combinative causes, or possession of the 'class' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternal appearing in non-combinative causes, or possession of the 'class' not appearing in action which does not co-exist in the same substratum with the effect.—1.

What attributes are non-eternal.

Upaskāra.—Now, the examination of Attributes, as Attributes, is the subject of the seventh book. Of this, in the first Chapter, there are five sections, viz., (1) the examination of Attributes as eternal, (2) the examination of Attributes as non-eternal, (3) the examination of Attributes due to the action of heat, (4) the examination of Attributes which appear of function in more substances than one, *e. g.*, Number, etc., and (5) the examination of measure or extension. Herein he states the non-eternality of the four Attributes, colour, etc.

पृथिव्यादि रसगन्धस्पर्शा द्रव्यानित्यत्वादित्याश्च ॥ ७ । १ । २ ॥

पृथिव्यादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः Pṛithivi-ādi-rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ, the Colour, Taste Smell, and Touch of Earth, etc., *i. e.*, of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air. द्रव्यानित्यत्वाद् Dravyā-anityatvāt, on account of the non-eternality of the substances in which they reside. अनित्याः Anityāḥ, non-eternal. च Cha, also.

2. The Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, are also non-eternal, on account of the non-eternality of their substrata.—258.

Of the wholes made up of parts, beginning with Earth, and ending with Air, the four Attributes, colour, and the following, are non-eternal. Although other Attributes also, being present in whole made up of parts, are really non-eternal, yet (they are not referred to here, because) their destruction is also due to other causes. The four Attributes, beginning with colour, disappear only on the destruction of their substrata; and

not in consequence of another, and contradictory, Attribute. 'Dravya-anityatvât:' The meaning is that the non-eternality of the dependent Attributes is on account of the non-eternality of substances upon which they depend.—2.

What attributes are eternal.

Upaskāra.—If the non-eternality of substrata governs the non-eternality of colour, etc., then, he says, it is obtained from necessary implication, that those colour, etc., which reside in eternal substrata, possess eternality.

एतेन नित्येषु नित्यत्वं कम् ॥ ७ । १ । ३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. नित्येषु Nityeṣu, in eternal. नित्यत्वं Nityatvam, eternality. उक्तम् Uktam, stated. Implied.

3. By this is implied eternality (of Colour, etc., which reside) in eternal substances.—259.

Of the same four Attributes, colour, etc., present in eternal substrata, eternality is implied 'by this,' which means, by the declaration of non-eternality by reason of the non-eternality of the substrata.

The writer of the *Vṛitti*, however, explains thus : नित्येष्वनित्यत्वं कम् —this is the reading, with the addition of an अ, (so that instead of 'eternality,' the reading is 'non-eternality.') Thus, colour, etc., residing in terrene ultimate atoms, disappear on the conjunction of fire.—3.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Does, then, eternality belong also to colour, etc., which reside in terrene eternal substances? Accordingly he specifies (the eternal referred to in the preceding aphorism).

अप्सु तेजसि वायौ च नित्या द्रव्यनित्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ४ ॥

अप्सु Apsu, in water. तेजसि Tejasi, in fire. वायौ Vāyau, in air. च Cha, and. नित्या: Nityāḥ, eternal. द्रव्यनित्यत्वात् Dravya-nityatvât, in consequence of the eternality of substrata.

4. And also in consequence of the eternality of their (respective) substrata, (Colour, etc.) are eternal in Water, Fire, and Air.—260.

In aqueous ultimate atoms, Colour, Taste, and Touch are eternal; in igneous ultimate atoms, Colour and Touch; in ultimate atoms of Air, Touch is eternal. "But," it may be asked, what is the contradiction, if colour, etc., present even in things eternal, be themselves non-eternal like Sound, Understanding, etc.?" Accordingly, an additional reason, viz., non-appearance of another attribute (*vide* IV. ii. 3 *ante*), is indicated by the word च, 'and.' For, in Sound, the manifestation of a different attribute is observed in the form of tones, high, low, etc.; and in knowledge, etc., *samskāra*, impression or habit, etc., contradictory of, or which oppose, knowledge, etc., (are observed). In aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms, other attributes, contradictory of colour, etc., do not appear. If they appeared, then Colour, etc.,

heterogeneous from the antecedent ones, would be observed also in the aqueous and other wholes made up of parts, or compounds, originated by the same ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic aggregates. But colour, different in kind from white colour, does not belong to Water and Fire; nor do Touches, different in kind from cold and hot Touches. "Hot water," "Cold air,"—such intuitions are, however, due to the influence of *upādhi* or adjunct or external condition. This is the import.—4.

Vivṛiti.—"But Colour, etc., residing in aqueous ultimate atoms, being destructible by the conjunction of fire," it may be objected, "why this generalisation, namely, "in eternal" (in the preceding aphorism)?" Hence he specifies the eternal.

The meaning is that Colour, etc., inherent in the eternal earth (*i. e.*, ultimate atoms of earth), are not certainly eternal, but that it has been stated in the preceding aphorism that those only are eternal, which inhere in the eternal Water, Fire, and Air (*i. e.*, aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms).

What attributes are non-eternal.

Upaśāra.—Already it has been stated that (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal in non-eternals among terrene substances. Now he states it in the case of aqueous other non-eternals also.

अनित्येष्वनित्या द्रव्यानित्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ५ ॥

अनित्येषु Anityeṣu, in non-eternals. *अनित्याः* Anityāḥ, non-eternal. *द्रव्यानित्यत्वात्*—*Dravya-anityatvāt*, in consequence of the non-eternality of substrata.

5. In non-eternals, (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal, in consequence of the non-eternality of their substrata.—261.

The meaning is that Colour, etc., of aqueous, and other wholes made up of parts, disappear only on the dissolution of substrata, but not in consequence of other, contradictory, attributes.—5.

Vivṛiti.—Are Attributes, inhering in non-eternals, and other than Colour, etc., eternal? If so, then Conjunction, etc., also will be eternal. To remove this apprehension, he says :

The meaning is that Attributes which exist in non-eternal substances, are, all of them, non-eternal, because their substrata are non-eternal, so that eternal Attributes do not at all exist in non-eternal substances.

Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning.

Upaśāra.—In earth, appearing in the form of wholes made up of parts, (*i. e.*, in terrene bodies), also, Colour, etc., appear and disappear only on the conjunction of fire. How, therefore, are they destructible only by the destruction of their substrata? To remove this apprehension, he says :

कारणगुणपूर्वकाः पृथिव्यां पाकजाः ॥ ७ । १ । ६ ॥

कारणगुणपूर्वकाः—*Kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvvakāḥ*, preceded by, or having for antecedents, the attributes of the causes. **पृथिव्यां** *Prithivyām*, in earth. **पकायाः** *Pākajāḥ*, produced by burning. Due to the action of heat. Thermal.

6. In Earth, (Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch) have for their antecedents (like) attributes in (its combinative) causes, (and are also) due to the action of heat.—262.

'*Pākajāḥ*' means Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, due to the action of heat, '*Kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvvakāḥ*' means preceded by the attributes of that, *e. g.*, potsherds, etc., which is the combinative cause of the substratum of Colour, *e. g.*, a water-pot. Thus, the Colour of the potsherd is the non-combinative cause of the colour of the water-pot, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the cause. So also in the case of Taste, etc. Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch possess the *jāti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attribute-ness such as colourness, etc.

Objection.—Colourness, which is nothing but apprehensibility by the eye, is the *upādhi* or external condition (of colour-perception).

Answer.—It is not. For, this would entail non-appearance of the intuition of colour immediately on the falling of the sense, since an *upādhi* or external condition which is not adjacent, is unfit for producing the intuition of that which is conditioned or super-imposed. Here the *upādhi*, again, is the eye, and the same—the ocular sense—is supersensuous. And apprehensibility is the being the object of apprehension. This too is not an object of ocular perception, since perception distinguished or determined by colour-ness is ocular. Colour-ness, therefore, is the characteristic of the attribute perceptible by the external sense of the eye alone.

Objection.—But it does not pervade or include supersensuous colour.

Answer.—The objection does not arise; for, the possession of the *jāti* or class apprehensible by the external sense of the eye alone, is intended. Such *jāti* is colour-ness; as also are blue-ness, etc.

Objection.—The manifestations of blue, yellow, etc., are eternal, only as each of them is a single, individual, manifestation. There are not blue-ness, and other classes, inasmuch as their denotation is a single individual.

Answer.—This is not the case, as it would entail the non-appearance of the intuition of deeper blue, deepest blue, etc.

Objection.—But the use of the comparative and the superlative may be caused here by the absence of inter-penetration of whiteness, etc.

Answer.—It cannot, since there is no proof of it, and also because of the intuition, "Dark colour is gone, red produced."

Objection.—But such intuition is caused by the production and destruction of combination.

Answer.—No, since there is no trace of combination there, and since combination is eternal. The same (*i. e.*, production and destruction of combination) being applicable also in the case of the non-eternality of the water-pot, etc., the result would be non-finality, since *Anyathasiddhi*, production by other means, or plurality of causes, can be easily ascribed there by way of the very non-eternality of combination.

Another *objection*.—The attributes, blue, yellow, etc., are not different from substance, since there is no difference between a property and that of which it is a property.

Answer.—This cannot be the case, as it would entail such uses as “Colour is water-pot,” “Touch is water-pot,” etc.

Objection.—But there is no harm in it, inasmuch as there are really such intuitions as “White cloth,” “Blue cloth,” etc.

Answer.—The analogy does not hold, because the intuitions are explained by the supposition of elision of the affix, *matup*, denoting possession, or by the supposition of transference of identity.

Objection.—This supposition would be somewhat probable, were there proof of difference.

Answer.—But difference is proved by means of such predication as “Colour of sandal-wood,” “Smell of sandal-wood,” etc. If the cloth were identical with colour, then, like the cloth, colour also would be perceived by the sense-organ of the skin, and being asked to bring the colour, one would bring some substance whatever.

Objection.—Let, then, there be identity in difference, seeing that in the case of absolute difference as well as of absolute identity, co-existence in the same substratum would not be possible.

Answer.—This cannot be, for it is impossible for identity and difference, which are contradictory to each other, to appear together in the same place, without the difference of their situation.

Objection.—But the characteristic of mutual non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite of identity, *e. g.*, a waterpot is not a cloth) appears in that which appears in what is not pervaded or included, since it is the characteristic of being the property of that which appears in eternal non-existence, like the characteristic of absolute non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite of connection with the past, the present, and the future, *e. g.*, there is no waterpot inside the earth).

Answer.—This is not the case. For, in virtue of the intuition of conjunction and its absolute non-existence, the characteristic of appearing in that which is not pervaded, is observed of absolute non-existence, but, in the case of mutual non-existence, such intuition does not exist.

Now, this colour is of various kinds in Earth; in Water and Fire, it is only white. Sometimes there is one more colour, *i. e.*, variegated or compound colour, also in a cloth, etc.; for, otherwise, they would not be objects of visual perception, since only substances possessing colour can be objects of perception by the eye.

Objection.—But there can be no origination of colour by heterogeneous colours.

Answer.—This is not the case ; for, homogeneity, only as constituted by the characteristic of being colour, is required in the origination of blue, yellow, etc., since otherwise, as has been already stated, they would not be objects of visual perception.

Objection.—But the apprehension of the colour of a whole made up of parts is possible by means of the apprehension of the colours of those parts.

Answer.—It is not, as it would entail that the parts also, possessing variegated or compound colour, are themselves void of colour. Moreover, wherever, in consequence of the action of heat, variegated colour appears in ultimate atoms, there also variegated colour is produced in the cloth, etc., originated by them successively.

Objection.—In the yellow myrobalan, then, taste also is variegated.

Answer.—No, for no harm would be done, even if the yellow myrobalan were void of taste. The tradition of six tastes, however, is due to the causality which produces the effects or properties of those tastes.

Similarly, smell also is not variegated, since a fragrant and a non-fragrant part are not its originators.

Objection.—In the parts of a *karkaṭṭi* or cucumber, there is sometimes bitterness, and sometimes sweetness. Which taste, then, exists in *karkaṭṭi* ?

Answer.—Only sweetness..

Objection.—There existing a conflict of attributes, how can it be so ?

Answer.—On account of the non-existence of bitterness in the parts thereof.

Objection.—How, then, does such sensation (of bitterness) arise ?

Answer.—It arises from the bitter taste of the bilious substance existing at the tip of the tongue irritated by the eating of the *karkaṭṭi*. It is from this cause that sometimes the mouth also becomes bitter.

Objection.—But how does not this explanation apply in the case of the yellow myrobalan also ?

Answer.—Because, in the parts of the yellow myrobalan, various tastes are felt, e. g., sour, sweet, salt, etc. There is no need of further argumentation or elaboration.

And this colour is an auxiliary to the eye.

Objection.—Such being the case, how do the non-existence of Colour in air, and darkness become objects of ocular perception ?

Answer.—The question does not arise, since colour is an auxiliary to the eye in the apprehension only of existences or objective realities.

The colours of all the three, viz., the object, the light, and the eye, are exciting causes of ocular perception.

Taste, again, is that which possesses the *jāti* or 'class,' taste-ness. Taste-ness is the *jāti* or 'class' which is the object of immediate cognition producible by the sense taste alone. And the possession of such a *jāti* or 'class' is taste-ness. It is this, the source of vitality, growth, strength, and health, that is an auxiliary to the tongue. Thus, taste-ness being possession of the *jāti* or 'class' pervaded by attribute-ness capable of being apprehended by the organ of the tongue, there is no non-pervasion, i. e., exclusion, of super-sensuous taste.

Attribute, apprehensible by the nose alone, is Smell. Smell-ness is the possession of the *jāti* or 'class' pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the nose only. It is two-fold, being fragrant and non-fragrant. Or Smell-ness denotes the possession of the *jāti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attribute-ness appearing only in that which is present in Earth.

In like manner, Touch also is the attribute possessing the *jāti* or 'class,' touch-ness. Touch-ness denotes the possession of the *jāti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the organ of the skin only. Inhering in the quartet of substances, (namely, Earth, Water, Fire, Air), it is, again, three-fold, according to the differences of neither hot nor cold, cold, and hot.

Now, in passing, the process due to the action of heat, is considered. Here, according to those who hold the theory of the burning of an earthenpot (as a whole), the whole of the effect and the cause is burnt. Those who hold the theory of the burning of the ultimate atoms (constituting the whole), maintain that it is the ultimate atoms which are separately burnt, that it is in them that there take place destruction of the previous colour and production of the succeeding colour, etc., and that, following the course of the attribute of the cause, colour, etc., are produced in the burnt (wholes made up again) of (burnt) parts. Here the sense is as follows: From the impulse or the impact, given by fire, to a raw substance, e. g., a water-pot, etc., thrown in a kiln, disjunction, which is the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of a compound substance, appears among the ultimate atoms originative of that raw substance, and on the destruction of originative conjunction by the disjunction, destruction of the substance must take place. For, it is seen that of rice, etc., placed in a pan, destruction takes place at once from frying, only by the application of heat from below, and that, (under similar conditions) intense ebullition takes place in milk, water, and the like. Therefore, it is hoping too much that substances, smitten with flames of fire on all sides, in a kiln, will endure. Moreover, if there be no destruction of substances, then burning at their centre will not be possible. For, there is no possibility of conjunction of fire at the centre which is enclosed with harder other constituent parts. So that there will be this great incongruity that the parts are dark but the whole made up of those parts is red.

Objection.—Substances which are wholes made up of parts, are certainly porous. How, otherwise, can oil, clarified butter, etc., poured

into a jar, etc., ooze out, and how also can these be boiled? Hence, at the centre also, there can be conjunction of fire.

Answer.—This cannot be, inasmuch as, on account of exclusion of ponderable or corporal or dense substances in virtue of the property of impenetrability, conjunction of fire is impossible at the centre which is already conjoined with other (constituent) parts.

Objection.—If there is destruction of the substance, how, then, can there be the recognition, "This is that very water-pot?" How, again, in all changes of conditions, in the kiln, etc., are the water-pot, etc., observed in one and the same form? How is it that a pan, a plate, etc., placed on the burning water-pot, etc., are observed in the same position? For they should fall down on the dissolution of the water-pot, etc. How, again, are exactly the same number of wholes as are placed in the furnace, afterwards obtained from it? For, during the process of burning, the origination is possible, of more or less substances, by the (dissolved) ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic aggregates. How, again, are water-pot, etc., of exactly the same dimensions, observed to come out from the furnace? How, again, will not the marks of lines and prints be obliterated? Burning, therefore, takes place only in the wholes.

Answer.—Such is not the case. For disjunction of three or four tertiary atomic aggregates being effected from a water-pot, etc., with the point of a needle, there being destruction of substance as a whole in consequence of the destruction of conjunction originative of substance, all such contradictions appear in, or are explained on, both the theories. For, even they who hold the theory of the burning of the water-pot as a whole, cannot venture to say that substance as a whole is not destroyed in the case of the above instance.

Even in that case the water-pot, etc., are not destroyed, since it is possible for an effect to continue to exist by inhering in the remaining constituent parts even when there has been destruction of some constituent parts. Were it not so, recognition, etc., would be really impossible. This is the view of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. But they should be asked; how the water-pot, etc., bearing relation to the situation or arrangement of all the constituent parts, can appear in a smaller number of constituent parts. If it be their reply that it is possible in the same way as is possible contraction of measure or extension or quantit in a cloth which is not yet destroyed; we reply that there can be no such analogy, for there is no observation of contraction and expansion in the case of wood, stone, pillar, earthen jar, etc., made up of harder constituent parts. It cannot be rejoined by them that what is said to destroy the water-pot, etc., destroys only its measure or extension; for, measure or extension can be destroyed only by the destruction of its substratum. Moreover, like the recognition of the water-pot, etc., measure or extension also is recognised in the case of the needle-scratch, whereas in their view its destruction also is impossible. This is the point.

On the theory of those who hold that disjunction which is the counteropposite of conjunction originative of substance as well as disjunction which is not its counter-opposite, are produced by one and

the same action in the constituent part, there is production of red colour, etc., at the ninth moment counting from the destruction of the binary atomic aggregate, in another binary atomic aggregate, since action is conceived to exist in the very same ultimate atom. Thus, there is first action in the ultimate atom originative of the binary atomic aggregate, from the impulse given by fire; then, disjunction; then destruction of conjunction originative of substance; then, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate; then, in consequence of conjunction of fire, disappearance of dark colour, etc., from the pure or singly existing ultimate atom, after the destruction of the binary atomic aggregate; after destruction of dark colour, etc., production of red colour, etc., from another conjunction of fire; after production of red colour, etc., cessation of action in the ultimate atom; following it, action in the ultimate atom, from conjunction of soul possessing *adristam* or destiny; then, disjunction; then, cessation of previous conjunction, originative of substance, with another ultimate atom; then, production of the binary atomic aggregate; after the production of the binary atomic aggregate, production of red colour, etc., in the progressive order of the attribute of the cause. These are the nine moments, if a different action is produced just at the moment of the cessation of the previous action. If, on the other hand, a different action is produced not at the moment of the cessation of the previous action, then there are ten moments. Even if disjunction, etc., produced by disjunction, be admitted, still there are ten moments, if disjunction produced by disjunction has reference to the time in which destruction of conjunction originative of substance takes place. If, on the other hand disjunction produces another disjunction with reference to the time in which destruction of substance takes place, then there are eleven moments in the process. Thus, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate and disjunction produced by disjunction, at one moment; then, destruction of previous conjunction, and cessation of dark colour, etc.; subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc.; cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action, by means of subsequent conjunction; then, action in the ultimate atom, favourable to origination of substance, disjunction from action; cessation of previous conjunction from disjunction; thence, conjunction originative of substance; thence production of substance; production of red colour, etc., in the produced substance. These are the ten moments. Where however, production of disjunction by disjunction depends upon the passing of the time containing the destruction of substance, there are, by the increase of one moment, eleven moments. Thus, destruction of substances; then disjunction produced by disjunction and cessation of dark colour, etc.; then subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc.; then cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action; then action in the ultimate atom, favourable to the origination of substance; then disjunction; cessation of previous conjunction; production of conjunction originative of substance; production of the binary atomic aggregate; production of red colour, etc. These are the eleven moments. Such is the process on the conception of action and cessation of action in one and the same ultimate atom. If action favourable to the origination of substance is conceived to take place in a different ultimate atom, then the production of red colour, etc., should be understood to

appear at the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth moment commencing from destruction of the binary atomic aggregate. The same has been explained in *Kaṇḍa-Rahasyam*.—6.

Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning, continued.

Upaskāra.—In order to establish that the Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms have conjunction of fire as their non-combinative cause, he says :

एकद्रव्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ७ ॥

एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravya-tvāt, Because of the characteristic of inhering in one substance.

7. Because their substratum is the same.—263.

The expression, "of (attributes) produced from burning," is the complement of the aphorism. "Being attributes," and "being effects," are also intended here. The whole sentence, therefore, means : Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms, have conjunction for their non-combinative cause, inasmuch as these, being product-attributes, are at the same time non-abhorrent or incongruent attributes inhering in eternal, like Sound, and like Understanding, etc. Or the *sādhyā*, or what has to be proved, is merely the characteristic of being produced from conjunction. Hence there is no undue extension to, or inclusion of, Sound produced from disjunction, since conjunction of Air is the efficient cause of all Sounds whatever. And from the observation of the presence and absence of fire in relation to them, the non-combinative causality of conjunction of fire, towards terrene colour, etc., is proved by the force of *pakṣa-dharmatā* i. e., the characteristic of the *vyāpya* or the middle term, the mark of inference, existing in the *pakṣa* or the subject of the conclusion.—7.

Vivṛiti.—The question may arise, how the attributes of the cause, as they do not exist in the effect, can be productive of the attributes of the effect, when there is thus a difference of substrata. Apprehending this, he says :

Because they have one substance as their substratum, that is to say, because there is co-existence in the same substratum. Thus, even though the attributes of the cause do not exist in the effect by the relation of immediate combination, yet, inasmuch as they exist in the effect by the relation of co-existence in the same substratum in the form of combination with that which is in combination with them, their productiveness of the attributes of the effect is not unproved. This is the import.

Non-cognition of Minuteness and cognition of Magnitude, explained before.

Upaskāra.—Having elucidated Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, by long discourses, and going to begin first the examination of Measure of Extension, in violation of the order of enumeration (of the Attributes), following the maxim* of the needle and the kettle, inasmuch as Measure of Extension is proved by common consent, whereas there is a wide range of divergent views on the question of Number,—he says :

* The maxim of the needle and the kettle is that when a man has got to turn out a needle and a kettle, he first makes the needle, the smaller and easier piece of work, and then devotes his whole attention, energy, and time to the manufacture of the kettle, the large and more difficult piece of work.

अणोर्मत्तरचोपलब्ध्यनपलब्धी नित्ये व्याख्यात ॥ ७ । १ । ८ ॥

अणोः Anoh, of the atom or atomic. महत् : Mahataḥ, of the molecular or the dense or the extended. च Cha, and. उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी Upalabdhi-anupalabdhi, cognition and non-cognition. नित्ये Nitye, in (the book treating of) the eternal. व्याख्याते Vyākhyāte, explained.

8. Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and the extended or massive, respectively, have been explained in (the fourth book treating of) the eternal.—264.

The term, 'in the eternal,' signifies the fourth book, demonstrative of the eternal, i. e., the container, by the contained. 'Cognition and non-cognition': The application (of these words) will be according to relevancy, or the maxim, "When one thing is relevant to another, it belongs to that other, even though lying at a distance." So that the proposition, "Non-cognition of the atomic" is obtained. In like manner, in the perceptual cognition, therefore, namely, "large, blue jug," Measure or Extension also is as much an object (of perception) as blue colour. And by means of this Measure or Extension, Measure or Extension terminating in the ultimate atom, is inferred, as also from Substance-ness. Moreover, in the perceptibility of Substance, Measure or Extension also is a cause, like colour; for, without magnitude, substance cannot be perceptible. It is, therefore, ascertained that, as being a cause of the perceptibility of Substance, and being itself perceptible, an attribute, called Measure or Extension, exists. For, were the distinctive form of a water-pot, etc., its Measure or Extension, a man would bring any water-pot, when he was told to bring महत्, the massive or the extended, and thus there would be a contradiction between the order of the master and the apprehension of it by the servant. Likewise from the term water-pot, Measure or Extension would be understood, or from the term, Measure or Extension, a water-pot.

Measure or Extension is the non-common or specific cause of the usage or application of measures, or a universal attribute inhering in the object which is the cause of the perceptual cognition of Substance. Application of measures is the application of cubits, etc., but not the application of weights, numbers, etc., This Measure or Extension is of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness. Of these, extreme largeness and extreme length exist in the four 'universals' (i. e., Space, Time, Ether, and Soul); extreme smallness and extreme shortness exist in the ultimate atoms; the next (higher) degree of smallness and shortness exists in binary atomic aggregates; largeness and length exist in substances from tertiary atomic aggregates upwards to composite wholes (or compound bodies as they exist in nature). In this manner, all substances whatever possess two Measures or Extensions. The attribution of smallness to a *vilva* or a *bael* fruit, *amalaka* (*phylanthus emblica*), etc., and of shortness to fuel-sticks, etc., is relative. And relativity here denotes non-existence of bulkiness. The bulkiness that exists in the *amalaka* (emblic myrobalan), does not exist in the jujube; the bulkiness that exists in the *vilva*, does not exist in the *amalaka*. It is this bulkiness, which is the denotation of the

term, relativity, inasmuch as it partakes of both the primary and secondary uses.

Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the eternal substances. Others hold that these are not even modes of Measure or Extension ; for, what they mean is this : As in the command, " Bring the longer ones from amongst these bodies," so also in the command, " Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from amongst these bodies," discrimination being equally possible, sphericity or roundness, etc., also could then have to be admitted as modes of Measure or Extension.—3.

Largeness or magnitude how produced.

Upaskāra.—He now enumerates the causes of measure or extension.

कारणबहुत्वाच्च ॥ ७ । १ । ६ ॥

कारणबहुत्वात्. Kāraṇa-vahutvât, from a multiplicity of causes. च Cha, also.

9. Largeness or Magnitude is produced, from a multiplicity of causes also.—265.

The word ' cha ' implies the addition of magnitude and *prachaya* i. e., loose conjunction among parts. " Measure or extension is produced "—this is the complement of the aphorism. Among these, multiplicity of causes alone produces largeness or magnitude and length in tertiary atomic aggregates, since magnitude and accretion do not exist in their causes. That multiplicity is produced by the relative understanding of God, and the apprehension of particular *adriṣṭam* or destinies, determines this plurality of objects in such relative understanding. Likewise, it will be stated hereafter, duality existing in two atoms is productive of measure or extension in a binary atomic aggregate. In a piece of cloth, originated by two non-coalescent threads, it is magnitude alone which is the non-combinative cause, since multiplicity and coalescence do not exist there. Where again, a ball of cotton, in this case, inasmuch as an increase of measure or extension is observed, therefore accretion is the cause, since multiplicity does not exist, and since magnitude though existing, is not a condition or occasion for increase of measure or extension. Such being the case, were magnitude cause here, there would be no defect in the argument, for it has been said, " By two, by one, or by all."

Prachaya, coalescence or accretion, is originative conjunction, and is defined as conjunction in an object of some of its constituent parts towards itself, in which object some of the constituent parts were not in conjunction towards itself. And this conjunction of constituent parts, it has been observed, is dependent upon a loose conjunction among their own constituent parts, is productive of measure or extension, and is involved in the origination of Attributes and Actions.—9.

The atomic is the opposite of the large or massive ; the short, of the long.

Upaskāra.—Having demonstrated magnitude and length, he now demonstrates atomic-ness or minuteness.

अताविपरीतम् ॥ ७ । १ । १० ॥

अतः Atah, of this. विपरीत Viparitam, the contrary. अणु Anu, the atomic, small, or minute.

10. The contrary of this is the atomic.—266.

'Atah,' i. e., from large or massive measure or extension established by perception ; 'viparitam,' (i. e., divergent). The meaning is that that is atomic measure or extension. The contrariety arises from imperceptibility, and from contrariety of causes also. For in the case of magnitude or massiveness, magnitude, multiplicity, and accretion are the causes, while in the case of atomic-ness or minuteness, duality inhering in the cause and produced by the relative understanding of God, is the cause. By this is also to be understood that the contrary of length is shortness, and here too the contrariety is as afore-said.—10.

In what sense the same thing appears both small and large.

Upaskāra.—He now shows that in the case of a jujube, an amalaka, etc., the attribution of smallness is secondary or relative.

अणु म. दिति तास्मिन् विशेषभावात् विशेषभावाच्च ॥ ७ । १ । ११ ॥

अणु Anu, atomic, small, minute. महत् Mahat, large, massive. इति Iti, such. तस्मिन् Tasmin, in that, i. e., in respect of one and the same object. विशेषभावात् Viśeṣa-bhāvât, from the existence of the species, or of the peculiarity. विशेषभावात् Viśeṣa-abhāvât, from the non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity.

11. ' (It is) smaller,' ' (It is) larger,'—such affirmations, in respect of one and the same object, arise from the existence of the species, or of the peculiarity, and from the non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity.—267.

The word, 'iti,' indicates the sense of attribution or usage. There is, then, all this usage that a jujube, is small in relation to a bael-fruit, that an emblic myrobalan is large in relation to a jujube, that a bael-fruit is large in relation to an emblic myrobalan. Amongst these, '(It is) large'—such usage with regard to them is primary. If it be asked how it is so, says, 'viśeṣa-bhāvât,' i. e., because of 'bhāva, i. e., existence of 'viśeṣa,' i. e. the very species, magnitude, by 'bhāva,' i. e. the relation of more, etc. On the other hand, the trantment of them as small, is secondary or relative. If it be asked how this is so, he says, 'viśeṣa-abhāvât,' i. e., because of the non-existence in them of the species, smallness. For, smallness, as an effect, resides only in binary atomic aggregates, and, as eternal, resides in the ultimate atoms, and consequently it does not exist in a jujube, etc.

Or, the meaning may be, that the treatment of a jujube, etc., as small is secondary, because of the 'bhāva,' i. e., the existence in the constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the 'viśeṣa,' i. e., the cause of magnitude, namely, multiplicity of constituent parts, magnitude, and accretion, and because of the 'abhāva,' i. e., the non-existence, in the constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the 'viśeṣa,' i. e., the cause of smallness, namely, duality which does not co-exist in the same substratum with magnitude.—11.

In what sense the same thing appears both small and large, continued.

Upaskāra.—He gives the reason why the attribution of smallness is secondary :

एककालत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । १२ ॥

एककालत्वात् Eka-kāla-tvāt, from simultaneity (of the cognitions of largeness and smallness).

12, (The attribution of smallness is secondary), because of the simultaneity (of the cognition of largeness and smallness in respect of the same object.)—268.

Magnitude and minuteness are perceived at one and the same time. And these, magnitude and minuteness, being mutually contradictory, cannot appear together in one and the same substratum. The intuition of magnitude, therefore, is there primary inasmuch as the cause of magnitude exists there, and the intuition and application of minuteness are secondary. This is the meaning.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He states the reason for the primariness of the intuition of magnitude :

दृष्टान्ताच्च ॥ ७ । १ । १३ ॥

दृष्टान्तात् . Dṛṣṭāntāt, from example, or analogue. **च** Cha, And.

13. Also because there is the analogue.—269.

The meaning is that it is seen likewise that in the natural order of things the practical recognition, i. e., the application, of large, larger, and largest, must be with regard only to things possessing magnitude, namely, the jujube, the emblic myrobalan, and the bael fruit, just as the application of white, whiter, and whitest, is, according to the nature of things, with regard only to white objects, namely, a piece of cloth, a conch-shell, a crystal, etc.—13.

Minuteness and magnitude do not exist in minuteness and magnitude.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected : In virtue of the usage, " Small Measure or Extension," " Large Measure or Extension," it is known that there is magnitude also in magnitude as a measure or extension, and that there is smallness in smallness also. How, then, can those be said to exist in Substance alone ? How, again, does not the contradiction result, in Attribute, of being existent in Attribute ?

अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोरणुत्वमहत्त्वाभावः कर्मगुणैर्व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । १ । १४ ॥

अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोः Anutva-mahattvayoh, in minuteness and magnitude.
अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभावः Anutva-mahattva-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of minuteness and of magnitude. **कर्मगुणैः** Karma-guṇaiḥ, by Actions and Attributes. **व्याख्यातः** Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

14. The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude, in minuteness and magnitude, is explained by (the explanation, already given, of the non-existence of Actions and Attributes, in) Actions and Attributes.—270.

To this he replies :

The meaning is that as Attribute and Actions do not possess minuteness and magnitude, so also do not minuteness and magnitude possess minuteness and magnitude. The usage should be regarded as derivative.—14.

Above continued.

It may be urged that as Attributes are possessed of Attributes,—and how else could there be such uses as “Large (i. e., extensive) Sound,” “Two Sounds,” “One Sound,” “Twenty-four Attributes,” etc.?—and as Actions appear to be possessed of Actions,—and how else could there be such uses as “It goes quickly,” “It goes swiftly”? so minuteness and magnitude must also be possessed of minuteness and magnitude.

कर्मभिः कर्माणि गुणैश्च गुणा व्याख्याताः ॥ ७ । १ । १५ ॥

कर्मभिः Karmabhiḥ, by actions. **कर्माणि** Karmāṇi, actions. **गुणैः** Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. **च** Cha, and. **गुणाः** Guṇāḥ, attributes **व्याख्याताः** Vyākhyātāḥ, explained.

15. Actions have been explained (to be void) of Actions, and Attributes, of Attributes.—271.

With this in view, he says :

By Actions, Actions are not possessed of Actions. By Attributes, Attributes are also not possessed of Attributes. In like manner, minuteness and magnitude are also not possessed of minuteness and magnitude. The usage, however, is, in all these cases, derivative. This is the meaning.—15.

Minuteness and Magnitude do not exist in Attribute or in Action.

Upakāra—It may be urged that usage such as “Large Actions,” “Minute Actions,” “Large Attributes,” “Minute Attributes,” etc., entails that Actions possess minuteness and magnitude, and also Attributes possess both of them. In anticipation of this, he says :

अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां कर्मगुणाश्च व्याख्य त ॥ ७ । १ । १६ ॥

अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां, Anutva-mahattvābhyāṁ, by minuteness and magnitude. **कर्मगुणा** Karma-guṇāḥ, actions and attributes. **च** Cha, and. **व्याख्याताः** vyākhyātāḥ, explained.

16. By minuteness and magnitude, Actions and Attributes also are explained (to be void of minuteness and magnitude).—272.

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude are not possessed of minuteness and magnitude, so Actions are not possessed of either of them, nor are Attributes possessed of either of them. This treatment as such however, is derivative as aforesaid. This is the import.—16.

Bhāṣya.—Minuteness and magnitude may be predicated of action and attribute.

Length and shortness do not exist in length and shortness.

Upaśāstra.—He extends the process of minuteness and magnitude to length and shortness.

एतेन दीर्घत्वस्वत्वे व्याख्याते ॥ ७ । १ । १७ ॥

एतेन Etena, hereby. *दीर्घत्वस्वत्वे* Dirghatva-hrasvatve, length and shortness. *व्याख्याते* Vyākhyāte, explained.

17. Hereby are explained Length and Shortness.—273.

Length, and shortness also are not possessed of length and shortness, Whatever is productive of magnitude, the same is productive of length; whatever is productive of minuteness, the same is productive of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explained, like attributes produced by burning, by the difference of antecedent non-existence. Wherever there is minuteness, there is shortness; where there is eternal minuteness, there is eternal shortness, etc. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy.—17

How Measure or Extension is destroyed.

Upaśāstra.—He now points out that which destroys (Measure or Extension):—

अनित्येऽनित्यम् ॥ ७ । १ । १८ ॥

अनित्ये Anitye, in the non-eternal. *अनित्यम्* Anityam, non-eternal, perishable.

18. In the non-eternal, (Measure or Extension also is) non-eternal.—274.

All this four-fold Measure or Extension, being present in perishable substance, disappears only on the destruction of the substratum, and not on account of contradictory, other attributes.

Objection.—But the Measure or Extension of a water-pot is destroyed, although the water-pot still exists; how else, even after the breaking of the neck of the water-pot, can there be the recognition, "This is that very water-pot"?

Answer.—This is not the case, in as much as the destruction of the water-pot is necessary or inevitable, by the destruction of the substratum. For, it stands neither to reason nor to experience that, the binary atomic aggregates being destroyed on the destruction of the conjunction of two ultimate atoms, there is non-destruction of the tertiary atomic aggregates constituted by the binary ones, and of limestone, etc., constituted by the tertiary atomic aggregates.

Objection.—How then does the recognition arise?

Answer.—It is an error, like the recognition, "This is that very flame of the lamp."

Objection.—But the recognition of the the lamp is certainly correct knowledge; whereas minuteness and magnitude undergo production and destruction.

Answer.—This cannot be maintained, because it has been already mentioned that their destruction is not possible without the destruction of their substratum.—18.

What Measure or Extension is eternal.

Upaskāra.—Is then minuteness, inhering in ultimate atoms, destroyed, as are Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms? Is magnitude also, inhering in ether, etc., destroyed, as are Sound, Understanding, etc.? In anticipation of these objections, he says:

नित्ये नित्यम् ॥ ७ । १ । १६ ॥

नित्ये Nitye, in the eternal. नित्यम् Nityam, eternal.

19. In the eternal, (Measure or Extension also is eternal. —275.

Measure or Extension which exists in eternal substances, e. g., ether. etc., and also in the ultimate atoms, is eternal since there is nothing to destroy it.—19.

Eternal Measure or Extension is called Parimandalam.

Upaskāra.—He states the name by which the Measure or Extension of the ultimate atom is denoted in the *Vaisesika* system:—

नित्यं परिमण्डलः ॥ ७ । १ । २० ॥

नित्यं Nityam, eternal. परिमण्डलम् Parimandalam, *Parimandala*, the allround, or the spherical. Measure or Extension of the ultimate atom.

20. *Parimandala* is eternal.—276.

Parimandalyam has the same denotation as 'Parimandalam.' So it has been said, "Elsewhere than in *Parimandalya*, etc."—20.

Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked: If minuteness, or shortness as applied respectively to a jnube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcendental or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental?

Accordingly he says:

अविद्या च विद्यालिङ्गम् ॥ ७ । १ । २१ ॥

अविद्या Avidyā, false knowledge. Nescience. च Cha, moreover, and. विद्यालिङ्गम् Vidyā-liṅgam, mark or indication of knowledge.

21. False knowledge is, moreover, the (inferential) mark of (true) knowledge.—277,

'The mark of knowledge' is 'false knowledge.' The meaning therefore, is this: The cognition or consciousness of minuteness in respect of a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousness of shortness in respect of sticks for fuel, sugar-canes, etc., are all *avidyā* or false knowledge, inasmuch as real or transcendental minuteness and shortness do not exist there. Moreover, it is admitted by those who hold the doctrine of *anyatha-khyati*, illusion of the senses, that every where unscientific knowledge is just preceded i. e., pre-supposed, by scientific knowledge. So that true consciousness of minuteness, as well as true consciousness of shortness, should be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of words being impossible without the primary use, minuteness and shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be present somewhere.—21.

Vivṛiti.—But why should substance, in the form of the ultimate atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible to the senses? On the other hand, substance which is perceptible to the senses, such as a tertiary atomic aggregate, etc., should be recognised.

To meet this objection he says :

'*Avidyā*,' i. e., unscientific knowledge, in other words, cognitions, such as "Earth is eternal," "Water is eternal," etc., of which the objects are wholes made up of parts, is the inferential 'mark,' of '*Vidyā*,' i. e., scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of which the object is (i. e., in respect of), the ultimate atom ; because everywhere scientific knowledge, is preceded by unscientific knowledge, for nowhere it is possible for a man to have the erroneous idea that Earth is eternal, if he does not know what eternality is. This is an indirect proof. The method of proof of ultimate atoms as realities, which has been pointed out before, should be preferred.

Ether and Soul possess infinite Measure or Extension.

Upakāra.—He describes the nature or proper form of the Measure or Extension of Ether, etc., which has been already inferred by the mark of their substance-ness.

विभवान्महानाकाशस्तथा चात्मा ॥ ७ । १ । २२ ॥

विभवान् Vibhavāt, in consequence of omnipresence, infinite expansion, or universality. महान् Mahān, vast. Immense. Infinitely large. अकाशः Ākāśaḥ, Ether. तथा Tathā, so. The same. च Cha, and. Also. आत्मा Ātmā, Soul.

22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is infinitely large. So also is the Soul.—278.

'Vibhavah' denotes capacity for conjunction, or the characteristic of being in conjunction, with all dense bodies ; and this, being impossible, or incapable of proof, without vast magnitude, leads to the inference of vast magnitude. It is also observed by us that Sounds

are produced, just at one and the same time, both at *Bārānast* (Benares) and at *Pataliputra* (Patna); It is one and the same Ether that is here the combinative cause. Consequently the pervasion of Ether is proved. Pervasion, again, consists only in connection with infinitely vast Measure or Extension. To suppose a diversity of Ether would be superfluous; hence only one Ether should be recognised. Such reference as "A portion or division of Ether," is, however, relative, being due to conjunction with the water-pot, etc. (occupying a limited space, or) possessing limits. And the relativity consists in the characteristic of being in conjunction with substances possessing limits.

'Tathā ātmā': As Ether is immensely vast, since it possesses universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies, so is also the Soul immensely vast. Did not the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies belong to Soul, then action would not be produced in the respective dense bodies, as a result of conjunction of the Soul carrying its *adriṣṭam* or destiny, inasmuch as *adriṣṭam*, being present in a different substratum, is dependent upon or stands in need of, 'proximity,' (or a common platform), in order that it may be productive of action; and that 'proximity' is nothing but conjunction of the Soul carrying its *adriṣṭam*. Likewise, as the body moves on, the production of knowledge, pleasure, etc., in particular situations, is impossible or incapable of proof except on the theory of the universal pervasion of the Soul. Consequently, the Soul also is pervasive. The Soul, however, is not only one, like Ether, since, as has been already pointed out, difference of status or condition is observed. This is the import.

In these cases, the magnitude is infinite, and is also eternal, like the minuteness of the ultimate atom.

In like manner, should be inferred infinite length in the case of Ether, etc., and infinite shortness in the case of the ultimate atom.—22.

Mind is infinitely small.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked that Mind being all-pervading, inasmuch as it is always a touchless substance, like Ether, and inasmuch as it is, like the soul, the field wherein takes place the conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge, etc., why has it not been mentioned along with Ether and the Soul? Hence he says:

तदभावाद् अणु मनः ॥ ७ । १ । २३ ॥

तदभावाद् Tat-abhāvāt, in consequence of the non-existence of that, i. e., universal expansion. अणु, Anu, atomic. Minute. Small. मनः Manah, mind. The internal organ.

23. In consequence of non-existence of universal expansion, Mind is atomic or infinitely small.—279.

'Manah' is anu, in consequence of the non-existence of 'that,' i. e., universal expansion or the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies. Did the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies exist (in it), then, there being simultaneous conjunction with more than one sense, simultaneity of cognitions would

follow, with the result that there would be no particular attachment or act of attention. The two inferences, (namely, that Mind is all-pervading, because it is a touchless substance, and that mind is all-pervading, because it is the seat of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of cognition, etc.) are, however, unproved in point of their subject matter, so long as Mind is not proved (to exist), while in the state of Mind being proved (to exist), they are counter-opposed by proof which leads to the cognizance of the object i. e., Mind as an atom.)

Objection.—Minuteness cannot be thus proved from non-existence of universal expansion, since the inference would be unduly applicable to the water-pot, etc.

Answer.—It would not, inasmuch as (only) non-pervasion (and not atomic-ness) is proved by non-existence of universal pervasion.

In one body, therefore, there is just one mind, since the supposition of plurality would entail redundancy. To imagine parts even of a single mind would be showing exuberance of imagination. Moreover, being touchless, they cannot originate. By such arguments, (infinite) minuteness is proved. This is the import.—23

Space is all-pervading.

Upaskāra.—He states the argument for the infinite magnitude of space :—

गुणैर्दिग्व्याख्याता ॥ ७ । १ । २४ ॥

गुणः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. दिक् Dik, space. व्याख्याता Vyākhyātā, explained.

24. By attributes, Space is explained (to be all-pervading). —280.

The meaning is that, 'guṇaiḥ,' i. e., by attributes characterised as priority and posteriority inherent in all dense bodies, and appearing in the forms of the intuitions of the East, the West, etc., common to all persons inhabiting all the island or divisions of the globe, space also is explained under the aspect of pervasion. For, it will be mentioned later on that in the production of (the notions of) priority and posteriority, the cause is relative understanding having for its subject-matter larger and smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct. Moreover, the supposition of a plurality of space is contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition.

Objection.—How, then, can there be the intuition and the expression or reference, namely, "Ten spaces (i. e., quarters)"?

Answer.—The objection does not arise, since it has been already stated that they are due to particular *upādhi* or external conditions.—24.

Time is all-pervading.

Upaskāra.—He explains the universal expansion of Time :

कारये कावः ॥ ७ । १ । २५ ॥

कारणे Kāraṇe, in cause. To a specific cause, or to a universal cause.
कालः Kālah, time.

25. Time (is the name given) to (a specific, or a universal) cause. (Hence, in either case' it is all-pervading).281

Time is the name which fully designates the substance which is the cause of the intuitions of reciprocal prior and posterier, simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slow, and fast. Such an intuition, common to all persons in all countries, would be impossible without the universal pervasion of time. Universal pervasion, that is to say, connection with infinite magnitude, therefore, belongs to it.

Or, in virtue of such intuitions as "born now," Time is known to be the efficient or occasional cause of all that is produced; and this is dependent upon universal pervasion, for an occasional cause must be, as a rule, in proximity with the combinative and non-combinative causes.

Or, the use or application of past, future, and present is universal: consequently time is all-prevading.

Or, time is the name of the substance which is the cause of the application or use of moments, *lavas* (thirty-six winks), hours, watches, days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. Consequently, such use or application being universal, time is universal, and therefore, infinitely large.

The supposition of its manifoldness is, as has been already stated, contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition.—25.

Here ends the first chapter of the seventh book in the Commentary of Sāṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK SEVENTH—CHAPTER SECOND.

Number : Proof of Unity.

Upaskāra.—In the second chapter there are five sections : (a) the section on the examination of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object ; (b) the section on the examination of attributes existing only in more than one object ; (c) the section, in passing, on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (i. e., of words and their meaning) ; (d) the section of the examination of attributes existing in one object and having for their non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of particular or distinguishing attributes ; and, (e) the section on the examination of combination. Now, the perceptibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the same object with magnitude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also separateness, immediately after the determination of measure of extension, in violation of the order of enumeration, the author says :

रूप सगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकादर्थान्तरमेकत्वः ॥ ७ । २ । १ ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकात्. Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vyatiṛekāt, because of difference from Colour .Taste, Smell, and Touch. **अर्थान्तरम्** Arthāntaram, a different object. **एकत्वम्** Ekadvam, unity.

1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Unity is a different object.—282.

‘Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa’ is indicative of all attributes other than the pentad beginning with number, (i. e., number, measure or extension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). ‘Vyatiṛekāt’ =because of difference or divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this : “ One water-pot ”—Such particular intuition can be produced by some particularity. And that particularity is not colour, etc., for the intuition is produced by difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the being a water-pot, etc., that is the condition or occasion (of the intuition), for such intuition is produced in respect of a piece of cloth also. Nor is unity a Genus, like Existence, for its denotation is neither less nor more than that of Existence. Nor, again, is it a Genus confined to substance only, for it is neither less nor more extensive than Substance-ness. Nor does the difference or mutual distinction (of Unity and Substance-ness) arise from difference of intuition, even though they are neither less nor more extensive than each other ; for if difference of intuition were caused by itself, existence also would be differentiated ; if, on the other hand, it were to be caused by difference of subject-matter, then, difference of subject-matter, as has been stated, is not possible, since, otherwise, there would be difference of the characteristic of being a small water-pot and of being a large water-pot. Nor is the view, held by *Bhāṣaṇa*, that unity is non-difference from (or identity with) itself, a reasonable one. Were self-identity of the water-pot its Unity, then there would be no intuition of Unity in the case of a cloth, etc., *Bhāṣaṇa*’s other view, namely, that difference from itself constitutes Duality, etc., is also not valid ; for variety of uses of difference from itself or self-distinction, as being common to three, four, and so on, is not possible or capable of proof. This is the import.—1.

Proof of Separateness.

Upaskāra.—With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to Unity, he says :

तथा पृथक्त्वम् ॥ ७ । २ । २ ॥

तथा Tathā, similarly. पृथक्त्वम् Prithakatvam, separateness. Individuality.

2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different object).—283.

The practice of discrimination or separation verily exists, in the form, namely "This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this." For, separation means definite apprehension or grasp, having regard to certain limits. Here, again, Colour, etc., are not the cause, since they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because the limits (of them) are undefinable.

Objection.—Separateness is nothing but *anyonya-abhāva*, mutual non-existence, non-existence which opposes identity ; for, like "This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this," the intuition " (This is) different from this " rests on *anyonya-abhāva*.

Answer.—It is not so. Although the terms separate, etc., are synonymous, they do not convey the sense of *anyonya-abhāva*, 'since in that case the use of the ablative (from,) would not be possible or reasonable, because the intuitions, "This is separate from this," and "This is not this," contain different subject-matter. Nor is separateness an object or entity which possesses *anyonya-abhāva*, for, then, in "A cloth is a not water-pot," there would also be the use of the ablative. *Objection.*—The intuitions, "It is separate," and "It is distinct," having the same form, Separateness is nothing but distinctness. *Answer.*—It is not. For, in that case, while Maitra possessed the distinction of a staff, the intuition, "This Maitra is separate from Maitra," would also arise. Likewise it would entail the application of separateness to Ether it is distinguished by Sound, and to the Soul when it is distinguished by Understanding.

For the same reason, dissimilarity or difference in property also is not Separateness, inasmuch as it would entail, in the case of a water-pot, which has been burnt to redness, such usage as "This water-pot is separate from the dark water-pot." For, it is the possession of properties repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in property from that thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately after darkness.

Nor is it Genus itself, which is Separateness. For, the limits of a Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it would entail inter-mixture of classes ; for, if it exist only in existent things, then its denotation would be neither less nor more than that of existence, and if it exist in substance only, then, than that of Substance-ness.—2.

Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separateness.

Upaskāra.—It may be argued that inasmuch as there is this usage, namely "One Unity," "Separateness is separate from colour, etc.," therefore, there is Unity also in Unity, Separateness, and similarly, in other and other instances. Accordingly he says :

एकत्वेकपृथक्त्वयोरैकत्वैक्यकत्वाभावोऽणुत्वमहत्वाभ्यां

व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । ३ ॥

एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वयोः Ekatva-ekaprithaktvayor, in Unity and Separateness of one, or Individuality. एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावः Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of Unity and Individuality. अणुत्वमहत्वाभ्यां-Āṇutva-mahattvābhyām, by minuteness and magnitude: व्याख्यातः Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

3. The non-existence of Unity and Individuality, in Unity and Individuality, is explained by minuteness and magnitude.—284.

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude do not possess minuteness and magnitude, the application of which to them is derivative, so Unity and Individuality do not possess Unity and Individuality, the application of which to them is derivative.

"By Actions, Actions," "By Attributes, Attributes,"—these two aphorisms (vii. 24, 25, *infra*) also, which employ analogy, here seem to carry the same import as the preceding (i. e., the present) aphorism employing an analogy. The meaning is that as Actions are not possessed of Actions, nor are Attributes possessed of Attributes, so Unity and Individuality are not possessed of Unity and Individuality.—3.

Unity is not universal, but is confined to Substance only.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked : The application or use of Unity is indeed common to Attributes and Actions. What does here lead to the conclusion that Unity exists only in Substances and not in Attributes, etc ? To this, he replies :

निःसंख्यत्वात् कर्मगुणानां सर्वैकत्वं न विद्यते ॥ ७ । २ । ४ ॥

निःसंख्यत्वात् Niḥ-samkhatvât, being void of Number. कर्मगुणानां Karma-guṇānām, of Actions and Attributes. सर्वैकत्वं Sarvva-ekatvaṃ, Universal Unity. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

4. Actions and Attributes being void of Number, universal Unity does not exist.—285.

Unity of all—that does not exist. On what ground? So he says.—'Nihsamkhyatvam' means the state or condition of standing away from Number. Thus Actions and Attributes are void of Number. Number being an attribute, Number by no means exists in attributes ; nor, again, in Actions, because Attributes are excluded from, or denied to, Action, since, otherwise, Actions would possess Substance-ness. And the attributeness of Number has been proved, and also the Number-ness of Unity. This is the import.—4.

Cognition of Unity in Attribute and Action is erroneous.

Upaskāra.—How, then, do such cognitions arise, as "One colour," "One taste," etc. ? To this, he replies :

भ्रान्तं तत् ॥ ७ । २ । ५ ॥

भ्रान्तं Bhrântam, mistaken ; Erroneous. तत् Tat, that, i. e., the cognition of Unity in Action and Attribute.

5. That (i.e., the cognition of Unity in Action and Attribute) is erroneous.—286.

The meaning is that the cognition of Unity which arises in the case of Attributes and Actions, is erroneous. 'Cognition'—this is the complement of the aphorism, because an objection of the opponent has been thrown into it. The application (of Unity in these cases) is, however derivative, and it is non-difference from itself, or self-identity, which constitutes the derivation. Nor is Unity nothing but that (i. e., self identity), for the reply has been already given.—4.

Bhāṣya :—explains VII. ii. 5 as demolishing the view contained in VII. ii, 4.

Indirect proof of Unity.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked : " Let this application of Unity be secondary in the case of substances also and the intuition of it erroneous, what is the use of unity at all ? " To this, he replies :

एकत्वाभावाद्भक्तिस्तु न विद्यते ॥ ७ । २ । ६ ॥

एकत्वाभावाद् Ekatva-abhāvât, in consequence of the non-existence of Unity. भक्तिः Bhaktiḥ, derivative function. Secondariness. तु Tu, but. However. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

6. In consequence of the non-existence of Unity, however, secondariness would not exist.—287.

If Unity in its transcendental or real sense be nowhere to be observed, then the application of the term could not be secondary, for the secondary, has for its antecedent the primary, use. Nor, again, could the intuition be erroneous, for error has for its antecedent certain knowledge. For it is the certainly known that is (erroneously) attributed, and not the erroneous, for the intuition of the non-existent has been disproved, and the intuition of the otherwise (i. e., the existent) has been proved.—6.

Bhāṣya :—explains VII. ii. 6 in support of the interpretation of VII. ii. 5, thus: Did not unity exist everywhere, there would be no *bhakti*, production, of things at all. For, any one thing is the joint product of several things ; but there can be no such production in the absence of one-ness or unity ; unity, therefore, exists in all places.

Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause.

Upaskāra.—Effect and cause, e. g., threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Individuality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which Unity belongs to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself. For when a piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another, a piece of cloth different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from the threads, then it should be observed under the characteristic of being different from them, like a water-pot. In like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with the two potsherds (which compose it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over and above the two potsherds is observed. Accordingly it has been said, " A whole made up of parts is nothing else than the parts." This is the view of the Sāṃkhya thinkers. And for the purpose of controverting it, he says :

कार्यकारणयोरेकत्वैकः थक्त्वाभावादेकत्वैपृथक्त्वं न विद्यते

॥ ७ । २ । ७ ॥

कार्यकारणयोः : Kāryya-kāraṇayoh, of or in effect and cause. **एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वं** Ekatva-ekaprīthakatva-abhāvāt, in consequence of non-existence of identity and heterogeneity. **एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वं** Ekatva-ekaprīthakatvam, Unity and Individuality. **न** Na, not. **विद्यते** Vidyate, exists.

7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar (in being equally distinguished from all other things) ; therefore, Unity and (single) Individuality do not exist in them.—288.

Effect and cause—these two are not one. Why ? So he says : from non-existence of 'ekatva,' i. e., from non-existence of non-difference and because co-existence of plurality and unity in the same substratum is not therefore, possible, as would be required by the proposition that the very same thing which is the effect, is also the cause, e. g., that threads are a piece of cloth.

Objection.—But there is as a matter of fact such co-existence in the same substratum, seeing that the term, waters, is applied to a drop of water only; and also seeing that the term, wives, is applied to a single woman.

Answer.—Such is not the case. For such applications can be possible by reference to multiplicity of constituent parts. In the case of the ultimate atom of water, however, such application takes place, according to some thinkers, by means of multiplicity of colour, etc., naturally belonging to it ; while, according to others, it is due to the characteristic force of sound or language which should not be found fault with. Nor do fibres present in a *salvinia cucullata* and honeycomb obtain the application of cloth. Nor do threads singly prevail to contain and to drag anything.

Nor, again, can the two, effect and cause, become the substratum of single Individuality, for it is seen that they become the limits of each other. How ? So he says, 'eka-prīthakatva-abhāvāt,' i. e., in consequence of the non-existence of 'eka-prīthakatvam,' or non-heterogeneity or non-difference in property ; in other words, because, of effect and cause, difference in property is observed, for it is universal among mankind that the notions of thread and cloth, as well as of water-pot and potsherds, are embraced by different acts of understanding.

Objection.—Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, cognised by their difference (or separately from one another, i. e., one after another always) ?

Answer.—Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, i. e., modes of manifestation. And when sometimes, as in a piece of cloth of variegated colour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most manifest there.—7.

Only non-eternal unity and separateness of one proceed from like attributes in their causes.

Upaskāra.—He points out that non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one have for their antecedents attributes of these causes.

एतदनित्ययोर्व्याख्यातः ॥ ७।२।८ ॥

एतत् Etat, this, i. e., the characteristic of having the attributes of the cause as antecedents. अनित्ययोः Anityayoh, of the two non-eternals, namely, Number and Separateness. व्याख्यातम् Vyākhyātam, explained.

8. This, (as) explained in the case of the two non-eternals (namely, Number and Separateness, should be understood only in the case of non-eternal Unity and Separateness of one).—289.

The characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents, which has been explained in the case of non-eternal Number and Separateness, should be understood to apply to only non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one, since other Numbers and Separatenesses are produced by relative understanding. As the characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents belongs to non-eternal colour and touch of Fire, so it belongs also to non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one. This is the import. It follows, therefore, that Numbers beginning with two and ending with the highest arithmetical number, possess or reside in more than one substance. It also follows that separatenesses beginning with Separateness of two and ending with Separateness of the highest arithmetical number, co-exist in the same substratum with those Numbers. Now, the processes of the production and destruction of Duality, etc., are as follows ; When two homogeneous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye, cognition of the attribute qualified with the notion or characteristic of Unity, which is the genus of the two numbers, Unities, inhering in the two substances, are produced immediately after the elimination of difference in thought i.e., the assimilation of the two substances under the notion (of Unity); and it is this cognition which is called relative understanding or the conception of the one in the many. By it Duality is produced in the two substances. Then there takes place reasoning about the notion or characteristic of Duality which is the genus of the Duality so produced. After it, simultaneously there appear destruction of relative understanding by means of that reasoning, and a qualified or concrete understanding having for its content the attribute Duality as qualified with the notion or characteristic of Duality. And in the next moment there are simultaneously produced destruction of the attribute Duality in consequence of the destruction of relative understanding, and cognition, in the form of "Two substances," qualified with Duality. Thereafter, results *Samskāra*, impresssion or a fixed idea, from the above cognition of substances qualified with Duality. Thus, to sum up :—Beginning with contact with the sense and ending with *Samskāra* or impresssion, there are eight moments ; viz., contact of the sense with the substratum of Duality which is going to be produced, then cognition of the genus inherent in the attribute Unity, then relative understanding in the form of cognizance of the many along with the

attribute Unity as qualified with the generic notion or characteristic of Unity, then production of the attribute Duality, then cognition of the genus inherent in Duality, then cognition of the attribute Duality as qualified with that genus, then cognition of substances as qualified with the attribute Duality, and then *Samskāra* or impression. The order of destruction, again, is as follows: Destruction of the generic notion or characteristic of Unity, from relative understanding; destruction of relative understanding, from cognition of the generic notion or characteristic of Duality; destruction of the generic notion or characteristic of Duality, from cognition of the attribute Duality; destruction of cognition of the attribute Duality, from cognition of substances as qualified with the possession of Duality; and destruction of the latter, from *Samskāra* or impression, or from cognition of other objects.

Objection.—Why is not cognition of substance qualified with the possession of Unity, itself produced after the cognition of Unity, when all the causes of its production are present there? For, cognition of attribute taking place, there can be no delay in the cognition of substance. From that same cognition (of substance so qualified), therefore, there being destruction of relative understanding, from its destruction will follow, at its very next moment, destruction of Duality. Hence destruction of Duality resulting at the very moment prior to the qualified or concrete cognition in the form of “*Two* substances,” the production of cognition of substance as qualified with the possession of Duality, becomes impossible.

Answer.—The argument is defective; for, it is relative understanding uninfluenced or unobstructed or unobscured by the causes of the production of Duality, etc., which invariably produces cognition qualified with the content of substance, the above supposition being made on the strength of the result.

Objection.—But still destruction of relative understanding being caused by the very *Samskāra* or impression produced by itself, the fault, pointed out above, again appears all the same, since there is possibility of destruction of Duality at the very moment prior to the cognition qualified with Duality.

Answer.—It does not, since cognition of pure attribute, or of attribute unassociated with substance, is not productive of *Samskāra* or impression. For pure attribute can be nowhere called back to mind, since everywhere it is only by the background of, or as contained in, substance, that there can be recollection of attribute.

Objection.—Let it be so; still inasmuch as even at the time of the production of qualified or concrete cognition, there may be destruction of Duality, the possibility of non-production of qualified cognition remains in the very same state. For qualified or specific cognition, illuminative of that which is present, cannot possibly appear at the moment of the destruction of the qualification or that which serves to specify, since there is no such observation.

Answer.—This is not the case. For, cognition of that which serves to specify, contact of sense with that which is specified, and non-apprehension of non-association of the above two, which make up the whole

cause of specific cognition, are possible also in the case of the subject under discussion. If, however, contact of sense with that which serves to specify, is also required, then this too existing at the preceding moment, the very contact, which exists at the preceding moment, is observed to be the cause. That which serves to specify, or a qualification or distinction, which is beyond the compass of specified cognition, may also exist: for, it is only the being the object or content of cognition productive of specified cognition, which determines the characteristic of being a distinction or that which serves to specify, but the being the object of specified cognition does not also determine it.

Objection.—In this view, an *upalakṣaṇam* or indication also will come to have the nature of a *viśeṣaṇam* or distinction.

Answer.—By no means; for, existence in the same substratum, which is invariable and which does not cause specified cognition, determines the characteristic of being a distinction, whereas an indication exists in a different substratum from that which it indicates. Thus, when there is possession of a raven in the house of Devadatta, then the raven is a distinction. But when, flying over the house, it does not exist in it, then the raven is an indication.

Objection.—This being so it would follow that in such cases as “There is taste in that which possesses colour,” etc., colour, etc., also would be distinctions.

Answer.—This is not an objection, since it is desired to be so.

Objection.—Then there too taste will exist.

Answer.—No, since that which exists in something distinguished by the possession of something else, does not necessarily exist in that by which it is so distinguished. For a distinction and that which is distinguished are not one and the same thing.

Objection.—At the time of the destruction of Duality, there exists no connection with the distinction. How can specified cognition, or cognition of that which is distinguished, be produced?

Answer.—The question does not arise, for the meaning of the term, the being distinguished or qualified, is only non-variation or non-deviation or non-divergence from that (*i. e.*, the distinction); whereas the manifestation of that (*i. e.*, the distinction) exists there (*i. e.*, in specified cognition) also.

Hence, the teachers say, nothing remains unproved.

In like manner, on the analogy of the production and destruction of Duality, should be understood the production and destruction of Triplicity.

Duality is destructible by the destruction of relative understanding, for an existing attribute cannot be destroyed in the absence of another attribute opposed to the destruction of its substratum, like ultimate cognition, since ultimate cognition is destroyed by destruction of *adviṣṭam*. In some cases it is destroyed also from destruction

of substratum, *e.g.*, where there is knowledge of the genus, unity, simultaneously with action in the constituent parts of the substratum of Duality. It is in this way: Action in constituent parts and cognition of the genus; Disjunction and relative understanding; destruction of Conjunction and production of attribute Duality; destruction of constituted substance and cognition of the genus Duality;—here destruction of Duality results from destruction of substance, and destruction of relative understanding from cognition of the genus Duality; since, destruction of relative understanding taking place at the same time with destruction of Duality, there exists no relation, resembling the relation of effect and cause, between them. Where, however, there is simultaneity of action in the constituent parts of the substratum of Duality and relative understanding, there destruction of Duality results from both destruction of substratum and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this way: Action in the constituent parts and relative understanding; production of disjunction and production of Duality; destruction of conjunction and cognition of the genus Duality; destruction of constituted substance and destruction of relative understanding; destruction of Duality from both, the capacity of each for destroying being observed. This process properly fits in with the theory of two cognitions being related as the destroyed and the destroyer; and it is this theory which is legitimate or established by proof.

Objection.—The entire group of cause being the same in the cases of Duality, Triplicity, etc., how is it that there is this difference in their effects, namely, Duality is constituted by two Unities, Triplicity by three Unities?

Answer.—The question cannot arise, since Duality, etc., do not exist in Unity.

Objection.—It is Duality, Triplicity, etc., inhering in the combinative cause, which determine cognitions of Duality, Triplicity, etc.

Answer.—This is not the case; for prior to the production of Duality, etc., Duality, being absent therefrom, the enquiry after the cause of Duality, etc., does not cease even there, and the existence of such difference in relative understanding, and in Unities, or in the supposition of that on the strength of the result, is contravened by non-observation.

Objection.—Let the use also of Duality, etc., proceed from the same source; what is the need of Duality, etc.? Difference will result from difference of *adriṣṭam*.

Answer.—Were it so, Triplicity, and Four-ness, would be sometimes produced also by the set of causes originative of Duality. Hence it would entail non-uniformity. Moreover, it may be said in this connexion that difference in the effect is explained by difference in prior non-existence; as in the case of colour, taste, smell, and touch, produced by burning, difference is produced under the same set of causes.

Objection.—Prior non-existence also is common to all, or is the same in all cases.

Answer.—It is not; for each prior non-existence in each particular case has been ascertained to have causality towards its own effect only.

Or, the process should be carried on in this way that Duality is produced by pure relative understanding, and Triplicity by relative understanding accompanied by Duality. In such cases as "I have killed a hundred of ants," Duality is not at all produced in consequence of the non-existence of combinative cause. Accordingly, it should be observed, the use of number is there derivative or secondary.

Professor *Śrīdhara* opines that in the case of an army, a forest, etc., in consequence of the non-existence of constant relative understanding, only multiplicity is produced, but not hundred, thousand, and other numbers. With regard to this view, Professor *Udayana* observes that if such be the case, then in these cases no doubt could arise whether it be hundred, or thousand, etc., nor could there be such cognition as "A large army," "A larger army," and that hence this is not the case. Here the matter should be discussed in the following manner: Multiplicity is either nothing but number commencing from Triplicity, and terminating with the highest arithmetical number, or another number different from them. It cannot be the first since in the case also of any army, a forest, etc., there is as a rule production of hundred, thousand, and other numbers. Nor can it be second, since multiplicity different in mark from Triplicity, etc., is not observed. Multiplicity, therefore, is only number, namely, hundred, etc., produced by relative understanding which is uniformly constant in each case and which does not depend upon Unity. The manifestation of hundred, etc., does not, however, take place there, since nothing exists there which can manifest it.

We, on the other hand, say that multiplicity is really a different number, existing in the same substratum with Triplicity, etc., and producible by relative understanding productive of Triplicity, etc. It is so in consequence of the difference of prior non-existence. How else can such a statement be possible as "All I can say is that there are many"? I do not know particularly whether they be a hundred or a thousand? As magnitude or largeness and length co-exist in the same substance, so do Triplicity, etc., and multiplicity co-exist in one and the same substratum. For, to the query, "Shall I bring a hundred or a thousand of mango fruits?" the reply is given, *viz.*, "Let a large number of them be brought. What is the use of inquiring about a particular number?" This being so, Triplicity is produced by relative understanding accompanied by Duality, Four-ness by relative understanding accompanied by Triplicity, and so on, one after the other. In the production of multiplicity, on the contrary, there is no such uniformity or law that the relative understanding must be qualified with the possession or accompaniment of all the numbers which stand behind it. Hence in the case of an army, a forest, and the like, only multiplicity is produced, but not any other number; and so the alternatives amongst which Doubt has to swing also become really non-existent.

Separateness, again, exists in the same substratum with that (*i. e.*, number). Hence as is Duality, so is also separateness of two ; and so on.

Objection.—The use of separateness of two, etc., being possible by means of separatenesses of one existing in the same substratum with Duality, Triplicity, etc., what is the use of Separateness of two, etc.?

Answer.—The question cannot be raised in view of the discrepancy that while in the case of “ A cloth and a clod are separate from a water-pot ” there is no perception of the separateness of the dual (cloth and clod) being produced by the dual and the single limiting each other, there is such perception in the case of their individual separateness. Nor does this theory entail and explain Priority of two, for Priority of two is explained and possible by means of two priorities existing in the same substratum, or co-extensive, with Duality. The contradiction in respect of one being the limit of the other, which exists in the case of separateness, does not exist in the case of Priority ; since the intuition. “ These two are prior,” is possible or proved in same way as the intuition. “ These two are blue.” For, though two bodies occupying the same part of space possess equal manifoldness of conjunctions with the conjunct, yet production of different effects is possible by means of the difference of the conjunction of space and body, which is the non-combinative cause. Moreover, as two Unities jointly become the non-combinative cause of Duality, it being, in like manner, possible for two separatenesses of one or single individualities, jointly operating, to possess non-combinative causality towards the production of separateness of two, or dual individuality, it is not observed that more than, one *i. e.*, many, conjunctions are, by their joint operation, originative of one effect, which is not a constituted substance, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the effect. On the other hand, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the cause, a larger number of conjunctions of threads and the cylinder of wood in a loom do really originate a single conjunction of a cloth and the cylinder of wood in a loom. This is the direction.

On the analogy of destruction of Duality, etc., should be understood also destruction of separateness of two, etc.—8.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected : “ The thread is distinct from the cloth and is dissimilar to the cloth ”—such intuitions are simply erroneous, since it is threads conjoint among themselves, which becomes the cloth, and since no proof exists that the cloth is distinct from the threads. It cannot be said that difference from the thread can be proved to exist in the cloth by means of its dissimilarity to the thread, for dissimilarity itself is not proved. For, the nature of the cloth does not constitute its dissimilarity to the thread, inasmuch as in the state of the manifestation of the cloth, the nature of the cloth is recognised in the threads themselves. Accordingly it has been taught by Professor *Īśvarakṛiṣṇa* :—

असदकरणादुपादानसंग्रहात् सर्व्वसम्भवाभावात् ।

वस्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणाभावाच्च सत्कार्य्यम् ॥

The effect is existent (in the cause, in an enveloped state, prior to its production) ; For, there can be no production and manifestation of

that which is non-existent; there can be no connection of the cause with the effect (if the latter be non-existent); (some connection must exist between the cause and the effect, since) the production of everything is not possible from everything else; there can be production of one thing from another, if the two are mutually related as the producer and the producible (and such relation cannot be possible if the effect be non-existent); and the cause and the effect are identical, (so that the one cannot be non-existent, while the other is existent).—*Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, verse 9).

This being the case, the non-existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity between the cause and the effect remaining itself unproved, how can it establish the relation of Unity and of Separateness of one or single individuality?

To meet this objection, the author says :

‘*Etat*,’ i. e., the possession of the non-existence of Unity and Separateness of one in consequence of the possession of the non-existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity, has been observed, ‘*anityayoh*,’ that is, in the case of non-eternal cause and non-eternal effect. This is the meaning. Accordingly on the hypothesis of the non-difference of the threads and cloth, it would follow that in the state of the production of the threads, there would arise the intuition and use of language that the cloth is being produced; in the state of the production of the cloth, that the threads are being produced; in the state of the destruction of the threads, that the cloth is being destroyed; in the state of the destruction of the cloth, that the threads are being destroyed; and so on. Nor can it be maintained that production and destruction are not themselves entitled to acceptance, inasmuch as such intuitions are explained on the very theory of development or appearance and envelopment, or disappearance; for the hypothesis of an appearance, will entail a regress to infinity. If, on the other hand, the production of the appearance is admitted, then how does the theory of the production of the cloth, etc., become offensive? If, again, the production of appearance in appearance be not admitted, then appearance would become omniferous, or all-sided, (which is not desired by the objector). For, the all-sidedness of appearance is not recognised even by the *Sāṃkhya* thinkers. In reality, the common consent of humanity that the cloth is produced, the cloth is destroyed, and so forth, is proof of production and destruction; for, if experience of one thing be admitted to have another thing as its object, we must deny also the water-pot, cloth, etc.

Conjunction, how produced.

Upaskāra.—He begins another section or topic :—

अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजः संयोगश्च संयोगः ॥ ७ । २ । ६ ॥

अन्यतरकर्मजः Anytara-karmma-jah, produced by the action of either of two things. **उभयकर्मजः** Ubhaya-karmma-jah, produced by action of both. **संयोगजः** Samyoga-jah, produced by conjunction. **च** Cha, and. **संयोगः** Samyogah, conjunction.

9. Conjunction is produced by action of any one of two things, is produced by action of both, and is produced by Conjunction, also.—290.

Unobstructed intuition that things are conjunct is proof of conjunction. So also are effects ; *e. g.*, substance, in the case of conjunctions of constituent parts ; colour and other attributes produced by burning, in the case of conjunction of fire ; particular measure or extension, in the case of accretion ; sound, in the case of conjunction of the drum and ether ; such other instances should be understood. Nor is Conjunction merely production without the intervention of empty space. The theories of transiency and transformation of things having been thrown away, Conjunction is the coming together which has non-coming together for its antecedent. And it is produced by the action of one of two things ; as is the conjunction of a motionless post with a hawk in motion, or the conjunction of one in motion, when the motion is not directed where the conjunction takes place, *e. g.*, conjunction of a runner with the back of another runner. Conjunction produced by the action of both the conjunct is that of two rams or of two wrestlers, since it is produced by both of them exercising strength towards each other. The third (conjunction produced by conjunction) is the conjunction of the hand and the tree resulting from the conjunction of the finger and the tree. And it results sometimes from one conjunction even, as the conjunction of cloth and reed may result from the conjunction of thread and reed. In some cases, one conjunction is produced from two conjunctions, as from two conjunctions, of ether with two threads, may result only one conjunction of a two-threaded cloth with ether. In some cases, again, a single conjunction is originated even by a plurality of conjunctions, as ten conjunctions of ether with ten threads may originate only one conjunction of a ten-threaded cloth and ether. Sometimes, on the other hand, two conjunctions are produced even from a single conjunction as their non-combinative cause. For example, there having first taken place non-originate conjunction between two ultimate atoms, terrene and aqueous, subsequently two conjunctions, originate of two binary atomic aggregates, are produced, namely, one in the terrene ultimate atom with another terrene ultimate atom, and another in the aqueous ultimate atom with another aqueous ultimate atom. By those two conjunctions inhering in homogeneous things, two binary atomic aggregates are simultaneously produced. Therein by that one non-originate conjunction alone, produced between the terrene and the aqueous ultimate atom, one conjunction of the terrene ultimate atom with the aqueous binary atomic aggregate, and another conjunction of the aqueous ultimate atom with the terrene binary atomic aggregate, are produced simultaneously with the production of the colour, etc., of the two binary atomic aggregates.

Inasmuch as the conjunction of cause and not-cause must necessarily produce conjunctions of effect and not-effect, the conjunction of all-pervading substances (*viz.*, Space, Time, Ether and Soul) with dense or corporal bodies is produced by action of one of the two only. Of two all-pervading substances, however, there is no conjunction, since there is no cause (of conjunction). For in them there is no action, nor is

there any (combinative) cause ; hence there cannot be in this case also conjunction of effect and not-effect resulting from conjunction of cause and not-cause. Eternal conjunction, on the other hand, is not possible, for conjunction is the coming together of two things, which has the not-coming together as its antecedent, and eternality is opposed to it. And were conjunction eternal, Disjunction also would be without production ; and eternality of conjunction will not be obtained, since it would be impossible for Conjunction and Disjunction, which are contradictory, to exist side by side in their indestructible states. Moreover, *yuta-siddhi* or uncombined or naturally unassociated existence is a necessary condition of Conjunction, and it is not possible in the case of two all-pervading substances. For *yuta-siddhi* is merely the separate existence of two or of one of two (unrelated) things, or the relation of one thing being inherent in another, as its substratum, when the two have been externally brought into relation with each other.

Destruction of Conjunction, however, results from Disjunction having a common substratum with Conjunction. In some cases it results from destruction of substratum also. For example, action is produced in the constituent fibre of a thread immediately after the Conjunction of two threads ; thereby is caused Disjunction from another fibre ; from Disjunction results destruction of originative conjunction ; from this follows destruction of the thread ; and from destruction of the thread results destruction of Conjunction, where two threads having been long conjoined, action is not produced in them. Some, on the contrary, maintain that Conjunction is destroyed by simultaneously produced destruction of substratum, and by Disjunction, inasmuch as action is conceived to exist in another thread at the moment when by action in the constituent parts of a thread there is effected destruction of Conjunction originative of the thread. This is impossible ; for there can be no production of Disjunction at the moment of destruction of the combinative cause, since the rule is that the combinative cause is of equal duration with the effect.

This same Conjunction which is an independent agent in the origination of substances, and a dependent agent in the origination of attributes and actions, is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence existing in the same substratum with itself, since it is observed to be so. For it is perceived that there is conjunction of an ape in the Banyan tree, although conjunction of the ape present in a large Banyan tree is limited to a branch only. Were such mere limitation to a part not sufficient to account for it, then conjunction would come to exist in ultimate atoms, and so would not be cognizable. In the case of the all-pervading substances also, it is the difference of *upādhi*, adjunct or external condition, which serves to localise them. Conjunction present by limitation to that is not pervaded in its denotation. Of Conjunction residing in the ultimate atoms also, direction in space, and the like should be regarded as determinants.—9.

Disjunction, how produced.

Upaskāra.—By extending the mode of the production of Conjunction to Disjunction he says :

एतेन विभागो व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । १० ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. विभागः Vibhāgaḥ, disjunction. व्याख्यातः Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

10. By this Disjunction is explained.—291.

Like Conjunction, Disjunction also is produced by action of either of two things, by action of both, and by Disjunction. Disjunction takes place between a hawk and a post by the action of the hawk ; disjunction of two wrestlers or of two rams fighting with each other, by the actions of both. And Disjunction in these cases has its production at the moment immediately following the production of action, inasmuch as there exists nothing else to be waited for or depended upon. Accordingly it has been said, " Action is an independent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction " (*vide* I. i. 1., *above*).

Objection.—There is dependence upon substratum where Disjunction has to be produced, and upon destruction of antecedent Conjunction where Conjunction has to be produced.

Answer.—This is not the case, for action is independent since it does not depend upon anything in the form of an existence which has its production immediately after the production of itself.

Disjunction, produced by Disjunction, however, is two-fold, according to the difference of Disjunction of cause and not-cause produced by Disjunction of cause alone, and the difference of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, produced by Disjunction of cause and not-cause. Therein Disjunction of potsherd and Ether, resulting from Disjunction of the two potsherds, is an example of Disjunction of cause and not-cause, resulting from Disjunction of cause alone; and Disjunction of hand and tree resulting from Disjunction of finger and tree, and Disjunction of body and tree, resulting from Disjunction of hand and tree, are examples of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, resulting from Disjunction of cause and not-cause.

Objection.—There is no proof of Disjunction itself, the term, Disjunction, being used to denote only non-existence of Conjunction.

Answer.—It is not so. For, if non-existence of Conjunction be absolute non-existence, then it would follow that the term Disjunction would be used to denote attribute and action also.

Objection.—Absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present in two substances, is the source of the intuition of the disjunct.

Answer.—It cannot be, since it would in that case follow that absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present also in a constituted whole and its constituent parts, would be the source of the intuition of the disjunct.

Objection.—The term " two substances " should be qualified by the expression " not being related to each other as effect and cause."

Answer.—In that case, absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present in the Vindhya and Himalaya mountains also, would be the cause of the intuition of the disjunct

Objection.—Indeed there it is.

Answer.—It is not. For there being existence of erroneous intuition, due to it, in the case of attribute and action also, it should be considered how far it will be valid to make it the source of convention or usage with reference to the accurate intuition only.

Objection.—Destruction of Conjunction is Disjunction.

Answer.—Were this the case, it would entail the use of the term Disjunction on Conjunction being destroyed by the destruction of any one of the two things in Conjunction.

Objection.—"Things in Conjunction" should be qualified as being existent.

Answer.—In that case, it would entail the intuition of Disjunction even in the state of Conjunction of a jujube and an emblic myrobalan which become conjunct again immediately after the destruction of one conjunction.

Objection.—Disjunction is the destruction of all Conjunctions.

Answer.—If it be so, then there would be non-existence of Disjunction in the case of destruction of one Conjunction, since the denotation of 'all' finds no place there.

Disjunction, therefore, exists, and it is an additional attribute.

This attribute, again, is destructible by another contradictory attribute, inasmuch as, so long as the substratum exists, destruction of attribute cannot be possible without a contradictory attribute existing in the same substratum.

Objection.—Action itself may be destructive of Conjunction.

Answer.—It cannot be, since only a contradictory attribute is destructive of attribute. Moreover, although where finger, hand, arm, and body come to have conjunction with the tree, by means of their respective actions, there is possibility of destruction of conjunction of the finger and the tree, by means of the action produced in the finger only, yet there would not follow destruction of conjunctions of the hand and the tree, of the arm and the tree, and of the body and the tree, since the hand, etc. are inactive and the action of the finger rests in a different substratum. If it be supposed that even action resting in a different substratum may be destructive of conjunction, it would then follow that there would be destruction of all conjunctions at one and the same moment of time, by action wherever it may be produced.

Objection.—What then is the solution here on your theory?

Answer.—Disjunction of the hand and the tree, produced by Disjunction of the finger and the tree, is destructive of conjunction of the hand and the tree. This is a matter of observation.

Sarvajña has said that there may very well be destruction of conjunction of the hand and tree, by the very action of the finger, resting in a different substratum, and that there will be no undue extension (of the causality of action), inasmuch as it is observed that mutual non-conjunction of the container and the contained is itself destructible by action resting in a different substratum. This too is not a sound opinion; for, destructiveness is everywhere observed to belong only to a contradictory attribute appearing in the substratum, and it is not reasonable to abandon that without some argument to the contrary.

Sound and Disjunction, again, are effects of Disjunction. Therein we shall ponder over the non-combinative causality of Disjunction towards the production of Sound. For, of the Sound which is produced, when a bamboo is being split up, and one of the two halves is held down by the pressure of the foot, and the other is drawn upwards, we find no other non-combinative cause than the disjunction of the half and ether (or of the ether within the halves). Nor do we find any non-combinative cause over and above Disjunction in the case of the sounding forth of a bamboo bursting but while it is being burnt in a conflagration. We also infer the Disjunction of the effect and not-effect from the Disjunction of the cause and not-cause. How else, where conjunction of the finger and the tree, conjunction of the hand and the tree, conjunction of the arm and the tree, and conjunction of the body and the tree are produced by the respective actions of the finger, etc., can there be destruction of the conjunction of the hand and the tree, and of other conjunctions, even on the destruction of the conjunction of the finger and the tree, consequent on the disjunction of the finger and the tree produced by action produced in the finger alone? For, in this case, it is the series of disjunctions, produced by disjunctions, that is, as has been already stated, destructive of the corresponding conjunctions. There is, however, no clear evidence in the case of disjunction of the cause and not-cause, of which the antecedent is the disjunction of the two (constituent) causes (i.e., the two halves of the bamboo); for, it is observed that, production of the disjunction of ether, etc., like the disjunction of one of the two halves of the bamboo, being also possible by the action produced in the other half, disjunction is produced by the action of that other half from all those with which that half was conjunct. For it is not that disjunctions are not produced also from particular parts of ether, etc., by action produced in a finger, equally as disjunction from another finger. Nor is it that disjunctions from particular parts of ether, etc., are not originated by action produced in a lotus-leaf, even as disjunction from another lotus-leaf is produced. We maintain, "Let a single action originate even a hundred disjunctions which are not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. But that action which originates disjunction which is opposed to the conjunction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. And that which originates disjunction which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which is opposed to the conjunction originative of substance."

Objection.—Is there any reason for taking such a view ?

Answer.—Yes, there is, diversity of cause being rendered necessary by diversity of effect.

Objection.—Variety is necessary in action, so that one action may produce disjunction which is opposed to conjunction originative of substance, as in the case of flowering lotus-blossoms, etc., and another action may produce both, i. e., disjunctions which are opposed and not opposed to conjunctions originative of substance.

Answer.—This cannot be. For contrariety of effect is the origin of the supposition of diversity of cause ; and that contrariety arises by way of the characteristic of the one being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance, but by way of the characteristic of the other not being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance, inasmuch as diversity also ought to be supposed by those very ways.

This same action, present in the one half of the bamboo, produces only disjunction of the two halves. And this disjunction first originates disjunction from the particular parts of ether, etc.,—disjunction which is not the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance. And if it produced disjunction by itself, it would then bear the characteristic of action ; hence it depends upon time which is distinguished with the possession of destruction of substance.

Objection.—At that moment also let that action itself produce Disjunction.

Answer.—It cannot do so, being past in time. In the production of Disjunction, Time follows immediately after the production of action itself.

Objection.—But subsequent Disjunction being thus produced by antecedent Disjunction, action cannot produce conjunction with other places.

Answer.—This is not the case ; for towards the production of conjunction, action is not past time. Otherwise, action will be never destroyed, it being destructible only by subsequent conjunction.

This same Disjunction, destructible by subsequent conjunction, lasts for three moments only. Sometimes it is destructible by destruction of substratum. It is in this way : Action is produced in the fibre which is a constituent part of the thread ; Disjunction of two fibres follows it ; at the same moment, action is produced in another thread ; then there is destruction of conjunction, originative of the thread, by disjunction of two fibres, and Disjunction is produced by action in the thread ; then there is destruction of the thread from destruction of conjunction originative of substance, and from destruction of the thread results destruction of Disjunction produced by action in another thread.

Objection.—Such being the case, there will be no destruction of action produced in another thread, since there is nothing to destroy it. For, it can be destroyed by subsequent conjunction, but Disjunction being destroyed, there is no subsequent conjunction.

Answer.—The argument is not valid. As Disjunction of the thread in the state of being destroyed is produced by action which is produced in the thread, so by the same action should be produced Disjunction of the thread from the fibre also. Such Disjunction also is really opposed to originative conjunction. By this Disjunction of the fibre and the thread is produced Disjunction of the thread and ether, which produces subsequent conjunction, and this, in its turn, causes destruction of action. Or, wherever action is produced in a thread, action is produced in its fibre also. That action, again, in the thread in the state of being destroyed, originates simultaneous Disjunctions from the constituent parts of the thread, and particular parts of ether, etc., all these Disjunctions being not opposed to originative conjunction. There is, therefore, destruction of action combined or co-inherent in the thread, by conjunction which has its production immediately after the Disjunction of the effect, *e. g.*, thread, from the not-effect, *e. g.*, ether, etc., produced from the Disjunction of the cause, *e. g.*, the fibre, and the not-cause, *e. g.*, ether etc.

Sometimes Disjunction is destroyed jointly by subsequent conjunction and destruction of substratum. It is in this way : There being conjunction of a thread, and a thread, action is produced in the constituent parts of the thread, namely, the fibre, and action is produced in the reed. This is one moment of time. By action in the fibre is produced Disjunction from another fibre, and by this there is destruction of conjunction originative of the thread. By the action in the reed also, there is Disjunction of the thread and the reed, and there is also destruction of the conjunction of the thread and the reed. Destruction of the thread immediately follow destruction of conjunction originative of the thread. Conjunction of the reed with another portion of space immediately follows destruction of conjunction of the thread and the reed. Jointly from both of them, *viz.*, destruction of substratum, and conjunction, results destruction of Disjunction.—10.

Conjunction and Disjunction do not possess Conjunction and Disjunction.

Upaśhāra.—It may be said, "Let there be Conjunction in Conjunction also, and Disjunction in Disjunction also." To prevent this he says :

संयोगविभागयोः संयोगविभागाभावोऽणत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां

व्यख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । ११ ॥

संयोगविभागयोः Sāmyoga-vibhāgayoh, in Conjunction and Disjunction. **संयोगविभागाभावः** Sāmyoga-vibhāga-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction. **अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां** Aṇutva-mahattvābhyām, by minuteness and magnitude. **व्याख्यातः** Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

11. The non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction, in Conjunction and Disjunction, is explained by Minuteness and Magnitude.—292.

As Minuteness and Magnitude are not possessed of Minuteness and Magnitude, so also are not Conjunction and Disjunction possessed of Conjunction and Disjunction.—11.

Actions are void of actions, and Attributes, of attributes.

कर्मभिः कर्माणि गुणैर्गुणा अणुत्वम त्वाभ्यामिति ॥७२१२॥

कर्मभिः Karmabhiḥ, by actions. कर्माणि Karmāṇi, actions. गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. गुणाः Guṇāḥ, attributes. अणुत्वमहत्वाभ्यां Anutva-mahattvābhyām, by minuteness and magnitude. इति Iti, this.

12. Actions are (void) of Actions ; Attributes are (void) of Attributes. This (is explained) by Minuteness and Magnitude. —293.

Upaskāra.—This second aphorism has been already explained. (Vide VII. i. 15 supra).

Bhāṣya. reads VII. ii. 12 as two aphorisms viz., *Karmabhirkar-māni guṇair-guṇāḥ* and *Anutvamahattvabhyāmīti*, and explains them in the same way as VII. i, 16.

Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause do not exist.

Upaskāra.—If it be asked why there cannot be conjunction of two substances, namely of constituent part and constituted whole, so he says :

युतसिद्धयभावात् कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न विद्येते

॥ ७ । २ । १३ ॥

युतसिद्धयभावात् Yutasiddhi-abhāvāt, in consequence of the absence of separate or independent existence. कार्यकारणयोः Kāryya-Kāraṇayoh, of effect and cause. संयोगविभागौ Saṃyoga-vibhāgau, Conjunction and Disjunction. न Na, not. विद्येते Vidyete, exist.

13. In consequence of the absence of separate existence, there exist not Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause. —294.

‘Yutasiddhiḥ’ means the state of being existent, of two things which have no connection with each other, or the characteristic of being supported by separate substrata. A constituent part and a constituted whole, however, do not possess this. This is the meaning.—13.

Vivṛiti.—‘Yutasiddhiḥ’ means the existence of two uncombined things. Of cause and effect, e. g., of constituent part and constituted whole, conjunction and disjunction do not exist, because of the absence of their uncombined existence. For constituted wholes such as a water-pot, etc., do not exist having no relation to constituent parts such as potsherds, etc., whereby their conjunction and disjunction might be possible.

The relation between a word and its meaning is neither conjunction nor combination.

Upaskāra.—Now follows from the context another section intended to establish the conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argument.

गुणत्वात् ॥ ७ । २ । १४ ॥

गुणत्वात् Guṇatvât, because it is an attribute.

14. (There can be no conjunction of Sound or Words with Objects), because (Conjunction, is an Attribute.—295.

‘Of conjunction’—this is the complement. Thus, the meaning is, how can there be conjunction which is an attribute, of an attribute, e. g., Sound or Word, with objects such a water pot, etc. ?—14.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Moreover, the object also is sometimes characterised as colour, taste, etc., Therefore, conjunction is not possible, inasmuch as the existence of attribute in an attribute has not been admitted. This is what he says :

गुणोऽपि विभाव्यते ॥ ७ । २ । १५ ॥

गुणः Guṇaḥ, attribute. अपि Api, also. विभाव्यते Vibhāvyaṭe, is known or established.

15. Attribute also is known (to be an object denoted by Word), or is established (by Word).—296.

‘Attribute also, object’—this is the complete sentence. Attribute also, e. g., colour, etc., is an object denoted by Word, but with that there is no relation of conjunction. This is the meaning. Or, the meaning is that attribute also is established (by being denoted) by Word and that with that there is no relation of conjunction of Word.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—Further, conjunction (of Word and Object) cannot be produced by the action of either or by the action of both, because any substance whatever, e. g., Ether, etc., as well as Word are inert. This is what he says :

निष्क्रियत्वात् ॥ ७ । २ । १६ ॥

निष्क्रियत्वात् Niṣkriyatvât, because of inactivity or inertness.

16. Because Word and Object are inert.—297.

‘Of Word and of any Object whatever’—Such is the complement of the aphorism.—16.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He states another obstruction to the inter-relation (of Word and Object) :

असति नास्तीति च प्रयोगात् ॥ ७ । २ । १७ ॥

असति Asati, not existing. न अस्ति Na asti, (It) does not exist. इति Iti, such. च Cha, and. प्रयोगात् Prayogât, because there is application.

17. (Word and Object are not in conjunction), also because in the case of a non-existent object there is such application (of word) as " (It) does not exist."—298.

Even in the case of a non-existent water-pot, cloth, etc., such application (of word) is observed as " There is no water-pot in the room," " Cloth does not exist," " The letter *ga*, which was heard before, no longer exists," " There was a cloth," " There will be a cloth," etc. ; therefore (there is no inter-relation) This is the meaning. The import accordingly is that there is no conjunction, nor again combination, of Word with a non-existent water-pot, etc.—17.

Word and Object are unrelated.

Upaskāra.—What then ? He gives the answer :

शब्दायै ऽसम्बन्धौ ॥ ७ । २ । १८ ॥

शब्दायै Śabda-arthau, sound and sense. Word and object. असम्बन्धौ Asambandhau, unrelated.

18. (Therefore), Word and Object are unrelated.—299.

If Conjunction of Word and Object does not exist, it then comes to this that Word and Object are unrelated. This is the meaning.—18.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked why one or other of the relations of Conjunction and Combination should not exist (between Word and Object). Accordingly he says :

संयोगिनो दण्डात् समवायिनो विशेषाच्च ॥ ७ । २ । १९ ॥

संयोगिनः Samyogināḥ, which is in conjunction. The conjunct. दण्डात् Daṇḍāt, from the staff. समवायिनः Samabāyinaḥ, which is in combination. The combined. विशेषाच्च Viśeṣāt, from a distinction or distinguishing element. च Cha, and.

19. (Cognition of Conjunction results) from (e. g.) the staff, which is in conjunction (with the hand of a man), and (of Combination) from a distinguishing element which is in combination (with the whole).—300.

" This person is carrying a staff," " The elephant possesses a trunk,"—these intuitions take place. Of these, the first results from conjunction, and the second, from combination. The intuition in respect of the trunk which is a particular member of the body, is dependent upon its combination with the elephant, since it arises from the distinction that that is an elephant to which belongs a trunk as being in combination with it. The distinction itself, viz., the trunk, etc., is distinctive in consequence of the relation of combination. But there is no intuition of threads, etc. also, such as " A cloth possesses threads " etc., under the relation of distinctive possession of the parts. Likewise, " The object, water-pot, is that which possesses the word, water-pot,"—

such intuition does not take place. Of Word and Object, therefore, there is neither conjunction, nor again combination. This is the import.—19.

Intuition of object from word proceeds from convention.

Upaskāra.—If there is neither conjunction nor combination between Word and Object, then by what relation does a word establish a determinate object? To this, he gives the answer :

सामयिकः शब्दार्थप्रत्ययः ॥ ७ । २ । २० ॥

सामयिकः Sāmayaikah, conventional. According to direction. **शब्दार्थप्रत्ययः** Śabda-artha-pratyayah, intuition of object from word.

20. The intuition of Object from Word (takes place) according to the direction (of God).—301.

“ ‘Sāmayaikah :’ ‘Samaya’ means the direction of God, in the form that such an object should be understood from such a word. Whatever word has been assigned by God to a particular object, denotes that object. It is then the will of God which supplies the link between word and object. The same is convention, dependent upon the will of God; as, for example, “Whatever plant the ichneumon touches with its teeth, is an antidote to poison.” This is the meaning.

This convention is learnt sometimes from usage; *e.g.*, when an employer gives the order “Bring the water-pot,” and an employee brings an object possessing a tubular neck, a boy standing near by infers the knowledge of the latter in this way. This his activity is produced by knowledge, because it is activity, like my activity; that knowledge again is produced by the words of this order, because it follows immediately after it; and the subject-matter of this knowledge, namely, this object with a tubular neck, is the denotation of the term, water-pot. By such processes of transposition of verbs and cases, the boy becomes informed in respect of the object, water-pot, cloth, etc.

Sometimes the convention is learnt directly from testimony alone; *e.g.*, that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term, water-pot. Sometimes it is learnt from comparison; *e.g.*, from a comparison of resemblance in such cases as, that a gayal is that which is like a cow, that as is *mudga*, so is *mudga-parṇi* (a kind of bean), that as is *māga*, so is *māga-parṇi* (a leguminous plant), etc. Sometimes (knowledge of objects is derived) from condemnatory passages also; *e.g.*, “O, the camel with too pendulous upper lip and long neck, the eater of hard thorns, the vilest of animals”—when after hearing this condemnatory sentence, one sees a body of this description, knowledge arises in one, *viz.*, “This is that camel.” Sometimes it springs from community of substratum, or synonymy, with words of known import; *e.g.*, “The honey-bee is sipping the honey within cloven lotus-blossoms”—after hearing this proposition, (the knowledge arises), “This is what is designated by the term, honey-bee, because it is the sipper of honey within cloven lotus-blossoms,” or as in the case of the proposition, “The cuckoo sings sweetly in the mango-tree.” Here, in the above instances, it is either a case of inference, or a case of word itself being productive of

knowledge through the force of synonymy with words of known import, or only a particular mode of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the being the agent in drinking honey infers resemblance to other individuals such as the bee, etc.

The convention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals being brought home by means of special characteristics,—such is the view of the followers of *Tutāta*. According to the followers of *Prabhākara*, the force of word is in respect of both the class and the individual, but so far as it refers to the class, it denotes the object by the word, by being known, and so far as it refers to the individual, by being its proper form. The teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention is the force itself and that classes appearing in the forms of the individuals are the objects denoted by words. This is the case with words like cow, etc., but the objects denoted by words expressive of attribute and action are both classes and individuals as detailed in the *Mayākha*.—20.

Vivṛiti.—He now points out the connection between words and objects, which is the means of verbal knowledge.

* * * * 'Samaya' is arbitrament or convention. It is two-fold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament is called force (of words), and modern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has for its form, This object is to be understood from this word, or Let this word convey this signification. Accordingly it has been said,

आजानिकञ्चाधुनिकः समयो द्विविधः स्मृतः ।

नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते ।

कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ॥

Convention has been declared to be two-fold, original and modern. Therein the original is the eternal, which is called force; whereas the modern is the occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others.

The apprehension of the force of words proceeds from conduct, etc. So it has been said,

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानात्

कोशप्रवाक्याद्भ्यवहारतश्च ।

संनिध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धा

वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विबृतेर्वदन्ति ॥

The elders declare the apprehension of the force of words to proceed from grammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy, from lexicography, from authoritative sayings or testimony, from conduct (of the employer who gives an order which is carried out by the employed), from contiguity to a word of well-known import, from context, and from explication or description.

* * * * The doctrine of the force of the word to denote primarily the class is not sound, for, in such instances as "Bring the cow," the fact which is established by experience, namely, that the individual is the object of verbal cognition, cannot be explained except on

the theory of the force of the word primarily to denote the individual. Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication or derivatively, for in the absence of a primary use a derivative use is impossible. Nor is the knowledge of the individual possible even by the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge); for, inasmuch as the being an object of verbal cognition, standing in the position of an effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge) which is supposed to be the condition, cannot be the condition there, as is desired. We should, therefore, respect the doctrine that the force of the words, cow, etc., lies in denoting the individual characterised by, or possessing, the generic form and the class or the universal. It has been accordingly laid down in the aphorism of Gautama, "The individual, the generic form, and the universal are, however, the object of the word." (*Nyāya-Sūtram*, II. ii 63).

Priority and Posteriority, how produced.

Upakāra.—Now he explains Priority and Posteriority, the next in the order of enumeration, in one context, as these are the causes of mutually involved uses, and for the purpose of clearing up the understanding of the disciples as well as for the sake of brevity.

एकदिक्कालाभ्यामेककालाभ्यां सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां परमपरञ्च

॥ ७ । २ । २१ ॥

एकदिक्कालाभ्यां Eka-dikkābhyām, lying in the same direction. एककालाभ्यां Ekakālābhyām, existing at the same time सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां Sannikṛṣṭa-vipkrṣṭābhyām, near and remote. परं Param, prior. अपरं Aparam posterior. च Cha, and.

21. The Prior and the Posterior (are produced by two objects) lying in the same direction, existing at the same time, and being near and remote.—302.

"The Prior and the Posterior"—the reference here is principally in a substantive sense. "Are produced"—such is the complement. Or, the word "usage" or "convention" is to be supplied after 'The Prior and the Posterior: such'. The word "such" should be understood. 'Ekadikkābhyām' means by two bodies which have the same direction in space. Two bodies occupying equal place (i. e., equally distant) may also have the same direction in space, but by them Priority and Posteriority are neither produced, nor come into use. Accordingly it has been said, 'Near and remote,' which expression means, possessing nearness, i. e., the quality or state of containing a smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct, and remoteness, i. e., the quality or state of containing a larger number of conjunctions with the conjunct. Hereby combinative cause (of Priority and Posteriority) is stated; whereas conjunction of bodies and direction in space is the non-combinative cause. Priority and Posteriority are thus produced in a man standing with his face towards the east, by observing a relative paucity of conjunctions with the conjunct in one of two bodies lying in the east and a relative plurality of conjunctions with the conjunct in the other. The non-combinative cause is thus

stated. 'Near and remote'—the term implies intuition, as the contained metaphorically denotes the container. Relative understanding or cognition of relativity is thus stated to be the efficient cause. Priority and Posteriority are produced in respect only of two bodies lying in the same direction in space; hence there is no production of them in all places. Relative understanding is produced in one and the same observer only; hence there is no production of them in all circumstances. Being regulated by relative understanding, there is no production of them at all times. There is no mutual dependence between them, inasmuch as being produced from the capacity or power of the cause, they are proved by sense-perception. For otherwise they would be neither produced nor perceived. For in case of mutual dependence there would be non-production as well as non-perception of both of them. But Priority and Posteriority are perceived, and their perception cannot be possible without their production.

'Existing at the same time'—this has reference to Priority and Posteriority in time. Now 'existing at the same time' means, by two bodies one young and the other old, which occupy the same, i. e., the present, time. Here nearness is the state of having the birth intervened by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun, and remoteness is the state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun. Here too understanding i. e., the container, is implied by the contained. Thus the young and old bodies are the combinative causes. Conjunction of time and bodies is the non-combinative cause. The understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case of Posteriority, and the understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case of Priority.

These, Priority and Posteriority, again, are produced even in respect of bodies indeterminate in place and direction in space.

Now there is a seven-fold destruction of Priority and Posteriority in space but their production is simultaneous, else there would be mutual dependence. Priority and Posteriority in space then are destroyed from the destruction of relative understanding (1) from the destruction of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause, (2) from the destruction of substance which is the combinative cause, (3) from the destruction of the efficient and non-combinative causes, (4) from the destruction of the efficient and combinative causes, (5) from the destruction of the efficient cause, (6) from the destruction of the non-combinative cause, and (7) from the destruction of the combinative cause. Now, from the destruction of relative understanding, thus: Production of Priority; knowledge of the genus Priority; then destruction of relative understanding; after its destruction, at the moment of knowledge of substance distinguished by Priority, destruction of Priority,—the process should be understood in the same way as in the case of destruction of duality. Destruction of Priority and Posteriority follows also from the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Thus, as soon as there is relative understanding, action takes place in the body which is the substratum of Priority; as soon as Priority is produced therefrom, disjunction takes place between direction in space and the

body ; after it, when there is knowledge of the genus Priority, then there is destruction of the conjunction of direction in space and the body ; then, destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus ; at the very same moment, destruction of Priority and Posteriority results from destruction of conjunction of direction in space and the bodies. And in this case destruction of relative understanding does not destroy them, inasmuch as it is synchronous with destruction of Priority.

Objection.—On the theory of destruction of attribute even from destruction of non-combinative cause, great confusion will result from the thus possible destruction of *Samskāra*, (tendencies, impressions), *adṛiṣṭam* (invisible after-effects of acts performed), etc., also from the destruction of the conjunction of Mind and Soul.

Answer.—It is not so. For Priority being pervaded by the characteristic of being remote, there must needs be cessation of Priority consequent on the non-existence of remoteness on the removal of the substratum of Priority to some other place. Nor is there at the time any other agent of destruction ; hence, such destruction being otherwise impossible, destruction of conjunction alone is conceived to be the destroying agent. On the other hand *samskāra*, *adṛiṣṭam* etc., as well as their effects, *e. g.*, recollection, pleasure, etc., cannot be supposed to be so destroyed, inasmuch as they are observed even after a long time.

This also implies that Priority and Posteriority are destroyed also by the destruction of the conjunction between that particular place and the standard limit as well as the observer, the argument being the same as above.

Destruction of Priority sometimes results also from destruction of combinative cause. Thus, relative understanding arises at the very same moment that action produced in a portion of a body causes disjunction from another portion ; from disjunction results destruction of the conjunction originative of the body, and then production of Priority ; at the next moment, destruction of substance results from destruction of conjunction, and there takes place knowledge of the genus Priority ; destruction of Priority follows destruction of substance, and destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus. So that, being synchronous, destruction of relative understanding does not destroy Priority.

Destruction of Priority sometimes takes place by the destruction of substance and destruction of relative understanding. It happens in this way : Production of action and relative understanding in a portion of the body ; then, disjunction from another portion, and production of Priority ; next destruction of originative conjunction and knowledge of the genus ; thereafter, destruction of substance and destruction of relative understanding ; and following them, there is destruction of Priority.

Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of substance and destruction of conjunction. It is in this way : Simultaneously with disjunction amongst the constituent parts of substance,

there is production of action in the body and of relative understanding; following it, appear destruction of conjunction of constituent parts, disjunction between space and body, and production of Priority; thereafter there are destruction of substance, destruction of conjunction of space and body, and production of knowledge of the genus: thereafter destruction of Priority results from destruction of substance and destruction of conjunction of space and body, and destruction of relative understanding from knowledge of the genus.

Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of conjunction and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this way: Production of Priority, and action in the body; knowledge of the genus, and disjunction; destruction of relative understanding, and destruction of conjunction of space and the body; then, destruction of Priority.

Destruction of Priority results sometimes from destructions of combinative, non-combinative and efficient causes. It is in this way: Production of Priority, disjunction among constituent parts of the body, and action in the body, take place simultaneously; knowledge of the genus Priority, destruction of conjunction of constituent parts and disjunction between space and the body follow them; thereafter results destruction of Priority or of Posteriority in space, from destruction of relative understanding, destruction of substance, and destruction of conjunction of space and the body, which destructions are simultaneously produced.

Of Priority and Posteriority in time, however, there is no destruction due to destruction of non-combinative cause. As in the case of Priority and Posteriority in space, there is destruction of nearness and remoteness on the destruction of conjunction of space and the body, so it is not the case with Priority and Posteriority in time. The three cases, therefore, of their destruction namely from destruction of combinative cause, from destruction of relative understanding, and from both jointly, should be understood in the way described above.—21.

Vicṛiti.—It should be observed that, according to the writer of *Muktāvali*, destruction of relative understanding is destructive of Priority and Posteriority in both their forms (*i. e.*, in space and in time), whereas in the *Upaskara* it is stated that it is the destruction of their three-fold causes which is destructive of Priority and Posteriority.

Priority and Posteriority in Time, how produced.

Upaskara.—He states a peculiarity in the case of temporal priority and posteriority.

कारणपरत्वात् कारणापरत्वाच्च ॥ ७ । २ । २२ ॥

कारणपरत्वात् Kāraṇa-paratvāt, from priority of the cause. कारणापरत्वात् Kāraṇa-aparatvāt, from posteriority of the cause. च Cha, and.

22. (Temporal Priority and temporal Posteriority are said, by suggestion, to arise respectively) from Priority of the cause and from Posteriority of the cause.—303.

The cause of Priority and Posteriority is time. Priority and Posteriority belong to it. Conjunction of time which is the non-combinative cause of priority, and conjunction of time which is the non-combinative cause of posteriority are stated, by implication, as otherwise, the result would be want of congruity or syntactical connexion. For, priority and posteriority cannot be produced by priority and posteriority themselves. The terms, priority and posteriority, denote, by implication, conjunctions of time which are productive of them.—22.

Vivṛiti.—If the uses of prior (remote) and posterior (near) are produced by cognitions of remoteness and nearness, then, inasmuch as the cognition, Kāśī (Benares) is near in relation to Prayāga (Allahabad), refers also to Prayāga as its object subject-matter, why does not there arise the use of Posteriority (or nearness) in respect of Prayāga? Likewise, why is there not the use of Priority (or remoteness), in respect of Kāśī, etc., which also become the subject-matter of the cognition of remoteness?

He removes this incidental doubt.

'Kāraṇa-paratvāt,' i. e., owing to the priority or remoteness of the combinative cause; and also owing to its posteriority or nearness. The uses of priority and posteriority are only in respect of the combinative cause, but not in respect of anything else simply because it becomes the subject-matter of relative understanding. For use is determined by the object in respect of which the use arises. This is the import.

Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and Posteriority.

प त्वापरत्वयोः प त्वापरत्वाभावोऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां

व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । २३ ॥

परत्वापरत्वयोः Paratva-apatvayoh, in priority and posteriority.
 परत्वापरत्वाभावः Paratva-apatva-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of priority and posteriority. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां Aṇutva-mahattvābhyām, by minuteness and magnitude. व्याख्यातः Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

23. The non-existence of Priority and Posteriority, in Priority and Posteriority, is explained by minuteness and magnitude.—304.

Actions are void of actions.

कर्मभिः कर्म्मणि ॥ ७ । २ । २४ ॥

कर्मभिः Karmabhîḥ, by actions कर्म्मणि Karmmaṇi, actions.

24. Actions are (void) of Actions.—305.

Attributes are void of attributes.

गुणैर्गुणाः ॥ ७ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. गुणाः Guṇāḥ. attributes.

25. Attributes are (void) of Attributes.—306.

Upaskāra.—These aphorisms, being virtually explained above, are not explained here.—23, 24, 25.

Bhāṣya.—reads VII. ii. 24 and 25 as one aphorism.

Combination described.

Upaskāra.—It has been stated that priority, posteriority, etc., are combined in dense or corporeal substances only, and that knowledge, pleasure etc., are combined in the soul. Now, what is this combination itself? Having regard to this inquiry of the disciples, he steps over Understanding which is the next subject for treatment according to the order of enumeration, and describes the examination of Combination.

हेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः ॥ ७ । २ । २६ ॥

इह Iha, here, i. e., in the cause. इदम् Idam, this, i. e., the effect. इति Iti, such. यतः Yataḥ, whence. कार्यकारणयोः Kāryya-kāraṇayoḥ, of effect and cause सः Saḥ, that. समवायः Samavāyaḥ, combination.

26. That is Combination by virtue of which (arises the intuition) in the form of "This is here," with regard to effect and cause.—307.

'Kāryya-kāraṇayoḥ' is an indication; non-effect and non-cause also are implied. So it has been said in the section called the Locality of the Predicables, "Combination is that relation of things mutually involved or associated in nature and bearing to one another the relation of the contained and the container,—which is the source of intuition in the form of "(It is) here." *Ayuta siddhiḥ*, inseparable association, is the non-existence of things unrelated. As in the case of "There is curd here in the bowl," "There are jujubes here in the bowl," so in the case of "There is cloth here in the threads," "There is mat here in the reeds," "There are substance, attribute, and action here in substance," "There is bovineness here in the cow," "There is knowledge here in the soul," "There is Sound here in Ether," the cognition of *here* which is thus produced, cannot be produced without some relation; whereby it is inferred that some relation exists. And this relation is not mere conjunction. For the causes of conjunction, namely, action or either of the two things, etc., are absent here; it does not terminate in disjunction; related things do not exist unrelated; it can be inferred as a uniform substratum; it is not perceptible to the senses; it is one; and it is eternal.

Objection.—If combination be one, it would then entail intermixture of substance-ness, etc., since combination of action-ness, etc., would be possible in substance.

Answer.—This cannot be the case, since non-intermixture follows from the very rule of the container and the contained. Although the same combination which is the combination of substance-ness. is also the combination of attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., still substance is not their container or substratum, since they are not observed there.

Substance-ness is observed in substances only, attribute-ness in attributes only, action-ness in actions only, but not elsewhere. It is from the observation of this agreement and difference, that the uniformity (of the container and the contained) results. As even in the absence of a particular conjunction between the bowl and the curd, it is the bowl which is the container, and not the curd, and hence there is the uniformity of the relation of the container and the contained, so the uniformity is valid in this case also from the very difference of the power of the revealed and the revealer, for action-ness, etc., are not revealed by substance in the same way as substance-ness is. Accordingly it has been said.

सम्बिदेव हि भगवती वस्तूपगमे नः परब्रह्म ॥

All-powerful consciousness is verily our resource in the apprehension of things. For consciousness in respect of the being the container is not reversible; nor is there the intuition that substance is action; nor, again, that threads are in the cloth. It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the combination of colour in Air, "There is colour in Air"—such characteristic of being the container is not observed in the case of Air. It is natural capacity, therefore, which everywhere determines the relation of the container and the contained.

This combination, again, is eternal, inasmuch as it is uncaused. For the rule of production from combinative causes applies to existences or beings, and efficient and non-combinative causes are subsidiary to those causes. Therefore that which would be the combinative cause of combination would be either another combination, or that combination itself. It cannot be the first, as it would entail non-finality; nor the second, as it would involve self-dependence, for that very combination cannot produce combination with itself.

Objection.—How does the intuition arise that there is combination of cloth in threads, and that there is combination of colour in cloth?

Answer.—It is by means of the relation of their intrinsic form, or essential relation, as the supposition of another combination would entail non-finality.

Objection.—The intuition of *here*, e. g., "There is colour here in the cloth," will, then, arise by means of the same essential relation. What is the use of combination?

Answer.—It is not so, since there is no obstruction here to the admission of an additional relation.

Objection.—If it be so, then "Here in this place there is non-existence of the water-pot,"—in this case also there will be either combination or any other relation.

Answer.—No, as the intuition can be possible by means of essential relation itself. For, on the contrary supposition, the absolute and mutual non-existences of the water-pot, which are eternal and combined with more than one substance, would have the characteristic of being Genera, subsequent non-existence also, being an effect in combination, would be perishable or destructible, and antecedent non-existence also, not being produced, though combined, would be indestructible.

Nor is the quality of existence the determining factor there, for the quality of existence can be produced at any time.

The *Bhāttas* maintain that in non-existence there really is present a different relation called distinguishedness or qualifiedness. Nor is this distinguishedness be one and the same in the case of all individual manifestation of non-existence, then it would follow that there is non-existence of the water-pot even in that which contains a water-pot, inasmuch as the distinguishedness of the non-existence of the water-pot would exist by means of the same distinguishedness of the non-existence of the cloth.

Objection.—But the water-pot itself will in this case prevent the cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot.

Answer.—It cannot do this, since the non-existence of that which will prevent such cognition is itself present there by means of the relation of distinguishedness. Nor is the very nature of the substratum (*i.e.*, where the water-pot lies) such that on account of it there can be no manifestation of the non-existence of water-pot in that place, for immediately after the removal of the water-pot follows the intuition of the non-existence of water-pot in that very place.

Objection.—In your view also, why is there not intuition of possession of colour after the destruction of colour, since Combination is, as you say, eternal and one?

Answer.—Because non-intuition of colour is proved from the very destruction of colour.

The arguments against Combination have been demolished in the *Mayākha* under Sense-Perception. So we stop here.—26.

Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species.

Upaskāra.—By way of proving its difference from the five beginning with Substance (*i.e.*, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species), he says :

द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधो भावेन व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । २७ ॥

द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः Dravyatva-guṇatva-pratiṣedhaḥ, negation or exclusion of substance-ness and attribute-ness, (in or from Combination). **भावेन** Bhāvena, by existence. **व्याख्यातः** Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

27. The negation of Substance-ness and Attribute-ness (in Combination) is explained by Existence.—308.

‘Bhāvaḥ, means Existence. As Existence is not identical with substance, etc., being cognised by a different form of understanding, so combination also is different from the same Substance, etc., ‘Dravyatva-guṇatva’ is an indication ; Action-ness, etc., also should be understood.—27.

Combination is one.

Upaskāra.—He proves Unity :

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ ७ । २ । २८ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvaṃ, that-ness. One-ness. Unity. भावेन Bhāvena, by Existence.

28. The Unity (of Combination, is explained) by Existence.
—309.

‘Explained’ is the complement. ‘Tattvaṃ,’ i. e., Unity, ‘bhāvena,’ i. e., by Existence, is explained. As one Existence everywhere induces the cognition of the existent, so one Combination everywhere induces the cognition of the combined. Moreover the inferential mark of Combination is not differentiated, nor is there any other particular mark. For, we do not find any particular mark, i. e., differentiating mark, of Combination, whereby we could recognise its diversity. For the very same reason, Combination is eternal; for, as in the case of Existence, non-eternality cannot appropriately belong to it which is undifferentiated even in the difference of Space, Time, etc.

Objection.—If combination is nothing but this relation, then there may be disunion of threads and cloth, or of the cloth and its colour.

Answer.—This cannot be, for in the absence of (previous) uncorrelated existence, disunion is not possible. For, there is no unrelated existence or colour and that which possesses the colour, or of the parts and the whole, that there may be a disunion between them.

Objection.—But their! uncorrelated existence may be brought to pass.

Answer.—It cannot, for the effectuation is contravened by being never so experienced.

The followers of *Prabhākara* hold that Combination is manifold and also non-eternal. But this is not a reasonable view to take, for the intuition of “Colour is destroyed,” whereas it is the intuition of no body that the Combination of colour is destroyed.

The view of the school of *Nyāya* that Combination is perceptible to the sense is also not valid. Combination is supersensuous, for being different from the Soul, it is at the same time in a state of being uncombined, like the Mind, or like Time, etc.—28.

Bhāṣya :—Combination is proved to be an attribute in the same way as is existence, and further, like existence, Combination also is produced by itself, i. e., does not depend upon any other Combination for its production.

Here ends the second chapter in the seventh book of Śaṅkara’s Commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK EIGHTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Cognition explained by allusion to III. i. 2, 18.

Upakāra.—The order of enumeration was violated in favour of the curiosity of the disciples. The author now adopts the order of enumeration. Therein the examination of understanding is the subject of the eighth book. Understanding has been already mentioned for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says :

द्रव्येषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातः ॥ ८ । १ । १ ॥

द्रव्येषु Dravyeṣu, among substances. ज्ञानं Jñānam, knowledge. Cognition. व्याख्यातम् Vyākhyātam, explained.

1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substance.—310.

By the term, "Among substances," the author implies the third book, as the the container by the contained. The meaning is that cognition, *jñānam*, has been explained by the two aphorisms, namely, "The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) an object different from the senses and their objects" (III. i. 2), and "That (*i. e.*, knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark)" (III. i. 18).

Now in the kindred system (*i. e.*, the *Nyāya-Sātram* of Gautama), under the definition of understanding, there has been made a declaration of synonyms, namely, "Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition, Intuition—these are synonyms," (*Nyāya-Sātram*, I. i. 15), for the purpose of demolishing the Sāṅkhya doctrine. For the Sāṅkhyas maintain a difference in meaning of the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus *Prakṛiti*, Matter, is the state of equilibrium of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, the principles of purity, passion and darkness, or the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, respectively. *Prakṛiti* is one, and one only, while *Puruṣas*, Spirits, are divided to infinity. They are seated in the cave (*i. e.*, retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal, immutable, and characterised, by eternal consciousness. They are called lame, as it is not their nature to undergo modification or transformation, while *Prakṛiti* is said to be blind, being stupid or insensate. When there arises in *Prakṛiti* a desire for the enjoyment of sensuous objects, or a desire to see the difference between *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa*, at that moment *Prakṛiti* is modified, or transforms, under the influence or osculation of *Puruṣa*. And its first transformations *Buddhi*, Understanding, a particular form of the inner sense. Understanding it is that is called the principle of *Mahat*, the great one; accordingly it has been said, "The great one evolves from *Prakṛiti*." And this understanding is pure or stainless like a mirror. And that particular transformation of it, which takes the form of an object in such shapes as "It is a water-pot," "It is a cloth," etc., through the channel of the external senses, is called cognition, *jñānam*, and faculty, *vr̥tti*. Apprehension, *upalabdhi*, is the same as a kind of *abhimāna*, egoity or self-consciousness, in the form of "I know," which arises in consequence of the non-perception or non-apprehension of the distinctness or difference of *Puruṣa* which is consciousness, by cognition present in transparent or pure understanding. *Pratyaya*, Intuition, is that particular

transformation of understanding itself, which takes the form of pleasure, pain, etc., through the channel of the senses alone, in consequence of the contact of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of sense. Hence it is that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, reminiscence, virtue, and vice are, all of them, particular transformations of understanding, and being present in *Prakṛiti* itself, in subtle forms or in minute proportions, appear and disappear, according to difference of circumstances; while *Puruṣa* is as free from adhesion or affinity or attachment as a lotus-leaf, but casts its shadow in the understanding. This theory which the Sāṅkhyas hold is thrown away by the proof indicated in the above declaration of (these terms as) synonyms. Thus, if the term, understanding, be derived in the instrumental sense, *viz.*, as that *by* which a thing is understood, then it comes to be nothing else than the mind. Nor is the mind an object of perception, whereas understanding is surely cognizable by perception in the form of "I understand." Nor are cognition, etc., the properties of the internal sense, inasmuch as they are proved to exist only as being the properties of an agent. For the manifestation of "I know" "I intuit," "I apprehend," takes place as having community of substratum with I-ness or egoity. If they reply that this phenomenon is *abhimāna* or conceit, we rejoice that it cannot be so, since there is no obstruction to its being real. It cannot be contended that such obstruction is supplied by the very characteristic of the *Puruṣa* as being seated in the cave, that is to say, by its not being the receptacle of adventitious properties or changes; for, we would then reply that eternality is compatible with the nature of being the substratum of adventitious modes. For that which possesses a property and the property are not one and the same reality, so that the production and destruction of the property should themselves be the production and destruction of the substratum of the property. It is only he, then, who is conscious, that also understands, cognises, apprehends, and intuit. Hence the hypothesis of distinct entities (*e. g.*, Soul and understanding) is not reasonable. This is the point.—1.

Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space Air and Ultimate Atoms are not (ordinarily) perceptible.

Upakāra.—This cognition, again, is two-fold, *Vidyā*, Science or true knowledge and *A-vidyā*, Nescience or false knowledge. *Vidyā* is of four kinds, characterised by perception, inference, memory and testimony. *A-Vidyā* also has four kinds characterised by doubt, error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced by the senses. Why this is so, is explained here.

तत्रात्मा मनश्चाप्रत्यक्षो ॥ ८ । १ । २ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, among substances. आत्मा, Ātmā, soul. मनः Manas, mind. च Cha, and others, *e. g.*, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms. अप्रत्यक्षे A-pratyakṣe, non-perceptible, not objects of perception.

2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and other are not objects of perception.—311.

The word, soul, in the aphorism denotes the soul of another or one's own soul. That even one's own soul is not an object of perception, has been already declared, inasmuch as the casual mental intuition of the I, *aham*, in one's own soul, is repudiated by such intuitions "I am fair," "I am thin," "I have long arms, etc. (where the I has reference to the body). The word, "cha," extends the application of the predicate to the substances, namely, ether, time, space, air, and ultimate atoms. Sense-born cognition again is of two degrees, being that of the omniscient and that of the non-omniscient. That of the omniscient is the cognition of such and such complements of objects by means of the proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily supersensuous objects) characterised by virtue or merit springing from *Yoga* (i. e., inhibition of the activity of the internal organ, the mind, and consequent freedom of the all-pervading soul, in other words, the steadiness of the mind in the soul. *Vide v. ii. 16 above.*) Thus ultimate atoms fall within its sphere, (or are objects of perception), being demonstrable, nameable, and existent.

Objection.—Since there is no material or data of such cognition, how can this be the case? Magnitude also is a cause of sense-perception, but ultimate atoms do not possess magnitude. The possession of colour, again is the cause of visual perception, but space, etc., do not possess colour. How then can there be perception in these cases?

Answer.—The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is possible by means of the mind alone as an auxiliary to the virtue or merit born of *Yoga*, or by means of the eye and other senses under the favourable influence of such mind. For the virtue or merit produced by *Yoga* is of inconceivable efficacy, and does not stand in need of any other auxiliary.

"The man whose omniscience is the subject of controversy, is not omniscient, because he is a man like myself,"—such reasonings, however, are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would render impossible the proposition of the other side (maintaining the existence of omniscience in the man in question), as is the case with the reasoning, "A follower of *Prabhākara* (a writer of the *Mīmāṃsā* school) is not versed in *Mīmāṃsā*, because he is a man like myself."

Perception of the non-omniscient, again, is two-fold, discriminative and non-discriminative. Discriminative cognition, according to *Dharmakīrti* and *Diṇṇaga* and others of the *Bauddha* school, is not certain knowledge or proof. Thus they argue: Such cognition owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words. But the connection of an object with a word, a name, is not possible, that there should be such intuition, coloured with a name, as it were, as "A water-pot," or "A piece of cloth." Nor is *jāti*, the universal, really existent or objectively real, that the being distinguished with the possession of it should be apprehended in objects by the sense. Nor is possible connection of the existent characterised by itself with that which is non-existent. Nor is the non-existent within the cognizance of senses. Therefore, discrimination (*ālōchanam*) is produced by the senses, and while in the process of being produced, and leading to

corresponding objects, by the power of the discrimination, discriminative cognition is called perception and also proof. (To this the commentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative cognition may be objectively unreal, because it owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words, it may be at the same time real, because it is the product of contact of sense and object. Hence it is doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the being distinguished with the possession of a name may very well be a possible object in visual cognition, its appearance in consciousness being possible form presentation by memory, as is the case with the perception "Fragrant sandalwood." Or, it may be, the being distinguished with the possession of a name does not come to light in perceptual cognition, and there is only recollection of the name, which as soon as it is recollected serves to distinguish its corresponding object, like the recollection of the counter-opposite in the case of the cognition of non-existence. Also it has been proved that *jāti*, the universal or class, ect., are immanent in objects or entities. Hence, discriminative or modified cognition also is perception, inasmuch as it is produced from contact of senses and objects.

Objection.—Non-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither excites to activity, nor is an object of current use. What then is the proof of its existence ?

Answer.—The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognition itself, for, this is a specialized cognition, or the cognition of a thing as possessing, and being accordingly distinguished by, something else. Nor can it be produced without the cognition of that which is possessed and serves to distinguish or individualize, that is the distinctive element. For it has been ascertained above that the cause of specialized cognition is cognition of that which serves to specialize, contact of sense and that which is going to be specialized, and non-apprehension of non-connection of both.—2.

Bhāṣya: Among substances, Self, Mind, and Ether are not objects of perception.

Cognition, how produced.

Upaskāra.—In order to elucidate how Cognition is produced, in what circumstances, and from what causes, he says :

ज्ञाननिर्देशे ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविधिरुक्तः ॥ ८ । १ । ३ ॥

ज्ञाननिर्देशे Jñāna-nirddeśe, in the differentiation of a particular cognition. *ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविधिः* Jñāna-niṣpatti-vidhiḥ, mode or process of production of cognition. *उक्तः* Uktaḥ, stated, described.

3. The mode of the production of Cognition is being described, in connection with the differentiation of a particular Cognition. —312.

A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from other cognitions, in respect of the mode of its production, in respect of its subject matter, and in respect of its property. Now, differentiation of

cognition having to be made, the process of the production of cognition is going to be described. This is the meaning. In 'uktah,' the past participle affix *kta* is used in the sense of incipient action.—3.

Vivṛiti.—What is the cause of cognition ? There being this expectancy, he says :

'Jñāna-nirddēśe,' i. e., in the third book, where enunciation of cognition has been made. There too the process of the production of cognition has been described. The meaning is that the causes of cognition have been mentioned in the aphorism, "That (i. e., knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the object, is other (than a false mark)" (III. 1. 18.) Thus, the soul is the combinative cause of cognition, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non-combinative cause, and contact or contiguity of the object is the efficient cause. This has been mentioned in that very aphorism. It should be observed that the causality of contact has been stated under the topic of perception.

Substance is the cause of cognition of Attributes and Actions.

Upaskāra.—He describes the mode of production (of cognition) :

गुणकर्मसु सन्निकृष्टेषु ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेर्द्रव्यं कारणम् ॥ ८ । १ । ४ ॥

गुणकर्मसु Guṇa-karimmasu, Attributes and Actions. सन्निकृष्टेषु Sannikṛiṣṭeṣu, being in contact. ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेः Jñāna-niṣpattēḥ, of the production of cognition. द्रव्यं, dravyam, substance. कारणम् Kāraṇam, cause.

4. Substance is the cause of the production of cognition, where Attributes and Actions are in contact (with the senses).—313.

Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced in respect of attributes, e. g., colour, etc., and in respect of actions, e. g., throwing upwards, etc., Both of them are apprehended only in so far as they inhere in substances appropriate or perceptible to the senses. Hence it is the appropriateness or perceptibility of the substances which determines their perceptibility. It is by substance, moreover, that their contact with the senses is constituted, they being apprehended by means of their combination with the conjunct (i. e., Substance which is conjunct with the sense). Although there is apprehended the odour of dispersed particles of *champa* flower, and of portions of camphor, which are all imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be, which effects their contacts. Although perceptibility of substance is not a requisite in the apprehension of sound, yet sound is apprehended only as it is combined or inherent, therein and hence this itself is the requisite. If it be asked, why is made this supposition of contact which is invisible ? we reply that the production of cognition, being an effect, necessitates the supposition of a cause. This is the import.—4.

Substance is the cause of cognition of Genus and Species also.

Upaskāra.—He describes another mode of the production of knowledge :

सामान्यविशेषे सामान्यविशेषाभावात्, एव ज्ञानम् ॥ ८।१।५॥

सामान्यविशेषेषु Sāmānya-viśeṣesu, in genera and species. सामान्यविशेषाभावात् Sāmānya-viśeṣa-abhāvāt, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and species. ततः Tataḥ, thence, from substrata. एव Eva, alone. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, cognition.

5. In consequence of the non-existence of Genus and Species in genera and species, cognition (of them) is due to that alone.—314.

Existence is the (*summum*) genus, its species are substantiveness, attribute-ness and action-ness. These again are genera, and their species are earth-ness, etc., colour-ness, etc., throwing-upward-ness, etc. Among these, omnisensuous cognition of the genera inhering in substance is due to that only, that is, due only to appropriate or perceptible, particular substratum, and also to combination with the conjunct, combination with the combined with the conjunct, and combination with the combined, all these combinations being related to that substratum. Omnisensuous cognition, again, is produced, in the case of attribute, from combination with the combined with the conjunct; in the case of sound-ness, *ka*-ness, etc., from combination with the combined; in the case of existence, from combination with the conjunct, from combination with the combined with the conjunct, and from combination with the combined. In the case of attribute, the proximity or contiguity which is the condition of perceptibility, is not constituted by combination with the conjunct, or combination.

It may be objected: 'Tataḥ, eva,' i. e., from contact with or contiguity to their substrata alone—such delimitation or exclusion is not valid. Because in genus and in species also there do exist other genus and species. Contact with, or contiguity to, them also is a cause of cognition. In anticipation of this objection, he says, 'In consequence of the non-existence of genus and species.' For genus and species do not exist in genus and species, since that would entail infinite regression. The intuition of their mutual distinctions arises from their own forms or natures alone, or in this way, for instance, that the genus, bovine-ness, is cognised from the distinctness of the *upādhi*, adjunct or external condition, characterised by being present-in-all-bovine animals; while being absent from other than bovine animals. Similarly with regard to pot-ness, etc., also.—5.

Genus and Species are causes of cognition of Substance, Attribute and Action.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked: As, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and species, cognition of genus and species is absolutely independent of them, is it likewise absolutely independent of them in the case of substance, attribute and action also? He says, No:

सामान्यविशेषोपेक्षं द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु ॥ ८।१।६॥

सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं Sāmānya-viśeṣa-apekṣam, dependent upon genus and species. द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु Dravya-guṇa-karmmasu, in respect of substance, attribute and action.

6. (Cognition which is produced) in respect of Substance, Attributes and Action, (is) dependent upon genus and species.—315.

"Cognition is produced"—this is the subject in discourse. In respect of substance, attribute and action, there is no doubt cognition specialized with the content of substance-ness, attribute-ness and action-ness. Such specialized cognition, again, cannot be produced without the contact of the subject specified, that which serves to specify, and the sense. Hence dependence upon genus and species is there necessary. For there is such specialized cognition as "This is substance," "This is attribute," "This is action." This is the import.—6.

Substance, Attribute and Action are causes of cognition of Substance.

Upaskāra.—Is, then, in the case of substance also, cognition dependent only upon genus and species? To remove this curiosity, he says :

द्रव्ये द्रव्यगुणकर्मपेक्षम् ॥ ८ । १ । ७ ॥

द्रव्ये Dravye, in substance. द्रव्यगुणकर्मपेक्षम् Dravya-guṇa-karmma-apekṣam, dependent upon substance, attribute and action.

7. (Cognition), in the case of Substance, (is) dependent upon Substance, Attribute and Action.—316.

"Cognition is produced"—this is the subject in discourse. "A white cow, possessing a bell, is going,"—this is a cognition. Here substance, the bell, is the distinction or that which serves to specify; 'white' denotes an attribute; 'is going' denotes action. Thus in specialized cognition or intuition of a thing distinguished with the possession of something else, there cannot be non-apprehension of the distinction or that which serves to specify, nor can such specialized intuition take place without relation to that which serves to specify. Hence in the cognition of substance there is dependence upon substance, attribute and action. Such is the import.—7.

Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attribute and Action.

Upaskāra.—Is there, then, dependence upon attribute and action, also in the case of attribute and action? He says, No :

गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्मभावाद् गुणकर्मपेक्षं न विद्यते ॥ ८ । १ । ८ ॥

गुणकर्मसु Guṇa-karmmasu, attributes and actions. गुणकर्मभावाद् Guṇa-karmma-abhāvāt, in consequence of the non-existence of attribute and action. गुणकर्मपेक्षं Guṇa-karmma-apekṣam, dependent upon attribute and action. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

8. (Cognition), dependent upon Attribute and Action, does not exist in the case of Attributes and Actions, inasmuch as Attribute and Action do not exist in Attribute and Action.—317.

“Cognition” is the complement of the aphorism. Since there is no cognition of attribute as distinguished with the possession of another attribute, and since there is no cognition of action as distinguished with the possession of another action, there is no cognition thereof, which is dependent upon attribute and action. For there exists no attribute in an attribute nor action in actions, whereby they might appear as distinctions in them. This is the import.—8.

Combination (as well as Attribute) is a cause of Cognition.

Upaskāra.—Lest it might be asked that since there is manifestation of attribute and action (in the cognitions thereof), why there should not be dependence upon attribute and action in the cognition of attribute and in the cognition of action, so he begins another topic in reply to that :

समवायिनः श्वैत्याच्छ्वैत्यबुद्धेश्च श्वेते बुद्धिस्त एते कार्य-
कारणभूते ॥ ८ । १ । ६ ॥

समवायिनः Samavāyinaḥ, of that in which combination exists, the substratum. श्वैत्यात् Śvāityāt, from whiteness. श्वैत्यबुद्धेः Śvāitya-buddheḥ, from cognition of whiteness. च Cha, and. श्वेते Śvete, in a white object. बुद्धिः Buddhiḥ, cognition, ते Te, they. एते Ete, these. कार्यकारणभूते Kārya-kāraṇa-bhūte, related as effect and cause.

9. The cognition, (‘It is white’) in respect of a white object, (results) from whiteness of the substance in which combination of whiteness exists, and from the cognition of whiteness. These two, (cognition of white object, and cognition of whiteness), are related as effect and cause.—318.

By using the term ‘Samavāyinaḥ’ he states the causality of relation. Thus, inasmuch as combination of attribute does not exist in attribute, and inasmuch as combination of action does not exist in action, in their respective cognitions there is no dependence upon attribute and action as distinguishing marks or qualifications; but there does exist dependence upon attribute and action as subject-matter or objects of cognition. This being so, it is stated that in the case of such intuitions as “A white conch shell,” the combination of whiteness, the attribute whiteness, and the cognition of whiteness as a distinction or that which serves to specify, are the causes. So that relation with the distinction, the distinction, and cognition of them are the causes of specialized perceptual cognition. Hereby is proved all that has been stated before.—9.

Bhaṣya.—reads VIII. i. 9 as two aphorisms, viz., Samavāyinaḥ Śvāityachchhaiya buddheścha śvete buddhiḥ, and Ta ete kāryakāraṇa-bhūte.

Exception to the above. In the case of Substances, Cognition is not a cause of cognition.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected. As in the case of "possessing a bell," cognition of substance (e. g., the cow possessing the bell) is dependent upon substance (e. g., the bell), so also in the case of (the serial cognitions of) "It is a pillar," "It is a jar," etc., where the cognition does not embrace another substance as a distinction, cognition of (the first) substance, (the pillar), is the cause (of the cognition of the second substance, jar), (and so on). Thus nowhere can there be cognition of substance in the first instance or at first hand.

व्येष्वनितरेतरकारणाः ॥ ८ । १ । १० ॥

द्रव्येषु Dravyeṣu, in substances. अनितरेतरकारणाः An-ī tara-ī tara-kāraṇāḥ, not causes, one of another.

10. In the case of Substances, (cognitions are) not causes of one another.—319.

Accordingly he says.

"Cognitions" is the complement of the aphorism. Cognition of the jar, even though it takes place immediately after the cognition of the pillar, is yet not the effect of the cognition of the pillar, inasmuch as the pillar cannot properly be the distinction of, or that which serves to specify, by being contained in, the jar.—10.

The exception explained.

Upaskāra.—It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and cause. So he says :

कारणायौगपद्यात् कारणकामाच्च घटपटादिद्विनां क्रमो न हेतुफलभावात् ॥ ८ । १ । ११ ॥

कारणायौगपद्यात् Kāraṇa-ayaugapadyāt, from non-simultaneity of causes. कारणकामाच्च Kāraṇa-kramāt, from succession of causes. च Cha, and. घटपटादिद्विनां Ghaṭa-paṭa-ādi-buddhīnām of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc. क्रमः Kramah, succession. न Na, not. हेतुफलभावात् Hetu-phala-bhāvāt, in consequence of the relation of cause and effect.

11. The sequence of the cognition of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes, due to the non-simultaneity of the causes, and not in consequence of the relation of cause and effect (among the cognitions.)—320.

The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is dependent upon the sequence of their causes, and not dependent upon the relation of cause and effect. If it be asked, where the sequence of causes itself comes from, so he says, 'from the non-simultaneity of the causes.' Simultaneity of cognitions has been denied or disproved. Hence there is not simultaneity also of diverse causes of cognition. If,

on the other hand, there were simultaneity of causes, it would entail simultaneity also of effect, and thus the argument that non-production of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of the mind, would be shattered. This is the import.—11.

Here ends the first chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Vivṛiti.—The sequence or order, in the form of antecedence and subsequence, of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, not from the relation of cause and effect amongst them, but from the order, or the antecedence and subsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot, cloth, etc., (with the senses), which contacts are the causes of those cognitions. The word 'cha,' and, implies the addition of non-simultaneity which is not mentioned here, and this word is to be construed after the word sequence or order. The meaning, therefore, is this that the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is due to the non-simultaneity of their causes, *e. g.*, contacts with senses, etc. Where, however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot and the cloth exists, there is simultaneously produced a collective cognition of all the objects in contact with the senses for the time being. Hence it is also to be understood that simultaneity of effects follows from simultaneity of causes, and non-sequence of effects from non-sequence of causes.

Understanding or Intelligence, *buddhi*, is primarily divided into presentation, *anubhūti*, and representation, *smṛiti*. Presentation, according to the doctrine of Kaṇāda, is again two-fold, being divided into perception *pratyakṣa* and inference, *anumāna*. Perception is of six kinds, as derived from smelling, etc., (*i. e.*, from the five external, and the internal, senses); and is two-fold, as discriminative, *savikalpaka*, and non-discriminative, *nirvikalpaka*; and two-fold, as ordinary or popular, *laukika*, and super-ordinary or hyper-popular, *alaukika*. Inference, again, is three-fold, as produced by illation from only positive conditions, *kevala-anvayi*, or purely agreemental; from only negative conditions *kevala-vyatireki* or differential; and from both positive and negative conditions *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, or inference from commonly observed marks. For example, "This is expressible by words, inasmuch as it is knowable," etc., are illations from purely positive condition (or by Mill's method of agreement). "Earth differs from other substances, inasmuch as it is possessed of odour," and the like are illations from purely negative conditions, (or by Mill's method of difference); and "The mountain is fiery, inasmuch as it smokes," and the like are illations from both positive and negative conditions (or by Mill's method of agreement and difference.) Representation, reproduction or memory, on the other hand, is uniform, dependent on that form of *Samskāra* which is called *Bhāvana* or permanent mental impression, having the same form as the original presentation and dependent upon certain cognition in which inattention played no part. In another point of view also, understanding is two-fold, science or correct knowledge, *pramā*, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, *apramā*. Science is cognition in a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience is cognition in a certain form of that in which there is non-existence

of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold accordingly as it is divided into doubt, *saṁśaya*, and certitude, *nischaya*. Doubt is a cognition whereof the form is (mutually) repugnant existence and non-existence in one and the same object; certitude in regard to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the non-existence thereof. In this doctrine, in the case of cognition of similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place by the production of a judgment respecting the inferential mark, subsequently thereto. Evidence or proof, *pramāṇa*, is of two kinds, perception and inference; and science is exact experience or correct presentation or presentation in accordance with reality. This will be explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel.

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BOOK EIGHTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Cognition of a doubly specialized nature, illustrated.

Upaskāra.—Having described the mode of production of perceptual cognition, both discriminative and non-discriminative, now the author, with a view to describe the perception of (a doubly specialized nature, or) the being specialized in the specialized, gives a few examples:

अयम् त्वया कृतं भोजयैनमिति बुद्धरपेक्षम् ॥ ८ । २ । १ ॥

अयम् Ayam this. एषः Eṣaḥ that. त्वया Tvayā, by you. कृतं Kṛitam, done. भोजय Bhojaya, feed एनम् Enam, him. इति Iti, such. बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् Buddhi-apekṣam, dependent upon understanding or cognition.

1. 'This,' 'That,' 'Done by you,' 'Feed him'—such (cognitions are) dependent upon Understanding.—321.

The cognition, 'this,' arises in respect of an object which is near, and, 'that,' in respect of an object which is distant. 'By you'—such cognition, coloured with the characteristic of being an agent, presupposes or depends upon the cognition that he is independent in the action. The cognition of the act, namely, 'done,' depends upon the cognition that it is the subject of the operation of the instrument of action. The cognition, 'feed,' depends upon the cognition that he is the agent in the act of feeding, and also the employer of the instrument. The cognition, 'him,' depends upon the cognition that he is the subject of the operation or relation of the fed and the feeder. Similar other instances of cognition, dependent upon cognition, should be understood.—

Dependence of cognition upon cognition, explained.

Upaskāra.—He says that this (i.e., dependence of cognition upon cognition in some cases) is proved by induction from agreement and difference:

दृष्टेषु भावाददृष्टेष्वभावात् ॥ ८ । २ । २ ॥

दृष्टेषु Dṛiṣṭeṣu, in the case of objects seen. भावात् Bhāvāt, from their existence or appearance. अदृष्टेषु A-dṛiṣṭeṣu, in the case of objects unseen. अभावात् Abhāvāt, from their non-existence or non-appearance.

2. (Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions), inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not appear in respect of objects unseen.—322.

When the contiguous object of the cognition 'This,' the object, though distant yet presented in consciousness, of the cognition 'That,' the object, i.e., the contiguous agent, of the cognition 'By you,' the object, i.e., the action, of the cognition 'done,' the object, i.e., the employer and the employed, of the cognition 'Feed,' the object, i.e., the occupation of both of them, of the cognition 'Him,'—when these objects come into contact with the senses, then such cognition is produced. Whereas with reference to unseen objects these cognitions do not

appear. Hence this (i.e., the dependence of cognition upon cognition can be inferred from agreement and difference. This is the meaning.—2.

Substance, Attribute and Action are called artha or object.

Upaskāra.—He now begins another topic :

अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु ॥ ८ । २ । ३ ॥

अर्थः Arthaḥ object. इति Iti, such. द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु Dravya-guṇa-karmasū, in respect of substance, attribute, and action.

3. (The Vaiśeṣikas apply) the term, object, to Substance, Attribute and Action.—323

Of these, i. e., Substance, Attribute and Action, the characteristic of being sought after or apprehended (by the senses) or objectified in such and such ways. has been stated. Hence, '(It is) an object,'—such is the terminology of the Vaiśeṣika thinkers with regard to them, inasmuch as they are presented by the term, object. Accordingly it has been said by Professor *Prasastadeva*, "The characteristic of being denoted by the term, object, belongs to the three."—3.

IV. ii. 2, re-called.

Upaskāra.—He introduces another topic.

द्रव्येषु पञ्चात्मकत्वं प्रतिषिद्धम् ॥ ८ । २ । ४ ॥

द्रव्येषु, Dravyeṣu, under substances. पञ्चात्मकत्वं. Pañcha-ātmakatvaṁ, penta-substantiality, the characteristic of being a compound of five substances. प्रतिषिद्धम् Pratiṣiddham, denied, contravened.

4. In (the topic dealing with the ascertainment of) Substances, (the theory) that bodies, etc., are a compound of five elements, has been refuted.—324.

'Under substances'—the term indicates the topic of the determination of the predicable, substance. By the aphorism (IV. ii. 2, *supra*)", "Of things perceptible and imperceptible, etc.," the penta-substantiality of the body, etc., that is to say, (the theory, that they are compounds of five elements, 'pratiṣiddham,' has been refuted. As a variety of constituent causes does not belong to the body, so also it does not belong to the senses of smell, etc., which are going to be described, It, therefore, becomes proved that the senses are uniformly percipient of their corresponding attributes. This is the import.—4.

The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth.

Upaskāra.—He states the proposition for which the topic was begun :

अयस्त्वादुगन्धव नाञ्च पृथिवी गन्धज्ञाने प्रकृतिः ॥ ८ । २ । ५ ॥

भूयस्त्वात् Bhûyastvât, by reason of preponderance or predominance. गन्धवत्त्वात् Gândha-vatvât, by reason of possession of smell. च Cha, and. पृथिवी Prithivî; earth. गन्धज्ञाने Gandha-jñāne, in (the constitution of) that by which smell is perceived, i. e., the olfactory sense. प्रकृतिः Prakṛtiḥ, matter, material cause, essence.

5. By reason of (its) predominance, and of possession of Smell, Earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense.—325.

That by which smell is cognised, is 'gandha-jñānam,' that is, the olfactory sense. Therein 'prithivî,' Earth, alone is 'prakṛtiḥ,' the material cause. It may be asked, why is it so? Accordingly he says 'gandha-vatvât,' for it has been said already that that which possesses smell cannot be originated by that which is void of smell. The possession of smell (by the olfactory sense) or its odorousness is proved from the rule or well-known uniformity of nature that the external senses themselves possess attributes similar in kind to those which are apprehensible by them. If it be urged, how then can there be such uniformity that the characteristic of being the revealer of smell does not belong to the other members of the body but only to the olfactory sense-organ, even when terrene-ness belongs to all of them without distinction? So he says 'bhûyastvât.' It is the being constituted or originated by terrene particles uninfluenced by other substances, which is called 'bhûyastvām,' 'predominance.' This, 'bhûyastvam,' is a technical term, and has been so used in the kindred system (i. e., the Nyāya-Sūtram) also.—5.

Similarly the Senses of Taste, Colour and Touch are respectively constituted by the Elements of Water, Fire and Air.

Upaskāra.—He extends the argument to the other senses :

तथापस्तेजोवायुश्च रसरूपस्पर्शविशेषात् ॥ ८ । २ । ६ ॥

तथा Tathā, in like manner. आपः Āpaḥ, waters. तेजः Tejaḥ, fire वायुः Vāyuḥ, air. च Cha, and. रसरूपस्पर्शविशेषात् Rasa-rûpa-sparśa-aviśeṣât because of the non-difference of taste, colour and touch.

6. In like manner, Water, Fire and Air (are the material causes of the sense-organs of Taste, Colour and Touch), inasmuch as there is no difference in the Taste, Colour and Touch (which they respectively possess, from what they respectively apprehend).—326.

'The material causes of the organs of the tongue, the eye, and the skin'—this is the complement of the aphorism. Water, etc., are then respectively the material causes of the tongue, etc., inasmuch as the latter respectively apprehend the objects with which they are uniformly related. Here too it is 'bhûyastvam,' 'predominance,' which governs the uniformity (that the characteristics of being the revealer of taste, etc., belong respectively to the tongue, etc.) It has been declared that

it is the rule or uniformity that the tongue, etc., possess particular attributes of the same kind as are apprehensible by them, that is the proof of the possession of taste, etc., by the tongue, etc. Likewise the organ of hearing is only a portion or division of Ether confined within the hollow of the ear and favourably influenced by particular *adriṣṭam* or destiny.—6.

Here ends the second chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.



BOOK NINTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Perception, e. g., of antecedent non-existence is produced by other means than conjunction or combination.

Upaskāra.—After the determination of popular or ordinary perception produced from contact or contiguity in the form of either conjunction or combination, the author begins the ninth book of which the object is to demonstrate ordinary or popular and super-ordinary or hyper-popular perception produced from proximity or presentation due to other causes :

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् प्रागस्त ॥ ६ । १ । १ ॥

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् Kriyâ-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhāvât, in consequence of the non-existence of application or predication of action and attribute. प्राक् prāk, prior, antecedently. अस्त A-sat, non-existent.

1. In consequence of the non-application of Action and Attribute (to it), (an effect is) non-existent prior (to its production.) —227.

‘An effect,’—such is the complement of the aphorism. ‘Prak,’ *i. e.*, prior to the production of the effect, ‘an effect,’ *e. g.*, a water-pot, cloth, etc., ‘a-sat,’ (*i. e.*, non-existent), that is to say, the counter-opposite or contradictory of the contemporaneous non-existence of its own producer. Here the reason is the impossibility of the application of action and attribute. If the effect, *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., were really existent during that time also, then it would be affirmed to possess action and attribute. As in the case of a water-pot already produced reference can be made to it in such forms as “The water-pot is at rest,” “The water-pot is in motion,” “The water-pot is seen to possess colour,” etc., there can be no reference made to it in like manner also prior to its production. It is therefore inferred that the water-pot is during that time, non-existent. And this, antecedent non-existence; in such cases as while straws are in the course of weaving or threads in the course of joining, or when clay is placed on the potter’s wheel, while the activity of the potter, etc., is yet going on, is the universally experienced perceptual cognition that there will be in that place a mat, or a piece of cloth, or a water-pot, inasmuch as such cognition takes place as soon as the eyes are opened. Here proximity or presentation constituted either by conjunction or by combination cannot be the cause of the cognition. Hence proximity or presentation in which the thing in itself or the qualification or distinction of that which is connected with the sense, (indriya sambodha viśeṣanatā) is here the necessary condition of perception. It cannot be said that in this explanation there is mutual dependence (of cause and effect) in as much as the distinction of antecedent non-existence being existent, there is perception of it and the perception being existent, there exists the distinction for the characteristic of being the distinction is here really the proper or essential form of both the cause and the effect and it is capable of producing perception in which both are mutually involved and that is really existent even prior to the perception so it has been declared in

the *Nyāya-Vartika*, "In the case of combination as well as if Non-existence, the relation of *viśeṣa* that which serves to specify and *viśeṣya* that which is specified, (is the proximity between the sense and the object)."

This same antecedent non-existence is productive of its counter-opposite (that is, the object not yet existent). For when a water-pot is produced, it is not produced just at that very moment. Even though the other (partial) causes existed at the time, the imperfectness of the cause, being pursued, should pursue only the imperfectness consisting of the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot itself. If it be objected that the (antecedently non-existent) water-pot itself would then be an impediment to its own production; our reply is that since, by its non-existence at the time, it constitutes the absence of impediment, its causality should not be thrown away. Nor can it be objected that the water-pot itself constituting the non-existence of its antecedent non-existence, it would follow that its antecedent non-existence will again appear when the water-pot is destroyed; for, the destruction of the water-pot also is repugnant to its antecedent non-existence, so that there can be no appearance of a contradictory also during the existence of another contradictory. For the contradiction between them is not merely spatial, so that they might be simultaneous like (the genera of) bovine-ness and horse-ness. The contradiction is temporal also, and therefore how can they be existent at one and the same time?—1.

Note.—In this and the few following aphorisms, the author deals with the topic of *non-existence*. Now, non-existence is primarily divided into two kinds, *samsarga-abhāva* and *anyonya-abhāva*. *Anyonya-abhāva* or reciprocal non-existence is characterised as non-existence of which the counter-opposite (i.e., the object non-existent) is determined by the relation of identity; in other words, it is equivalent to absence of identity, that is, difference. *Samsarga-abhāva* or relational non-existence is non-existence other than reciprocal non-existence, and it is sub-divided as antecedent, consequent, and absolute non-existences.

Bhāṣya.—Non-Existence is not the seventh predicable inasmuch as absolute non-existence, e.g., a castle in the air, is not a predicable at all, while non-existence of the existent, in the forms of non-production, destruction, and absence of identity, cannot exceed the number of the six-predicables.

Consequent non-existence also is proved by perception and inference.

Upaskṛta.—He states that another (form of) non-existence is established by the force of cognition.

सदसत् ॥ ६ । १ । २ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

2. The existent (becomes) non-existent.—328.

As the non-existence of the effect, prior to the operation of the cause, is proved by perception and inference, so is it proved by perception and inference, after the operation of a club, etc., which destroys it, that a really existent effect, e.g., a water-pot, etc., is now non-existent. And this same non-existence is commonly described as

annihilation or destruction (or consequent or emergent non-existence.) For there arise such cognitions as that the water-pot is now destroyed, annihilated, that the letter *ga* which was heard before, no longer exists, etc. This is the import.—2.

The existent is a different thing from the non-existent, so that after annihilation there can be no continuation of existence.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected : It is the same water-pot that under a particular condition gives rise to the idea, or conventional use, of annihilation ; and not that the annihilation of the water-pot is different from the water-pot :

असतः क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादर्थान्तरम् ॥ ६ । १ । ३ ॥

असतः A-sataḥ, from the non-existent. क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् Kraiyā-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhāvāt, in consequence of the non-existence of reference by, or predication of, action and attribute. अर्थान्तरम् Artha-antaram, a different object.

3. (The existent is) a different object (from the non-existent), inasmuch as Action and Attribute cannot be predicated of the non-existent.—329.

Accordingly he says :

"The existent"—such is the complement of the aphorism. The existent is a different object from the non-existent. If it be asked, How ? So he says, 'kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhāvāt.' For there can be no such predication, during the period of annihilation also, as "The water-pot remains," "The water-pot exists at this moment," "The water-pot possesses colour," "Bring the water-pot," etc. In consequence of this difference, therefore, the existent is a different thing from the non-existent.—3.

* *Bhāṣya.*—Whatever is non-existent prior to its appearance as an effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is essentially different from absolute non-existences.

Reciprocal non-existence or absence of identity, explained.

Upaskāra.—Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the present aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-existence :

सच्चासत् ॥ ६ । १ । ४ ॥

सत् Sat, the existent. च Cha, and, also. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

4. The existent also is non-existent.—330.

Where a really existent water-pot etc., are spoken of as being non-existent, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For there arise such cognitions "The horse is non-existent by the nature of the cow," "The cow is non-existent by the nature of the horse," "A piece of cloth

is non-existent by the nature of a water-pot," "A piece of cloth is a not-water-pot," "A cow is a not-horse," "A horse is a not-cow," etc. Now, "A cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse," "A water-pot possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth,"—it is this reciprocal non-existence, otherwise called absence of identity, that appears in the above cognitions. Here identity is that which determines the counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of identity). And this (reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum or denotation or extension as its counter-opposite (i. e., identity); for there is such cognition as that the water-pot is not the ground (on which it lies). It is also eternal, for it is impossible that there should be at any time identity between a water-pot and a piece of cloth.—4.

In addition to antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existence, there is absolute non-existence.

Upaskāra.—Now he describes the fourth (kind of) non-existence called absolute non-existence.

यच्चान्यदसदस्तदसत् ॥ ६ । १ । ५ ॥

यत् Yat, that, which. च Cha, and. अन्यत् Anyat, different. असत् A-sat, non-existent. अतः Atah, from these, i. e., antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existents. तत् Tat, that. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

5. And that which is a different non-existent from these, is (absolutely) non-existent.—331.

'Atah,' from the three forementioned non-existences, 'yat anyat a-sat tat a-sat,' (that which is a different non-existent is non-existent) i. e., that is absolute non-existence. The word 'a-sat' (non-existent) is in both the places used in a substantive sense. Of these, one 'a-sat,' is the subject and the other 'a-sat' is the predicate in apposition with the subject. The meaning of the aphorism, therefore, comes to be this that non-existence which is different from the three fore-mentioned non-existences, is absolute non-existence. Amongst these, antecedent non-existence is limited in the future or at the end, consequent non-existence is limited in the past or at the beginning, and reciprocal non-existence has the same substratum or extension as its counter-opposite; but absolute non-existence differs from all the three. Hence it is the fourth (kind of) non-existence.—5.

Vivṛiti.—There are three things repugnant to absolute non-existence, viz., the counter-opposite or the object non-existent, its antecedent non-existence, and its consequent non-existence. The ancients teach that the cognitions that dark colour does not exist (after baking) in a red water-pot, and that red colour does not exist (before baking) in a dark water-pot, are conversant about consequent and antecedent non-existences, but not absolute non-existence. The moderns, on the other hand, maintain that consequent and antecedent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute non-existence and hence that there certainly is absolute non-existence also by reference to annihilation, production, etc. They hold that when a water-pot, etc., previously removed, are brought back to a place, there is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water-pot, so

long as the water-pot exists, inasmuch as the time during which the water-pot is existent does not constitute connection with non-existence. Some, again, teach that when there has formerly stood in any place a water-pot, and this has been removed and brought back again, there arises in this case cognition of a fourth kind of non-existence under the aspect of connection (*Samsarga-abhāva*), called temporary non-existence, and not of absolute non-existence.

Causes of the perception consequent non-existence.

Upaskāra.—He now begins another section and therein states the causes of the perception of consequent non-existence :

असदिति भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावात् भूतस्मृतेर्विरोधि

प्रत्यक्षवत् ॥ ६ । १ । ६ ॥

असत् A-sat, non-existent. इति Iti, such. भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावात् Bhūta-pratyakṣa-abhāvāt, because of the non-existence of the perception of a past object. भूतस्मृतेः Bhūta-smṛteḥ, because of the recollection of a past object. विरोधिप्रत्यक्षवत् Virodhi-pratyakṣa-vat, similar to the perception of the contradictory or opposite.

6. “(It is) non-existent”—such (perceptual cognition) is similar to the perception of the counter-opposite (of non-existence), because (in both cases) there is non-existence of the perception of that which is past and gone, and there is recollection of the past.—332.

‘ A-sat iti ’ ; By the word, ‘ iti,’ he indicates cognition in the form of perception. Thereby (it is obtained that) there is such perceptual cognition as “ The water-pot is non-existent,” “ The water-pot has been destroyed,” “ The water-pot is now in a state of annihilation.” An example of this cognition is given by ‘ virodhi-pratyakṣa-vat ’ ; as there is clear perception of the counter-opposite (of existence) e. g., a water-pot, etc., so there is of its annihilation or consequent non-existence also. The reason of this stated as ‘ bhūta-pratyakṣa-abhāvāt,’ which means, because there is non-existence of the perception of ‘ bhūta,’ i. e., a water-pot, etc., which having been first produced have been subsequently destroyed. Hereby the non-apprehension of the (once) apprehensible is stated. There, again, the following argument is confirmatory (of the perceptual cognition) : If there were a water-pot here, it would be seen, as the place is seen ; but it is not visible ; therefore there is none. He mentions another auxiliary cause : ‘ bhūta-smṛteḥ,’ which means, because there is recollection of the counter-opposite, e. g., a water-pot, etc., which is past and gone. Hereby recollection of the counter-opposite is stated.—6.

Vivṛiti.—The four kinds of non-existence being explained, the perception of consequent non-existence is explained.

‘ A-sat, iti,’ “ The water-pot is non-existent,” “ The water-pot is destroyed,” “ The water-pot is annihilated,”—such perception, ‘ virodhi-pratyakṣavāt,’ is similar to the perception of the water-pot which is the

counter-opposite (of its non-existence), that is to say, is proved by sense-experience and produced from the ordinary or popularly understood contact (of sense and object). Between them there is, however, this difference that the perception of the counter-opposite is produced from the conjunction of the eye, etc., (with their objects), while the perception of consequent non-existence is produced from there being a modification or qualification (e. g., non-existence of water-pot in ('place possessing non-existence of water-pot')) conjoint with the eye, etc. He mentions another point of difference, viz., 'bhūta-pratyakṣa-abhāvāt.' The meaning is that perception of consequent non-existence is produced from a cause in the form of the non-apprehension of the apprehensible consequent on the non-existence of the perception of the past, i. e., the counter-opposite, e. g., the water-pot, etc., and also from the recollection of the past water-pot etc., in other words, from cognition of the counter-opposite, which cognition is here identical with recollection. Thus the perception of consequent non-existence is produced from the non-perception of its counter-opposite as well as from the cognition of the counter-opposite, whereas the perception of the counter-opposite is not so produced. There is, therefore, difference between them in this respect also. This is the import. 'It should be observed that recollection as such is not intended (in this aphorism, though the word has been used), but mere cognition is intended. That being so, the idea is this that as the water-pot, etc., are proved by perception, so also are their consequent non-existences.

Causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.

Upakāra.—Extending to antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent non-existence is an object of perception, he says :

तथाऽभावे भावप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च ॥ ६ । १ । ७ ॥

tathā Tathā, similarly. अभावे A-bhāve, in the case of (antecedent) non-existence. भावप्रत्यक्षत्वात् Bhāva-pratyakṣa-tvāt, in consequence of the perceptibility of the existent. च Cha, also.

7. Similarly (there is perceptual cognition) of (antecedent) non-existence, in consequence also of the perceptibility of the existent.—333.

Although this word, non-existence is a general term, still from the context it signifies antecedent non-existence. As there is perceptual cognition in the case of consequent non-existence, so also in the case of antecedent non-existence. Q.—How? A.—'Bhāva-pratyakṣatvāt' : 'pratyakṣatvāt,' in consequence of the characteristic of being made an object of cognition by perception, 'bhāvasya,' of straws, etc., while these are in the course of weaving (for a mat which is then antecedently non-existent). Or, the meaning is this: 'pratyakṣatvāt,' in consequence of the 'fitness' (for the senses) or apprehensibility, 'bhāvasya,' of the substratum as well as of the counter-opposite (i. e., the mat after production); inasmuch as the apprehensibility of the substratum as well as the apprehensibility of the counter-opposite govern the apprehension of *Samsarga-abhāva* or relational non-existence. The word 'cha,' also, brings

forward the recollection of the counter-opposite and the argument already stated (in the preceding aphorism, as contributory causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.) (It is to be observed that), although antecedent non-existence has no beginning, and although consequent non-existence has no end, yet they are perceptible under particular conditions only.—7.

Vivṛiti.—It may be asked, inasmuch as antecedent non-existence has no beginning, how is it that there is no perception of it long before the production of the conjunction of the two halves of a water-pot, etc., the fore-mentioned causes (of such perception) being possible at that time also? Hence the author adds, 'bhāva-pratyakṣatvāt.' 'Bhāva' means the final collocation of causes, according to its derivation from the root *bhū*, 'to be' by the affix *ghaff*, in the ablative sense that it springs from this. 'Bhāvapratyakṣatvāt' means the state or condition of that whereof perception takes place by means of 'bhāva.' The resultant meaning of the term, therefore, is, because it must be manifested by the final collocation of causes. Thus, the import is, in the instance in question, there can be no perception of antecedent non-existence in consequence of the non-existence of the final collocation of cause.

Causes of the perception of reciprocal non-existence.

Upaśkāra.—He shows that reciprocal non-existence is an object of perception :

तनघटोऽगौरधर्मश्च व्याख्यातः ॥ ६ । १ । ८ ॥

एतेन Etena, hereby. अघटः A-ghaṭaḥ, not-water-pot. अगौः A-gauḥ, not-cow. अधर्मः A-dharmaḥ, not-dharma. च Cha, and, also. व्याख्यातः Vyākhyātaḥ, explained.

8. Hereby also are explained 'not-water-pot,' 'not-cow,' not-dharma.' 334.

'Etena'—by this term he extends (the causality of) the recollection of the counter-opposite, apprehension of the substratum, and the argument stated before. Non-apprehension of the apprehensible is the same in all cases. The word, 'cha,' also, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before. 'A-dharmaḥ': By saying that the reciprocal non-existence of *dharma*, merit, though it is supersensible, is an object of perception in its substratum, e. g., pleasure, knowledge, etc., he suggests that in the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence, apprehensibility of the counter-opposite is not the governing condition, but that only the apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing condition. How otherwise could the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend, in the form that the pillar is not a fiend, be apprehended in the pillar? For, the non-apprehension of a fiend as being coincident or identical with the pillar is the cause of the apprehension of the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend (in the pillar), and, it is again impossible, were the pillar identical with a fiend, that there should be such non-apprehension (of a fiend in the pillar), since such non-apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by, the existence of the entity (e. g., a fiend) which is the counter-opposite (of its non-existence.)

Objection.—Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the counter-opposite. Is it then a fiend? But it may be that though it is present in the pillar, yet, like its gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its non-apprehension would not be contradictory to the existence of the entity which is the counter-opposite, (*viz.*, a fiend.)

Answer.—It is not so, for, like the non-apprehension of the counter-opposite, the non-apprehension of that which determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of non-existence.

Objection.—The apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is dependent upon the apprehension of counter-opposite-ness, and counter-oppositeness is of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence; and hence it follows that the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is really dependent upon the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.

Answer.—This is not the case; for, as has been already stated, it is a property which is cognised as being not present in any given substratum, that determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, but the apprehension of that property also as that which determines counter-opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence).—8.

Vivṛiti.—The causes of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence are determination (or possession of attribution, or intrinsic form) in relation to the senses,—*indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣanata*,—non-apprehension of the counter-opposite, and cognition of the counter-opposite. The difference, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counter-opposite is the condition of apprehension of *Samsarga-abhāva* or relational non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus, in spite of the super-sensibility of *dharma* or merit, there is no impediment to the perception of its reciprocal non-existence in the sensible substratum thereof, *e. g.*, pleasure and the like. Whereas some have taught that perceptibility of both the counter-opposite and the substratum is the condition of apprehension of relational non-existence, this is inaccurate; for, were this the case, since the perception of non-existence of fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in treacle, of non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch as well as sound in ether would be impossible, their respective substrata would not be perceptible to the several senses cognisant thereof respectively. It is from this consideration that *Pakṣadhara Mīśra* has maintained that the perception of the destruction (or cessation) of the touch of air is produced by the determination or qualification thereof by time conjoint with the skin.

Perception of absolute non-existence, how produced.

Upakāra.—Now in this aphorism he says that absolute non-existence is an object of perception:

अभूतं नास्तीत्यनयान्तरः ॥ ६ । १ । ६ ॥

अभूतं A-bhutam, not produced. न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, exists. इति Iti, this. अनयान्तरं An-artha-antaram, not different objects.

9. That which has not been produced, does not exist;—this is an identical proposition.—335.

That which was produced, at present does not exist—such cognition rests upon annihilation, and is not conversant about, or does not bring out, the having been produced; whereas perceptual cognition which embraces simply this that it does not exist, reposes upon absolute non-existence. 'A-bhūtam,' (that which has not been produced), denotes non-cognizance of production and destruction. The being 'an-artha-antaram,' not different objects, also has the same purport only. For example, Earth-ness does not exist in Water, and Water-ness does not exist in Earth. For, were there Earth-ness in watery wholes, it would be perceived, but it is not perceived, therefore it does not exist;—a reference to such argument is to be observed in this case also. We must, in like manner, hold that there is absolute non-existence of a thing where such a thing will never be, nor even has been, produced. The cognition, on the other hand, in the form that it does not exist, of the non-existence in their substratum, of that which has been, and that which will be, depends upon consequent non-existence and antecedent non-existence. Hence it is that this (absolute non-existence) is designated as absolute or illimitable and as of trinal time or eternal.—9.

Vivṛiti.—'Na asti iti,' perception in the form that something does not exist, which is 'abhūtam,' not conversant about the past, 'an-artha-antaram,' that is, has for its object nothing but absolute non-existence, such as consequent non-existence etc. * * * *. The word 'bhūta' or past includes the future also.

The perception, "The water-pot does not (now) exist in the room," explained.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected: The non-existence of the water-pot in the room is not absolute non-existence, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-existence or consequent non-existence, for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-existence undergoing production and destruction, for the expression 'absolute non-existence undergoing production and destruction' involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind of *sāmsarga-abhāva* or non-existence of association, since in that case the three-fold division of the non-existence of association would be disproved.

To meet this objection, he says :

नास्ति घटो गेहे इति सतो घटस्य गेह संसर्गप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६ । १ । १० ॥

न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, exists. घटः Ghaṭaḥ, water-pot. गेहे Gehe, in the room. इति Iti, such. सतः Sataḥ, existent. घटस्य Ghaṭasya, of water-pot. गेहसंसर्गप्रतिषेधः Geha-sāmsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ, negation of association with the room.

10. The water-pot does not exist in the room—such is (the form of) the negation of association of the existent water-pot with the room.—336.

('Geha-sāmsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ' means) the negation or privation of the association or conjunction of the water-pot with the room. And it would be simply absolute non-existence, if the water-pot do not exist

at any time whatever ; antecedent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which will exist ; and consequent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which had its existence in the past.

Objection.—That being so, the cognition should have been in this form that connection of the water-pot does not exist in the room.

Answer.—What is meant by ‘ the cognition should have been ’ ? If it means ‘ the cognition of which the actual object or content is the connection of the water-pot, should have been,’ and so conveys the sense of inclusion, then what is desired is obtained. If, on the other hand, it means ‘ (the cognition) which refers to or suggests that (i. e., connection of the water-pot),’ then (we reply that), it is the reference to the substratum, viz., in the room, which leads to, and results in, the reference to the connection, inasmuch as it is the being the substratum that appears in the form of connection of the property (or conjunction of the contained.)

Objection.—Does then the water-pot really exist there ?

Answer.—What do you mean by ‘ really exist ’ ? Is it combined or conjunct ? It cannot be the first since there is in the room non-existence, of the water-pot as combined with it (that is, since the room is not the material cause of the water-pot). Nor the latter, since there is denial of conjunction.

Objection.—It would then follow that the water-pot, etc., are always present, inasmuch as there is everywhere denial only of the one or the other of their conjunction and combination.

Answer.—This would not follow, since the denial itself of both of them is identical with the denial of the water-pot. Are then the water-pot and its conjunction one and the same thing, whereby denial of conjunction of the water-pot would be the denial of the water-pot ? Are then the water-pot and its combination one and the same thing, whereby the admission itself of its combination would be the admission of the water-pot ? For, there is not presence of the water-pot there where both of them (conjunction and combination) are denied, whereby the water-pot might be in constant agreement. Thus it is the denial or negations of the admission or affirmation of something, that constitutes the denial or negation of that thing.

Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of the water-pot in the room in the relation of being in combination, and that it is this (absolute non-existence) that is the object of the cognition that the water-pot does not exist in the room ; as for example, (there is absolute non-existence of the water-pot) in the potsherd in the relation of being in conjunction.

Objection.—Such being the case, the water-pot would be non-existent, being the counter-opposite of the constantly present absolute non-existence.

Answer.—It would be so, were it everywhere non-existent under the joint characteristics of being in conjunction and being in combination.—10.

Perception of the Soul, how produced, in the yogins who are (called) united.

Upaskāra.—Having thus ascertained popular perception having for its object existence and non-existence, he begins a new section in order to ascertain the perception of the *yogins* :

आत्मन्यात्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ६ । १ । ११ ।

आत्मनि *Ātmani*, in the soul. *आत्ममनसोः* *Ātma-manasoḥ*, of soul and mind. *संयोगविशेषात्* *Samyoga-viśeṣāt*, from a particular conjunction. *आत्मप्रत्यक्षम्* *Ātma-pratyakṣam*, perception of the soul.

11. Perceptual cognition of the Soul (results) from a particular conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul.—337.

“ Knowledge is produced ”—such is the complement (of the aphorism.) Now, the *yogins* or ascetics are divided into two classes ; those whose internal organs have been steadied in *samādhi* or deep meditation, and they are called *united* ; and those whose internal organs are no longer steadied in *samādhi*, and they are called *disunited*. Therein those who are *united*, having with eagerness fixed their mind on the object to be presented to it, are engaged in constant meditation ; and in them cognition of the soul, of their own souls as well as of the souls of others, is produced. ‘ *Ātma-pratyakṣam* ’ means in the manner of the cognition in which the soul is the percept or object of immediate presentation or intuition. Although in ourselves and others also, cognition of the soul sometimes exists or appears, yet, as it is obscured by *avidyā* or nescience, it has been declared to be virtually non-existent. ‘ *Ātma-manasoḥ samyoga-viśeṣāt* ’ means from particular contiguity between the soul and the mind, namely, a favourable influence by virtue born of *yoga* or holy communion.—11.

Vivṛiti.—Having examined perception produced through ordinary or physical presentation or contiguity, he now explains perception produced through super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or contiguity.

‘ *Ātma-manasoḥ samyoga-viśeṣāt*, ’ from the conjunction of the soul and mind, accompanied by the power or virtue born of *yoga*, or holy communion ; ‘ *Ātmani*, ’ there being effort or volition towards the origination of understanding, (*ātma* meaning volition) on the authority of the lexicography : “ Soul or *Ātma*, Volition, Patience or Contience, Understanding (are synonymous), ”—that is to say, when there arises the thought produced by volition towards the origination of understanding ; ‘ *Ātma-pratyakṣam*, ’ perception of one’s own soul as well as of the souls of others ; “ takes place, ” this is the complement of the aphorism.

Now, super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or contiguity is three-fold, according to its division as *Samānya-lakṣaṇa*, having the form of the genus, *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*, having the form of cognition, and *yogaja-dharma*, virtue or power born of holy communion. Therein *yogaja-dharma* is a particular merit or virtue produced by the practice

of *yoga* or holy communion, and to the existence of which the Vedas, Purāṇas, etc., testify. It is again two-fold according to the two-foldness of the *yogins* as those who are *united* or have attained to holy communion and those who are *in the process of being united* or are in the course of attaining to holy communion. Among them those are called the *united*, who have subdued their mind or inner sense by the practice of *yoga* and have achieved the *siddhis* or 'powers,' perfection or attainments by means of *Samādhi* or meditation. It is they that are also called the specially united, on account of their possessing conspicuous or advanced *yoga*. Those who are *in the process of being united* are they whose minds are turned away from objects of the senses and who are immediate beholders of all objects through the accompaniment of contemplation. The present aphorism has been laid down with reference to such *yogins* only.

Note.—It would seem that the word *viyukta* has been differently used by *Śaṅkara* *Mīra* and *Jayanārdayaṇa*; by the former in the sense of the *disunited*, and by the latter as denoting those who are *specially united* through the possession of highly advanced *yoga* Vide IX. i. 13 *infra*, *Upaskāra*. *Śaṅkara* *Mīra* obviously does not recognise the distinction, made by *Jayanārdayaṇa*, of the *united* and those *in the process of being united*. According to him, *yogins* are of two classes, namely, the *united* and the *ultra-united* or *dis-united*.

Omniscience of the united yogins, how possible.

Upaskāra.—Do then the *united* have cognition in respect of the soul only? How therefore can they possess omniscience? In reply to these possible queries, he says:

तथा द्रव्यान्तरे प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ६ । १ । १२ ॥

Tathā, similarly. *द्रव्यान्तरेषु* *Dravya-antareṣu*, in the case of other substances. *प्रत्यक्षम्* *Pratyakṣam*, perceptual.

12. Perceptual (cognition is) similarly (produced) in the case of the other substances.—338.

"Cognition is produced"—this is implied by the context. '*Tathā*' means by the mind, only as favourably influenced by, or accompanied with, the virtue or power, born of *yoga* or holy communion. '*Dravya-antareṣu*' means in respect of the four kinds of ultimate atoms, the mind, air, space, time and ether. By the term, substance, are included attribute, action and genus inhering in substance; the predicable, species, combination; also gravity, elasticity, etc., appertaining to things which are not objects of perception; and also volition, the source of vitality (or spontaneity), non-discriminative thought, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., residing in the soul. For the favourable influence of the virtue or power born of *yoga* is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus; otherwise omniscience would not be affirmed (of those who are *united*).—12.

Omniscience belong also to those yogins who are (called) dis-united.

Upaskāra.—Having described the perceptual cognition of the *united*, he now describes that of the *disunited*.

असंयतचित्तः करणा उपसं तसमावयस्तथैव ॥ ६ । १ । १३ ॥

असमाहितान्तःकरणः *Ā-samāhita-antahkaraṇāḥ*, whose internal organs are not attached to meditation. उपसंहृतसमाधयः *Upsamāhrita-samādhayaḥ*, who have given up meditation. तेषां *Teṣām*, their. च *Cha*, also.

13. They whose internal sense-organs are not attached to meditation, are those by whom meditation has been given up. They too (have perception of hidden and distant objects.)—339.

'*Upasamāhrita-samādhayaḥ*' is simply an explication of '*asamāhita-antahkaraṇāḥ*.' Or, to the question, why they are called '*asmāhita-antahkaraṇāḥ*'? the reply is given by '*upasamāhrita-samādhayaḥ*,' meaning, because they are those by whom. '*Samādhi*' of which the essence is constant meditation, '*upasamāhrita*,' has been thrown away. For they, being able to transcend the senses through the influence of *Samādhi*, absorption or intentness of mind on one acquiring *Śarīra-Siddhi*, powers over, or perfection of, the physical object only, and, organism, *e. g.*, the power of attenuation, etc., and *Indriya-Siddhi*, powers over, perfection of, the senses, *e. g.*, the power of hearing at a distance, *i. e.*, clair-audience, etc., and then feeling the insufficiency of *Samādhi* itself, realise the need of other parctices as referred to in following and other texts of the Veda : तावदेवास्य चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ रूपस्थ्ये, There is need for it so long as I am not freed and fulfilled. They learn that every form of *bhoga* or experience whether agreeable or disagreeable, must be undergone, and that they will undoubtedly reach firm ground from which there is no fall, only after experiencing *Karma-āśaya*, vehicles of *karma*, *i. e.*, physical organisms, previously merited or acquired, in different countries, divisions of the land, peninsulas, etc., by different births as horses, elephant, birds, serpents, etc., as well as by existence as celestials, sages, or men. They, therefore, make the whole universe of things, hidden and distant, the objects of their perception, the powers of their senses having been enlarged or heightened by the force of the virtue or power born of *Yoga*.—13.

Vivṛiti.—After describing the perception of the *yogin* who is in course of union, he describes that of the *yogin* who has attained union.

'*Asamāhita-antahkaraṇāḥ*,' those whose internal sense is destitute of *Samādhi* or meditation; '*upasamāhrita-samādhayaḥ*,' those by whom *samādhi* or deep meditation has been consummated, that is, carried to fruition, in whom are produced the various *siddhis*, perfections or attainments which are the fruit of *samādhi* or deep meditation;—such united *yogins* attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is the sense to be gathered from the aphorism. In fine, in the perception of the *yogin* who is in course of union, there is need for *dhyāna*, thought or contemplation, while in the perception of the *yogin* who is united, there is no need of *samādhi* or meditation involving thought or contemplation.

Note.—According to the *vivṛiti*, 'the word '*asamāhita-antahkaraṇāḥ*' would seem not to have syntactical connection in the aphorism. The classification of *yogins*, made by *Jyānārḍyaṇa*, is, therefore, so far unsatisfactory.

*The Yogin's perception of Substance, Attribute and Action,
popularly explained.*

Upaskṛta.—It may be objected: In them (i.e., substances, etc.) cognition (of the Yogins) is not mental, inasmuch as the mind is not self-dependent outside its sphere. Nor is it a product of the external senses; for, they apprehend objects present as being connected with them, depend upon the development of colour, etc., as the case may be, to the degree of perceptibility, and particularly depend also upon light, etc.

In anticipation of this objection, he proves 'proximity' (i.e., the medium of cognition) in the case of certain predicables, and says:

तत्समवायात् कर्मगुणेषु ॥ ६ । १ । १४ ॥

तत्समवायात् Tat-samavāyāt, from combination with that, i.e., substance. कर्मगुणेषु karma-guṇeṣu, in respect of actions and attributes.

14. (Perception) of Actions and Attributes (arises) from (their) combination with Substance.—340.

"Perceptual cognition is produced"—this is the complement (of the aphorism.) If the elemental senses are dependent upon some presentation or contiguity (of objects to them for the apprehension of those objects by them), then from the combination in that which is in conjunction with the mind of the perceiver, cognition of the genera of attributes combined or inhering in the ultimate atoms, ether, space and time, is produced and in the case of other substances, since there is conjunction with them of various sterile (seed-less?) minds, favourably directed towards, or taken over for, the experience of mortal coils, cognition is produced in respect of the attributes, etc., of those substances through their combination in those substances which are thus conjoint with those minds. This is declared here, regard being had to, or in view of easy demonstration. In fact, in the case of the external senses as well as of the mind, it is the virtue or power born of *yoga* that constitutes the 'proximity' or presentation to the senses, inasmuch as all uncertainty or impossibility of proof is set at rest by it alone. The drinking up of the ocean by *Agastya* (the sage), and the conversion of the kingdom of *Dandaka* into a forest are examples in point.—14.

Vivṛiti.—It may be urged that omniscience is not possible or proved in the *Yogin*, for though there be perception of substances, there is no such cognition of attributes, etc. Accordingly he says :

The meaning is that from combination of 'that,' i.e., conjunction of mind facilitated by the power or virtue born of *Yoga* or holy communion, there is produced in the *Yogin*, whether united or in course of union, perception of attributes and actions.

* * * The term 'of actions and attributes' is indicative, and genus, etc., also are to be understood. In a like manner, should be understood perception produced from super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or contiguity in the form of *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* or general implication, and *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* or implication of cognition.

The Yogins perceive the attributes of their own souls in the popular way.

Upaskṛta.—Is it then, it may be asked, combination with that which is conjoint with some other substance, that constitutes the presentation or 'proximity' to the mind, even in the case of one's own understanding, etc. ? He replies, No :

आत्मसमवायादात्मगुण ॥ ६ । १ । १५ ॥

आत्मसमवायाद् *Ātma-Samavāyāt*, from combination in the soul. आत्मगुणेषु *Ātma-Guṇeṣu*, in respect of the attributes of the soul.

15. (Perceptual cognition) of the attributes of the Soul (results) from (their) combination in the Soul.—341.

"Perceptual cognition of the *yogins* is produced"—this is the topic. Perceptual cognition of understanding, etc., combined in the soul is on the other hand, produced simply from combination in the conjoint, (i. e., the soul which is conjoint with the mind), as it is with ourselves and others. The meaning, therefore, is that in such cognition there is no dependence upon any other form of contiguity or presentation. Now, ordinary or popular perception is cognition, which is never changing, produced from the contact of the senses and objects. It may be said to be produced by objects. Perception is connected with the genus of presentation (that is, without some form of immediate presentation, there can be no perception). And this is common to ordinary or popular and to super-ordinary or hyper-popular cognitions.—15.

Here ends the first chapter in the ninth book of the Commentary of Śaṅkara on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Bhāṣya.—In the view of *Kaṇāda*, there are only three independent and ultimate predicables, namely, Substance, Attribute, and Action, for, while describing the process of *yogic* cognition of all realities, he deals with these three predicables only and is entirely silent with regard to the other so-called predicables.

BOOK NINTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Marks of inference enumerated.

Upaskṛta.—Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of *gogins* and non-*gogins* has been determined according to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the two kinds into which *pramāṇa* or proof has been divided, viz., perceptual or sensuous and inferential or produced by marks, the author now commences to determine that which is produced by means of marks :

अस्यैः कार्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति

लौकिकः ॥ ६।२।१॥

अस्य *Asya*, of this. इदे *Idam*, it. कार्यं *Kāryam*, effect. कारणं *Kāraṇam*, cause. संयोगि *Samyogi*, conjunct. विरोधि *Virodhi*, contradictory. समवायि *Samavāyi*, combined. च *Cha*, or. इति *Iti*, such. लौकिकम् *Laingikam*, produced by the mark of inference, mediate.

1. “ It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined in, this,”—such is (cognition) produced by the mark of inference.—342.

‘Cognition’—this is the topic in hand. ‘*Laingikam*’ means produced from *lingam* or mark. *Lingam* is a property of the *pakṣa*, possessing *vyāpti*, pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term. Therein *vyāpti* has been already declared. (*Vide* III. i. 14, *supra*.) One thing is *pakṣa* in relation to another, when there is in the former non-existence of proof or evidence repugnant to the desire for proving the latter. Such evidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative as well as obstructive, for a *pakṣa* or minor term is that which contains non-existence of both of them. For, there existing either demonstrative or obstructive evidence, no one feels doubt or desire of demonstration. It is for this reason that the ancients defined the *pakṣa* to be an object wherein the existence of the *sādhya*, that which has to be established, the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existence of the *sādhya*, is desired to be demonstrated. According to *Jīvanātha Mītra*, a *pakṣa* is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascertainment of the possession of producible *sādhya*. Some others say that that is a *pakṣa* in which there is non-existence of demonstrative evidence accompanied with absence of desire of proof. In this view, the nature of the *pakṣa* will exist even in the case of obstruction (i. e., even where obstructive evidence, in other words evidence which disproves the existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be seen in the *Anumāna-Mayūkha*.

It then becomes apparent that the property or characteristic of this *pakṣa* is the *linga* or mark of inference. And the cognition, in the form of a presentative state of consciousness, which the mark, whether it be a visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is ‘*laingikam*’ or that which is produced from a mark. Accordingly it has been said.

अनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं तद्विधेः । ॥

तद्विधेः तु नास्त्येव तन्निमित्तं नापकम्

That mark is the medium of inference, which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is known to exist in that which is accompanied with that which is to be inferred, and does not exist at all where that does not exist.

If is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential cognition, and not its *parāmarśa*, subsumption, inasmuch as subsumption, being destitute of function, lacks causality whereas 'it is the same (i. e., to cause inference) that is the function of the mark.

Objection.—How can there be illation or inferential cognition, where the smoke, etc., (i. e., marks) are either past or future?

Answer.—This is not a valid objection, as in this case the *sādhya* or that which is to be proved, is also inferred as past or future.

Objection.—How can there be illation where, in consequence of an impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke, etc., be past, future or present?

Answer.—There can be by no means, since in such an instance there is uncertainty also as to the *sādhya*, that which is to be proved.

Objection.—How can an illation take place where there is certainty as to the existence (of the mark) on a previous and a following day, and uncertainty as to the intermediate day?

Answer.—In such a case, the inferential cognition results from the inference of fire, etc., limited to those days, by means of smoke, etc., limited to those days, such having been ascertained to be the causality of *vyapti*, pervasion or the universal concomitance of the major and minor terms, (in the process of inference)

Objection.—How does inferential cognition arise from a cloud of dust mistaken for smoke?

Answer.—It is because that which is understood to be pervaded (i. e., the cloud of dust, supposed to be smoke, and therefore pervaded by fire), is the mark of inference, and because the inference is correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of such understanding; else how should your own *parāmarśa* or subsumption be the instrument (of inferential cognition) in such a case?

Objection.—In the case of a supersensible mark, *parāmarśa* or subsumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have the function (of being the means of inference)?

Answer.—Such function is effected by there being a practical or saving argument demonstrative of existence (*kṣaimika sādhanatā*), for, otherwise, the function of combination in the case of hearing, etc., would not be possible.

Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the inference of fire, etc., from smoke, light, etc.; also from (a mark which is) a cause, as the inference of sound by a deaf man from a particular conjunction of the drum and the drumstick, or the inference of dharma or merit, heaven, etc., by a pious man from the due performance of

sacrifice, ablution, etc., or the inference of rain from the due performance of *kārtti* or Sacrifice for rain, or the inference of the efflux of water from a channel which men are digging out from a river, etc., full of water, or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation of rain overhead. This is, then, a single connection, characterised as the relation of effect and cause, which has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as the inference of the sense-organ of the skin from the observation of the physical organism which is in conjunction with it. Inference from a contradictory or repugnant object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, etc., from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural antagonist. Inference from a combined object is such as the inference of fire connected with water by means of the warmth of the water.—1.

Vivṛiti—* * * Cognition by means of marks is of three kinds, according as it contains a cause, or an effect or a co-existent thing as the mark, and is called *pūrva-vat*, *śeṣa-vat*, or *sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭam*. *Pūrva-vat* means that which contains as the mark the antecedent, that is, the cause. *Śeṣa-vat* means that which contains as the mark the consequent, that is, the effect. *Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭam* means that which contains as the mark something other than a cause or an effect. The author explains these forms of inference, which have been also explained in the aphorisms of *Gautama* (i.e., the *Nyāya-Sātram*) ‘*Asya idam kāryyam*’; ‘*Asya*,’ of this, i.e., of the *sādhyā* or that which is to be proved, ‘*idam*,’ this the *sādhana* or that which will prove the *sādhyā*, is ‘*kāryyam*,’ i.e., the effect—where such usage arises, there it is the case of inference by means of an effect as the inferential mark, e.g., the inference of fire and the like, by the mark of the smoke and the like ‘*Asya idam kāraṇam*’: that is inference of which the mark is a cause is as, e.g., the inference of a shower by means of a particular ascent of clouds. *Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭam* or that which appears in the form of that of which the inferential mark is something other than a cause or an effect, is manifold; as, for example, the inference of the iron ring as being in conjunction with the mortar and the like, by means of the mark of a particular pestle which is conjoint with the iron ring (at its end); so also is the inference of an ichneumon concealed behind bushes and the like, by the sight of a particular excited snake which is the enemy of the ichneumon; and also the inference of fire and the like (as existing) in a frying pan and the like, by means of the hot touch combining in fire, in the form of the counter-opposite of combination favourable to fire.

Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related.

Upasāra.—It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since it does not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the moon, of the rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation *Argo navis*) from the tranquillity or clearness of the waters of the rising of the moon from the expansion of the Nymphs, of the setting of the fourteen lunar mansions or *nakṣatras* from the rising of the other fourteen, of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular colour.

अस्येदं कार्यं काणसम्बन्धश्चावयवाद् भवति ॥ ६ । २ । २ ॥

अस्य *Asya*, its, to it. इदं *Idam*, it. कार्यकारणसम्बन्धः *Kāryya-kāraṇa-sambandhaḥ*, (The suggestion or introduction of the relation of effect and

cause.) च Cha, and, whereas. अवयवात् Avayavât, from a member of the argument or syllogism. भवति Bhavati, arises.

2. 'It is its' (—this cognition is sufficient to cause an illation to be made); whereas (the introduction of) the relation of effect and cause arises from a (particular) member (of the argument). —343.

In anticipation of this objection, he says.

'It is its'—this much only becomes the instrument of illation. 'Asya,' i. e., of the means of illation, e. g., smoke, etc., 'idam,' i. e., (it is) that which is to be established, e. g., fire, etc.; or, 'asya,' i. e., of the pervader, e. g., fire, etc., 'idam,' i. e., (it is) that which can be pervaded, e. g., smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being that which can be pervaded, that governs (the process of illation), and not also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might be objected that the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorism is consequently futile, he adds 'the relation of effect and cause.' Other relation (i. e., of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined), mentioned above, are also hereby implied. In the word 'relation,' there is the tropical suggestion of that in which relation is the thing contained. 'Relation' accordingly means the introduction or talk of relation. Whence does the introduction or talk of relation arise? He gives the reply by saying 'avayavât, i. e., from a part or member (of the argument), that is to say, only from the *udaharana* or example or illustration. The fifth case-ending or the ablative inflection (in 'avayavât') bears the sense of the infinite. The meaning, therefore, is that, in this *Darśana* or philosophy as well as in the Sāṃkhya and other *Darśanas* the introduction of the relation of effect and cause, etc., has been made in conformity with, or regard being had to, the *udaharana* or illustration (q. v., further below).

Thus, then, *vyāpyatva*, the being that which can be pervaded (as the mark, by that of which it is the mark) denotes the possession of a natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental or adventitious. This quality of being non-accidental is in the case of perceptive object, known simply from its being ascertained, in some cases that they do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with) that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term), and from the certainty, in other cases that they pervade the instrument of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects established by proof, some are pervasive of both (that which is to be proved, and the instrument of inference), or non-pervasive only of the instrument of inference, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be proved. Amongst these, the quality of being non-accidental is to be ascertained, in the first case, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference; in the second case, from their being non-pervasive of that which is to be proved; and in the fourth case also, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference. In the third case also, there being room for the further inquiry that while it is not possible or proved why that which pervades, should pervade only this much (i. e., the instrument of inference) and not more, how it is at the same time possible for that

which does not pervade, to pervade even so much (i. e., the instrument of inference), and thus acquisition and preservation (or loss and gain) being counter-balanced, and from other considerations, the quality of being non-accidental should be determined. The attitude of mind that the demon of apprehension that some *upādhi*, accident, adjunct, or external condition, may exist in these cases, attacks all rules of conduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, should be rejected, inasmuch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental nature. The definitions of *upādhi* and *vyāpti* (pervasion) have been already stated.

This inference is of two kinds self-satisfying or logical, and other-satisfying or rhetorical. Therein inference for the sake of, or originating from, oneself, arises from the investigation by a person himself of *vyāpti*, pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle terms, and *pakṣadharmatā*, the being a property or characteristic of the minor term or the existence of the middle in the minor term; and inference for the sake of, or originating from, another, results from the knowledge of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* produced from an argument (*nyāya*.) enunciated by another.

A *nyāya* argument or syllogism is a proposition productive of verbal cognition which leads to the recognition or sub-sumption of the mark of illation in the third member of the syllogism. The members thereof are five; and membership here denotes the being a proposition productive of verbal cognition, which again is productive of another verbal cognition leading to the recognition or sub-sumption of the inferential mark in the third member. Such propositions are: *pratijñā*, enunciation; *hetu*, mark or reason; *udāharana*, illustration; *upanaya*, application, ratiocination, or deduction; and *nigamana*, conclusion. Of these the *pratijñā*, enunciation, is a proposition which is a member of the argument or syllogism, conveying verbal cognition the object whereof is neither less nor greater than that of the inferential cognition desired; the *hetu*, mark or reason, is that member of the syllogism, ending with the ablative inflection, which is applied to the instrument of inference or the middle term under consideration; the *udāharana*, illustration, is that member of the syllogism which is declaratory or demonstrative of the inseparable existence of the given major and middle terms; the *upanaya*, application or deduction, is that member of the syllogism which establishes that the *hetu* which is so distinguished by the possession of inseparable existence, is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the *pakṣa*, the subject of the conclusion, i. e., the minor term; and the *nigamana*, conclusion, is that member of the syllogism which declares that the object denoted by the given major term is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the *pakṣa*. Thus the syllogism proceeds as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,—*pratijñā*,

Because it is an effect,—*hetu*.

Whatever is an effect or producible is non-eternal,—*udāharana*,

It (sound) possesses effectness or producibility pervaded by non-eternality,—*upanaya*,

Therefore, (it is) non-eternal,—*nigamana*.

The significant appellations given by the *Vaiśeṣikas* to these very members are *pratijñā* (enunciation of that which is to be proved), *apadeśa* (reason), *nidarśana* (instance), *anusandhana* (investigation), and *pratyāmnyā* (re-statement of the *pratijñā*). In this connection, the mode of the application of *vāda*, theory or discourse, *jalpa*, disputation or demolition of the argument of the opponent and establishment of one's own theory, and *vitandā*, controversion or only destructive criticism, and the characteristics of *chhala*, misconstruction, *jāti*, futile or adverse reply, and *nigraha-sthāna*, ground of defeat, i. e., misapplication or non-application of the argument advanced, may be sought in the *Vādi-vinoda*.—2.

Inferential Cognition includes Verbal Cognition.

Upakṣāra.—With the purpose of including other forms of proof into [the] inferential, he commences another topic.

एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातः ॥ ६ । २ । ३ ॥

एतेन *Etena*, hereby. शाब्दं *Śābdam*, verbal. व्याख्यातः *Vyākhyātam*, explained.

3. Hereby verbal (cognition is) explained.—344.

This cognition is 'Śābdam' (verbal), produced by the instrumentality of sound or word—this doctrine, maintained by the *Nyāya* school, is also, 'vyākhyātam,' explained, 'etena' (by this), by the characteristic of being inferential, that is to say, simply as being produced from marks (of inference). As inferential cognition depends upon *vyāpti*, pervasion, *pakṣadharmatā*, the existence of the middle in the minor term, and recollection, so does verbal cognition also. Thus, e. g., "These objects denoted words, or meanings of words, are mutually connected, since they are represented in memory by words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one another, etc., as are the meanings of words in 'Drive away the cow.'" Here it is by observing or apprehending the characteristic of being represented in, or called to, memory by a number of words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one another, which characteristic is pervaded by the possession of mutual connection by these meanings of, or objects denoted by, those words, that one infers the possession of connection. What then is the use of the supposition of sound or word or language as a form of proof?

Objection.—There can be no inference in cognition produced by words, inasmuch as such inference fails where the words are spoken by an untrustworthy person; e. g., that there are five fruits on the river bank.

Answer.—The objection does not arise, as the words must have the qualification of coming from the mouth of an *apta* or trustworthy person. For trustworthiness denotes the possession of knowledge of the meaning of the statement corresponding to objective reality within the reach of the meaning of the given statement, and not merely that a person is not a deceiver.

Objection.—But this is hard to apprehend, prior to the intuition of the meaning of the statement.

Answer.—Not so, for even those who hold the theory of the authoritativeness of word or language, admit the apprehensibility of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, which serves to differentiate fallible or false language.

Objection.—They depend upon that (*i. e.*, the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person) for the apprehension of authoritativeness, whereas verbal cognition is produced even without the apprehension of that quality. In your case also the apprehension or inference must needs be in accordance with nature of the inferential mark. And that which is pervaded (*i. e.*, the middle term), is qualified with the possession of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person.

Answer.—The objection is not successful, since it is possible to have such general apprehension as “He is here infallible.”

Objection.—But the term ‘here’ ultimately means the same thing as the term ‘the connection under consideration.’ So that to apprehend that (*i. e.*, the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person), previously, is simply impossible.

Answer.—It is not, in consequence of the possibility of ascertainment of the inferential mark by means of the possibility of ascertainment in a general way of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, from the force of association with the topic and other circumstances. If even then discrepancy sometimes appears the inferential process proceeds as by the property of smoke (mistaken) in vapour, etc.

Objection.—What is in this case the *sādhyā* or the major term? Is it that the meanings of words are in fact connected, or that their connection is something possible? It cannot be the first, as it is not the case with the statement of an untrustworthy person. Nor can it be the second, for, even though mere connectibility or coherence of words be proved, still inference cannot proceed unshaken, in consequence of the uncertainty of actual connection. Moreover, coherence being previously known as the qualification of the inferential mark, what is the use of inference?

Answer.—This is not a valid objection, inasmuch as it is the general proposition or uniformity which is the *sādhyā* or the thing to be proved, and, there can be no violation of the rule in consequence of the qualification, as has been already stated, by the characteristic of being spoken by a trustworthy person.

Objection.—Expectancy or interdependence of the words of a sentence is equivalent to antecedent non-existence in the hearer of the cognition of connection (of the meanings of words) producible by it. It is only so long as it exists as such that it can be the inferential mark. The futility of inference (in verbal cognition), therefore, follows from this that in order to the cognition of expectancy, the cognition of connection must take place beforehand, and not at any other time.

Answer.—This is not the case, for we do not say that expectancy is merely antecedent non-existence of the cognition of connection. On the other hand, expectancy is distinguished with the possession of inseparable existence or universal agreement of what is presented to consciousness by the words and what is represented in memory, as it is from the cognition of this adjective element that the cognition of expectancy results.

Objection.—Let then inseparable existence itself constitute expectancy.

Answer.—By no means. For, "The water of the river is pure," "The buffalo grazes in the basin of the river"—in these cases also it would entail the consciousness of the connection of the river and the basin by means of their inseparable existence in the form of the cognition that the buffalo grazes in the basin of the river of pure water. And in such instances as "The water-lily is blue," in the presence of inseparable existence of the water-lily and blueness even in particular cases, would make the inseparable existence of the substance and attribute presented to consciousness by the words, possible (that is, that all water-lilies were blue.)

Or, it may be that expectancy is nothing but the desire to know or enquiry with reference to the object recalled by words, or that it is the complement of the connotation. Still the cognition of it is necessary, inasmuch as in a cause which is being known, there must appear divergence in characteristic from what is not a cause, appropriate to such cognition, as is the case with pervasion or universal concomitance. It is for the very same reason, whether connectibility or coherence of the words of a sentence mean the absence of certainty of non-agreement, or the non-existence of contradictory evidence, or the observation of agreement with similar other words, or that in the connection of the meaning of the one word (*e.g.*, fire) with that of another (*e.g.*, wets), there exists as something contained therein, certain knowledge that the one (*e.g.*, fire) is not the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence inherent in the other (*e.g.*, wets), that cognition of coherence is necessary. Cognition of adjacency of the words of a sentence, in the form of recollection without interval of the objects denoted by them, is also a condition. It may be that differences or peculiarities of connection of words result only from the peculiarities of differences of the words which are going to be connected; and the proof of the peculiarity or difference in this way, is not undesired. Or, the desired peculiarity may be proved by the characteristic of its so determining cognition, inasmuch as the inference takes place that these words, being a collection of words possessing expectancy, coherency, and adjacency, are preceded by, or have for their antecedent, cognition of the connection of the ideas or meanings represented in memory, as is the case with the group of the words "Drive away the cow." The opposition that the *sādhya* or thing to be proved is that these words have the connection of the meanings recalled, and that the possession by words of connection with the meanings of those words, is impeded, is better left unnoticed. Nor is it the being expressive of, or the means of making known; connection, by

being the inferential mark, that is the possession of connection by the words, since the mark not being proved to exist prior to the inference, there can be no apprehension or cognition of the pervasion thereof.

Some say that expressive movement or gesture is a new form of proof. To this it is replied: Gesture is of two kinds, conventional, and non-conventional. Therein that which is conventional, calls back to mind the sound or word lying in the understanding or intent or common consent, but does not also produce certain cognition of connection (between gesture and its significance), as letters do. It is sound or word, rising up in memory, that is the means of proof there, and it has been already declared that the characteristic of being a mark of illation belongs to sound or word. Nor is recollection of the word a collateral or secondary function of gesture, inasmuch as, in order to exercise such function, gesture would have to be uniformly present in all cases, whereas there takes place intuition of meanings from words even without the intervention of gesture.

Objection.—This being so, how does the conduct of a deaf person come to depend upon, or spring from, gesture? For, it is impossible for him to have knowledge of the convention in a given instance.

Answer.—The objection cannot prevail, for it is to be considered how he derives certain knowledge of the meaning or idea even, from gesture, when it is impossible for him to grasp the sense or connection of the meaning or idea also. His conduct, again, springs from the apprehension of inseparable existence (or serviceable associated (habit), in the same way as particular adaptations of conduct are possible in the case of the elephant and the horse in accordance with the pricks of the goad and strokes of the whip.

On the other hand, non-conventional gesture,—that kind of it which, further, is in agreement or association with action,—causes activity in the employee by reminding him of the intention of the employer, but does not produce sure cognition in any case. For example, as according to the instruction “You should come on the blowing of the conch-shell,” the man turns up on hearing the blowing of the conch-shell, so a man strikes another at the proper time according to the pre-ordination “You should strike him when I shall raise my forefinger,” but this does not prove anything. Non-conventional gesture, again, which is in agreement with cognition, is either prominent on its subjective side, as in “By the raising of the ten fingers, it should be understood by you that the number of coins, (or contortions of the limbs in ascetic posture), or of the *purāṇas* is ten;” or it is prominent on its verb or predicate side, as in “You should come up, after seeing contraction of the hand.” Thus, by this form of gesture the meanings of words are no doubt recalled, but only severally or each independently of the rest; but their mutual association or connection also is not illuminated by it, as it is by nominative, objective, and other case-endings which explain that inter-relation, inasmuch as in the case under consideration, invariable or constant components of gesture do not exist.

Objection.—How do then activity and inactivity proceed from gesture in the absence of cognition of connection?

Answer.—You may take it that these follow from either the one or the other of doubt or uncertainty and *pratibhā* or inventive genius or instinct. Gesture also is, therefore, no proof.—3.

Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked, how sound (or word) could be a mark of illation, when its difference from the mark appears from its possessing the nature of an *apadeśa* or a description. Anticipating this, he says :

हे परदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरः ॥ ६ । २ । ४ ॥

हेतुः Hetuḥ, reason. अपदेशः Apadeśaḥ, description. Sound. लिङ्गं Liṅgaṃ, mark. प्रमाणं Pramāṇaṃ, proof. करणं Karaṇaṃ, instrument. इति Iti, these. अनर्थान्तरम् An-artha-antaram, not different things.

4. Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument—these are not antonyms.—345.

‘Apadeśaḥ’ means sound (or word), according to its derivation that by it objects are referred to, i. e., affirmed or described. And it is really a synonym of *hetu*, reason, and *liṅga*, mark. ‘Pramāṇaṃ’ means the instrument of true cognition in the manner of the inferential mark. In like manner, the word ‘karaṇaṃ’ also is equivalent to the mark itself which is the instrument (*karaṇa*) of inferential cognition. For the operation of *karaṇa* or the instrument is two-fold : Some *karaṇa* operates or exercises its function under or subject to contact or contiguity, and some *karaṇa* exercises its function on the strength of inseparable existence. Sound (or word), on the contrary, has neither contact nor inseparable existence with the object or meaning ; hence, how can it lead to the object ?

Objection.—It leads to the object with the help of arbitrament or according to direction.

Answer.—It cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with reference to the meaning of words, and not to their connection.

Objection.—There may be arbitrament or direction with reference to that also.

Answer.—No, for that connection being of a manifold nature, it is impossible that it could be the object of reference by arbitrament or direction.

Objection.—But it is from the force of arbitrament or direction in the case of (words and) meaning that the meaning of a sentence also becomes manifest.

Answer.—This is not the case, as there would be then over extension or undue application of the principle, if something is brought forward or called up by arbitrament or direction with regard to something else.

Objection.—Invariable antecedence or pervasion of connection in this case will be that of connection as recalled by sound.

Answer.—If it be so, then, by that admission, inference itself finds admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion. Arbitrament or direction also, if it implied mere intention or desire, would be unduly applied or too wide.

Objection.—But the desire of Īsvara, God, cannot be said to be too wide.

Answer.—Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even in the absence of divine will, the words, river or Gaṅgā (Ganges), etc., suggest or call up the ideas of the bank, etc.

This is enough of over-forwardness in a logician.—4.

Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference.

Upakāra.—For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised of others (as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of inseparable existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential cognition, he says :

अस्येदमिति बुद्ध्यपेक्षितत्वात् ॥ ६ । २ । ५ ॥

अस्य *Asya*, its. इदं *Idam*, it. इति *Iti*, such. This. बुद्ध्यपेक्षितत्वात् *Buddhi-apekṣitevāt*, because of the cognition or notion being needed.

5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference by marks), because they depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, “It is its.” —346.

The words “of comparison, presumption, comprehension or sub-sumption and privation” complete the aphorism. ‘*Asya*,’ of the pervader, ‘*idam*’ (it is) the pervaded,—the cognition is in this form. They are dependent upon it, by which it is depended upon as their originator. ‘*Buddhi-apekṣitatva*’ means the state of being so dependent. In consequence of such dependence,—this is the meaning of the term, it being a relative compound formed similarly to *dhīta-agnih* (by whom fire has been deposited), or formed with the affix *ita* (which signifies that something, *e. g.*, dependence upon the cognition, has been produced in the something else, *e. g.*, comparison, etc.), according to the rule that it is applied to the words star, etc., (so that *tāraka + ita = tārakita = starry, heaven*).

Upamāna, comparison or analogy, is in every respect nothing but *anumāna*, or inference, by means of words. Now the sentence, “A gavæus or gayal looks like a cow,” is spoken by a forester in reply to the enquiry by a townsman, *viz.*, “What does a gayal look like to ?” Here immediately after hearing the above sentence at distant place, the townsman determines the meaning of the name, gayal, of the strength of the community of substratum, namely that which is like a cow is the object of reference by, or designate of, the word, gayal. Then when he goes to the forest and meets an animal body of that description, he recognises that that is that which is the designate of the word, gayal.

Objection.—At the time of hearing the sentence at a distant place, the generic nature of the *gayal*, which is condition or occasion of the recognition or application of the name, is not known. How then can there be such determination by, or application of, the name?

Answer.—There can be such determination, as the cognition thereof (*i. e.*, of the generic nature) is possible by means of suggestion or metaphorically.

Objection.—But where is the room for suggestion, when in the sentence, "A *gayal* looks like a cow," there is no want of proof of the agreement or position of the subject and predicate?

Answer.—There is room for suggestion, inasmuch as complete equivalence of the two terms still remains to be proved. For it is not proper to hold up before one, who desires to be enlightened in the matter, likeness to a cow as the condition or occasion of partial application of the name. Therefore, it (the name) refers to a particular genus or class in its entirety. Hence arises the possibility of suggestion. Or, the word, *gayal*, is denotative of the animal, *gayal*, being applied thereto by the elect, and there existing no other application of it. Other applications being non-existent, whatever word is applied by the elect to a certain object, the same is denotative of that, as the word, cow, is of the cow. It is from this inference that the application of the name, *gayal*, comes to be determined.

And the reasoning which you may set forth as being auxiliary to *upamāna*, comparison, would better go with *anumāna*, inference, which has been established as a method of proof. What is the use of *upamāna* which, as a method of proof, is yet to be supposed?

More detailed consideration on this subject may be sought in the *Anumāna-Mayākha*.

Arthāpatti, Presumption or Explanation, also is nothing but inference. Thus, (1) presumption from the observed, arises where by means of the non-existence of Chaitra who is living, in the house, ascertained by stronger evidence, (*e. g.*, perception), his existence outside it is presumed. Here the cognition of Chaitra's existence outside the house is wholly dependent upon the ascertainment of the relation of the pervader between the demonstrable and the demonstrator. For, as a matter of fact, the non-existence of a living person in the house is accompanied with this existence outside it, or there arises the cognition that the non-existence of a living person in the house is impossible without his existence outside it. In the first case, there is apprehension of positive pervasion or concomitance, and, in the last, of negative pervasion.

Objection.—Pervasion does exist, but the apprehension thereof does not here take place.

Answer.—Were this the case, then, in the absence of the apprehension of pervasion, there would be no scope or occasion for the manifestation of presumption, and there would consequently be supposition of only that which, as an entity, would demonstrate pervasion existing in its proper form or as such. This is the direction or point.

The inclusion of presumption due to the instrumentality of doubt or uncertainty as well as of that due to the instrumentality contradiction or contrast or opposition, in inference, should be also understood or inferred ; for contrast or opposition, characterised as uniformity of non-co-existence, also is constituted by pervasion or (negative) concomitance.

(2) Presumption from what is heard, is also inference by means of the inferred. "Deva-datta, who is stout, does not eat by day"—By this proposition, stoutness is inferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there takes place inference of eating at night in this way that Deva-datta eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot otherwise appear in him.

Sambhava, Comprehension or Sub-sumption, also is merely a form of inference. For, the examples of it are : A *drona* (a standard measure) does not exceed a *khāri* (one *khāri*=4 *dronas*) ; an *ādhaka* does not exceed a *drona* (one *drona*=4 *ādhakas*) ; a hundred does not exceed a thousand ; etc. Here a *khāri* contains a *drona*, being constituted by it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot is possessed of its components. Other instances should be similarly understood. That learning is probable in a *Brahmaṇa* (because *Brahmaṇas* as a class are learned), that valour is probable in a *Kṣatriya* (because *Kṣatriyas* as a class are valiant), etc., on the other hand, do not at all become means of proof, inasmuch as they do not produce certainty.

Abhāva, Non-existence or Privation, also is not a different form of evidence ; for, being similar to the inference of the cause by means of the effect, the inference of the non-existence of the cause by means of the non-existence of the effect, is included within inference itself, as pervasion or universal concomitance is the ground of such inference by means of non-existence.

The *Bhāṭṭas* (*Prabhākara* and other *Mīmāṃsakas*), however, maintain that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the ground, etc., (e.g., The water-pot does not exist on the ground), is called non perception. Now, this evidence or proof is in some cases included in perception, and in other cases, inference, inasmuch as non-existence is apprehended by the eye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot be said that the senses are exhausted just in the apprehension of the substratum (of non-existence, e. g., the ground), since their function continues up to the apprehension of non-existence.

Āitiḥya, Tradition, is a succession of sayings of which the authors are not known. *Itiḥa*—this collection of expletives appears in the narration of past events. The state of being such narration of past events is called *āitiḥya*, traditional saying. If it is not impeded in its meaning, then, coming under the class of verbal cognition, it is a made of inference. For example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a *Yakṣa*. There is a *Gauri* (a Buddhist Spirit) in the *madhuka* tree (*Bassia latifolia*) etc. Now, if the traditional sayings come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are as has been already declared ; if they do not come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are no evidence at all.

Accordingly it is established that proof or evidence is of two kinds only, perception and inference.—5.

Vivṛiti.—*Sambhava* or Probability is cognition dependent upon a plurality of concomitances ; e. g., learning is probable in a *Brahmaṇa* ; a hundred is probably contained in a thousand.

Note.—The construction put by *Jayanārayana* upon the word, *Sambhava* is explicitly rejected by *Śaṅkara Miśra*. In the lexicon *Medint* also we find that the meaning of the word is *Ādheyasya adhāranatiriktatvam*, i. e., the state of what is contained not exceeding that which contains it, or, simply, the relation of the part not being greater than the whole.

Reminiscence, how produced.

Upaskāra.—Inferential cognition having been explained, he now begins another topic.

आत्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषात् संस्काराच्च स्मृतिः ॥ ६। २। ६ ॥

आत्ममनसोः Ātma-manasoh, between the soul and the mind. **संयोगविशेषात्** Saṁyoga-viśeṣāt, from a particular conjunction. **संस्काराच्च** Saṁskārāt, from impression or retention or latency. **च** Cha, and. **स्मृतिः** Smṛtiḥ, Reminiscence.

6. Reminiscence (results) from a particular conjunction between the Soul and the Mind and also from Impression or latency.—347.

“Results”—This is the complement of the aphorism. ‘Saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ’ means contact or contiguity such as reflection or meditation or inter-penetration, etc. From this as the non-combinative cause, in the soul as the combinative cause, ‘Smṛtiḥ,’ (reminiscence), a particular kind of cognition or knowledge, is produced. He states the efficient cause by ‘Saṁskārāt.’ By the word ‘cha’ he implies past experience which too is operative here as the object recalled. Reminiscence or recollection imitates the correctness of the previous experience, such alone being the recollection of him who has mistaken a rope for a snake and has consequently fled from it. It does not, moreover, follow that reminiscence should take place at all times or continually, since it depends on the resuscitation of the mental impression. Accordingly it has been said by the revered *Prāśastadeva*, “Reminiscence, caused by the inferential process (as in inferring fire from smoke there is recollection of the universal concomitance of fire and smoke), desire, re-production (or suggestion of one idea by another), and aversion, and having for its content the past, among objects seen, heard, and otherwise experienced, (results) from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind, due to the observation of a suggestive mark, voluntary attempt at recollection, etc., and from impression or latency produced by intuitions constantly repeated and attended to with interest.”

The cognition of highly advanced sages, or their intellectual intuition has not been separately noticed by the author of the aphorisms. It is included within perception by *Yogins* or ascetics (See IX. ii. 13 below). In the treatise, called the *Padārtha-Pradeśa*, an account of it has been given, which is as follows : " Prescient or inventive cognition which is produced from conjunction between the soul and the mind, and also from a particular *dharma*, virtue or merit, independently of inferential marks, etc., in advanced sages, the promulgators of the Vedas, in respect of objects, supersensible, or past, present, and future, or in respect of *dharma*, etc., as preserved in books,—that is called sagely cognition." This form of cognition at times arises in ordinary or wordly people also ; as when a young maiden says, " My heart assures me my brother will depart to morrow."—6.

Dream, how produced.

Upaskāra.—Thus four-fold *vidyā*, or true cognition, or knowledge, having been explained, it now becomes proper to explain *avidyā* or false cognition or knowledge. Therein doubt or uncertainty and error have been incidentally ascertained before. For the purpose of ascertaining dreaming, he says :

तथा: स्वप्नः ॥ ६ । २ । ७ ॥

तथा, Tathā, so. स्वप्नः Svapnaḥ, dreaming.

7. So (also is) dreaming.—348.

The meaning is that as reminiscence results from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind, and from impression or latency, so also does cognition in dreaming. Cognition in dreaming is the mental experience, through the channels of the senses, belonging to one, when one's senses have ceased to be active and one's mind is in a quiescent state. And this is of three kinds (1) It partly arises from acuteness of impression or facility of reproductiveness ; as in a man who, in love or in anger, thinks intently on some object, when he goes to sleep, in that state, cognition resembling perception, in the form, " This is the contest between *Karna* and *Arjuna* " (two heroes of the *Mahabharata*), is produced, through the influence of impression, reproductiveness or latency, produced by previous hearing of the *Purāṇas*, etc. (2) It arises partly from derangement of the humours or affections of the body, viz., wind, bile, and phlegm. Therein, in consequence of disorder of the wind, one dreams of moving about in the sky, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers, etc., and the like ; under the influence of an unwholesome excess of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire, embracing flames of fire, golden mountains, corruscations of flashing lightning, sudden extensive conflagrations, etc. ; while, through predominance of phlegmatic derangement, one dreams of swimming upon the sea, immersions in rivers, sprinklings with showers of rain, silver mountains, etc., (3) Dreams appear also under the influence of *adr̥ṣṭam* (the invisible after-effects of past acts) or deserts. These are cognitions, produced in one whose internal sense has been lulled to sleep or overpowered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or previous states of existence. Therein somnial cognition, signifying good, results from *dharma* or merit, and has for its object the riding upon elephants, ascending on mountains, acquisition of the royal

umbrella, feasting upon pudding, interview with the sovereign, and the like ; whereas somnial cognition, signifying evil, arises from *adharmā* or demerit, and has its object unction with oil, falling into blind wells, riding upon camels, immersion in mire, the seeing of one's own nuptials, and the like.

The above three, only as jointly operating, have causality here (*i.e.*, in the production of dreams). It should be further observed that this division of causes, is based on the predominance of one or another of the qualities of these causes in their effects.—7.

Cognition accompanying dreaming, how produced.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected :—The cognition which springs up in the midst of a dream, in the form of recollection of the very same object which is experienced in somnial cognition, does not possess the nature of dreaming inasmuch as dreaming takes the form of perceptual experience. From what cause, then, does it arise ?

To this he gives the reply :

स्वप्नान्तिकः ॥ ६ । २ । ८ ॥

स्वप्नान्तिकम् Svapna-antikam, that which intervenes in, or lies near to, or accompanies, dream.

8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams.—349.

The word 'so' comes in from the preceding aphorism. The meaning, therefore, is that as dreaming, so also consciousness accompanying dreaming arises from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind and also from impression or retention. The difference between the two cases extends only thus far that somnial cognition results from impression or retention produced by former experience, while consciousness accompanying dreaming results from impression or retention produced by experience arising at the very time (of dreaming.) It has been accordingly stated by Professor *Parāśastadeva*, "Somnial cognition is merely recollection, inasmuch as it results from looking back upon past cognitions." The writer of the *vṛitti* also says, "Somnial cognition, its function being the illumination of experienced objects, is not a different thing from recollection."

Some teach that 'consciousness accompanying dreaming' is cognition amounting to certitude, in the midst of dreams, as, for example, "I am in a state of lying on the bed," etc.—8.

Another cause of dreaming and of cognition in dreaming.

Upaskāra.—He adds another cause of dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming.

धर्माच्च ॥ ६ । २ । ९ ॥

धर्माच्च Dharmāt from *dharma* or merit. च Cha, also.

9. (Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming result) from *dharma* also.—350.

The word 'cha' is used with the purpose of adding *adharmā*, demerit. This has been already explained.—9.

Vivṛiti.—* * * * Some think that this aphorism has been laid down for the purpose of showing that in some cases dreaming, etc., are also produced from *dharma*, etc., alone, even without the action of *Samskāra* or impression, and that the poetic observation of *Śrīharsa* that the maid Sleep brings before the vision of man, through the all-pervading efficacy of *adṛiṣṭam*, even objects which have not been observed before, accordingly becomes explained.

Causes of Avidyā or Incertitude.

Upaskāra.—Now, referring to the series (of doubt, dream, incertitude) he says :—

इन्द्रियदोषात् संस्कारदोषाच्चाविद्या ॥ ६ । २ । १० ॥

इन्द्रियदोषात् Indriya-doṣāt, from imperfection of the senses. *संस्कारदोषात्* Samskāra-doṣāt, from imperfection of impression. *च* Cha, and. *आविद्या* A-vidyā, false knowledge. Incertitude.

10. False knowledge (arises) from imperfection of the Senses and from imperfection of Impression.—351.

The word 'A-vidyā,' though a general term, applies to incertitude, according to the context, doubt, dream, and incertitude having been mentioned. Therein imperfection of the senses is inefficiency caused by predominance of the bile, etc. Imperfection of impression is the being accompanied with non-observation of distinctions ; for under such non-observation, false cognition is produced.—10.

Vivṛiti.—Understanding according to another mode is divided into two kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, he states the cause of incertitude.

'Indriya-doṣaḥ,' is such as ophthalmia, etc. 'Samskāra-doṣaḥ' is the being the effect of erroneous experience, etc. The word 'and' implies the addition of such imperfections as remoteness, etc., and also sub-sumptions of false marks or middle-terms, etc. The cause, then, of false knowledge or incertitude is imperfection ; and imperfection, as consisting of biliousness, remoteness, etc., is of diverse kinds.

The characteristic of Avidyā.

Upaskāra.—He states the characteristic or definition of *avidyā* in general :

तदुक्तानम् ॥ ६ । २ । ११ ॥

तत् Tat, that. *Avidyā*. false knowledge. *दुष्टज्ञानम्* Duṣṭa-jñānam, imperfect cognition.

11. That (*i. e.*, *Avidyā*) is imperfect knowledge.—352.

'Tat,' an indeclinable word, conveying the sense of a pronoun, alludes to *avidyā*. That, *avidyā*, is 'duṣṭajñānam', *i. e.*, cognition which is unduly applied, cognition that a thing is what in fact it is not, in other words, cognition determined in the manner of a divergent object, and

having the mode which does not reside in the object in question. Imperfection consists also of cognition taking the form of uncertainty. Doubt, therefore, even where there is only one alternative, is vicious, being identical with non-assurance or non ascertainment.

The four (forms of *avidyā*), therefore, namely, Doubt, Error, Dream, and Regression or Indecision are included in this aphorism.—11.

The characteristic of Vidyā.

Upaskāra.—(He declares what scientific cognition is :)

अदुष्टं विद्या ॥ ६ । २ । १२ ॥

अदुष्टं *Aduṣṭam*, not imperfect. Free from imperfection. **विद्या** *Vidyā*, true knowledge, *Vidyā*.

12. (Cognition) free from imperfection, is (called) *Vidyā* or scientific knowledge.—353.

The word "Cognition" comes in (from the preceding aphorism). 'Aduṣṭam' means produced by organs of sense which are not inefficient or defective (in consequence of any derangement mentioned above). The meaning, therefore, is that *vidyā* is the experience of a thing in its proper place, or the experience of a thing in the same manner in which another thing having a common substratum with the former is experienced, or experience of a thing not having the mode which does not reside in the thing in question. It is of two kinds, immediate or sensuous, and mediate or inferential.—12.

Cognition by Sages Siddhas, how produced.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected : The cognition (of objects beyond the reach of senses), by advanced sages, also appears in the very same form in which other cognitions, having a common substratum with the former, take place. It is again not produced by the senses, inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in the absence of any investigation of such marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and inference) which is the instrument of such cognition.

In view of this objection, he says :

आर्षं सिद्धदर्शनञ्च धर्मेभ्यः ॥ ६ । २ । १३ ॥

आर्षं *Ārṣam*, sagely. Of advanced sages. **सिद्धदर्शनं** *Siddha-darśanam*, vision of the Perfected Ones. **च** *Cha*, and. **धर्मेभ्यः** *Dharmmebhyah*, from *dharma* or merits.

13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the Perfected Ones, (results) from *dharma* or merits.—354.

'Ārṣam' or sagely cognition is the cognition of sages such as *Galava*, etc., having for its object things past and yet to come. 'Siddha-darśanam' means the vision by those who have attained success in the direction of cognition apprehensive of objects remote as well as screened from view, by means of *mantra* or incantation, herbs, eye-salve prepared from cocoon, etc. Both of them arise from *dharma* or merit, such that there is cognition of objects in their true light. The author of the *Vṛitti*

observes that this cognition is not a different kind of *vidyā* or scientific knowledge, as it is included in *Yogic* or ascetic perception. Sagely cognition is really the fourth kind of *vidyā*, and it occurs to sages as well as to worldly people. And it is simply a form of mental perception, being produced by the mind accompanied with inattention (to internal and external objects), or produced by inferential marks such as faithful observances of the rules of conduct. The cognition of pervasion which is the ground of inference is here solely dependent upon or due to *Samskāra*, or impression having its origin in a former state of existence *i. e.*, in the same way as is the pervasion or universal concomitance of sucking the breast and the cognition that this is the means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the instinctive application of the baby to sucking the breast.)

The revered Professor *Prāśastadeva*, however, says that 'Siddhadarśanam,' cognition of the Perfected Ones, is not a different form of cognition. His reasoning is as follows: If it is said that cognition, by the Perfected Ones, of objects remote and hidden from view, takes its rise from conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared from cocoon, and the like, then it is nothing but perception. If it be, on the other hand, cognition which apprehends objects belonging to the earth, the region lying between the earth and the vault of heaven, and the space beyond it, and which is dependent upon the conditions or inferential marks such as the movements, etc., of planets and the lunar mansions (*nakṣatras*), then it is nothing but inferential cognition, inasmuch as pervasion, or universal concomitance of the thing to be inferred and the mark of inference, is determined by the observation of such accompaniment.—13.

Here ends the second chapter of the ninth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK TENTH—CHAPTER FIRST.

Pleasure and Pain are two different things.

Upakāra.—The purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of *Gautama*, which enumerates or classifies the provables or objects of certitude, viz., "Soul, Body, Sense, Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emancipation are the provable" (*Nyāya-Sūtram*, I. i. 9.), there being no mention of pleasure, the error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure and pain themselves.

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद्विरोधाच्च मिथः सुखदुःखयो-
र्थान्तरभावः ॥ १० । १ । १ ॥

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद् *Iṣṭa-anīṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣāt*, in consequence of the difference of causes, (in the forms of) desirables. and undesirable विरोधाद् *Virodhāt* on account of opposition. च *Cha*, and. मिथः *Mithaḥ*, between them, towards each other, mutual. सुखदुःखयोः *Sukha-duḥkhaḥ*, between pleasure and pain. अर्थान्तरभावः *Artha-antara-bhāvaḥ*, relation of different objects.

1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their) mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the relation of objects different from each other.—355.

'*Sukha-duḥkhaḥ*,' (between pleasure and pain there exists) 'mithaḥ,' mutual, 'artha-antara-bhāvaḥ,' distinction that is to say heterogeneity. Whence (does this distinction arise)? To this question the author replies, 'iṣṭa-anīṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣāt' i. e., in consequence of 'viśeṣaḥ,' distinction or difference, of their causes which have, in the one case, the form of 'iṣṭam,' desirable objects such as garlands, sandal-paste, women, etc., and, in the other case, the form of 'anīṣṭam,' undesirable objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of effect necessarily follows from heterogeneity of cause. He lays down another principle of distinction, viz., 'virodhāt,' on account of opposition characterised by non-dwelling together. For pleasure and pain are not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time. The word, 'cha,' and, brings forward the difference of the effect of pleasure and pain as a further means of distinguishing between them. Thus, graciousness, the embrace, clearness of the eyes, etc., are the effects of pleasure, while despondency, a sullied countenance, etc., are the effects of pain; hence on this ground also pleasure and pain must differ from each other. Accordingly it has been stated by Professor *Praśasta-deva*, "Pleasure has the characteristic of agreeable feeling. In the presence of garlands and other desirable objects, from the contact of the senses and objects in the recognition of something desirable being produced, and from the conjunction of the soul and the mind and dependent upon *dharma* or merit and the like, that which is produced and is the cause of complacency, embrace, and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure."

In the case of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyed in the past, pleasure arises from *smṛiti*, reminiscence, and, in the case future objects, it arises from *Sanhālpa*, desire or appetency or imagination or will.

The non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of *Gautama* is in order to promote indifference or dispassion, in other words, to teach that dispassion would arise in one who should account even pleasure as pain. (Cf. *Nyāya Sūtram*, IV. i. 58, दुःखविपर्यये ज्ञानिमानाद्य, The idea of pleasure takes place in an alternative form of pain).—

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.

Upaskāra.—It may be urged : Let pleasure and pain be mutually distinct. But they may be non-different from cognition, like recollection and perception of sensation.

Accordingly the author says :

सं तयनिर्णयान्त भावश्च ज्ञानान्तरत्वे हेतुः ॥ १० । १ । २ ॥

संयनिर्णयान्तरभावः *Samsāya-nirṇaya-antara-abhāva*, non-inclusion in doubt and certainty. च *Cha*, and. ज्ञानान्तरत्वे *Jñāna-antaratve*, in the matter of being different from cognition. हेतुः *Hetuh*, reason, mark.

2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain) either in Doubt or in Certainty, is the mark that they are other than cognition.—356.

The meaning is that non-inclusion either in doubt or in certainty is the mark of inference that pleasure and pain are other than, i. e., different from, cognition. The idea is this ; Were pleasure or pain a kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have the form of certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which must be present in doubt) do not exist ; nor can it be the second, as the single alternative does not exist (see *Vivṛiti*—below). And the species or parts being thus excluded, the genus or whole is necessarily excluded. For the species of cognition, are two only, the characteristic of doubt and the characteristic of certainty. And both of them are excluded from pleasure as well as from pain ; hence the characteristic of cognition also finds no place in them.

The word, ' *cha* ' and, adds on the exclusion of external sensation or perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental i. e., by the inner sense, in the form, " I feel pleasure," " I feel pain " ; whereas perception of them does not take such shape of form as in " I know," " I am doubtful," " I am certain."—2.

Vivṛiti.—* * * Neither pleasure nor pain has the form in which two repugnant alternatives are present together, that it should be probable that they have the nature of doubt, nor has either possession of a given form together with absence of negation of that form, that it should be likely that they have the nature of certainty. The supposition of a third form of cognition is chimerical like the horn of a hare. Consequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge.

Pleasure and Pain are not form cognition—continued.

Upaskāra.—He lays down another principle of differentiation,

तयोर्निष्पत्तिः प्रत्यक्षलौकिकभ्याम् ॥ १० । १ । ३ ॥

तयोः Tayoḥ, their, of doubt and certainty. निष्पत्तिः Niṣpattiḥ, production. प्रत्यक्षलौकिकभ्याम् Pratyakṣa-laiṅgikābhyām, by means of perception and inference.

3. The production thereof (*i.e.*, of Doubt and Certainty) is by means of perception and inference.—357.

'Tayoḥ,' of doubt and certainty, 'niṣpattiḥ,' production, (is) from perception and from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks. For, pleasure is four-fold, being objective, subjective, imaginative or sympathetic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess the characteristic of taking their origin from the contact of the (outer) senses (with their objects). Should it be contended that the first is cognition, inasmuch as it is generated by contact of the senses and their objects, we reply that it is not so, for a part only of the whole cause, (being the same), cannot entail homogeneity in the effect; else all and sundry effects would come to be homogeneous as they must have space and time as their common antecedents. Moreover, (if pleasure were cognition), the pleasure which is not produced through contact of the senses and their objects, would be either non-discriminative or indefinite, or discriminative or definite. But it cannot be the first, for then it would be supersensible; nor can it be the second, inasmuch as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in the relation of subject and predicate. Again, pleasure and pain are necessarily accompanied with sensibility; (were they forms of cognition), there would be involved in the (consequent) notion of a sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. 'Laiṅgikam' (the adjective) means merely 'līṅgam' (the noun), mark, as the word, objective, (means an object).

The author of the *Vṛitti*, on the other hand, explains the aphorism thus, that the origin thereof, *i. e.*, of cognition and pleasure, is explained, 'pratyakṣa-laiṅgikam,' *i. e.*, by the explanations of perceptual and inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition is produced by the senses, and inferential by marks of illation, it is not so with pleasure, etc.—3.

Vivṛiti—It may be urged that as non-discriminative cognition is neither doubt nor certitude, so too may be pleasure and pain. Accordingly he says :

The proof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and inference. In one's own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by perception; in other souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes, etc., and pain by paleness of the face, etc. So that, had they the form of non-discriminative cognition, there could be no perception, nor could it be possible for them to be the subject of inference by such marks as brightness or paleness of the face, and the like. Hence, the import is, they are not included in cognition.

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.—continued.

Upaskāra.—He points out the difference of pleasure, etc., from inferential cognition, depending upon a difference of their modes or appearance.

अदित्यपि ॥ १० । १ । ४ ॥

अभूत् Abhūt, (it) was. इति Iti, such modal distinction. अपि Api, also.

4. “(It) was”—such (modal distinction) also (establishes the difference between pleasure or pain and cognition.)—358.

The word ‘iti’ indicates the form. The word ‘api’ implies another form, viz., “(It) will be.” Thus, in inferential cognition, e. g., “There was or will be fire in the mountain,” the modal distinction of the past, etc., is observed; but pleasure or, pain, produced under this form, has never been observed.—

Vivṛiti—* * * * Cognition is conversant about objects past, future, and present. But of other pleasure or pain, no object whatever exists. Therefore, by the application of contradictory properties, viz., objectivity and non-objectivity, it follows that pleasure and pain are not identical with cognition.

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.—continued.

Upaskāra.—He brings forward a further ground of differentiation :

सति च कार्यादर्शनात् ॥ १० । १ । ५ ॥

सति Sati, existing. च Cha, also. कार्यादर्शनात् Kāryya-adarśanāt, because of the non-observation of the effect.

5. Also (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition), inasmuch as the effect, (pleasure or pain), is not observed, where (the antecedents of cognition) are present.—359.

Pleasure or pain is not merely perception or merely inferential cognition, since the effect, pleasure or pain, is not observed, where contact of the senses and objects exists, or where there is recognition of the universal concomitance (which is the ground of inference), of the mark of inference being a property of the minor term, etc. The meaning, therefore, is as follows : It has been already stated that pleasure and pain are not cognition in general, (i. e., non-discriminative cognition). Should they be cognition in particular (or discriminative cognition), they would be either perceptual cognition or cognition in the form of inference. (Pleasure and pain cannot be the former), inasmuch as the experience of the element of pleasure does not take place during the perception of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., on the contact of the senses and their object; nor can they be the latter, since there is no experience of the pleasurable or the painful, as the case may be, where there exists an inference respecting sandal-paste, etc., or an inference respecting fire, etc. In like manner, pleasure and pain being

not experienced in any particular act of perception or in particular act of inference, they are also not the particulars of that perception or that inference.—5.

Bhāṣya reads *Saticha* of X i. 5 as a separate aphorism, and explains it thus : Cognition arises, *Sati*, i. e., in respect of objects actually existing at the moment. Cognition accordingly relates to past, present, and future objects. But this is not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein also, therefore, there is difference between cognition, on the one hand, and pleasure and pain, on the other.

Above continued : Causes of Pleasure and Pain.

Upaskāra.—He mentions another differentiating characteristic.

एकार्थसमवायिकारणान्तरे दृष्टत्वात् ॥ १० । १ । ६ ॥

एकार्थसमव विकारणान्तरेषु Eka-artha-samavāyi-kāraṇa-antarēṣu, there existing other causes co-inherent in one and the same object. दृष्टत्वात् *Dṛṣṭatvāt*, from the being observed. Because they are observed.

6. (Pleasure and Pain are not form of cognition), because they are observed, when there exist other causes co-inherent in one and the same object, (i. e., the soul).—360.

“ Of pleasure and pain ”—such is the complement (of the aphorism). In relation to pleasure, uncommon or specific causes co-inherent in one and the same object are *dharma* or merit, attachment to, or attraction for, pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure, volition or striving to secure the material (cause) of pleasure, and cognition of garlands, sandal-paste, etc.; while in relation to pain, they are *adharma* or demerit, and cognition of thorns and other undesirable object. The meaning is that (pleasure and pain differ from cognition), inasmuch as they are observed on the co-inherence of these causes in one and the same object. But cognition which is non-discriminative, does not at all stand in need of an uncommon cause co-inherent in the same object (with it). Discriminative cognition, of course, depends upon a cognition of predication or attribution (or judgment), but this is not another cause, that is, a cause heterogeneous to the cause of the cognition itself. Conjunction of the mind, as being a cause common (to pleasure and pain with cognition), does not require mention. Though reminiscence requires *samskāra*, impression or reproductiveness, as its specific or uncommon cause, yet the difference therefrom is quite obvious, as it is for this reason that the difference (of pleasure and pain) has been investigated with reference only to cognition or perceptual experience. Although in inferential cognition there is dependence upon the recollection of pervasion or universal concomitance, the cognition that the mark is a property of the minor term, etc., yet it is thrown overboard by the very word ‘antara,’ other, (in the aphorism). The probative sense (of the aphorism) is, therefore, that pleasure and pain are different from cognition, inasmuch as they are the products of uncommon or particular causes, of their own kind, co-existing in the same substratum with them, as is the case with reminiscence, and with the first sound (in a series of sounds).—6.

An objection answered.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected; If the difference of pleasure and pain from cognition depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from each other be just like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then there can be no mutual difference between the body and its parts such as the head, the feet, the back, the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to these, no difference in their causes, whether they be the ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and semen.

To meet this objection, he says:

एकदेश इत्येकास्मिन् शिरः पृष्ठं दर् मर्माणि
तद्विशेषस्तद्विशेषेभ्यः ॥ १० । १ । ७ ॥

एकदेश Eka-deśa, in the part. इति Iti, such. This. एकस्मिन् Ekasmin, in one (body). शिरः Śiraḥ, the head. पृष्ठं Priṣṭham, the back. दर् Udaram, the stomach. मर्माणि Marmmāṇi, the vitals. तद्विशेषः Tat-viśeṣaḥ, their distinction. तद्विशेषेभ्यः Tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ, from the distinctions or their causes)

7. The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the parts of one and same (body) ; this their difference (results) from the differences thereof (*i. e.*, of their causes).—361.

‘Eka-deśa iti’ means, in the part. ‘Ekasmin’ means, in the body ; ‘Śiraḥ’—this is one part ; ‘udaram’ ; ‘priṣṭham’ ; and ‘marmmāṇi,’ *i. e.*, the sinews, etc. ; their ‘viśeṣaḥ,’ difference in kind, (results). ‘tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ,’ from the difference in kind of their causes. There, again, (*i. e.*, in the case of the heterogeneity of the causes), heterogeneity results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes) ; for, the combinative causes of the stomach, the back etc., also are not just of the same kind as that of the head ; just as the heterogeneity of a spiece of cloth, a water-pot, etc., results from the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, and other material causes ; heterogeneity being possible, in them also, the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, etc., also, results from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity is, in like manner, to be sought in the successive material causes ; for, while the ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in their respective effects) ; whereas homogeneity of the material causes, constituted by their substanceness, does not cause such heterogeneity. This is the point.—7.

Bhāṣya :—read *Ekadeśa iti* of X. i. 7 with X. i. 6, and explains it as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised.

Here ends the first chapter of the tenth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK TENTH—CHAPTER SECOND.

Substance is the only combinative cause.

Upaskāra.—As a collateral topic, the author now commences a special discrimination of the three causes :

कारणमिति द्रव्ये कार्यसमवायात् ॥ १० । २ । १ ॥

कारणं Kāraṇam, cause. इति Iti, such. द्रव्ये Dravye, in substance. कार्यसमवायात् Kāryya-samavāyāt, from the combination of effect.

1. “(It is the combinative) cause”—such (intuition and usage), with regard to Substance, (arise) from the combination of effect (in it).—362.

‘Kāraṇam,’ that is, that it is the combinative cause ; ‘iti,’ such intuition and usage, are to be observed, ‘dravye,’ with regard to substance. Why so ? He gives the reply : ‘kāryya-samavāyāt,’ because effect, viz., substance, attribute, and action, combine in it alone.—1.

Vivṛiti.—* * * * The definition of a cause in general is that causality consists in constant antecedence, there existing at the same time voidness of failure to produce the effect (that is to say, in Mill’s phraseology, causality consists in invariable and unconditional antecedence). There are three kinds of causes, according to their division into the combinative or material, non-combinative or formal, and instrumental or efficient. * * * *

Substance is efficient cause also.

Upaskāra.—It may be asked : Do then substances possess only combinative causality ?

So he says :

संयोगात् १० । २ । २ ॥

संयोगात् Samyogat, from conjunction. वा Vā, or, and.

2. And, through conjunction, (Substance becomes the efficient or conditional cause also).—363.

As combinative causality, so also efficient causality, belongs to the threads, in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction of the shuttle and the threads is also a cause of the cloth, the shuttle and the thread, are, mediately through that conjunction, also efficient cause of the cloth. The word ‘vā’ is used in a collective sense, inasmuch as, though the thread possesses combinative causality towards the conjunction of the shuttle and the thread, yet it possesses efficient causality towards the cloth, mediately through such conjunction.—2.

Vivṛiti.—He says that combinative causality belongs to substances, not only because effects combine in them, but also because they are fields for the operation of non-combinative causes.

‘Samyogāt’ means because they are the support or substratum wherein takes place conjunction which is the non-combinative cause.* *

Actions are non-combinative causes.

Upaskāra.—He explains what causality resides in Action :

कारणे समवायात् कर्मणि ॥ १० । २ । ३ ॥

कारणे Kāraṇe in the cause. समवायात् Samavāyāt, from combination. कर्मणि Karmmāṇi, actions.

3. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Actions (are non-combinative causes).—364.

“Non-combinative causes”—such is the complement (of the aphorism.) Non-combinative causality is causality combined or co-inherent in one and the same object connected with the state of effect and cause. Such causality results either from combination in the same object with the effect, or from combination in the same object with the cause. Of these the former is called, in the terminology of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the slighter or minor, and the latter, the greater or major, proximity. If it be asked by means of which proximity, then, actions possess non-combinative causality towards disjunction, and *samskāra* or impression ; it is here replied, ‘kāraṇe samavāyāt,’ (that it is) through combination in the combinative cause of conjunction, etc. The meaning, therefore, is that non-combinative causality is exercised by action in (the production of) conjunction, etc., by means of the minor proximity characterised as combination in the same object with the effect.—3.

Certain Attributes are non-combinative causes, and occasionally efficient causes also.

Upaskāra.—In anticipation of the question as to what kind of causality pertains to colour and other attributes residing in the (consistent) parts, in relation to the attributes of the wholes, he says :

तथा रूपे कारणैकार्यसमवायाच्च ॥ १० । २ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathā, so. रूपे Rūpe, in colour. कारणैकार्यसमवायात् Kāraṇa-eka-
artha-samavāyāt, through combination in the same object with the
cause. च Cha, and, also.

4. So also in Colour (there is non-combinative causality) through combination in the same object with the cause.—365.

The expression ‘colour’ indicates colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude or quantity, separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, etc. The term ‘so’ extends (the application of) non-combinative causality. ‘Kāraṇa-eka-artha-samavāyāt’ : (This non-combinative causality of colour, etc.) originates the colour, etc., of the wholes, by means of the major proximity (constituted) by (their) combination in the same object with the whole, which is the combinative cause of the colour, etc., of that whole ; as, for instance, the colour, etc., of the potsherds originate the

colour, etc., in the water-pot, and similarly it should be observed in all other cases. The word 'cha' implies that occasionally colour, etc., possess efficient causality also.—4.

Bhāṣya.—reads X. ii. 4 as two aphorisms, viz., *Tatha rāpe*, and *Kārāṇai-kārtha-Samavāyacheha*.

Conjunction is a non-combinative cause.

Upaskāra.—He states that the minor proximity belongs to conjunction while it is a non-combinative cause in the origination of substances :

कारणसमवायात् संयोगः पटस्य ॥ १० । २ । ५ ॥

कारणसमवायात् Kāraṇa-samavāyāt, through combination in the cause.
संयोगः Samyogaḥ, conjunction. *पटस्य* Paṭasya, of the cloth.

5. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Conjunction (is a non-combinative cause) of the cloth.—366.

The meaning is that, through combination in the combinative cause, conjunction also is a non-combinative cause, in the production of effects such as a piece of cloth, etc., by means of the proximity characterised as combination in the same object with the effect. The word 'cloth' indicates product substance in general.

A certain author maintains that if, on the other hand, conjunction of part with part be also a non-combinative cause of a piece of cloth and the like, then combination in the same object with the cause is also (a non-combinative cause).—5.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He says that causality sometimes pertains to conjunction by means of the major proximity :

कारणकारणसमवायच्च ॥ १० । २ । ६ ॥

कारणकारणसमवायात् Kāraṇa-kāraṇa-samavāyāt, through combination in the cause of the cause. *च* Cha, and, also.

6. And, through combination in the cause of the cause, (conjunction becomes a non-combinative cause by means of the major proximity) also.—367.

The conjunction, technically termed *prachaya*, (loose) coalition aggregation, and residing in the constituent parts of a bale of cotton, originates magnitude in the bale of cotton. Here the proximity is constituted by combination in the same object with the cause. This is the meaning.—6.

Efficient causes declared.

Upaskāra.—Having thus ascertained causality determined by the combinative cause, he begins a new section for ascertaining efficient causality.

संज्ञकसमवायद्वये शेषिकः ॥ १० । २ । ७ ॥

संयुक्तसमवायात् Saṃyukta-samavāyāt, through combination in the conjunct. अग्ने Agneḥ, of fire. वैशेषिकम् Vaiśeṣikam, distinctive attribute.

7. The distinctive attribute of Fire, (*i. e.*, heat), (becomes an efficient cause), through combination in the conjunct.—368.

‘Vaiśeṣikam,’ distinctive attribute, ‘agneḥ,’ of fire, in other word, heat, becomes an efficient cause in relation to the effects (colour, etc.,) produced by burning or baking, through combination (of colour, etc.,) in the conjunct, (*i. e.*, the water-pot placed in fire.) This is indicative; in relation to cognition everything possesses efficient causality. Understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression possess efficient causality only. It should be observed that this system or elaboration of thought has the purposes of establishing the mutual differences of pleasure, etc.—7.

Vivṛiti—* * * * The general definition of an efficient cause is to be understood to be a cause other than the combinative and non-combinative causes. * * * *

Observances produce adriṣṭam as their fruit, on the authority of the Veda.

Upaskṛta.—Now, in order to confirm the authoritativeness of the Vedas, he repeats the very same statement which has been made by him before :

दृष्टानां दृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोगोऽ

भ्युदयाय ॥ १० २ । ८ ॥

दृष्टानां Dṛiṣṭānām, of acts observed or known to be productive of good. दृष्टप्रयोजनानां Dṛiṣṭa-prayojanānām, of acts the purpose of which has been taught. दृष्टाभावे Dṛiṣṭa-abhāve, in the absence of visible or observed faults or defects. प्रयोगः Prayogaḥ, performante. अभ्युदयाय Abhyudayāya, for the production of exaltation or *adriṣṭam*.

8. The performance of acts of observed utility and of acts the purpose whereof has been taught (in the sacred writings), is, for the production of *adriṣṭam*, (as these teachings are authoritative being the word of God in whom) the defects found in ordinary speakers do not exist.—369.

‘Dṛiṣṭānām’ means, of acts which have been proved to be useful by the evidence of experience, *e.g.*, sacrifices, almsgivings, ablution, and the like.

Dṛiṣṭa-prayojanānām’ means, of acts the purpose whereof has been taught. For, thus, in such precepts as “He who desires heaven, shall perform sacrifice,” “He who desires heaven, shall offer oblation in the *agnihotra* sacrifice,” etc., the fruit or purpose is mentioned at once along with the injunction; in some cases, the purpose is given out by way of a recommendation, as in “The *pitris* or departed ancestors of him who studies during these nights, pour down upon, or send down to,

him streams of clarified butter and streams of honey," etc.; in other cases, the purpose is left to be imagined, as in "He shall perform the *Vitvaji* sacrifice," etc., for, here the purpose is neither mentioned along with the injunction nor presented by way of a recommendation, and is, therefore, suppositional, and (it cannot be any thing but heaven), for heaven alone should be supposed as the purpose or fruit which is charming in itself. That being so, it does not stand to reason that these acts which so shortly come to their end, should have causality towards the production of fruits or results in the distant future. Hence, the meaning is, 'prayogaḥ, the performance, of these acts, is 'abhyudayaḥ, for the purpose of *apāram*, that is, *adriṣṭam*, or deserts. It might be objected as follows: This would have been the case, were the authoritativeness of the Vedas a fact. But that is hard to maintain. For the authoritativeness of the Vedas as being eternally free from faults or defects in themselves, is not desired by you, (i. e., the *Vaiśeṣika*), as it is by the *Mīmāṃsā* school, inasmuch as you recognise them as the production of a person, and in that case, it is possible that mistake, absence of mind, intention to mislead, and other defects existed in the person. To this the reply is given by the phrase, 'driṣṭa-abhāve' which means, there being non-existence of personal defects such as error, absence of mind, desire to mislead, and the like, which are found in other persons, namely, in ourselves and others; inasmuch as the Supreme Person, inferred whether as the Creator of the earth or as the Speaker of the Vedas, is presented to us entirely under the characteristic of freedom from faults or defects. So that His words can neither have no meaning, nor convey a contrary meaning, nor convey a useless meaning. It is only impurities caused by error, absence of mind, inefficiency of the senses, and the like, due to defectiveness of the elements constituting the physical organism, the external senses, and the mind, that may possibly vitiate speech. But they cannot possibly lurk in the word of *Īśvara*. It has been accordingly declared:—

रागाज्ञानादिभिर्वक्ता प्रस्तत्वादनृत्तं वदेत् ।

ते चेक्षुरे न विद्यन्ते सब्रूयात् कथमन्यथा ॥

—Being influenced by passion, ignorance, and the like, a speaker may tell untruths. But these do not exist in *Īśvara*. How can He speak otherwise (than truthfully)?—8.

Note—Cf. VI. ii. 1, *supra*.

Vivṛiti.—Thus the Predicables have been ascertained, as also Resemblance and Difference. This *Sāstra* or System of Self-culture facilitates *manana*, intellection or thinking about things, in them only whose *chitta*, or inner sense or mind, has been purified by the performance of acts, and not in them whose *chitta* has not been so purified. Observances are productive of purity of *chitta*, as declared by such text of the Veda as "They desire to know," etc. The same has been mentioned before. He repeats it for further confirmation.

* * * * Observances, * * * when performed disinterestedly, do not produce elysian bliss, etc., as their fruit, but produce as their result purity of *chitta* or intellect, etc., according to the text of

the of Veda, " They desire to know," and the *Smṛiti*, " When worldly attachment has, by observances, borne its fruits, knowledge is afterwards produced."

Authoritativeness of the Veda established.

Upakāra—It may be urged : The Veda has been revealed by God,—it is here that there is conflict of opinions.

Accordingly he says :

तद्वचनाऽन्मायस्य प्रामाण्यमिति ॥ १० । २ । ६ ॥

तद्वचनात् Tat-vachanât, from being the word of Him, God. आज्ञायस्य Āmnâyasya, of the Vedas, प्रामाण्यं Prâmāṇyam, authoritativeness इतिIti, *finis*. According to Śrīdhara, author of Nyâya kandati, " " tat refers to Rîṣis.

9. The authoritativeness of the Veda (follows) from its being the Word of God.—370.

' iti' indicates the conclusion of the *Śāstra* or system. The authoritativeness, ' āmnâyasya,' of the Veda, (is derived), ' vachanât,' from its being the composition, ' tena,' by Īsvara. For, thus, we have already proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as they are a collection of sentences or declarations. Nor can we and others possibly be the speakers of them, divided and sub-divided as they are in a thousand branches, for they treat of objects which transcend the senses, and beings of our nature cannot behold objects which transcend the senses. Moreover, the Vedas must have been spoken by a trustworthy person, inasmuch as they are accepted by men of light and leading. That which is not spoken by a trustworthy person, is not accepted by men of light and leading, the Vedas are accepted by men of light and leading, therefore they have been spoken by a trustworthy person. To be spoken by a trustworthy person is to be declared by a self-governed or independent person ; and to be accepted by men of light and leading is to be believed in, and acted upon, by persons attached to all the systems of thought. It has been stated before that non-appearance of the fruit or result, which occasionally happens, is due to defect or flaw in the act or performance, the agent, and the means or requisites. If it be denied that this is so, there being no recollection on the part of the agent ; we reply that the denial has no value, it having been already proved that there is recollection on the part of the agent. The composition thereof by Him is proved, inasmuch as they could be declared only by an independent person, while such independent power to declare the Vedas in their thousand branches is as has been said, impossible for beings of our nature. Moreover, since certitude must be the product of excellence or superiority, the certitude derived from the Vedas must also have excellence for its condition, and excellence must in this case be pronounced to be only the speaker's accurate knowledge of the true meaning of the sentences. The speaker of the Veda must, therefore,

be one of that description, one who has immediate cognition of heaven, *adriṣṭam* and like other objects ; and there is none such but *Īśvara* alone. This is well said.—9.

Note.—Cf. I. i. 3, *supra*.

— + —

The fortunate *Saṅkara*, who is the son of *Bhavanātha* by *Bhavadni*, and who is devoted to the worship of *Śiva*, has written this commentary on the Aphorisms of *Kaṇāda*.

Even though this production of mine may not find favour with others, nay, may be an object of ridicule with them, yet, (it is hoped), it will be adored a thousand times and over by my pupils, out of respect for their teacher.

— + —

Here ends the second chapter of the tenth book in the commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms by *Śrī Saṅkara Miśra*, son of *Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhavanātha Miśra*.

And complete is also this treatise.



APPENDIX I. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

(Compiled from the *Viśvakōṣa* and Hall's Catalogue).

<i>Names of Works.</i>	<i>Names of Authors.</i>
1 Apaśabda-khaṇḍana	... Kaṇāda Muni.
2 Ahetu-saṃa-prakaraya	... <i>Anonymous.</i>
3 Ātma-tattva-viveka	... Udayana Ācharya
4 —kalpalatā	... Śankara Miśra.
5 —dīdhiti	... Raghunātha Bhaṭṭāchārya.
6 Kaṇāda-rahasya	... Padmanābha Miśra
7	... Śankara Miśra.
8 Kaṇāda-rahasya-saṃgraha	... <i>Anonymous.</i>
9 Kaṇāda-saṃgrahavyākhyā	... <i>Anonymous.</i>
10 Kaṇāda-sūtra-vyākhyāna	... Raghudeva Nyayālankāra
11 Kārikāvali	... Viśvanātha.
12 Kīrṇāvali	... Udayana Acharya
13 -ṭikā	... Udayana.
14	... Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa.
15 -ṭippaṇa	... Bhāgiratha Thākkura.
16	... Mathurānātha.
17 -prakāśa	... Vardhamāna Upādhyāya.
18 — ... —kāśikā	... Megha Bhāgiratha.
19 — vyākhyā	... <i>Unknown.</i>
20 —bhāskara	... Padmanābha Varadarāj
21 —rahasya	... Mathurānātha.
22 Kusumāñjali (-kārikā)	... Udayana Ācharya.
23 -vyākhyā	... Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya.
24	... Rāmaabhadra ...
25	... Rudra Bhaṭṭāchārya.
26 -ṭikā	... Miśra.
27 -prakāśa	... Vardhamāna Upādhyāya
28 -makaranda	... Ruchidatta.
29 -vṛitti	... <i>Unknown.</i>
30 -vyākhyā	... Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha Yati.
31	... Trilochana Deva.
32 Komalā-ṭikā-ṭika	... Viśvanātha.
33 Guṇa-kīrṇāvali	... <i>Untraced.</i>
34 -ṭikā	... <i>Untraced.</i>
35 -prakāśa	... Vardhamāna.
36 Guṇa-dīdhiti-ṭippaṇi	... Jayarāma Bhaṭṭāchārya.
37 Guṇa-prakāśa-dīdhiti	... Raghunātha.
38 -māthuri	... Mathurānātha.
39 -vivṛiti	... Raghunātha.
40 -bhāva-prakāśikā	... Rudra Bhaṭṭāchārya.
41 Guṇa-rahasya	... Rāmbhadra.
42 -prakāśa	... Madhava Deva.
43 Guṇa-śīramahī	... Raghunātha.
44 -ṭikā	... Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭāchārya.
45 Guṇānandī (on No. 22)	... Guṇananda.
46 Jāti-śatka-prakaraya	... Viśvanātha Pañchānana.
47 Tattva-jñāna-vivṛiddhi-prakāśa	
48 Tattvānusandhāna	... <i>Unknown.</i>

49	Tarka-kārikā	...	Jivarāja Dīkṣita.
50	Tarka-kanmudī	...	Laugākṣi Bhāskara.
51	Tarka-dīpikā	...	Annam Bhaṭṭa.
52	... -prakāśa	...	Nilakanṭha Śāstri.
53	Tarka-pradīpa	...	Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.
54	Tarka-bhāṣā	...	Viśvanātha.
55	Tarka-manjari	...	Jivarāja Dīkṣita.
56	Tarka-ratna	...	Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.
57	...	...	Virarāghava Śāstri.
58	Tarka-saṁgraha	...	Annam Bhaṭṭa.
59	... -chandrikā	...	Mukunda Bhaṭṭa
60	... -tattva-prakāśa	...	Unknown.
61	Tarka-saṁgrahopanyāsa	...	Meru Śāstri
62	Tarkāmṛita	...	Jagadīśa Tarkalankāra.
63	... -śaśaka	...	Gangāśana Jati.
64	... -tātparyā-tikā	...	...
65	... -tarāṅgini	...	Mukunda Bhaṭṭa
66	Dravya-kiraṇavali-prakāśa	...	Vardhamāna.
67	... -parikṣa	...	Rudra Vāchaspati.
68	... -sahita-vivēcana	...	Chandraśekhara Bharati
69	Dravya-guṇa-paryāya	...	Untraced
70	Dravya-nirūpaṇa	...	Untraced.
71	Dravya-patāka	...	Untraced.
72	Dravya-padārtha	...	Pakṣadhara.
73	Dravya-prakāśa-vivāṇa	...	Raghunātha.
74	Dravya-prakāśika	...	Megha Bhāgiratha Phakkura.
75	Dravya-bhāṣya-tikā	...	Anonymous
76	Dravya-sāra-saṁgraha	...	Raghudeva
77	Dvandva-vichāra	...	Gokulanātha Maṇḍila
78	Nirukti	...	Paṭtabhirāma Śāstri.
79	Nyāya-kandali	...	Śrīdhara Āchārya.
80	Nyāya-tantra-bodhini	...	Viśvanātha
81	Nyāya-tarāṅgini	...	Keśava.
82	Nyāya-bodhini	...	Govardhana Miśra.
83	Nyāya-līlāvati	...	Vallabha Āchārya.
84	... -kaṇṭhabhāṣana	...	Sankara Miśra.
85	... -prakāśa	...	Vardhamāna Upadhyaya.
86	... -didhiti	...	Raghunātha Śiromani.
87	... -viveka	...	Vidyāvagiśa Bhaṭṭācharya.
88	... -bhāva-prakāśa	...	Bhāgiratha.
89	Nyāya-sāra	...	Mādhava Deva.
90	Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvali	...	Viśvanātha Pañchānana.
91	Nyāyārtha-laghu-bodhini	...	Govardhana Ranga Āchārya.
92	Pada-kṛitya	...	Chandrarāja Simha.
93	Pada-saṁgraha	...	Kṛiṣṇa Miśra
94	Padārtha-khaṇḍara	...	Raghunātha Śiromani.
95	... -tikā	...	Govinda, Mādhava, Raghudeva, Ruchi-datta, and Rāmaṭṭhara.
96	... -tātparyā-tikā	...	Kṛiṣṇa Miśra.
97	Padārtha-chandrika	...	Misara Miśra (or Śārngadhara, ?)
98	... -vīlāsa	...	Kṛiṣṇa Bhaṭṭa.
99	Padārtha-tattvāvaloka	...	Viśvanātha.
100	... -nirṇaya	...	Anonymous.

101	Padârtha-dîpikâ	...	Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.
102	Padârtha-dharma-saṃgraha	..	Prâśastapâda.
103	Padârtha-nirûpaṇa	...	Nyâyavâchaspati
104	Padârtha-parijâta	...	Kriṣṇa Miśra.
105	Padârtha-pradeśa	...	Śaṅkarâchârya
106	Padârtha-bodha	...	Untraced.
107	Padârtha-mañi-mâlâ	...	Jayarâma Nyâyapañchânana.
108	... -prakâśa	...	Langâkṣi Bhâskara.
109	Padârtha-viveka (-siddhânta-tattva)	Untraced.	
110	... -tika	...	Gopinâtha Munî
111	Paribhâṣa-viśeṣa	Untraced.	
112	Pramâṇa-mañjarî	...	Sarvadeva Purî
113	Bâhyârtha-bhaṅga-nirakâraṇa	...	Viśvanâtha Pañchânana
114	Bhâṣa-parichchheda	...	...
115	Bheda-prakâśa	...	Śaṅkara Miśra.
116	Mita-bhaṣiṇî	...	Mâdhava Sarasvatî.
117	Mithyâ-tva-vâna-rahasya	...	Gokulanâtha.
118	Mukti-vâda-tikâ	...	Viśvanâtha.
119	Ratna-kośa	...	Prithvidhara Âchârya
120	... -kâra-padârtha	...	
121	... -mata-vâda	...	
122	... -karika-vichara	...	
123	... -mata-rahasya	...	
124	... -vâda or -vichâra...	...	Harirâma.
125	... -rahasya	...	Gadâdhara.
126	Rasa-sâra	...	Mâdhava Vadindra.
127	Râddhânta-muktâhâra	...	Padmanâbha Miśra.
128	Lakṣaṇâvali	...	Udayana Âchârya.
129	... -tika	...	Śeṣa Śaraṅgadhra.
130	Lilavati-rahasya	...	Mathurânâtha Tarkavâgisa.
131	Vâla-sudhâ-tikâ ratnavali	...	Kriṣṇa Miśra.
132	Vaiśeṣ-ka-ratna-mâlâ	...	Bhuvadeva Paṇḍita Kavi.
133	Vaiśeṣ-ka-Sûtra	...	Kaṇâda.
134	... -upaskâra	...	Śaṅkara Miśra.
135	... -tikâ	...	Udayana Âchârya ; Chandrâ nanda.
136	... -bhâṣya	...	Râvṇa ; Raghudeva ; Chandrâ-kânta.
137	... -vânṭika	...	Vijñâna Bhikṣu.
138	... -vivṛiti	...	Jayarâmyana.
139	... -vṛitti	...	Bhoja ?
139	Vyâkhyâ-parimala	...	
140	Sapta-padârthî	...	Śivâditya Miśra.
141	... -vyâkhyâ	...	Hari.
142	Śabda-prâmâṇy-vâda	...	
143	Śiddhârtha-tarkâmrta	...	Jaykriṣṇa (or Kriṣṇa Maunin).
144	Sambandho-padeśa	...	Bangadâsa.
145	... -tikâ	...	Gohardhana.
146	Siddhânta-chandrikâ	...	Kriṣṇa Dhârjati Dikṣita.
147	Siddhânta-tattva-viveka	...	Gokulanâtha.
148	... -sarvârva	...	Gopinâtha Maunî.
149	Siddhânta-muktâvali-prakâśa	...	Bâlakriṣṇa.

APPENDIX II.

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A P P E N D I X—III.

INDEX OF APHORISMS.

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N. B.—Words left out by some editors are shown within brackets.

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Translated by various Sanskrit Scholars.

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IN MEMORIAM

Major V[^]am[^]anadasa Vasu,
I. M. S. (Retired),

Scholar, Saint and Philosopher,

the versatile Editor of

The Sacred Books of the Hindus,

the Author of

The Indian Medicinal Plants,

The Historian of India,

this work

is humbly dedicated

as a mark of

Everlasting Love and Reverence.

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FOREWORD.

I

Differences of opinion prevail as to the precise number of the original aphorisms of the Nyâya-Sûtra of Gotama. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Dr. Satîś'achandra Vidyâbhûṣaṇa* is inclined to take the extreme view that it is only the first book of the Nyâya-Sûtra containing a brief explanation of the sixteen categories that we are justified in ascribing to Gotama, while the remaining four books bear marks of different hands and ages, the last and most considerable additions having been made by Vâtsyâyana who sought to harmonise the different, and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sûtras of his own making fathered upon Gotama. We are unable to subscribe to this view. The Nyâya-Sûtra is admittedly a *system* of philosophy, and its method, like that of the Vais'eṣika, consists in the enumeration, definition and examination of the categories. You cannot retain the first book, and reject the others, without mutilating the system. As regards the so-called references in the second, third and fourth books to the tenets of the Vais'eṣika, Yoga, Mîmâṃsâ, Vedânta and Buddhist philosophy, it should not be forgotten that every system of thought which has flourished on the soil of India has its source in a common fund of national philosophy, "a large Mânasa lake of philosophical thought and language, far away in the distant North, and in the distant past, from which each thinker was allowed to draw for his own purposes". Similarity of words and ideas here and there is therefore not a safe guide in the determination of the originality or otherwise of one system in relation to another. Moreover, isolated similarity of thought and expression is no ground for the rejection of whole books as spurious. The parallelism between the wording of some of the aphorisms and certain passages in the Lankâvatâra Sûtra, Mâdhyamika Sûtra, and the Śatoka is also misleading. For instance, as observed by Dr. Keith**, on the authority of Winternitz, *Gesch.d.ind. Litt.*, II. i. 243, the Lankâvatâra Sûtra in its present form is not earlier than the sixth century A. D., that is, is later than even Vâtsyâyana.

The Nyâya-Bhâṣya of Vâtsyâyana also presents a most formidable obstacle to the acceptance of the theory propounded by Dr. Vidyâbhûṣaṇa. For it is not confined to the first book alone but covers the other books as well. The difficulty can be overcome only by denying the authentic character of the Bhâṣya in its present form. And this is exactly what Dr. Vidyâbhûṣaṇa has done. We are not aware of any good reason for doubting the genuineness of the Bhâṣya as it has come down to us. Let us examine

* Introduction, page X.

** Indian Logic and Atomism, by A. B. Keith, 1921, page 23.

Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa's reasons. He translates aphorism II. i. 29 (II. i. 28 of the Bibliotheca Indica series edition) as follows : "It may be objected that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, as it is inefficient in some instances", and then proceeds :

"An objector may say that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, as we find that a person listening to a song may not see colour, though it comes in contact with his eye.

"Vātsyāyana interprets the aphorism as follows :—If the conjunction of soul with mind is not accepted as the cause of perception a well-known conclusion will be debarred, viz., the mark of the mind is that only one act of knowledge is possible at a time. This interpretation, here inappropriate, is based on the Bhāṣya-commentary published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1865. I fully agree with those who hold that the real Bhāṣya-commentary of Vātsyāyana is not yet available to us."

Similarly he translates the next aphorism as follows : "It is not so, because there is pre-eminence of some particular object", and proceeds :

"It is admitted that a person while listening to a song may not see colour, though it comes in contact with his eye. Yet the instance does not prove that the contact of a sense with its object is not the cause of perception, for it is to be understood that his intent listening prevents him from seeing the colour. In other words, the auditory perception supersedes the visual perception, because the song is more attractive than the colour.

"Vātsyāyana interprets the aphorism thus :—The conjunction of the soul with mind is not rendered useless, even if there is predominance of the senses and their objects. If perception is produced when a person is asleep or inattentive, it is because there is then the predominance of his sense and its object, though even then there is a faint conjunction of soul with mind. This interpretation is based on the Bhāṣya-commentary as available to us. It is ingenious but out of place here."

With due respect to the memory of the distinguished critic we submit that he has not been quite fair in his representation of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya on these two aphorisms. In the translation and explanation which we have felt constrained to substitute in the text in place of the above we have tried to show what Vātsyāyana exactly means. It will be seen that Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the two aphorisms is not necessarily inappropriate or out of place. It also goes without saying that for a pseudo-Vātsyāyana who could produce a Bhāṣya which has commanded universal respect through all the ages, it would not have been difficult to avoid such inappropriateness as is alleged, or to grasp the more obvious interpretation which he is supposed to have missed. Moreover, it is well-known that uncertainties as to the correct reading of the Nyāya-Sūtra and the Nyāya-Bhāṣya have given rise to two different schools of interpretation from very early times. One of

these schools is represented by Tâtparya-Paris'uddhi and Nyâya-Paris'iṣṭa of Udayanâchârya and Paris'uddhi-Prakâś'a and Anvikṣâ-Naya-Tattvabodha of Vardhamâna Upâdhyâya ; the other school, by Tâtparya-Tikâ and Nyâya-Sûchi-Nibandha of Vâchaspati Miś'ra. Mere difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of the Bhâṣya here and there cannot, therefore, be accepted as a sufficient reason for questioning the authenticity of the Bhâṣya in its present form. On the other hand, the Bhâṣya has been accepted as genuine in all the seats of Sanskrit learning in India, and, among modern researchers in the field, by Mahâmahopâdhyâyas Chandrakānta Tarkâlankâra, Bhîmâchârya Jhalikar, Gangâdhara Śâstrî Tailanga, and Dr. Gangânâtha Jhâ. Even amongst European orientalists Dr. Herrman Jacobi does not doubt that the author of the complete Nyâya-Bhâṣya is one and the same person. Dr. Keith also is convinced that there is no evidence of any corruption of the text of the Nyâya-Bhâṣya, and that the suggestion that Vâtsyâyana is responsible for remodelling the Nyâya-Sûtra is wholly unsupported by evidence.*

Vâtsyâyana is an ancient Ṛṣi. By tradition he is regarded as "Bhagavân", "Muni", "Mahâmuni", and "Maharṣi". His date cannot be very far removed from the time when the aphorisms of Gotama were first reduced to writing. Mahâmahopâdhyâya Vâsudeva Śâstrî Abhyankar assigns *circa* 300 A. D. to him.** It is therefore reasonable to conclude that all the original aphorisms of Gotama have been preserved in the Nyâya-Bhâṣya of Vâtsyâyana. Difficulties have been experienced from very early times in picking out the Sûtra from the Bhâṣya, particularly in those places where the Bhâṣya does not clearly indicate the Sûtra. These difficulties have been considerably enhanced by the privilege enjoyed by Bhâṣya-writers and undoubtedly exercised by Vâtsyâyana of raising issues and solving them in the course of the Bhâṣya in the form of aphorisms.*** This has misled many scholars in attributing the aphorisms of Vâtsyâyana to Gotama and *vice versa*. The results of such diverse readings are shown below in a tabular form :

1. Reading referred to by M.-M. Chandrakānta
Tarkâlankâra in Śrigopâla Vasumallik
Fellowship Lectures on Hindu Philo-
sophy, 1898 547 aphorisms.

*Indian Logic and Atomism, by A. B. Keith, 1921, pages 25 and 27.

**Sarva-Dars'ana-Sangraha, Government Oriental (Hindu) Series No. 1, Poona, 1924.

***Cf. "The knowers of Bhâṣyas know that to be a Bhâṣya by which is explained the meaning of aphorisms by means of words appropriate to the aphorisms as well as texts of the commentator himself."

2. Publication by the Asiatic Society of Bengal
in the Bibliotheca Indica series, 1865 ... 540 aphorisms.
3. According to Nyâyakoṣa by M. M. Bhîmâ-
chârya Jhâlkikar, second edition, 1893
(Bombay Sanskrit Series No. XLIX) ... 537 ..
4. According to M. M. Dr. Gangânâtha Jhâ
in the Nyâya-Dars'ana, Chowkhamba
Sanskrit Series, 1920—25 ... 532 ..
5. According to M. M. Gangâdhara Śâstri
Tailan'ga in the Vizianagram Sanskrit
Series, volume IX, 1896 ... 531 ..
6. According to Nyâyasûchinibandha of
Vâchaspati Miś'ra, *circa*. 841 ... 528 ..

The diversity of readings, again, is not confined only to the number of the aphorisms, but extends also to the aphorisms themselves ; for in regard to particular aphorisms commentators and compilers differ as to whether they are aphorisms or are the assertions of the author of the Bhâṣya. The statement below will explain the position from this point of view. Thus :

Book.	Chapter.	Number of aphorisms ac- cording to the edition of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1865.	Number rejected by Vâch- aspati.	Number added by Vâchaspati.	Number of aphor- isms according to Nyâya-Sûchi- Nibandha of Vâchaspati Miś'ra.
I	i	41	*	*	41
	ii	20	*	*	20
II	i	69	2	I	68
	ii	71	3	I	69
III	i	75	6	4	73
	ii	78	6	*	72
IV	i	68	2	I	67
	ii	50	*	I	51
V	i	43	*	*	43
	ii	25	I	*	24
I-V	i-x	540	20	8	528

Since the publication of the Nyāya-Bhāṣya by the Asiatic Society of Bengal a fairly large number of valuable manuscripts have come to light, and the results of recent investigations go to confirm the correctness of the Index to the Aphorisms of Nyāya (Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha) by Vāchaspati Miśra. We have therefore revised the work of Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa according to, and on the authority of, Vāchaspati. The twenty rejected aphorisms are however retained in appendix B. The eight additional aphorisms bear serial numbers 81, 172, 226, 227, 228, 261, 404 and 461 of the present edition.

M. M. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā and Pandit Dhuṇḍirāja Śāstrī have also followed the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha in their edition of the "The Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana with two Commentaries" published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1925. They have, however, retained four aphorisms which have been omitted from the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha. The total number of aphorisms according to them is therefore 532 instead of 528. The learned editors have not assigned any specific reasons for treating these four aphoristic statements as aphorisms of Gotama. They merely state that they "feel constrained to deviate from it (*i. e.*, the Nyāya-Sūchī-Nibandha) on the clear authority of either the Bhāṣya or the Vārtika." With due respect for the authority of Dr. Jhā we are unable to persuade ourselves to be of the same view. The absence of these so-called aphorisms leaves no extraordinary or unusual gap in the line of thought in the aphorisms of Gotama. We are therefore content to follow the lead of M. M. Chandrakānta Tarkālakāra in accepting Vāchaspati Miśra as a reliable guide to the aphorisms of Gotama.

II

In his posthumous work entitled "History of Indian Logic", published by the University of Calcutta in the year 1921, Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has completely changed his opinions as to the authorship and the date of the composition or compilation of the Nyāya-Sūtras. We give below a resume of the results of his later researches with our comments thereon.

"The word *nyāya* popularly signifies 'right' or 'justice'. The *Nyāya-s'āstra* is therefore the science of right judgment or true reasoning."¹ "Technically the word *nyāya* signifies a syllogism (or a speech of five parts), and the Ānvikṣikī was called *Nyāya-s'āstra*, when *nyāya* constituted its special topic."¹ "The term 'Nyāya' in the sense of Logic does not appear to have been used in literature before the first century A. D. Pāṇini (about 350 B. C.) did not know the word 'Nyāya' in the sense of Logic."² "There is no doubt that Pāṇini derives the word *nyāya* (evidently in the sense of justice) from

1. History of Indian Logic, 1921, page 40.

2. *Ibid.*, page 41.

the root *ni* in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 3—3—122, as follows :—*न्याय्याय न्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च*
His *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 4—2—60, *क्रतुकथादि सुत्रान्तात्ठक्*, does not, however, presuppose
nyāya in the sense of 'Logic'."³

"Medhātithi Gautama (was) the founder of *Ānvikṣiki par excellence* (circa 550 B. C.)."⁴ He "was quite different from Akṣapāda. While one lived in Mithilā, the other flourished at Prabhāsa in Kathiawar. The *Brahmaṇḍa-purāṇa* describes Akṣapāda and Kaṇvāda as the sons of a Brāhmaṇa named Soma-Śarmā who was Śiva incarnate, and well-known for his practice of austerities at the shrine of Prabhāsa during the time of Jātūkarṇya Vyāsa."⁵ "It is by no means easy to determine who was the real author of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Gautama and Akṣapāda seem both to have contributed to the production of the work."⁶

The *Nyāya-Sūtra* "treats of four distinct subjects, viz. (1) the art of debate (*tarka*) (2) the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), (3) the doctrine of syllogism (*avayava*), and (4) the examination of contemporaneous philosophical doctrines (*anyamata-parikṣā*)".⁷ The first two subjects, "combined together, constitute the *Tarka-s'āstra* (the philosophy of reasoning), popularly known as *Gautamī-vidyā* (the Gotamīde learning)."⁷ "The third subject, the doctrine of the Syllogism, does not appear to have been known in India a considerable time before the Christian era. The fourth subject refers to numerous philosophical doctrines that were propounded from time to time upto the second century A. D. Gotama's *Tarka-s'āstra*, after these two subjects had been introduced into it, became, about the second century A. D., designated as the *Nyāya-sūtra*, the aphorisms on logic."⁷

"Ananta-yajvan, in his commentary on the *Piṭrīmedha-sūtra*, observes that Gautama and Akṣapāda were the same person, while the *Nyāya-koṣa* mentions a legend to account for the name as applied, according to it, to Gautama. As no credible evidence has been adduced in either case, I consider the identification as fanciful, and maintain that Gotama or Gautama was quite different from Akṣapāda, but that both of them contributed to the production of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, one at its early stage and the other in its final form."⁸

3. *Ibid.*, page 41, footnote 4.

4. *Ibid.*, page 17.

5. *Ibid.*, page 49.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 498.

"Though Akṣapāda introduced into the Nyāya-sūtra the doctrine of the syllogism, he was by no means the first promulgator of the doctrine—nay, not even its first disseminator. The doctrine was carried to great perfection in Greece by Aristotle in the fourth century B. C. (384—322 B. C.). That it was known even in India prior to Akṣapāda is apparent from a notice of the same in the Charaka-saṃhitā, about 78 A. D."⁹

"Some philosophical doctrines of the third and fourth centuries A. D. were incorporated into the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda by Vātsyāyana the first commentator (about 400 A. D.), through the introduction of certain sūtras of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda."¹⁰

Thus, according to Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, "Ancient logic was called *Anvikṣiki*, or the science of debate, but with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning it came to be called Nyāya from the first century A. D.,"¹¹ and that "The Ancient School, which reached the height of its development at the hands of Akṣapāda about 150 A. D., extended over a period of one thousand years, beginning with Gautama about 550 B.C. and ending with Vātsyāyana about 400 A. D."¹²

III

It is gratifying to find that Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has discarded his former opinion that only the first book of the Nyāya-sūtra is the work of Gotama, while the remaining four books bear marks of different hands and ages. His opinion now is that Gotama's "work on *Ānvikṣiki* has not come down to us in its original form,"¹³ and that Akṣapāda is "the real author of the Nyāya-sūtra which derived a considerable part of its materials from the *Ānvikṣiki-vidyā* of Gautama."¹⁴ We have already explained why the charge against Vātsyāyana, viz., that he interpolated into the Nyāya-sūtra aphorisms of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda, must be rejected. The theory, again, that Gotama and Akṣapāda are two different persons is equally unsound. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa is wrong in supposing that Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda were sons of Soma-s'armā. The word 'sons' in the text of the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa means disciples. There is also no inconsistency in Gotama, born in Mithilā, proceeding to Prabhāsa for education. The identity of Gotama and Akṣapāda does not admit of doubt. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa himself has fully established it in the Introduction. We shall only point out that the commentators on Amara-koṣa : *Naiyāyikaḥ tu akṣapādaḥ*, explain that Akṣapāda, *Ākṣapāda*—

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 498—499.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 497, foot note 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. xvi.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

these two are the names of Gotama who holds that the number of Predicables is sixteen, viz., Pramâṇa, Prameya, Saṃs'aya, etc.

Dr. Vidyâbhūṣaṇa seems to us to have been induced to change his opinion as to the authorship and the date of the composition or compilation of the Nyâya-Sûtra by the idea that the doctrine of the syllogism was imported into India from Greece. We propose, therefore, to discuss this point, not fully, but in some detail. Dr. Vidyâbhūṣaṇa's reference to Pāṇini is incomplete. Pāṇini does not use the word "Nyâya" in the sense of justice only. In Aṣṭādhyāyī, I. 3.36 सम्माननोत् सञ्जना चार्य कणे ज्ञानभूति विगणन उपयेषु नियः the root ni is said to take the âtmanepada form of conjugation when it is used in one or other of the seven senses mentioned therein. One of these senses is Jñâna, knowledge. The commentators explain Jñâna as Prameyanis'chaya, ascertainment of the object of right knowledge. They also illustrate the use of the verb in this sense thus : Tattvam nayate, demonstrates or verifies the truth. It is therefore idle to argue that Pāṇini did not know the word "Nyâya" in the sense of Logic. And Pāṇini is as old as "Most probably the seventh century B. C. in my opinion, for which good authority might be cited" (Ancient and Hindu India by V. A. Smith, second edition, 1923, page 57, footnote 1).

Again, according to Dr. Vidyâbhūṣaṇa, the old Ānvikṣiki was called Nyâya-Śāstra when Nyâya in the technical sense of the syllogism came to constitute its special topic, i.e., about the second century A. D. This argument is demolished by Bhāsa's reference to "Medhâtithēḥ Nyâyas'āstram", the Nyâya-Śāstra of Medhâtithi, in his drama *Pratima*. Dr. Vidyâbhūṣaṇa seeks to get out of the difficulty by observing that by "Nyâya-s'āstra" Bhāsa "really meant its prototype the Ānvikṣiki." But the question is not what Bhāsa really meant, but that the term Nyâya-Śāstra in the sense of Logic was prevalent in the days of Bhāsa whereas, according to Dr. Vidyâbhūṣaṇa, it came into use about the second century A. D. And Bhāsa, in the opinion of M.-M. Pandit Gaṇapati Śāstrī, is even older than Pāṇini (vide his introduction to *Pratima nāṭaka*).

Dr. Keith shows a more correct appreciation of the position of Indian Logic *vis a vis* the Logic of Greece. He says : "Of logical doctrine in its early stages there is no reason whatever to suspect a Greek origin: the syllogism of Gautama and Kaṇāda alike is obviously of natural growth, but of stunted development. It is with Dignāga only that the full doctrine of invariable concomitance as the basis of inference in lieu of reasoning by analogy appears, and it is not unreasonable to hazard the suggestion that in this case again Greek influence may have been at work. But the possibility of a natural development is not excluded....."¹⁵

¹⁵, Indian Logic and Atomism, 1921, p. 18.

But we do not agree with the learned Doctor that the doctrine of invariable concomitance was unknown to Indian Logic before the time of Dignâga. We apprehend that he has missed the full significance and the true function of the *example* in the syllogism. The reasoning of Kaṇāda and Gotama was not merely from particular to particular and their *example* was not a mere particular experience. Generally, as Welton points out, "even in cases where the inference at first sight seems to be founded on one or more particular experiences, it is really based on the recognition of the universal element in which they agree ; and this may be expressed in a general proposition which forms the major premise of a syllogism"¹⁶. The need for the universal was fully recognised by Kaṇāda and Gotama. They do not draw their conclusion from the *example* alone, but from the *reason* as well. The function of the *example* and the *reason* have also been distinguished by Kaṇāda. According to him inference is based on the relation of "It is its" between the *subject* and the *reason*, and this relation can be grasped by the intellect and not by the sense. He has also explained (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, III. i. 14) that the mark of inference must be preceded by the recollection of its universal relation (*prasiddhi*) to that of which it is a mark. The Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra is older than the Nyāya-Sūtra. It is clear therefore that the doctrine of the universal relation was not borrowed from Greece.

N. S.

¹⁶. Intermediate Logic by J. Welton and A. J. Monahan, 1911, p. 271.

INTRODUCTION.

I.—GOTAMA THE FOUNDER OF NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

Pāṇini, the celebrated Sanskrit grammarian, who is supposed to have flourished about 350 B. C.,* derives the word

The word "Nyāya explained. "Nyāya"† from the root "i" which conveys the

same meaning as "gam"--to go. "Nyāya" as signifying logic is therefore etymologically identical with "nigama" the conclusion of a syllogism. Logic is designated in Sanskrit not only by the word "Nyāya" but also by various other words which indicate diverse aspects of the science. For instance, it is called "Hetu-vidyâ"‡ or "Hetu-Śāstra" the science of causes, "Ānvīkṣikī"§ the science of inquiry, "Pramāṇa-Śāstra" the science of correct knowledge, "Tattva-Śāstra" the science of categories, "Tarka-vidyâ" the science of reasoning, "Vādārtha" the science of discussion and "Phakkikā-

*Pāṇini is said to have been a disciple of Upavarṣa, minister of a King of the Nanda dynasty, about 350 B. C., as is evident from the following :—

अथ कालेन वर्षस्य शिष्यवर्गो महानभूत् ।

तत्र एकः पाणिनिर्नाम जडबुद्धितरोऽभवत् ॥

(Kathāsarit-sāgara, Chapter IV., verse 20).

Dr. Otto Böhtlingk observes :—

"We need therefore only make a space of fifty years between each couple of them, in order to arrive at the year 350, into the neighbourhood of which date our grammarian is to be placed, according to the Kathāsarit-sāgara."—Goldstucker's Pāṇini, p. 85.

† अध्यायन्यायोद्यावसंहाराश्च ।

(Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī 3-3-122.)

‡ निर्घण्टौ निगमे पुराणे इतिहासे वेदे व्याकरणे निरुक्ते शिक्षायां छन्दसि यज्ञकल्पे ज्योतिषि सांख्ये योगे क्रियाकल्पे वैशेषिके वैशिके अर्थविद्यायां बार्हस्पत्ये आश्वर्य्ये आसुरे मृगपक्षिहते हेतुविद्यायां जतुयन्त्रे.....सर्वत्र बोधिसत्त्व एव विशिष्यते स्म ॥

(Lalitavistara, Chapter XII., p. 179, Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra's edition).

§ आन्वीक्षिकी दण्डनीतिस्तर्कविद्यार्थशास्त्रयोः ।

(Amarakoṣa, svargavarga, verse 155).

Śāstra" the science of sophism. Nyāya-sūtra is the earliest work extant on Nyāya Philosophy.

The Nyāya or logic is said to have been founded by a sage named Gotama.* He is also known as Gautama,

The founder of Nyāya called Gotama, Gautama, Akṣapāda or Dīrghatapas.

Akṣapāda† and Dīrghatapas.‡ The names Gotama and Gautama point to the family to which he belonged while the names Akṣapāda

and Dīrghatapas refer respectively to his meditative habit and practice of long penance.

In the Ṛigveda-saṃhitā as well as the Śāthapatha-Brāhmaṇa of the

white Yajurveda we find mention of one Go-

The family of Gotama.

tama who was son of Rahûgaṇa § and priest of the Royal family of Kuru-śrīñjaya for whose victory in battle he

*मुक्तये यः शिलान्वाय शास्त्रमूचे महामुनिः ।

गोतमं तमवेतैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः ॥

(Naiṣadhacharitam 17-75.)

कणादेन तु सम्प्रोक्तं शास्त्रं वैशेषिकं महत् ।

गोतमेन तथा न्यायं सांख्यं तु कपिलेन वै ॥

(Padmapurāṇa, Uttarakhaṇḍa, Chapter 263.)

गोतमः स्वेन तर्केण खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि ।

(Skanda-purāṇa, Kālikā Khaṇḍa, Chapter XVII.)

†यदक्षपादः प्रवरो मुनीनाम् शमाय शस्त्रं जगतो जगाद ।

कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तत्र मया निबन्धः ॥

(Udyotakāra's Nyāyavārtika, opening lines.)

In the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha Nyāya philosophy is called the Akṣapāda system.

‡Kālidāsa's Raghuvamśam 11-33.

§ अत्रेदमाख्यानम् । रहूगणपुत्रो गोतमः कुरु सृजयानां राज्ञां पुरोहित आसीत् । तेषां राज्ञां परैः सह युद्धे सति स ऋषिरनेन सूक्तेनेन्द्रं स्तुत्वा स्वकीयानां जयं प्रार्थयामासेति । तस्य च तत्पुरोहितत्वं वाजसनेयिभिराम्नातम् । गोतम ह वै राहूगण उभयेषां कुरु सृजयानां पुरोहित आसीत् ।

(Ṛigveda-saṃhitā, Maṇḍala 1, Sūkta 81, Mantra 3, Sāyaṇa's commentary.)

विदेघो ह माधवोऽग्निं वैश्वानरं मुखे बभार ।

तस्य गोतमो राहूगण ऋषिः पुरोहित आस ॥

(Śāthapatha Brāhmaṇa of the white Yajurveda, Kāṇḍa 1, Adhyāya 4 Mādhyandiniya recension.)

prayed to Indra. Nodhâh, * son of Gotama, was also called Gotama who composed several new hymns in honour of Indra. The sages sprung from the family of Gotama are designated Gotamâsah † who were very intelligent ; and Agni, pleased with their adoration, gave them cattle and rice in abundance. It is related that Gotama, once pinched with thirst, prayed for water of the Marut-Gods, who out of mercy, placed a well‡ before him transplanted from elsewhere. The water gushing out copiously from the well not only quenched his thirst but formed itself into a river, the source of which was the seat of the original well.

In the Rîgveda-saṃhitâ the descendants of Gotama as already noticed are also called Gotama while in later Vedic The teachers called Gautama. literature they are called Gautama. The Vamśa-Brahmaṇa of the Sâṃaveda mentions four members of the Gotama family§ among the teachers who transmitted that

* सनायते गोतम इन्द्र नव्यमतक्षद्ब्रह्म हरियोजनाय ।

सुनीथाय नः शवसान नोधाः प्रातर्मक्षू धिया वसुर्जगम्यात् ॥

(Rîgveda-saṃhitâ, Maṇḍala 1, Sûkta 63, Mantra 13.)

† एवा ते हरियोजना सुवृकीन्द्र ब्रह्माणि गोतमासा अक्रन् ।

(Rîgveda-saṃhitâ, Maṇḍala 1, Sûkta 61, Mantra 16.)

एवाग्निर्गोतमेभिर्ऋतावा विप्रेभिरस्तोष्ट जातवेदाः ।

स एषु द्युम्नं पीपयत् स वाजं स पुष्टिं याति जायमाचिकित्वान् ॥

(Rîgveda-saṃhitâ, Maṇḍala 77, Sûkta 77, Mantra 5.)

‡ जिह्वं नुनुद्रेऽवतं तथा दिशासिंचन्नुत्सं गोतमाय तृणजे ।

आगच्छं तीमवसा चित्रभानवः कामं विप्रस्य तर्पयंत धामभिः ॥

(Rîgveda-saṃhitâ, Maṇḍala 1, Sûkta 85, Mantra 11.)

Sâyana in commenting on Rîgveda saṃhitâ, Maṇḍala 1, Sûkta 77, Mantra 10, observes :—

अत्रेयमाख्यायिका । गोतम ऋषिः पिपासया पीडितः सन् मरुत उदकं ययाचं । तदनंतरं मरुतोऽदूरस्थं कूपमुद्धृत्य यत्र स गोतम ऋषिस्तिष्ठति तां दिशं नीत्वा ऋषिसमीपे कूपमवस्थाप्य तत्पार्श्वं आहावं च कृत्वा तस्मिन्नाहावे कूपमुत्सिच्य तमृषिं तेनोदकेन तर्पयांचक्रुः । अयमर्थोऽनया उत्तरया च प्रतिपद्यते ।

The well (utsadhi) is alluded to in the Rîgveda, Maṇḍala 1, Sûkta 88, Mantra 4, thus :—

अहानि गृध्राः पर्या व आगुरिमां धियं वार्कार्थां च देवीं ।

ब्रह्म कृण्वं तो गोतमासो अकैरूध्वं नुनुद उत्सधिं पिबद्भैः ॥

§ राधाश्च गोतमाद्राधो गोतमो गातुर्गोतमात् पितुर्गाता गोतमः ।

Sâṃavedîya Vamśa-Brahmaṇa, Khaṇḍa 2, Satyavrata Sâṃâs'rami's edition, p. 7.)

Veda to posterity, *viz.*, the Rādha-Gautama, Gātri-Gautama, Sumanta-bābhra-Gautama and Saṃkara-Gautama, and the Chhândogya Upaniṣad of the same Veda mentions another teacher named Hâridrumata-Gautama* who was approached by Satya-Kāma Jāvāla to be his teacher. The Gobhila Gṛihya Sûtra of the Sāmaveda cites the opinion of a Gautama† who held that during the winter season there should be three oblations offered to the dead ancestors. Another Gautama was the author of the Itiṛimedha Sûtra‡ which perhaps belongs to the Sāmaveda. The Bṛihadâraṇyaka § of the white Yajurveda mentions a teacher named Gautama, while in the Kāthopaniṣad of the Black Yajurveda the sage Nâchiketas|| who conversed with Yama on the mystery of life, is called Gautama which evidently is a generic name as his father is also called Gautama in the same work. A Gautama ¶ is mentioned as a teacher in the Kauṣika sūtra

सुमन्ताद् वाभ्रवाद् गौतमात् सुमन्तो वाभ्रवो गौतमः ।

(Sāmavediya Vamś'a-Brāhmaṇa, Khaṇḍa 2).

संकराद् गौतमात् संकरो गौतमः ।

(Sāmavediya Vamś'a-Brāhmaṇa, Khaṇḍa 3.)

* स ह हारिद्रुमतं गौतममेत्योवाच ब्रह्मचर्यं भगवति वत्स्याम्युपेयां भगवन्तमिति ॥ ३ ॥

(Chhândogya Upaniṣad, Adhyaya 4, Khaṇḍa 4).

† चतुरष्टको हेमन्तः ॥ ४ ॥

ज्यष्टक इत्यौद्गाहमानिः ॥ ७ ॥

तथा गौतमवार्कखण्डो ॥ ८ ॥

(Gobhila Gṛihya Sûtra, 3-10.)

‡ An incomplete manuscript of the Itiṛimedha Sûtra is contained in the Library of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, but the work was printed in America several years ago.

§ गौतमाद् गौतमः ॥ १ । २ । ३ ॥

(Bṛihadâraṇyaka, Adhyâya 4.)

॥ हन्त त इदं प्रवक्ष्यामि गुह्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ।

यथा च मरणं प्राप्य आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥ ६ ॥

(Kāthopaniṣad, Valli 5.)

शान्तसंकल्पः सुमना यथा स्याद्वीतमन्युर्गौतमो माभिमृत्यो ।

त्वत् प्रसृष्टं माभिवदेत् प्रतीत एतत् त्रयाणां प्रथमं वरं वृणे ।

(Kāthopaniṣad, Valli 5.)

¶ Vide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 153.

of the Atharvaveda while to another Gautama is attributed the authorship of the Gautama Dharma sūtra* an authoritative work on the sacred law.

We need not take any notice of one Gautama† who, at the bidding of his mother, as stated in the Mahābhārata, cast into the Ganges his old and blind father Dirghatamas who was however miraculously saved.

The Rāmāyaṇa mentions a Gautama‡ who had his hermitage in a grove at the outskirts of the city of Mithilā where he lived with his wife Ahalyā. It is well-known how Gautama, husband of Ahalyā, Ahalyā, for her seduction by Indra, was cursed by her lord to undergo penance and mortification until her emancipation at the happy advent of Rāma. The Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa, while repeating the same account, places the hermitage of Gautama§ on the banks of the Ganges ; and our great poet Kālidāsa follows the Rāmāyaṇic legend describing Gautama|| as Dirghatapas, a sage who practised long penance.

* The text of the Gautama Dharma-sūtra has been printed several times in India while an English translation of it by Dr. G. Bühler has appeared in the Sacred Books of the East Series.

† स वै दीर्घतमा नाम शापाद्विरजायत ॥ २२ ॥

जात्यन्धो वेदवित् प्राज्ञः पत्नीं लेभे स विद्यया ॥ २३ ॥

तरुणीं रूपं सम्पन्नां प्रद्वेषीं नाम ब्राह्मणीम् ।

स पुत्रान् जनयामास गौतमादीन् महायशाः ॥ २४ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Âdiparva Adhyāya 104).

‡ मियिलोपवने तत्र आश्रमं दृश्य राघवः ।

पुराणं निर्जनं रम्यं पप्रच्छ मुनिपुङ्गवम् ॥ ११ ॥

इदमाश्रमसंकाशं किं न्विदं मुनिवर्जितम् ।

श्रोतुमिच्छामि भगवन् कस्यायम्पूर्वं आश्रमः ॥ १२ ॥

गौतमस्य नरश्रेष्ठ पूर्वमासीन्महात्मनः ।

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशः सुरैरपि सुपूजितः ॥ १५ ॥

Rāmāyaṇa, Âdikāṇḍa, Sarga 48).

§ इत्युक्त्वा मुनिभिस्ताभ्यां ययौ गङ्गासमीपगम् ।

गौतमस्याश्रमं पुरयं यत्राहल्या शिलामयी ॥ १४ ॥

(Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa, âdikāṇḍa, adhyāya 6)

|| तैः शिवेषु वसतिर्गताध्वभिः ।

सायमाश्रमतर्ष्वगृह्यत ।

The Vāyupurāṇa describes a sage named Akṣapāda* as the disciple of a Brāhmaṇa named Soma Śarmā who was Śiva incarnate and well-known for his practice of austerities at the shrine of Prabhāsa during the time of Jātūkarnya Vyāsa. This Akṣapāda mentioned along with Kaṇāda is evidently no other person than Gotama or Gautama who founded the Nyāya philosophy. As to the origin of the name Akṣapāda ("having eyes in the feet") as applied to Gautama, legend has it that Gautama was so deeply absorbed in philosophical contemplation that one day during his walks he fell unwittingly into a well out of which he was rescued with great difficulty. God therefore mercifully provided him with a second pair of eyes in his feet to protect the sage from further mishaps. Another legend† which represents Vyāsa, a disciple of Gautama, lying prostrate before his master until the latter condescended to look upon him, not with his natural eyes, but with a new pair of eyes in his feet, may be dismissed with scanty ceremony as being the invention of a later generation of logicians, anxious to humiliate Vyāsa for vilification of the Nyāya system in his Mahābhārata and Vedānta sūtra.

येषु दीर्घतपसः परिग्रहो
वासवक्षणकलत्रतां ययौ ॥ ३३ ॥
प्रत्यपद्यत चिराय यन् पुन-
श्चारुगौतमबधूः शिलामयी ।
स्वं वपुः स किल किल्बिषच्छिदां
रामपादरजसामनुग्रहः ॥ ३४ ॥

(Raghuvamśa, Sarga 11).

* सप्तविंशति मे प्राप्ते परिवर्त्ते क्रमागते ।
जातुकर्ण्यो यदा व्यासो भविष्यति तपोधनः ॥ २०१ ॥
तदाहं संभविष्यामि सोमशर्म्मा द्विजोत्तमः ।
प्रभासतीर्थमासाद्य योगात्मा लोकविश्रुतः ॥ २०३ ॥
तत्रापि मम ते पुत्रा भविष्यन्ति तपोधनाः ।
अक्षपादः कणादश्च उलूको वत्स एव च ॥ २०३ ॥

(Vāyupurāṇa, Adhyāya 23).

† गौतमो हि स्वमतदूषकस्य व्यासस्य मुखदर्शनं चक्षुषा न कर्त्तव्यमिति प्रति-
ज्ञाय पश्चात् व्यासेन प्रसादितः पादे नेत्रं प्रकाश्य तं दृष्टवान् इवि पौरा-
णिकी कथा ।

(Nyāyakoṣa, 2nd edition, by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhālakikara, Bombay).

The people of Mithilâ (modern Darbhanga in North Behar) ascribe the foundation of Nyâya philosophy to Local tradition. Gautama, husband of Ahalyâ, and point out as the place of his birth a village named Gautamasthâna where a fair is held every year on the 9th day of the lunar month of Chaitra (March-April). It is situated 28 miles north-east of Darbhanga and has a mud-hill of considerable height (supposed to be the hermitage of Gautama) at the base of which lies the celebrated "Gautama-kunḍa" or Gautama's well the water whereof is like milk to the taste and feeds a perennial rivulet called on this account Kṣîrodadhi or Khirroi (literally the sea of milk). Two miles to the east of the village there is another village named Ahalyâsthâna where between a pair of trees lies a slab of stone identified with Ahalyâ in her accursed state. In its vicinity there is a temple which commemorates the emancipation of Ahalyâ by Râma Chandra. The Gautama-kunḍa and the Kṣîrodadhi river, which are still extant at Gautama-sthâna, verify the account of Gotama given above from the Ṛigveda while the stone slab and the temple of Râma at Ahalyâsthâna are evidence corroborative of the story of Ahalyâ as given in the Râmâyana. There is another tradition prevalent in the town of Chapra that Gautama, husband of Ahalyâ and founder of the Nyâya philosophy, resided in a village now called Godnâ at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and Sarayû where a Sanskrit academy called Gautama Thomson Pâthasâlâ has been established to commemorate the great sage.

It seems to me that Gautama, son of Rahûgaṇa, as mentioned in the Ṛigveda, was the founder of the Gautama family from which sprang Gautama, husband of Ahalyâ, as narrated in the Râmâyana. It is interesting to note that Śatânanda*, son of Gautama by Ahalyâ, is a priest in the royal family of Janaka much in the same way as Gautama,

The founder of Nyâya philosophy identified.

*शतानन्दं पुरस्कृत्य पुरोहितमनिन्दितः ।

प्रतिगृह्य तु तां पूजां जनकस्य महात्मनः ।

(Râmâyana, âdikânḍa, Sarga 50).

गौतमश्च शतानन्दो जनकानां पुरोहितः ।

(Uttara Râma charitam).

son of Rahûgaṇa, is a priest in the royal family of Kurusṛiṅjaya. The fields waving with paddy plants which greet the eyes of a modern traveller near and round Gautama-sthâna bear testimony to Agni's gift of rice and cattle in abundance to the family of Gautama. The Nyâya philosophy was, on the authority of the tradition prevalent in Mithilâ, founded by Gautama, husband of Ahalyâ. The same Gautama has been designated as Akṣapâda in the Vâyu Purâṇa already referred to. Akṣapâda has been identified by Anantayajvan* with the author of the Piṭrîmedha Sûtra as well as with that of the Gautama Dharma sûtra, and it is possible that he is not other than the Gautama referred to in the Kauṣika sûtra of the Atharva Veda. The other Gautamas mentioned in the Brâhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, etc., appear to be the kinsmen of their illustrious name-sake.

The Râmâyana, as we have found, places the hermitage of Gautama, husband of Ahalyâ, at Gautama-sthâna twenty-eight miles north-east of Darbhângâ while the Adhyâtma Râmâyana places it on the banks of the Ganges at its confluence with the Sarayû off the town of Châprâ. The Vâyu-purâṇa fixes the residence of Akṣapâda, supposed to be identical with Gautama, at Prabhâsa† beyond Girnar in Kathiawar on the

*To the Gṛhya Sûtras of the Sâma-veda probably belong also Gautama's Piṭrîmedhasûtra (Cf. Burnell, p. 57; the commentator Anantayajvan identifies the author with Akṣapâda the author of the Nyâya-sûtra), and the Gautama-dharma-sûtra.—Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 85.

†Prabhâsa washed on its western side by the river Sarasvati and reputed as the residence of Kṛiṣṇa, is mentioned in the Śrîmad Bhâgavata thus :—

न वस्तव्यमिहास्माभिर्जिजीविषुभिरार्यकाः ।

प्रभासं सुमहत्पुण्यं यास्यामोऽद्यैव माचिरम् ॥ ३५ ॥

(Bhâgavata, Skandha II, adhyâya 6.)

स्त्रियो बालाश्च वृद्धाश्च शंखोद्धारं व्रजन्ति ततः ।

वयं प्रभासं यास्यामो यत्र प्रत्यक् सरस्वती ॥ ६ ॥

(Bhâgavata, Skandha II, adhyâya 30.)

Prabhâsa was situated beyond the rock of Girnar in Kathiawar where we come across all the edicts of As'oka as well as an inscription of Rudradâma supposed to be the first inscription in Sanskrit dated about 100 A. D. which mentions Chandra Gupta and As'oka by names. There are also some inscriptions in Gupta characters, and there is no doubt that Prabhâsa situated on the Sarasvati acquired celebrity in very old times.

sea-coast. To reconcile these conflicting statements it has been suggested that Akṣapāda otherwise known as Gotama or Gautama was the founder of the Nyāya philosophy, that he was born at Gautama-sthāna in Mithilā on the river Kṣīrodadhi, lived for some years at the village now called Godnā at the confluence of the Ganges and Sarayū until his retirement to Prabhāsa the well-known sacred place of pilgrimage in Kathiawar on the sea-coast.

The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa mentions Gautama along with Āsurāyaṇa and the Vāyupurāṇa (already quoted) states that Akṣapāda, *alias* Gotama or Gautama, flourished during the time of Jātūkarnya Vyāsa. Now Jātūkarnya, according to the Madhukāṇḍa and Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa * (Kāṇva recension), was a pupil of Āsurāyaṇa and Yāska who are supposed to have lived about 550 B. C. This date tallies well with the time of another Gautama who, together with Aṇemi, is described in the Divyāvadāna†, a Buddhist Sanskrit work translated into Chinese in the 2nd century A. D., as having transmitted the Vedas to posterity before they were classified by Vyāsa. It does not conflict with the view that Akṣapāda is identical

This Prabhāsa is not to be confounded with another town called Prabhāsa in Kausāmbi near Allahabad on the Jumna where there is an inscription, dated about the 2nd century B. C., of Aśadāsena, a descendant of Sonakāyana of Adhicchatra, (vide Dr. Fuhrer's Pabhosa inscriptions in Epigraphia Indica, Vol. II, pp. 242-243.)

* Vide Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 140.

In the Mādhyandiniya recension of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa a teacher intervenes between Yāska and Jātūkarnya, *viz.* Bhāradvāja. Cf.

जातुकर्ण्यज्जातुकर्ण्यो भारद्वाजाद् भारद्वाजो भारद्वाजाच्चासुरायणाच्च गौतमाच्च
गौतमो.....पाराशर्य्यात् पाराशर्य्यो जातुकर्ण्यज्जातुकर्ण्यो भारद्वाजाद्
भारद्वाजो भारद्वाजाच्चासुरायणाच्च यास्काच्चासुरायणः ।

(Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mādhyandiniya recension, Kāṇḍa 14, adhyāya 5.)

† The 33rd chapter of the Divyāvadāna called Mātāṅga Sūtra, in Chinese Mo-tan-nu-cin, was translated into Chinese by An-shi-kao-cie of the Eastern Han dynasty in A. D. 148-170. (Vide Bunjiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka). In it we read :—

ब्रह्मा देवानां परमतापसः इन्द्रस्य कौशिकस्य वेदार्थान् वाचयति स्म । इन्द्रः
कौशिकोऽरण्यमीगौतमे वेदान् वाचयति । अरण्यमीगौतमौ श्वेतकेतुं वेदान् वाचयतः
श्वेतकेतुः शुक्रं पण्डितं वेदान् वाचयति । शुक्रः पण्डितश्चतुर्था वेदान् विभजति स्म ।

(Divyāvadāna, Chap. XXXIII).

with Gautama, author of the Gautama Dharma-Sûtra which is "declared to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law*." Akṣapâda-Gautama, founder of the Nyâya Philosophy, was almost a contemporary of Buddha-Gautama who founded Buddhism and Indrabhûti Gautama who was a disciple of Mahâvîra, the reputed founder of Jainism.

The fourfold division of the means of knowledge (Pramâṇa) into perception, inference, comparison and word found in the Jaina Prâkṛita scriptures such as the Nandî-Sûtra, Sthânânga-Sûtra† and Bhagavatî Sûtra compiled by Indrabhûti-Gautama finds its parallel in the Nyâya-Sûtra of Akṣapâda-Gautama leading to the conclusion that this particular doctrine was either borrowed by Indrabhûti from Akṣapâda or was the common property of both. In the Pâli and Prâkṛita scriptures Gautama is called Gotama, and a Pâli Sutta mentions a sect called "Gotamakâ,"‡ who were followers of Gautama, identified perhaps with the founder of the Nyâya Philosophy. The Pâli Canonical scriptures such as the Brahmajâla Sutta, §

* Buhler observes :—These arguments which allow us to place Gautama before both Baudhâyana and Vâsîṣṭha are that both these authors quote Gautama as an authority on law..... These facts will, I think, suffice to show that the Gautama Dharma Sûtra may be safely declared to be the oldest of the existing works on the sacred law." (Buhler's Gautama, Introduction, pp. XLIX and LIV, S. B. E. series).

† अथवा हेऊ चउव्विहे पत्रत्ते तं जहा
पञ्चकखे अनुमारो उवमे आगमे ।

(Sthânânga-Sûtra, Page 309, published by Dhanapat Singh).

‡ *I*de Prof. T. W. Rhys David's Introduction to the Kassapa-Sihanâda Sutta, pp. 220-222. It is observed :—

"The only alternative is that some Brâhmaṇa, belonging to the Gotama Gotra, is here referred to as having had a community of Bhikṣus named after him."

§ इध, भिक्खवे, एकच्चो समणो वा ब्राह्मणो व तक्की होति वीमंशी । सो तक्कपरियाहतं वीमंसानुचरितं सयं पटिभानं एवं आह "अधिच्चसमुप्पन्नो अत्ता च लोको चाति" ।

(Brahmajâla Sutta 1-32, edited by Rhys Davids and Carpenter).

याव सम्मासम्बुद्धा लोके नुप्पज्जन्ति, न तक्किका सुज्झन्ति न चापि सावका दुदिट्ठी न दुक्खा पमुच्चरति ।

(Udâna, p. 10, edited by Paul Steinthal, P. T. S. edition).

Udâna, etc., which embody the teachings of Buddha, mention a class of Śramaṇas and Brâhmaṇas who were “takḱî” or “takḱika” (logicians) and “vîmamsî” (casuists) and indulged in “takka” (logic) and vîmamsâ (casuistry), alluding perhaps to the followers of Akṣapâda-Gautama described as “Gotamakâ.”

The Kathâvatthuppakaraṇa *, a Pâli work of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, composed by Moggaliputta Tissa at the third Buddhist Council during the reign of Aśoka about 255 B.C., mentions “patiññâ” in Sanskrit : “pratiññâ,” proposition), “Upanaya” (application of reasons), “Niggaha” (in Sanskrit : “Nigraha,” humiliation or defeat) etc., which are the technical terms of Nyâya philosophy or Logic. Though Moggaliputta Tissa has not made any actual reference to Logic or Nyâya, his mention of some of its technical terms warrants us to suppose that that philosophy existed in some shape in India in his time about 255 B. C. These facts lead us to conclude that Gotama, Gautama or Akṣapâda, the founder of Nyâya Philosophy, lived about the year 550 B. C.

II. NYÂYASŪTRA THE FIRST WORK ON NYÂYA PHILOSOPHY.

To Gotama, Gautama or Akṣapâda, of whom a short account has been given above, is attributed the authorship of

The earliest contribution to the Nyâya-Sûtra, the earliest work on Nyâya Sûtra literature.

Philosophy. Sanskrit literature in the Sûtra or aphoristic style was presumably inaugurated at about 550 B. C. and the Nyâya-Sûtra the author of which lived, as already stated, at about that time, must have been the first† contribution to that literature. The “Sutta” or Sûtra section of the Pâli literature reads very

* The terms “Patiññâ” (pratiññâ, proposition) and “niggaha” (nigraha, defeat) occur in the following passages :—

न च मय तथा हेताय पटिज्जाय हेवं पटिज्जानन्ता हेवं निग्गहेनब्बो ।

(Kathâvatthuppakaraṇa, Siamese edition, p. 3).

“Niggaha-Catukkam” is the name of a section of the first chapter of the Kathâvatthuppakaraṇa while “Upanaya-Catukkam” is the name of another section of that work.

†Kapila is stated in the Sâmkhye-Kârikâ, verse 70, to have taught his philosophy to Âsuri who is mentioned in the S’atapatha Brâhmaṇa as a teacher, Âsurâyaṇa and Yâska who followed Âsuri were the teachers of Jâtûkarṇya, a contemporary of Akṣapâda-Gautama. Kapila therefore

much like a body of sermons bearing no affinity with the Sûtra works of the Brâhmanas.

The Nyâya-Sûtra is divided into five books, each containing two chapters called âhnikas or Diurnal portions. It is believed that Akṣapâda finished his work on Nyâya Nyâya-Sûtra, in ten lectures corresponding to the âhnikas referred to above. We do not know whether the whole of the Nyâya-Sûtra, as it exists at present, was the work of Akṣapâda, nor do we know for certain whether his teachings were committed to writing by himself or transmitted by oral tradition only. It seems to me that it is only the first book of the Nyâya-Sûtra containing a brief explanation of the 16 categories that we are justified in ascribing to Akṣapâda, while the second, third and fourth books which discuss particular doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Mîmāṃsâ, Vedânta and Buddhist Philosophy bear marks of different hands and ages. In these books there are passages quoted almost *verbatim* from the Laṅkāvatâra-Sûtra *, a Sanskrit work of the Yogâcâra Buddhist Philosophy, from the Mâdhyaṃika Sûtra of Nâgârjuna† and from the Śataka‡ of Ārya Deva—works which were composed in the early centuries of Christ. The fifth book treating of the varieties of futile rejoinders and occasions for rebuke was evidently not the production of Akṣapâda who dismissed those topics without entering into their details. The last and most considerable additions were made by Vâtsyâyana, otherwise known as Pakṣila Svâmi, who about 450 A. D. wrote the first regular commentary, “Bhâṣya”, on the Nyâya Sûtra, and harmonised the different, and at times conflicting, additions and interpolations by the ingenious introduction of Sûtras of his own making fathered upon Akṣapâda.

preceded Akṣapâda by at least three generations. Kapila's Philosophy is believed to have come down by oral traditions and was not perhaps committed to writing in his life-time. Hence the Nyâya-Sûtra has been stated to be the first work of the Sûtra period.

* *Vide* Nyâya Sûtra 4-2-26, which quotes the Laṅkāvatâra Sûtra (dated about 300 A.D.)

† *Vide* Nyâya-Sûtra 2-1-39, 4-1-39, and 4-1-48, which criticise the Mâdhyaṃika Sûtra.

‡ *Vide* Nyâya-Sûtra 4-1-48 which criticises Ś'ataka of Āryaveda.

The Nyâya-Sûtra has, since its composition, enjoyed a very great popularity as is evident from the numerous commentaries that have from time to time centred round it. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below :—

TEXT.

1. Nyâya-Sûtra by Gotama or Akṣapâda (350 B. C.)
Commentaries.
2. Nyâya-Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana (450 A. D.)
3. Nyâya-Vārtika by Udyotakâra.
4. Nyâya-Vārtika-tâtparya-tikâ by Vāchaspati Miśra.
5. Nyâya-Vārtika-tâtparyatikâ-paris'uddhi by Udayana.
6. Paris'uddhiprakāśa by Vardhamāna.
7. Vardhamānendu by Padmanābha Miśra.
8. Nyâyālaṅkāra by Śrīkaṇṭha.
9. Nyâyālaṅkāra Vṛtti by Jayanta.
10. Nyâya-mañjarī by Jayanta.
11. Nyâya-Vṛtti by Abhayatilakopādhyāya.
12. Nyâya-Vṛtti by Viśvanātha.
13. Mitabhāṣiṇī Vṛtti by Mahādeva Vedānti.
14. Nyâyaparakāśa by Keśava Miśra.
15. Nyâyabodhinī by Govardhana.
16. Nyâya Sûtra Vyākhyā by Mathurānātha.

III. RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE NYÂYA PHILOSOPHY.

It appears from the Chhândogya-upaniṣad, Bṛihadâraṇyaka-upaniṣad and Kauṣîtakî Brâhmaṇa* that Philosophy (Adhyâtma-Vidyâ) received its first impetus from the Kṣatriyas (members of the military caste) who carried it to great perfection. King Ajâtaśatru in an assembly of the Kuru-Pañchâlas consoled a Brâhmaṇa named Śvetaketu, son of Âruṇi of the Gautama family, that

* Kauṣîtakî-Brâhmaṇa 2-1, 2; 16, 4.
Bṛihadâraṇyaka 2-1-20, 2-3-6.

Chhândogya 3-14-1 ; 5-11, 24 ; 1-8-9 ; 1-9-3, 7-1-3 and 5-11.

मा त्वं गौतमावदो यथेयं न प्राक् त्वत्तः पुरा विद्या ब्राह्मणान् गच्छति तस्मादु
सर्वेषु लोकेषु क्षत्रस्यैव प्रशासनमस्ति तस्मै होवाच ॥ ७ ॥
(Chhândogya-upaniṣad 5-3).

he had no cause of being sorry for his inability to explain certain doctrines of Adhyâtma-Vidyâ which were known only to the Kṣatriyas. It may be observed that Mahāvîra and Buddha who founded respectively Jainism and Buddhism—two universal religions based on philosophy or Adhyâtma-Vidyâ—were also Kṣatriyas. Kapila is reputed to be the first Brâhmaṇa who propounded a system of philosophy called Sāṃkhya, but his work on the subject not having come down to us in its original form we are not in a position to ascertain what relation it bore to the Vedas or what kind of reception was given to it by the orthodox Brâhmaṇas. We know for certain that the most powerful Brahmana who undertook to study and teach philosophy openly was Gotama, Gautama or Akṣapâda, the renowned author of the Nyâya-Sûtra. He founded a rational system of philosophy called "Nyâya" which at its inception had no relation with the topics of the Vedic Saṃhita and Brâhmaṇa. At this stage the Nyâya was pure Logic unconnected with the scriptural dogmas. Akṣapâda recognised four means of valid knowledge, *viz.*, perception inference, comparison and word of which the last signified knowledge derived through any reliable assertion.

This being the nature of Nyâya or Logic at its early stage it was not received with favour by the orthodox community of Brâhmaṇas who were anxious to establish an organised society, paid their sole attention to the Saṃhitâs and Brâhmaṇas which treated of rituals, ignoring

Professor P. Deussen observes :—

In this narrative, preserved by two different Vedic schools, it is expressly declared that the knowledge of the Brahman as âtman, the centrale doctrine of the entire Vedânta, is possessed by the King ; but, on the contrary, is not possessed by the Brâhmaṇa "famed as a Vedic scholar."—Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 17—18.

Again he remarks :—We are forced to conclude, if not with absolute certainty, yet with a very high degree of probability, that as a matter of fact the doctrine of the âtman standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Vedic ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brâhmaṇas, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Brâhmaṇa but in Kṣatriya circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times. Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 19.

सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म । विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म । तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो । सोऽहं ब्रह्म ।

altogether the portions which had nothing to do with them. The sage Jaimini* in his Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra distinctly says that the Veda having for its sole purpose the prescription of actions, those parts of it which do not serve that purpose are useless. We are therefore not surprised to find Manu † enjoining excommunication upon those members of the twice-born caste who disregarded the Vedas and Dharma-Sūtra relying upon the support of Hetu-Śāstra or Logic. Similarly Vālmīki in his Rāmāyaṇa ‡ discredits those persons of perverse intellect who indulge in the frivolities of Ānvīkṣikī, the science of Logic, regardless of the works of sacred law (Dharma-śāstra) which they should follow as their guide. Vyāsa in the Mahābhārata, § Sāntiparva, relates the doleful story of a repentant Brāhmaṇa who, addicted to Tarkavidyā (Logic), carried

These four pregnant expressions (Mahāvākya) originated from the Brāhmaṇas, whence it may be concluded Nirguṇa-Brahma-Vidyā or knowledge of absolute Brahman was confined among them. It was the Saguṇa-Brahma Vidyā or knowledge of Brahman limited by form and attributes that is said to have been introduced by the Kṣatriyas.

* आम्रायस्य क्रियार्थकत्वात् आनर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम् । १ । २ । १ ।
(Mīmāṃsā Sūtra).

† योऽवमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद्विजः ।
स साधुभिर्बहिष्कार्यो नास्तिको वेदनिन्दकः ॥
(Manu, adhyāya 2, verse 11).

‡ धर्मशास्त्रेषु मुख्येषु विद्यमानेषु दुर्बुधाः ।
बुद्धिमान्वीक्षिकीं प्राप्य निरर्थं प्रवदन्ति ते ॥ ३६ ॥
(Rāmāyaṇa Ayodhyā Kāṇḍa, Sarga 100).

§ अहमासं परिडतको हेतुको वेदनिन्दकः ।
आन्वीक्षिकीं तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थकाम् ॥ ४७ ॥
हेतुवादान् प्रवदिता वक्ता संसत्सु हेतुमत् ।
आक्रोष्टा चाभिवक्ता च ब्रह्मवाक्येषु च द्विजान् ॥ ४८ ॥
नास्तिकः सर्वशङ्की च मूर्खः परिडतमानिकः ।
तस्येयं फलनिवृत्तिः शृगालत्वं मम द्विज ॥ ४९ ॥
(Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva, adhyāya 180.)

In the Gandharva tantra we find :—

गोतमप्रोक्तशास्त्रार्थनिरताः सर्व एव हि ।
शार्गालीं योनिमापन्नाः सन्दिग्धाः सवकर्मसु ॥

(Quoted in Prāṇatoṣṇitantra).

on debates divorced from all faith in the Vedas and was on that account, turned into a jackal in his next birth as a penalty. In another passage of the Śāntiparva,* Vyāsa warns the followers of the Vedānta Philosophy against communicating their doctrines to a Naiyāyika or Logician. Vyāsa† does not care even to review the Nyāya system in the Brahma-sūtra seeing that it has not been recognised by any worthy sage. Stories of infliction of penalties on those given to the study of Nyāya are related in the Śkanda Purāṇa,‡ and other works ; and in the Naiṣadha-charita§ we find Kali satirising the founder of Nyāya Philosophy as “Gotama” the “most bovine” among sages.

Gradually however this system of philosophy instead of relying entirely upon reasoning came to attach due weight Nyāya reconciled to the authority of the Vedas, and later on, after with scriptural dog- its reconciliation with them, the principles of mas. Nyāya were assimilated in other systems of philosophy such as the Vaiśeṣika,|| Yoga, Mīmāṃsā,¶ Sāṃkhya**, etc.

* स्नातकानामिदं शास्त्रं वाच्यं पुत्रानुशासनम् ।

× × × × ×

न तर्कशास्त्रद्वयाय तथैव पिशुनाय च ॥ १८ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, adhyāya 246).

† अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ॥ १७ ॥

(Vedānta-sūtra 2-2).

‡ गोतमः स्वेन तर्केण खण्डयन् तत्र तत्र हि ।

शतोऽथ मुनिभिस्तत्र शार्गालीं योनिमृच्छति ।

पुनश्चानुगृहीतोऽसौ श्रुतिसिद्धान्ततर्कतः ।

सर्वलोकोपकाराय तव शास्त्रं भविष्यति ॥

(Skanda Purāṇa, Kālikākhaṇḍa, adhyāya 17).

§ मुक्तये यः शिलात्वाय शास्त्रमूचे महामुनिः ।

गोतमं तमवैतैव यथा वित्थ तथैव सः ॥

||Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 1-1-4, 2-1-15, 1-1-16, 2-1-17, 2-2-17, 2-2-32, 3-1-15, 9-2-3, 9-2-4.

(Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañchānanas edition).

¶ Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1-1-4, 1-3-1, 1-3-2, 1-3-3, 1-4-14, 1-4-35, 1-5-8, 3-1-17, 3-1-20, 4-3-18, 5-1-6, 10-3-35.

** Sāṃkhya-sūtra 1-60, 1-101, 1-106, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12.

Yoga-sūtra 1-5, 6.

Henceforth the Nyâya was regarded as an approved branch of learning. Thus the Gautama-Dharma-sûtra*

Nyâya as an approved branch of knowledge. prescribes a course of training in Logic (Nyâya) for the King and acknowledges the utility of *Tarka* or Logic in the administration of justice though in the case of conclusions proving incompatible ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas. Manu† says that *dharma* or duty is to be ascertained by logical reasoning not opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends Logic (Nyâya) as a necessary study for a King and a logician to be an indispensable member of a legal assembly. Yājñīka-vaalkya‡ counts “Nyâya” or Logic among the fourteen principal sciences while Vyāsa§ admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upaniṣads with the help of the Ānvīkṣiki or Logic. In the Padma-purāṇa|| Logic is included among the fourteen

* राजा सर्वस्येष्टे ब्राह्मणवर्जं, साधुकारी स्यात् साधुवादी, त्रय्याम् आन्वी-
क्षिक्याञ्चाभिविनोतः ।न्यायाधिगमे तर्कोऽभ्युपायः । तेनाभ्युद्य यथास्थानं
गमयेत् । विप्रतिपत्तो त्रैविद्यवृद्धेभ्यः प्रत्यवहृत्य निष्ठां गमयेत् ।

(Gautamadharmasūtra, adhyāya 11).

† आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।

यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥

(Manu, adhyāya 12, verse 106).

त्रैविद्येभ्यस्त्रयीं विद्यां दण्डनीतिञ्च शाश्वतीम् ।

आन्वीक्षिकीञ्चात्मविद्यां वार्त्तारम्भाञ्च लोकतः ।

(Manu, adhyāya 7, verse 43).

त्रैविद्यो हेतुकस्तर्को नैरुक्तो धर्मपाठकः ।

त्रयश्चाश्रमिणः पूर्वे परिषत् स्याद्दशावरा ॥

(Manu, adhyāya 12, verse 111).

‡ पुराणन्यायमीमांसा धर्मशास्त्राङ्गमिश्रिताः ।

वेदाः स्थानानि विद्यानां धर्मस्य च चतुर्दश ॥

(Yājñavalkya saṃhitā, adhyāya 1, verse 3).

§ तत्रोपनिषदं तात परिशेषं तु पार्थिव ।

मथ्नामि मनसा तात दृष्ट्वा चान्वीक्षिकीं पराम् ॥

(Mahābhārata quoted by Viśvanātha in his Vṛtti on Nyāya-sūtra 1-1-1).

|| अङ्गानि चतुरो वेदान् पुराणन्यायविस्तरान् ।

मीमांसां धर्मशास्त्रञ्च परिगृह्याथ साम्प्रतम् ॥

मत्स्यस्यरूपेण च पुनः कल्पादाबुदकान्तरे ।

(Padma-purāṇa, vide Muir's Sanskrit text Vol. III, p. 27).

principal branches of learning promulgated by God Viṣṇu, while in the Matsya-purāṇa,* Nyāya-vidyā, together with the Vedas, is said to have emanated from the mouth of Brahmā himself. In fact so wide-spread was the study of Nyāya that the Mahābhārata is full of references to that science.

In the Âdiparva of the Mahābhārata Nyāya† or Logic is mentioned along with the Veda and Chikitsā (the science of medicine), and the hermitage of Kāśyapa is described as being filled with sages who were versed in the Nyāya-tattva (logical truths) and knew the true meaning of a proposition, objection and conclusion. The Sânti-parva‡ refers to numerous tenets of Nyāya supported by reason and scripture while the Aśvamedha-parva§ describes the sacrificial ground as being resounded by logicians (Hetu-vâdin) who employed arguments and counter-arguments to vanquish one another. In the Sabhā-parva|| the sage Nārada is described as being versed in Logic

* अनन्तरञ्च वक्त्रेभ्यो वेदास्तस्य विनिःस्मृताः ।

मीमांसा न्यायविद्या च प्रमाणाष्टकसंयुता ॥

(Matsya-purāṇa 3-2).

† न्यायशिक्षा चिकित्सा च दानं पाशुपतं तथा ।

हेतुनैव समं जन्म दिव्यमानुषसंज्ञितम् ॥ ६७ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Âdiparva, adhyāya 1).

न्यायतत्त्वात्मविज्ञानसम्पन्नं वेदपारगैः ॥ ४२ ॥

नानावाक्यसमहारसमवायविशारदैः ।

विशेषकार्यविद्भिश्च मोक्षधर्मपरायणैः ॥ ४३ ॥

स्थापनाक्षेपसिद्धान्त परमार्थज्ञतां गतैः ।

शब्दच्छन्दोनिरुक्तज्ञैः कालज्ञानविशारदैः ॥ ४४ ॥

द्रव्यकर्मगुणज्ञैश्च कार्यकारणवेदिभिः ॥

(Mahābhārata, Âdiparva, adhyāya 70).

‡ न्यायतन्त्राण्यनेकानि तैस्तैरुक्तानि वादिभिः ।

हेत्वागमसमाचारैर्यदुक्तं तदुपास्यताम् ॥ २२ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Sântiparva, adhyāya 210).

§ तस्मिन् यज्ञं प्रवृत्ते तु वाग्मिनो हेतुवादिनः ।

हेतुवादान् बहूनाहुः परस्परजिगीषवः ॥ २७ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Aśvamedhaparva, adhyāya, 85).

|| न्यायविद् धर्मतत्त्वज्ञः षडङ्गविदनुत्तमः ।

ऐक्यसंयोगनानात्व समवायविशारदः ॥ ३ ॥

(Nyâyavid) and skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality ("aikya" and "nânâtva"), conjunction and co-existence ("samyoga" and "sama-vâya"), genus and species ("parâpara"), etc., capable of deciding questions by evidences (Pramâṇa) and ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a five-membered syllogism (Pañchâvayava-vākya).

In fact the Nyâya (Logic) was in course of time deservedly held in very high esteem. If it were allowed to follow its original course unimpeded by religious dogmas it would have risen to the very height of perfection. Nevertheless the principles of Nyâya entering into the different systems of philosophy gave them each its proper compactness and cogency just as Bacon's Inductive Method shaped the sciences and philosophies of a later age in a different country. It is however to be regretted that during the last five hundred years the Nyâya has been mixed up with Law (smṛiti), Rhetoric (alaṅkāra), Vedānta, etc., and thereby has hampered the growth of those branches of knowledge upon which it has grown up as a sort of parasite.

SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA. } SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.
The 7th November, 1913. }

वक्ता प्रगल्भो मेधावी स्मृतिमान्नयवित् कविः ।

परापरविभागज्ञः प्रमाणकृतनिश्चयः ॥ ४ ॥

पञ्चावयवयुक्तस्य वाक्यस्थ गुणदोषवित् ।

उत्तरोत्तरवक्ता च वदतोऽपि बृहस्पतेः ॥ ५ ॥

(Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 5).



THE NYÂYA-SÛTRAS.

Book I.—CHAPTER I.

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्त वयव
तर्क निर्णय वाद जल्प वितण्डा हेत्वाभास च्छल जाति
निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निश्चयेसाधिगमः ॥ १।१।१॥

प्रमाण *pramāṇa*, proof ; प्रमेय *prameya*, provable, knowable, object of proof ; संशय *samśaya*, doubt, uncertainty ; प्रयोजन *Prayojana*, aim, purpose ; दृष्टान्त *dṛṣṭānta*, example, familiar instance ; सिद्धान्त *siddhānta*, conclusion ; अवयव *avayava*, members of the syllogism ; तर्क *tarka*, hypothetical reasoning, confutation ; निर्णय *nirṇaya*, ascertainment ; वाद *vāda*, discussion ; जल्प *jalpa*, sophistry ; वितण्डा *vitandā*, cavil, wrangling ; हेत्वाभास *hetvābhāsa*, pseudo-mark, fallacy ; छल *chhala*, quibbling ; जाति *jāti*, futility ; निग्रहस्थान *nigraha-sthāna*, occasion for rebuke, opponent's errors ; तत्त्वज्ञानात् *Tattva-jñānāt*, from knowledge of the true nature ; निश्चयेसाधिगमः *niṣṭhreyasa-adhigamaḥ*, attainment of the supreme good.

1. **Supreme felicity** is attained by the knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories, *viz.*, means of right knowledge (*pramana*), object of right knowledge (*prameya*), doubt (*samsaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), familiar instance (*dristanta*) established tenet (*siddhanta*), members (*avayava*), confutation (*tarka**), ascertain-

* The English equivalent for "tarka" is variously given as "confutation," "argumentation," "reductio ad absurdum," "hypothetical reasoning," etc.

ment (nirṇaya), discussion (vada), wrangling (jalpa), cavil (vitanda), fallacy (hetvabhāsa), quibble (chhala), futility (jati), and occasion for rebuke (nigrahasthana).

*Knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories** means true knowledge by the “enunciation,” “definition” and “critical examination” of the categories. Book I (of the Nyāya Sūtra) treats of “enunciation” and “definition,” while the remaining four Books are reserved for “critical examination.” The attainment of supreme felicity is preceded by the knowledge of four things viz., (1) that which is fit to be abandoned viz., (pain), (2) that which produces what is fit to be abandoned (viz., misapprehension, etc), (3) complete destruction of what is fit to be abandoned and (4) the means of destroying what is fit to be abandoned (viz., true knowledge†).

**दुःख जन्म प्रवृत्ति दोष मिथ्याज्ञानाना मुत्तरोत्तरापाये
तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥१॥१२॥**

दुःख duḥkha, pain ; जन्म janma, birth ; प्रवृत्ति pravṛitti, activity ; दोष doṣa, fault ; मिथ्याज्ञान mithyā-jñāna, false knowledge ; उत्तरोत्तरापाये uttara-uttara-apāye, on the disappearance of one after another in the reverse order ; तदनन्तरापायात् tat anantara apāyāt, owing to the absence of each successive one ; अपवर्गः apavargah, final release, attainment of the end.

2. Pain, birth, activity, faults and misapprehension—on the successive annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release.

Misapprehension, faults, activity, birth and pain—these in their uninterrupted course constitute the “ world. ” Release, which consists in the soul’s getting rid of the world, is the condition of supreme felicity marked by perfect tranquillity and not tainted by any defilement. A person, by the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, is able to remove his misapprehensions. When this is done, his faults, viz., affection,

* Vātsyāyana observes :—

त्रिविधा वास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः । उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति ।

—(Nyāyadarśana, p. 9, Bibliotheca Indica Series).

† हेयं तस्य निवर्तकं हानमात्यन्तिकं तस्योपायोऽधिगन्तव्य इत्येतानि चत्वारि अर्थपदानि सम्यक् बुद्ध्या निःश्रेयसमधिगच्छति ।

—(Nyāyadarśana, p. 2)

aversion and stupidity, disappear. He is then no longer subject to any activity and is consequently freed from transmigration and pains. This is the way in which his release is effected and supreme felicity secured.

प्रत्यक्षा नुमानोपमानशब्दाः “प्रमाणानि” ॥१११३॥

प्रत्यक्ष pratyakṣa, perception ; अनुमान anumāna, inference ; उपमान upamāna, comparison ; शब्द śabda, word ; प्रमाणानि pramāṇāni ; proofs, means of right knowledge.

3. Perception, inference, comparison and word (verbal testimony)—these are the **means of right knowledge**.

[The Chārvākas admit only one means of right knowledge, viz., perception (pratyakṣa) ; the Vaiśeṣikas and Bauddhas admit two viz., perception and inference (anumāna) ; the Sāṅkhyas admit three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony (śr̥gama or śabda) ; while the Naiyāyikas, whose fundamental work is the Nyāya sūtra, admit four, viz., perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison (upamāna). The Prābhākaraś admit a fifth means of right knowledge called presumption (arthāpatti), the Bhāṭṭas and Vedāntins admit a sixth, viz., non-existence (abhāva), and the Paurāṇikas recognise a seventh and eighth means of right knowledge, named probability (sambhava) and rumour (aitihya).]

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं “प्रत्यक्षम्” ॥१११४॥

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नम् indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannam, produced from the contact of the sense with the object ; ज्ञानम् jñānam, knowledge ; अव्यपदेश्यम् a-vyapadeśyam, without naming ; अव्यभिचारि a-vyabhichāri, unerring ; व्यवसायात्मकं vyavasāya-ātmakam, certain in nature ; प्रत्यक्ष pratyakṣam, perception.

4. **Perception** is that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object, and which is determinate, unnameable and non-erratic.

Determinate.—This epithet distinguishes perception from indeterminate knowledge ; as, for instance, a man looking from a distance cannot ascertain whether there is smoke or dust.

Unnameable.—Signifies that the knowledge of a thing derived through perception has no connection with the name which the thing bears.

Non erratic—In summer the sun's rays coming in contact with earthly heat quiver and appear to the eyes of men as water. The knowledge of water derived in this way is not perception. To eliminate such cases the epithet non-erratic has been used.

[This aphorism may also be translated as follows:—Perception is knowledge and which arises from the contact of a sense with its object and which is non-erratic being either, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*, as "this is something") or determinate (*savikalpaka*, as "this is a *Brâhmaṇa* ")].

अथ तत्पूर्वकं "त्रिविधमनुमानं" पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो
दृष्टं च ॥१११५॥

अथ *atha*, then ; तत्पूर्वकं *tat-pûrvakam*, preceded by perception ; त्रिविधं *tri-vidham*, threefold ; अनुमानं *anumānam*, inference ; पूर्ववत् *pûrva-vat*, from cause to effect ; शेषवत् *śeṣa-vat*, from effect to cause ; सामान्यतो दृष्टं *sāmānyto-dṛṣṭam*, commonly seen ; च *cha*, and.

5. **Inference** is knowledge which is preceded by perception, and is of three kinds, *viz.*, *à priori*, *à posteriori* and 'commonly seen.'

À priori is the knowledge of effect derived from the perception of its cause. *e.g.*, one seeing clouds infers that there will be rain.

À posteriori is the knowledge of cause derived from the perception of its effects, *e.g.*, one seeing a river swollen infers that there was rain.

'*Commonly seen*' is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen, *e.g.*, one seeing a beast possessing horns, infers that it possesses also a tail, or one seeing smoke on a hill infers that there is fire on it.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनम् "उपमानम्" ॥१११६॥

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् *prasiddha-sādharmyāt*, through similarity to a known object ; साध्यसाधनं *sādhya-sādhanam*, the making known of the thing posited ; उपमानं *upamānam*, comparison, analogy.

6. **Comparison** is the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously well known.

A man, hearing from a forester that a *bos gavaeus* is like a cow, resorts to a forest where he sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he heard he institutes a comparison, by which he arrives at the conviction that the animal which he sees is *bos gavaeus*. This is knowledge

derived through comparison. Some hold that comparison is not a separate means of knowledge, for when one notices the likeness of a cow in a strange animal one really performs an act of perception. In reply, it is urged that we cannot deny comparison as a separate means of knowledge, for how does otherwise the name *bos gavaeus* signify the general notion of the animal called *bos gavaeus*? That the name *bos gavaeus* signifies one and all members of the *bos gavaeus* class is not a result of perception, but the consequence of a distinct knowledge, called comparison.

आप्तोपदेशः “शब्दः” ॥१११७॥

आप्तोपदेशः *āpta-upadeśaḥ*, the direction or instruction of a reliable person ; शब्दः *śabdaḥ*, word, testimony.

7. **Word (verbal testimony)** is the instructive assertion of a reliable person.

A reliable person is one—may be a *ṛṣi*, *Ārya* or *mlechha*,—who as an expert in a certain matter is willing to communicate his experiences of it.

[Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him that the river is easily fordable : the word of the old man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge, called verbal testimony].

“स द्विविधो” दृष्टाद्दृष्टार्थत्वात् ॥१११८॥

सः *saḥ*, it, word ; द्विविधः *dvi-vidhaḥ* twofold ; दृष्टाद्दृष्टार्थत्वात् *dṛṣṭā-adṛṣṭa-artha-tvāt*, because its object may be seen or not seen.

8. It is of two kinds, *viz.*, that which refers to *matter which is seen*, and that which refers to *matter which is not seen*.

The first kind involves matter which can be actually verified. Though we are incapable of verifying the matter involved in the second kind, we can somehow ascertain it by means of inference.

[*Matter which is seen e.g.*, a physician's assertion that physical strength is gained by taking butter].

[*Matter which is not seen, e.g.*, a religious teacher's assertion that one conquers heaven by performing horse-sacrifices].

आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धिमनःप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफल-
दुःखापवर्गास्तु “प्रमेयम्” ॥१११९॥

आत्मा ātmā, soul ; शरीर śarīra, body ; इन्द्रिय indriya, sense ; अर्थ artha, object ; बुद्धि buddhi consciousness, intellect, reason, understanding ; मनः manas, mind, sensorium ; प्रवृत्ति pravṛitti ; दोष doṣa, fault ; प्रेत्यभाव pretya-bhāva, rebirth ; फल phala, fruit ; दुःख duḥkha, pain ; अपवर्ग apavarga, release, salvation ; तु tu, excludes other provables ; प्रमेयम् prameyam, the object of proof.

9. Soul, body, senses, objects of sense, intellect, mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain and release—are the **objects of right knowledge.**

The objects of right knowledge are also enumerated as substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, intimate relation [and non-existence which are the technicalities of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy].

इच्छा द्वेष प्रयत्न सुख दुःख ज्ञानानि “आत्मनो लिङ्गम्” इति ॥१११०॥

इच्छा ichchhā, desire ; द्वेष dveṣa, aversion ; प्रयत्न prayatna, effort ; सुख sukha, pleasure ; दुःख duḥkha, pain ; ज्ञान jñāna, cognition ; आत्मनः ātma-naḥ, of the soul ; लिङ्ग liṅgam, mark.

10. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and intelligence are the marks of the soul.

[These abide in the soul, or rather are the qualities of the substance called soul]

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः “शरीरम्” ॥११११॥

चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः cheṣṭā indriya artha āśrayaḥ, site or locus of volition, or striving, senses, and objects, viz, pleasure and pain ; शरीरम् śarīram body.

11. **Body** is the site of gesture, senses and sentiments.

Body is the site of *gesture*, inasmuch as it strives to reach what is desirable and to avoid what is hateful. It is also the site of *senses*, for the latter act well or ill, according as the former is in good or bad order. *Sentiments* which comprise pleasure and pain are also located in the body which experiences them.

घ्राण रसन चक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्राणि “इन्द्रियाणि” भूतेभ्यः ॥१११२॥

घ्राण रसन चक्षुस्त्वक् श्रोत्राणि ghrāṇa-rasana-chakṣus-tvak-śrotrāṇi, nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear ; इन्द्रियाणि indriyāṇi, organs of sense ; भूतेभ्यः bhūtebhyāḥ, from the elements.

12. Nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear are the senses produced from elements.

Nose is of the same nature as earth, tongue as water, eye as light, skin as air and ear as ether

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति “भूतानि” ॥१११३॥

पृथिवी Prithivī, earth ; आप āpah, water ; तेजस् tejas, fire ; वायुः vāyuḥ, air ; आकाश ākāśam, ether ; इति iti, these ; भूतानि bhūtāni, elements.

13. Earth, water, light, air and ether—these are the **elements**.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः “पृथिव्यादिगुणाः” तदर्थः ॥१११४॥

गन्ध रस रूप स्पर्श शब्दाः Gandha-rasa rūpa-sparśa śabdāḥ, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound ; पृथिव्यादिगुणाः prithivī-ādi-guṇāḥ, attributes of earth, etc., तदर्थः Tat-arthāḥ, objects of them, the senses,

14. Smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are **objects of the senses** and qualities of the earth, etc.

Smell is the object of nose and the prominent quality of earth, taste is the object of tongue and quality of water, colour is the object of eye and quality of fire, touch is the object of skin and quality of air, and sound is the object of ear and quality of ether.

“बुद्धिः” उपलब्धिज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥१११५॥

बुद्धिः buddhiḥ consciousness, understanding ; उपलब्धिः Upalabdhiḥ, apprehension, intuition ; ज्ञान jñānam, cognition. ; इति iti, this. अनर्थान्तरं an-artha-antaram, statement of synonyms.

15. **Intellect**, apprehension and knowledge—these are not different from one another.

[The term apprehension (*upalabdhi*) is generally used in the sense of perception (*pratyakṣa*). According to the Sāṅkhya philosophy, intellect (*buddhi*), which is the first thing evolved out of primordial matter (*prakṛiti*), is altogether different from knowledge (*jñāna*), which consists in the reflection of external objects on the soul (*puruṣa*), the abode of transparent consciousness].

युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः “मनसो लिङ्गम्” ॥१११६॥

युगपत् *yugapat*, simultaneous ; ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः *Jñāna-anutpattiḥ*, non-appearance of cognitions ; मनसः *manasaḥ*, of manas, mind, लिङ्गम् *liṅgam*, mark.

16. The mark of the **mind** is that there do not arise (in the soul) more acts of knowledge than one at a time.

It is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously. Perception does not arise merely from the contact of a sense-organ with its object, but it requires also a conjunction of the mind. Now, the mind, which is an atomic substance, cannot be conjoined with more than one sense-organ at a time, hence there cannot occur more acts of perception than one at one time.

“प्रवृत्तिः” वागबुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इति ॥११११७॥

प्रवृत्तिः *Pravṛttiḥ*, activity ; वागबुद्धिशरीरारम्भः *Vāk-buddhi-śarīra-ārambhah* the start made by speech, manas and body.

17. **Activity** is that which makes the voice, mind and body begin their action.

There are three kinds of action, *viz.*, *vocal*, *mental* and *bodily*, each of which may be sub divided as good or bad.

Bodily actions which are *bad* are :—(1) killing, (2) stealing, and (3) committing adultery.

Bodily actions which are *good* are :—(1) giving, (2) protecting, and (3) serving.

Vocal actions which are *bad* are :—(1) telling a lie, (2) using harsh language, (3) slandering, and (4) indulging in frivolous talk.

Vocal actions which are *good* are :—(1) speaking the truth, (2) speaking what is useful, (3) speaking what is pleasant, and (4) reading sacred books.

Mental actions which are *bad* are :—(1) malice, (2) covetousness, and (3) scepticism.

Mental actions which are *good* are :—(1) compassion, (2) refraining from covetousness, and (3) devotion.

प्रवर्तनालक्षणा “दोषाः” ॥११११८॥

प्रवर्तना लक्षणः *pravartana-lakṣaṇāḥ*, of which the characteristic is to move to activity ; दोषाः *doṣāḥ*, faults.

18. **Faults** have the characteristic of causing activity.

The faults are affection, aversion and stupidity.

पुनरुत्पत्तिः “प्रेत्यभावः” ॥ १ । १ । १९ ॥

पुनरुत्पत्तिः punar-utpattiḥ, re-appearance, re-birth ; **प्रेत्यभावः** pretya-bhāvaḥ, existence after passing away.

19. **Transmigration** means re-births.

Transmigration is the series of births and deaths. Birth is the connection of soul with body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, and sentiments, while death is the soul's separation from them.

प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थः “फलम्” ॥ १ । १ । २० ॥

प्रवृत्तिदोष जनितः pravṛitti-doṣa-janitaḥ, produced by activity and fault ; **अर्थः** arthaḥ, object ; **फलम्** phalam, fruit.

20. **Fruit** is the thing produced by activity and faults.

Fruit consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain. All activity and faults end in producing pleasure which is acceptable, and pain which is fit only to be avoided.

बाधनालक्षणं “दुःखम्” इति ॥ १ । १ । २१ ॥

बाधनालक्षणं bādhanā-lakṣaṇam, of which the characteristic is restraint or irritation ; **दुःखम्** ; duḥkham, pain.

21. **Pain** has the characteristic of causing uneasiness.

Pain is affliction which every one desires to avoid. The aphorism may also be translated as follows :—

Pain is the mark of hindrance to the soul.

तदत्यन्तविमोक्षः “अपवर्गः” ॥ १ । १ । २२ ॥

तदत्यन्तविमोक्षः tat-atyanta-vimokṣaḥ, absolute deliverance from this ; **अपवर्गः** apavargaḥ, attainment of the goal, final release, salvation.

22. **Release** is the absolute deliverance from pain.

A soul which is no longer subject to transmigration is freed from all pains. Transmigration, which consists in the soul's leaving one body and taking another, is the cause of its undergoing pleasure and pain. The soul attains release as soon as there is an end of the body, and, consequently, of pleasure and pain. Those are mistaken who maintain that

release enables the soul, not only to get rid of all pains, but also to attain eternal pleasure, for pleasure is as impermanent as pain and the body.

**समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्य-
व्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः “संशयः” ॥१११२३॥**

समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेः samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatteḥ, from the appearance of several common properties ; **विप्रतिपत्तेः** vipratipatteḥ, from contradiction ; **उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातः** upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthā-taḥ, from absence of uniformity of apprehension and from that of non-apprehension ; **विशेषापेक्षः** viśeṣa-apekṣaḥ, in which there is need of the distinguishing mark ; **विमर्शः** vimarśaḥ, consideration, judgment ; **संशयः** saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

23. Doubt, which is a conflicting judgment about the precise character of an object, arises from the recognition of properties common to many objects, or of properties not common to any of the objects, from conflicting testimony, and from irregularity of perception and non-perception.

Doubt is of five kinds, according as it arises from—

(1) *Recognition of common properties, e.g.,* seeing in the twilight a tall object we cannot decide whether it is a man or a post, for the property of tallness belongs to both.

(2) *Recognition of properties not common, e.g.,* hearing a sound, one questions whether it is eternal or not, for the property of soundness abides neither in man, beast, etc., that are non-eternal, nor in atoms which are eternal.

(3) *Conflicting testimony, e.g.,* merely by study one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does, while another system states that it does not.

(4) *Irregularity of perception, e.g.,* we perceive water in the tank where it really exists, but water appears also to exist in the mirage where it really does not exist.

A question arises whether water is perceived only when it actually exists, or even when it does not exist.

(5) *Irregularity of non-perception, e.g.,* we do not perceive water in the radish where it really exists, and also on dry land where it does not exist.

A question arises whether water is not perceived only when it does not exist, or also when it does exist.

यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत् “प्रयोजनम्” ॥१।१।२४॥

यम् yam, which; अर्थम् artham, object; अधिकृत्य adhikṛitya, intending; प्रवर्तते pravartate, acts; तत् tat, that प्रयोजनम् prayojanam, purpose.

24. **Purpose** is that with an eye to which one proceeds to act. Purpose refers to the thing which one endeavours to attain or avoid. [A man collects fuel for the purpose of cooking his food].

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स “दृष्टान्तः”

॥ १ । १ । २५ ॥

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां laukika-parīkṣakāṇām, of average men and of men possessing discrimination either by nature or as a result of education; यस्मिन् अर्थे yasmin arthe, in which object; बुद्धिसाम्यं buddhi-sāmyam, community of idea; सः saḥ, that; दृष्टान्तः dṛṣṭāntaḥ, example, familiar instance.

25. **A familiar instance** is the thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion.

[With regard to the general proposition, “wherever there is smoke there is fire,” the Familiar instance is a kitchen in which fire and smoke abide together, to the satisfaction of an ordinary man as well as an acute investigator].

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः “सिद्धान्तः” ॥ १ । १ । २६॥

तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थितिः tantra-adhikaraṇa-abhyupagama samsthitiḥ, established truth about the subject matter of a tantra or course of teaching about a number of interrelated subjects, or of an adhikarana or topic of discussion or of an abhyupagama or admission without proof; सिद्धान्तः siddhāntaḥ, conclusion, established tenet.

26. **An established tenet** is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication.

सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् ॥१।१।२७॥

सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् sarva-tantra-prati-tantra-adhi-karaṇa-abhyupagama-samsthiti-artha-antara-bhāvāt, owing to differences as tenets of all the tantras, of a particular tantra, of a topic or of an admission.

27. The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between

a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma and an implied dogma.

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकृतोऽर्थः “सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः”

॥ १ । १ । २८ ॥

सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धः sarva-tantra-aviruddhaḥ, unopposed in all tantras or systems ; **तन्त्रे** tantre, in the particular tantra or system ; **अधिकृतः** adhikṛitaḥ, included, intended, dealt with, treated ; **सर्वतन्त्र सिद्धान्तः** sarva-tantra-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of all the systems, universal tenet.

28. **A dogma of all the schools** is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school.

The five elements (*viz.*, earth, water, light, air and ether), the five objects of sense (*viz.*, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound), etc., are tenets which are accepted by all the schools.

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रासिद्धः “प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः”

॥ १ । १ । २९ ॥

समानतन्त्रसिद्धः samāna-tantra-siddhaḥ, accepted in identical or allied systems ; **परतन्त्रासिद्धः** para-tantra-asiddhaḥ, not accepted in different systems ; **प्रतितन्त्र सिद्धान्तः** prati-tantra-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of a particular system, particular tenet.

29. **A dogma peculiar to some school** is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools.

“A thing cannot come into existence out of nothing”—this is a peculiar dogma of the Sāṅkhyas. [The eternity of sound is a peculiar dogma of the Mīmāṃsakas].

यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिस्स “अधिकरणसिद्धान्तः”

॥ १ । १ । ३० ॥

यत्सिद्धौ yat-siddhau, on and in the proof of which. ; **अन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः** anya-prakaraṇa-siddhiḥ, another sub-topic is proved and needed ; **सः** saḥ, that ; **अधिकरण सिद्धान्तः** adhikaraṇa-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of a topic of discussion.

30. **An hypothetical dogma** is a tenet which, if accepted, leads to the acceptance of another tenet.

“There is a soul apart from the senses, because it can recognise one and the same object by seeing and touching.” If you accept this tenet you must also have accepted the following :—(1) That the senses are more than one, (2) that each of the senses has its particular object, (3) that the soul derives its knowledge through the channels of the senses, (4) that a substance which is distinct from its qualities is the abode of them, etc.

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणम् “अभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः”

॥ १ । १ । ३१ ॥

अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात् a-parikṣita-abhyupagamāt, after admission of a tenet without proof or examination ; तद्विशेष परीक्षणं tat-viśeṣa-parikṣaṇam, examination of particulars concerning it ; अभ्युपगम सिद्धान्तः abhyupagama-siddhāntaḥ, established tenet of an admission without proof or of a concession.

31. **An implied dogma** is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows from the examination of particulars concerning it.

The discussion, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, pre-supposes that it is a substance. “That sound is a substance” is here an implied dogma. [The mind has nowhere been stated in the Nyāya-sūtra to be a sense-organ, but it follows from the particulars examined concerning it that it is so].

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनमनानि “अवयवाः” ॥१।१।३२॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनमनानि pratijñā-hetu-udāharaṇa-upanaya-nigama-nāni, proposition, mark, instance, ratiocination and inference ; अवयवाः avayavāḥ, members of a syllogism.

32. The **members** (of a syllogism) are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.

- [1. Proposition.—This hill is fiery,
2. Reason.—Because it is smoky,
3. Example.—Whatever is smoky is fiery, as a kitchen,
4. Application.—So is this hill (smoky),
5. Conclusion.—Therefore this hill is fiery.]

Some lay down five more members as follows :—

1 (a) Inquiry as to the proposition (jijñāsā).—Is this hill fiery in all its parts, or in a particular part ?

2 (a) Questioning the reason (samśaya).—That which you call smoke may be nothing but vapour.

3 (a) Capacity of the example to warrant the conclusion (śakya-prāpti).—Is it true that smoke is always a concomitant of fire ? In a kitchen there are of course both smoke and fire, but in a red-hot iron-ball there is no smoke.

4 (a) Purpose for drawing the conclusion (prayojana).—Purpose consists in the determination of the true conditions of the hill, in order to ascertain whether it is such that one can approach it, or such that one should avoid it, or such that one should maintain an attitude of indifference towards it.

4 (b) Dispelling all questions (samśayavyudāsa).—It is beyond all question that the hill is smoky, and that smoke is an invariable concomitant of fire.

साध्यनिर्देशः “प्रतिज्ञा” ॥ १ । १ । ३३ ॥

साध्यनिर्देशः sādhya-nirdeśaḥ, declaration of what is to be established; प्रतिज्ञा pratijñā, proposition.

33. **A proposition** is the declaration of what is to be established.

Sound is non-eternal—this is a proposition.

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात्साध्यसाधनं “हेतुः” ॥११॥३४॥

उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् udāharana-sādharmyāt, through similarity to instance; साध्य साधनं sādhya-sadhanam, statement of the means of establishing what is to be established ; हेतुः hetuḥ, mark.

34. **The reason** is the means for establishing what is to be established through the *homogeneous* or affirmative character of the example.

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Example (homogeneous).—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot.

The example “ pot ” possesses the same character as is implied in the reason, viz., “being produced,” inasmuch as both are non-eternal.

“तथा” वैधर्म्यात् ॥ १ । १ । ३५ ॥

तथा tathâ, likewise ; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyât, through dissimilarity to instance.

35. Likewise through *heterogeneous* or *negative* character.

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Example (heterogeneous).—Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced, as the soul.

The example “soul” possesses a character heterogeneous to that which is implied in the reason, *viz*, “being produced,” inasmuch as one is eternal and the other non-eternal.

साध्यसाधर्म्यात्तद्गुर्मभावी दृष्टान्त “उदाहरणम्” ॥११३६॥

साध्यसाधर्म्यात् sâdhya-sâdharmyât, through similarity to what is to be established ; तद्गुर्मभावी tat-dharma-bhâvi, in which the property of what is to be established exists, दृष्टान्तः dr̥ṣṭāntah, example ; उदाहरणम्, udâharaṇam, instance.

36. A **homogeneous** (or **affirmative example**) is a familiar instance which is known to possess the property to be established, and which implies that this property is invariably contained in the reason given.

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Homogeneous example.—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot.

Here “pot” is a familiar instance which possesses the property of non-eternality and implies that whatever is “produced” is attended by the same property (non-eternality).

तद्विपर्ययाद्वा “विपरीतम्” ॥११३७॥

तद्विपर्यात् tat-viparyayât, through dissimilarity to what is to be established ; वा vâ, or ; विपरीतम् viparītam, contrary, opposite.

37. A **heterogeneous** (or **negative**) example is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property to be established

and which implies that the absence of this property is invariably rejected in the reason given.

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Heterogeneous example.—Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced, as the soul.

Here the “soul” is a familiar instance which is known to be devoid of the property of non-eternality and implies that if anything were produced, it would necessarily be deprived of the quality of eternality, i.e. ‘being produced’ and ‘eternal’ are incompatible epithets.

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्य

“उपनयः” ॥ १ । १ । ३८ ॥

उदाहरणापेक्षः udâharana-apekṣaḥ dependent upon instance ; तथा tathâ, so. उपसंहारः upasamhâraḥ winding up, concluding. न तथा इति na tathâ iti, not so ; वा vâ, or ; साध्यस्य sâdhyasya, of what is to be established ; उपनयः upanayaḥ. ratiocination.

38. **Application** is a winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be established as being so or not so.

Application is of two kinds : (1) *Affirmative* and (2) *Negative*. The affirmative application, which is expressed by the word “so,” occurs when the example is of an affirmative character. The negative, which is expressed by the phrase “not so,” occurs when the example is of a negative character.

Proposition —Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Example.—Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot,

Affirmative application.—So is sound (produced),

Conclusion.—Therefore sound is non-eternal.

Or :

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Example.—Whatever is eternal is not produced, as the soul,

Negative application.—Sound is not so (i.e., sound is not not-produced),

Conclusion.—Therefore sound is not eternal.

हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं “निगमनम्” ॥१११३६॥

हेत्वपदेशात् *hetu-apadeśāt*, after statement of the mark ; प्रतिज्ञायाः *pratijñāyāḥ*, of proposition ; पुनर्वचनं *punaḥ-vachanam*, re-statement ; निगमनम् *nigamanam*, inference.

39. **Conclusion** is the re-stating of the proposition, after the reason has been mentioned.

Conclusion is the confirmation of the proposition, after the reason and the example have been mentioned.

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason.—Because it is produced,

Example —Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as a pot,

Application.—So is sound (produced).

Conclusion —Therefore sound is non-eternal.

अविज्ञाततत्त्वार्थे कारणोपपत्तितस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमूहः “तर्कः”

॥ १११३७ ॥

अविज्ञाततत्त्वे *a-viñāta tattve*, true nature of which is not known, अर्थे *arthe*, in the case of an object ; कारणोपपत्तिः *kāraṇa-upapatti-ṭaḥ*, by showing the appropriateness of the desired causes ; तत्त्वज्ञानार्थम् *tattva-jñāna-artham*, for the purpose of knowledge of true nature , ऊहः *ūhah*, reasoning, तर्कः *tarkaḥ*, confutation, *reductio ad absurdum*.

40 **Confutation**, which is carried on for ascertaining the real character of a thing of which the character is not known, is reasoning which reveals the character by showing the absurdity of all contrary characters

Is the soul eternal or non-eternal ? Here the real character of the soul, *viz.*, whether it is eternal, or non-eternal, is not known. In ascertaining the character, we reason as follows :—If the soul were non-eternal, it would be impossible for it to enjoy the fruits of its own actions, to undergo transmigration, and to attain final release. But such a conclusion is absurd : such possibilities are known to belong to the soul : therefore, we must admit that the soul is eternal.

विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थाविधारणं “निर्णयः” ॥१११४१॥

विमृश्य vimṛśya, arguing ; पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यां pakṣa-pratipakṣābhyāṃ, from opposite positions. ; अर्थावधारणं artha-avadhāraṇam, determination of object ; निर्णयः nirṇayaḥ, ascertainment.

41. **Ascertainment** is the removal of doubt, and the determination of a question, by hearing two opposite sides.

A person wavers and doubts if certain statements are advanced to him by one of two parties, but opposed by the other party. His doubt is not removed until by the application of reason he can vindicate either of the parties. The process by which the vindication is effected is called ascertainment. Ascertainment is not, however, in all cases preceded by doubt ; for instance, in the case of perception things are ascertained directly. So also we ascertain things directly by the authority of scriptures, or through discussion. But in the case of investigation, doubt must precede ascertainment.

इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥ १ । १ ॥



BOOK I.—CHAPTER II.

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भस्सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोप-
पन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो “वादः” ॥ १ । २ । १ ॥

प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः *pramâṇa-tarka-sâdhana-upâlambhaḥ*, proof and disproof, affirmation and negation, by means of *pramâṇas* or proofs or instruments of right knowledge and *tarka* or confutation ; *सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः* *siddhânta-a-viruddhaḥ*, not opposed to the established tenets ; *पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः* *pañcha-avayava-upapannaḥ*, presenting the five members of the syllogism ; *पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः* *pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigrahaḥ*, admission of opposite views on the same subject ; *वादः* *vâdaḥ*, discussion.

42. **Discussion** is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analysed in the form of five members, and defended by the aid of any of the means of right knowledge, while its opposite is assailed by confutation, without deviation from the established tenets —1.

[*A dialogue or disputation* (*kathâ*) is the adoption of a side by a disputant and its opposite by his opponent. It is of three kinds, *viz*, *discussion* which aims at ascertaining the truth, *wrangling* which aims at gaining victory, and *cavil* which aims at finding mere faults. *A discutient* is one who engages himself in a disputation as a means of seeking the truth].

An instance of discussion is given below :—

Discutient—There is soul.

Opponent—There is no soul.

Discutient—Soul is existent (proposition).

Because it is an abode of consciousness (reason).

Whatever is not existent, is not an abode of consciousness,
as a hare's horn (negative example).

Soul is not so, that is, soul is an abode of consciousness
(negative application).

Therefore soul is existent (conclusion).

Opponent—Soul is non-existent (proposition).

Because, etc.

Discutient—The scripture which is a verbal testimony declares the existence of soul.

Opponent

Discontent—If there were no soul, it would not be possible to apprehend one and the same object, through sight and touch.

Opponent

Discontent—The doctrine of soul harmonises well with the various tenets which we hold, *viz.* that there are eternal things, that everybody enjoys pleasure or suffers pain, according to his own actions, etc. Therefore, there is soul.

[The discussion will be considerably lengthened if the opponent happens to be a Buddhist, who does not admit the authority of scripture and holds that there are no eternal things, etc.]

यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो

‘जल्पः’ ॥ १ । २ । २ ।

यथोक्तोपपन्नः yathâ-ukta-upapannah, presented as stated i. e. possessing all the characteristics of a discussion. छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भः chhala-jâti-nigrahasthâna sâdhana-upâlambhah, affirmation and negation by means of quibbling, futility, and opponent's errors; जल्पः jalpah, sophistry.

43. **Wrangling**, which aims at gaining victory, is the defence or attack of a proposition in the manner aforesaid, by quibbles, futilities, and other processes which deserve rebuke—2.

A *wrangler* is one who, engaged in a disputation, aims only at victory, being indifferent whether the arguments which he employs support his own contention or that of his opponent, provided that he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has taken an active part in the disputation.

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो “ वितण्डा ” ॥ १ । २ । ३ ॥

सः sah, that, i. e. sophistry, प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनः pratipakṣa sthâpanâ-hīnch, without the demonstration of one of the opposite views, वितण्डा vitandâ, cavil.

44. **Cavil** is a kind of wrangling, which consists in mere attacks on the opposite side—3.

A *caviller* does not endeavour to establish anything, but confines himself to mere carping at the arguments of his opponent.

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता “हेत्वा-
भासाः” ॥ १ । २ । ४ ॥

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीताः savyabhi-chāra viruddha-prakara-
ṇasama-sādhya-sama-kālā-tīṭh, erratic or multifarious, contradictory,
synonymous with the prakaraṇa or subject under discussion—synonymous
with what is to be established, and time-expired ; हेत्वाभासाः hetu-ābhā-āḥ,
pseudo-marks.

45. **Fallacies of a reason** are the erratic, the contradictory,
the equal to the question, the unproved, and the misaimed.—4.

अनैकान्तिकः “सव्यभिचारः” ॥ १ । २ । ५ ॥

अनैकान्तिकः ana eka-antikah, not-one-pointed ; सव्यभिचारः sa vyabhi-
chārah, erratic.

46. The **erratic** is the reason which leads to more conclusions
than one—5.

An instance of the *erratic* is given below :—

Proposition.—Sound is eternal,

Erratic reason—Because it is intangible,

Example—Whatever is intangible is eternal, as atoms,

Application.—So is sound (intangible),

Conclusion.—Therefore sound is eternal.

Again :

Proposition.—Sound is non-eternal,

Erratic reason.—Because it is intangible,

Example.—Whatever is intangible, is non-eternal, as intellect,

Application.—So is sound (intangible).

Conclusion.—Therefore sound is non-eternal

Here from the reason there have been drawn two opposite conclu-
sions, viz. : that sound is eternal, and that sound is non-eternal. The
reason or middle term is erratic when it is not pervaded by the major
term, that is, when there is no universal connection between the major
term and the middle term, as pervader and pervaded. “Intangible” is per-
vaded neither by ‘eternal’ nor by ‘non-eternal’ In fact, there is no
universal connection between ‘intangible’ and ‘eternal’ or ‘non-eternal.’

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी “विरुद्धः” ॥१२।६॥

सिद्धान्तम् *siddhāntam*, established tenet ; अभ्युपेत्य *abhyupetya*, admitting or depending upon ; तद्विरोधी *tat-virodhī*, contradictory thereof ; विरुद्धः *viruddhaḥ*, contradictory.

47. The **contradictory** is the reason which opposes what is to be established—6.

Proposition.—A pot is produced,

Contradictory reason.—Because it is eternal.

Here the reason is contradictory, because that which is eternal is never produced.

यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः “प्रकरणसमः”

॥ १ । २ । ७ ॥

यस्मात् *yasmāt*, whence ; प्रकरणचिन्ता *prakaraṇa-chintā*, discussion of the subject ; सः *saḥ*, that ; निर्णयार्थम् *nirṇaya-artham*, for the purpose of the inference ; अपदिष्टः *apadiṣṭaḥ*, assigned ; प्रकरणसमः *prakaraṇa-samaḥ*, synonymous with the subject under consideration.

48. **Equal to the question** is the reason which provokes the very question, for the solution of which it was employed.—7.

Proposition—Sound is non-eternal,

Reason which is *equal to the question* —Because it is not possessed of the attribute of eternity.

‘Non-eternal’ is the same as ‘not possessed of the attribute of eternity.’ In determining the question, whether sound is non-eternal, the reason given is that sound is non-eternal, or, in other words, the reason begs the question.

साध्याविशिष्टस्साध्यत्वात् “साध्यसमः” ॥ १ । २ । ८ ॥

साध्याविशिष्टः *sādhya-aviśiṣṭaḥ*, not distinguished from what is to be established ; साध्यत्वात् *sādhya-tvāt*, requiring to be established ; साध्यसमः *sādhya-samaḥ*, synonymous with what is to be established.

49. The **unproved** is the reason which stands in need of proof, in the same way as the proposition does—8.

Proposition.—Shadow is a substance.

Unproved reason.—Because it possesses motion.

Here, unless it is actually proved that shadow possesses motion, we cannot accept it as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a sub-

stance. Just as the proposition stands in need of proof, so does the reason itself. It is possible that the motion belongs to the person who causes that obstruction of light which is called shadow.

कालात्ययापदिष्टः “कालातीतः” ॥ १ । २ । ६ ॥

कालात्ययापदिष्टः *kâla atyaya-apadiṣṭaḥ*, assigned after lapse of time ;

कालातीतः *kâla-atîtaḥ*, time-expired, mistimed.

50. The **mistimed** is the reason which is adduced when the time is passed in which it might hold good,—9.

Proposition.—Sound is durable.

Mistimed reason.—Because it is manifested by union, as a colour.

The colour of a jar is manifested when the jar comes into union with a lamp, but the colour existed before the union took place, and will continue to exist after the union has ceased. Similarly, the sound of a drum is manifested when the drum comes into union with a rod, and the sound must, after the analogy of the colour, be presumed to have existed before the union took place, and to continue to exist after the union has ceased. Hence, sound is durable. The reason adduced here is mistimed, because the manifestation of sound does not take place at the time when the drum comes into union with the rod, but at a subsequent moment when the union has ceased. In the case of colour, however, the manifestation takes place just at the time when the jar comes into union with the lamp. Because the time of their manifestation is different, the analogy between colour and sound is not complete; therefore, the reason is mistimed.

Some interpret the aphorism as follows :—The *mistimed* is the reason which is adduced in a wrong order among the five members, for instance, as, if the reason is stated before the proposition. But this interpretation, according to Vâtsyâyana, is wrong; for a word bears its legitimate connection with another word (in a Sanskrit sentence) even if they are placed at a distance from each other, and, on the other hand, even the closest proximity is of no use if the words are disconnected in their sense.* Moreover, the placing of members in a wrong order is noticed in the Nyâya-sûtra as a *nigrahasthâna* (occasion for rebuke), called *aprâpta-kâla* (inopportune). (V. ii. 11.)

वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या “छलम्” ॥ १ । २ । ७ ॥

वचनविघातः *vachana-vighâtaḥ*, opposition to statement ; अर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या

artha-vikalpa-upapattiyâ, by the assumption of an alternative import ; छलम् *chhalam*, quibble, finding fault with.

* (Quoted by Vatsyâyana in the Nyâya-bhâṣya, p. 250).

51. **Quibble** is the opposition offered to a proposition by the assumption of an alternative meaning.—10.

“तत्त्रिविधं” वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलमुपचारच्छलं चेति-

॥ १ । २ । ११ ॥

तत् tat, it; त्रिविधं tri-vidham, three fold; वाक्छलं vâk-chhalam, quibble in respect of a word; सामान्यच्छलं sāmānya-chhalam, quibble in respect of a genus; उपचारच्छलं upachāra-chhalam, quibble in respect of a metaphor; चेति cha iti, and.

52. It is of *three* kinds, viz, quibble in respect of a term, quibble in respect of a genus, and quibble in respect of a metaphor.—11.

अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना “वाक्छलम्” ॥ १ । २ । १२ ॥

अविशेषाभिहिते a-viśeṣa-abhihite, stated in a general way; अर्थे arthe, in respect of an object वक्तुः vaktuḥ, speaker's; अभिप्रायात् abhiprāyât, from the intention; अर्थान्तरकल्पना artha antara kalpanâ, supposition of a different object, वाक्छलं vâk-chhalam quibble in respect of words.

53. **Quibble in respect of a term** consists in wilfully taking the term in a sense other than that intended by a speaker who has happened to use it ambiguously.—12.

A speaker says: “This boy is *nava kambala* (possessed of a new blanket).”

A quibbler replies: “This boy is not certainly *nava kambala* (possessed of nine blankets), for he has only one blanket.”

Here the word *nava*, which is ambiguous, was used by the speaker in the sense of “new,” but has been wilfully taken by the quibbler in the sense of “nine.”

सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना

“सामान्यच्छलम्” ॥ १ । २ । १३ ॥

सम्भवनः sambhavataḥ, possible; अर्थस्य arthasya, of import; अतिसामान्ययोगात् atisāmānya-yogât, from the application of a higher genus, असम्भूतार्थकल्पना a-sambhûta-artha-kalpanâ supposition of an impossible import; सामान्यच्छलं sāmānya chhalam, quibble in respect of a genus.

54. **Quibble in respect of a genus** consists in asserting the impossibility of a thing which is really possible, on the ground that it belongs to a certain genus which is very wide.—13.

A speaker says: "This Brāhmaṇa is possessed of learning and conduct."

An objector replies: "It is impossible, for how can it be inferred that this person is possessed of learning and conduct because he is a Brāhmaṇa? There are little boys who are Brāhmaṇas, yet not possessed of learning and conduct."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knows well that possession of learning and conduct was not meant to be an attribute of the whole class of Brāhmaṇas, but it was ascribed to "this" particular Brāhmaṇa who lived long enough in the world to render it possible for him to pursue studies and acquire good morals.

धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशोऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेध "उपचारच्छलम्"

॥ १ । २ । १४ ॥

धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशे dharma-vikalpa-nirdeśe, in the case of transference of epithet ; अर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधः artha-sadbhāva-pratisēdhaḥ, denial of the possibility of sense ; उपचारच्छलं upachāra-chhalam, quibble in respect of a metaphor.

55. **Quibble in respect of a metaphor** consists in denying the proper meaning of a word by taking it literally, while it was used metaphorically, and *vice versa*.—14.

A speaker says: "The scaffolds cry out."

An objector replies: "It is impossible for scaffolds to cry out, for they are inanimate objects."

Here the objector is a quibbler, for he knew well that the word *scaffolds* was used to signify those standing on the scaffolds.

वाक्छलं वाच्योपचारच्छलं तद्विशेषात् ॥ १ । २ । १५ ॥

वाक्छलं vāk-chhalam, verbal quibble, playing on words ; एव eva, itself ; उपचारच्छलं upachāra-chhalam, metaphorical quibble, playing on metaphors ; तद्विशेषात् tat-aviśeṣāt, there being no difference from it.

56. It may be said that quibble in respect of a metaphor is in,

reality quibble in respect of a term, for the first is not different from the second.—15.

न तदर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ १ । २ । १६ ॥

na, not ; तदर्थान्तरभावात् tat-artha-antara-bhāvât, being different objects. Denial of the possibility of sense is not the same as the supposition of a different sense.

57. But it is not so, for there is a distinction between them.—16.

Words are taken in their direct (literal) meanings in the case of 'quibble in respect of a term,' while they are taken in their direct (literal) as well as indirect (secondary) meanings in the case of 'quibble in respect of a metaphor.'

अविशेषे वा किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः ॥ १ । २ । १७ ॥

अविशेषे aviśeṣe, in the absence of distinction ; वा vā, or ; किञ्चित् साधर्म्यात् kiñchit sādharmyâ, through partial similarity ; एकच्छलप्रसङ्गः eka-ṣṣhala-prasaṅgaḥ, one quibble only will result.

58. If you do not admit that one is different from another simply because there is some similarity between them, then we should have only one kind of quibble.—17.

If 'quibble in respect of a metaphor' were not different from 'quibble in respect of a term,' then these two also would not be different from 'quibble in respect of a genus,' because there is some similarity among all of them. This is absurd, hence the three kinds of quibble are different from one another.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं "जातिः" ॥ १ । २ । १८ ॥

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām, by means of similarity and dissimilarity ; प्रत्यवस्थानं pratyavasthānam, opposition ; जातिः jātiḥ, futility.

59. **Futility** consists in offering objections founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.—18.

A disputant says : "The soul is inactive, because it is all-pervading as ether."

His opponent replies : "If the soul is inactive because it bears similarity to ether as being all-pervading, why is it not active because it bears similarity to a pot as being a seat of union ?"

The reply is futile, because it overlooks the universal connection between the middle term and the major term which is existent in the arguments of the disputant, but wanting in the arguments of the opponent. Whatever is all-pervading is inactive, but whatever is a seat of union is not necessarily active.

Or again :

Disputant.—Sound is non-eternal, because unlike ether it is a product.

Opponent.—If sound is non-eternal because as a product it is dissimilar to ether, why is it not eternal because as an object of auditory perception it is dissimilar to a pot ?

The reply is futile, because it overlooks the universal disconnection between the middle term and the absence of the major term. There is a universal disconnection between “a product” and “not non-eternal,” but there is no such disconnection between “an object of auditory perception” and “not eternal.”

विप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिपत्तिश्च “निग्रहस्थानम्” ॥ १ । २ । १६ ॥

विप्रतिपत्तिः vipratipattiḥ, wrong deduction ; **अप्रतिपत्तिः** apratipattiḥ, indecision ; **च** cha, and ; **निग्रहस्थानं** nigrāha-sthānam, occasion for rebuke, ground of defeat.

60. **An occasion for rebuke** arises when one misunderstands, or does not understand at all.—19.

If a person begins to argue in a way which betrays his utter ignorance, or wilfully misunderstands and yet persists in showing that he understands well, it is of no avail to employ counter arguments. He is quite unfit to be argued with, and there is nothing left for his opponent but to turn him out or quit his company, rebuking him as a blockhead or a knave.

An instance of *occasion for rebuke* :—

Whatever is not quality, is substance.

Because there is nothing except colour, etc (quality)

A person who argues in the above way is to be rebuked as a fool, for his reason (which admits only quality) opposes his proposition (which admits both quality and substance)

Another instance :

Disputant.—Fire is not hot,

Opponent.—But the evidence of touch disproves such a statement.

Disputant, in order to gain the confidence of the assembled people, says—"O learned audience, listen, I do not say that fire is not hot," etc.

It is only meet that the opponent should quit the company of a man who argues in this way.

तद्विकल्पाज्जातिनिग्रहस्थानबहुत्वम् ॥ १ । २ । २० ॥

तद्विकल्पात् tat-vikalpāt, from their varieties ; जातिनिग्रहस्थान बहुत्वं jāti-nigrahasthāna-bahutvam, multiplicity of futility and ground of defeat.

61. Owing to the variety of kinds, there is multiplicity of futilities and occasions for rebuke.—20.

There are 24 kinds of futility and 22 kinds of occasion for rebuke which will be treated respectively in Chapter I and Chapter II of Book V.

इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने प्रथमस्याध्यायस्य द्वितीयमाह्निकम् ॥ १ । २ ॥

BOOK II, CHAPTER I.

समानानेकधर्माध्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायाद्वा न

संशयः ॥ २ । १ । १ ॥

समानानेक धर्माध्यवसायात् samāna-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyat, from the ascertainment of common or more than one attributes of two objects ; अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात् anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyat, from the ascertainment of the attributes of one of them ; वा vâ, or ; न na, not, संशयः samśayaḥ, doubt.

62. Some say that doubt cannot arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties, whether conjointly or separately.—1.

Conjointly.—It is said that doubt about an object is never produced if *both* the common and uncommon properties of the object are recognised. For instance, if we see in the twilight a tall object which moves, we do not doubt whether it is a man or a post. We at once decide that it is a man, for though tallness is a property possessed in common by man and post, locomotion is a property which distinguishes a man from a post.

Separately.—Likewise, doubt about an object is said never to be produced if *only* the common or the uncommon properties are recognised. For instance, if we see a tall object in the twilight, we have no reason to doubt whether it is a man or a post. Tallness is certainly a property possessed in common by man and post, but the tallness of a man is not identical with that of a post: it merely resembles it. Now, the knowledge of similarity between the tallness of a man and that of a post presupposes a knowledge of the man and the post, of which two kinds of tallness are attributes. If there is already a knowledge of the man and the post, there cannot be any doubt about them, for knowledge is the vanquisher of doubt.

विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायाच्च ॥ २ । १ । २ ॥

विप्रतिपत्त्यव्यवस्थाध्यवसायात् vipratipatti-avyavasthâ-adhyavasāyat, from the ascertainment of contradiction or of irregularity of perception and non-perception. च cha, and.

63. It is further said that doubt cannot arise, either from conflicting testimony, or from the irregularity of perception and non-perception.—2.

विप्रतिपत्तौ च सम्प्रतिपत्तेः ॥ २ । १ । ३ ॥

विप्रतिपत्तौ vipratipattau, if contradiction be a cause of doubt ; च cha, also ; सम्प्रतिपत्तेः sampratipatteḥ, from agreement.

64. In the case of conflicting testimony there is, according to them, a strong conviction (on each side).—2.

Suppose a disputant (Naiyāyika) says : there is soul. His opponent (Buddhist) replies : there is no soul.

The disputant and his opponent are quite sure that their respective statements are correct. Hence there is no doubt, but on the contrary there is conviction, in the minds of both.

अव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्थितत्वाच्चाव्यवस्थायाः ॥ २ । १ । ४ ॥

अव्यवस्था avyavasthā, irregularity ; आत्मनि ātmani, in itself ; व्यवस्थितत्वात् vyavasthita-tvāt, being regular ; च cha, and ; अव्यवस्थायाः a-vyavasthāyāḥ, from irregularity.

65. Doubt, they say, does not arise from the irregularity of perception and non-perception, because in the irregularity itself there is regularity.—4.

An irregularity may be designated as such with reference to something else, but with reference to itself it is a settled fact. If the irregularity is settled in itself, it is regular and cannot cause doubt. On the other hand, if the irregularity is not settled in itself, it is devoid of its own character and cannot cause doubt.

तथाऽत्यन्तसंशयस्तदुर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः ॥ २ । १ । ५ ॥

तथा tathā, similarly ; अत्यन्त संशयः atyanta-saṁśayaḥ, endless doubt ; तदुर्मसातत्योपपत्तेः tat-dharma-sātatya-upapatteḥ, from continuous existence of the attributes thereof.

66. Likewise, there is, they say, the chance of an endless doubt, owing to the continuity of its cause.—5.

Recognition of properties common to many objects is, for instance, a cause of doubt. The common properties continue to exist, and hence there will, they say, be no cessation of doubt.

यथोक्ताध्यवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेक्षात्संशयेनासंशयो
नात्यन्तसंशयो वा ॥ २ । १ । ६ ॥

यथोक्तव्यवसायात् yathâ-ukta-adhyavasâyât, from the ascertainment as stated by the opponent; एव eva, certainly; तद्विशेषापेक्षात् tat-viśeṣa-apekṣât, in which there is need of the differentia; संशये saṁśaye, doubt arising; न na, not; असंशयः a-saṁśayaḥ, absence of doubt; न na, not; अत्यन्त संशयः atyanta-saṁśayaḥ, endless doubt; वा vâ, or.

67. In reply, it is stated that the recognition of properties common to many objects, etc., are certainly causes of doubt, if there is no reference to the precise characters of the objects: there is no chance of *no*-doubt or of *endless*-doubt.—6.

It is admitted that doubt does not arise from the recognition of common and uncommon properties conjointly. Aphorism 2-1-1 brings forth the objection that doubt is not produced even by the recognition of common or uncommon properties alone. It is said that, while we see a tall object in the twilight, we at once think of a man and a post, both of which are tall. Thus there is knowledge rather than doubt about the man and post suggested by the tall object. The present aphorism dismisses the objection, by stating that there is certainly a common (non-distinctive) knowledge about a man and a post suggested by the tall object, but there is no precise (distinctive) knowledge about them. Precise knowledge (that is, knowledge of the precise character which distinguishes a man from a post) being absent, doubt must arise. Similar arguments will apply to doubt arising from the recognition of non-common properties alone.

Aphorisms 2-1-2 and 2-1-3 raise the objection that doubt does not arise from conflicting testimony, as the disputant and his opponent are both confident of their respective contentions. The present aphorism disposes of the objection, by pointing out that, in the case of conflicting statements, one is led to believe that both statements are worth consideration, but is unable to penetrate into the precise characters of the statements. Hence, though the disputant and his opponent remain fixed, the umpire and the audience are thrown into doubt by their conflicting statements.

Aphorism 2-1-4 raises the objection that doubt cannot arise from the irregularity of perception and non-perception, as the irregularity is settled in itself. The present aphorism meets the objection by stating that the irregularity cannot be concealed by mere verbal tricks. The irregularity, though settled in itself, does not lose its own character until the objects which cause it are removed.

Aphorism 2-1-5 gives rise to the fear that there is the possibility of an endless doubt, inasmuch as the cause is continuous. The present aphorism removes the fear by stating that, though materials of doubt, such as common properties, etc., continue to exist, we do not always recognise them. Unless there is recognition of the common properties, etc., there cannot be doubt.

यत्र संशयस्तत्रैवमुत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः ॥ २।१।७ ॥

यत्र yatra, wherever ; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt ; तत्र tatra, there ; एव evam, in this way ; उत्तरोत्तरप्रसङ्गः uttara-uttara-prasaṅgaḥ, sequence of arguments one after another.

68. **Examination** should be made in this way of each case where there is room for doubt.—7.

It has been stated that knowledge about the true nature of the categories consists in the true knowledge of their enunciation, definition, and examination. In case of well-known facts admitted by all, there should be no examination. We are to examine only those cases where there is room for doubt. The author explains, therefore, first the nature of doubt, and then proceeds to examine the other categories, lest there should be any room for doubt in them.

प्रत्यक्षादीनामप्रामाण्यं त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः ॥ २।१।८ ॥

प्रत्यक्षादीनां pratyakṣāḍiṇāṁ, of perception and the rest ; अप्रामाण्यं a-prāmaṇyam, absence of the characteristic of being the means of right knowledge ; त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः traikālya-asiddheḥ, because of their non-operation in any of the three divisions of time, past, present, and future.

69. Perception and other means of knowledge, says an objector, are invalid, as they are impossible at all the three times,—8.

According to the objector, perception is impossible at the present, past and future times, or, in other words, perception can neither be prior to, nor posterior to, nor simultaneous with, the objects of sense.

पूर्वं हि प्रमाणसिद्धौ नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात्प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः

॥ २।१।९ ॥

पूर्वं pūrvam, before ; हि hi, because ; प्रमाणसिद्धौ pramāṇa-siddhau, if the means of right knowledge, perception, etc., come into existence ; न na, not ; इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt, from the contact of

the sense and object ; प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ, production of perception.

70. If perception occurred anteriorly it could not, he says, have arisen from the contact of a sense with its object.—9.

With reference to the perception of colour, for instance, it is asked whether the colour precedes perception or the perception precedes colour. If you say that perception occurred anteriorly or preceded the colour, you must give up your definition of perception, viz., that perception arises from the contact of a sense with its object.

पश्चात्सिद्धौ न प्रमाणेभ्यः प्रमेयसिद्धिः । २।१।१०॥

पश्चात् paścāt, after ; सिद्धौ siddhau, if it comes into existence ; न na, not ; प्रमाणेभ्यः pramāṇebhyaḥ, from the means of right knowledge ; प्रमेयसिद्धिः prameya-siddhiḥ, establishment of what is to be proved.

71. If perception is supposed to occur posteriorly you cannot, he continues, maintain the conclusion that objects of sense are established by perception.—10.

The objection stands thus :—The means of right knowledge are stated by you to be perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. All objects of right knowledge are said to be established by them. The objects of sense, for instance, are supposed to be established by perception : colour is said to be established by visual perception. This conclusion will have to be abandoned if you say that perception occurs posteriorly to the objects.

युगपत्सिद्धौ प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात्क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धी-

नाम् ॥ २ । १ । ११ ॥

युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously ; सिद्धौ siddhau, if it comes into existence ; प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् prati-artha-niyata-tvāt, being restricted to each object ; क्रमवृत्तित्वाभावः krama-vṛitti-tva-abhāvaḥ, absence of the characteristic of being in successive order ; बुद्धीनाम् buddhīnām, of cognitions.

72. If perception were simultaneous with its object there would not, says the objector, be any order of succession in our cognitions, as there is no such order in their corresponding objects.—11.

Various objects of sense can exist at one time, e.g., colour and smell exist in a flower at the same time. If we hold that perception is simultaneous with its object, we must admit that the colour and the smell can

be perceived at the same time, that is, our perception of colour must be admitted to be simultaneous with our perception of smell. This is absurd, because two acts of perception, nay, two cognitions cannot take place at the same time. As there is an order of succession in our cognitions, perception cannot be simultaneous with its object. The aphorism may also be explained as follows:—

In knowing a colour we perform, we may say, two kinds of knowledge simultaneously, viz., perception and inference. As soon as our eye comes in contact with the colour, perception results which does not, however, enable us to be aware of the colour. The colour is brought home to us by inference which, we may say, is performed simultaneously with the perception. Now, says the objector, perception and inference being two different kinds of knowledge cannot be simultaneous, as the mind which is an atomic substance cannot be instrumental in producing more than one kind of knowledge at a time.

त्रैकल्यासिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ २।१।१२ ॥

त्रैकल्यासिद्धेः traikālyā-asiddheḥ, from the non-existence (of the means of right knowledge) in all the three times ; **प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः** pratishedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-establishment of denial or negation.

73. In reply, it is stated that if perception and other means of right knowledge are impossible, the denial of them is also impossible.—12.

Owing to absence of the matter to be denied, the denial is inoperative.

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः ॥ २।१।१३ ॥

सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधाच्च sarva-pramāṇa pratishedhāt, owing to the denial of all the means of right knowledge . **च** cha, and ; **प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः** pratishedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-existence of denial.

74. Moreover, the denial itself cannot be established, if you deny all means of right knowledge.—13.

If you are to establish anything (e g., denial), you can do so only by one or more of the means of right knowledge, viz., perception, inference, comparison, etc. If you deny them, there will be left nothing which will lead you to the establishment of the thing. Hence you will not be able to establish the denial itself.

तत्प्रमाणये वा न सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः ॥ २।१।१४ ॥

तन्प्रामाण्ये tat-prāmāṇye, if denial is valid ; वा vā, or ; न na, not ; सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषेधः sarva-pramāṇa-vipratishedhaḥ, denial of all the means of right knowledge.

75. If you say that your denial is based on a certain means of right knowledge, you do thereby acknowledge the validity of the means.—14.

Suppose you deny a thing, because it is not perceived. You do thereby acknowledge that perception is a means of right knowledge. Similarly, inference, etc., are also to be acknowledged as means of right knowledge.

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च शब्दादातोदसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥२११५॥

त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधः trai-kālya-apratishedhaḥ, non-denial by reference to three times ; च cha, and ; शब्दात् śabdāt, from sound ; आतोदसिद्धिवत् ātodya-siddhivat, like the proof of the existence of the drum ; तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, from the proof of their existence.

76. The means of right knowledge cannot, therefore, be denied. They are established in the manner that a drum is proved by its sound.—15.

There is, says Vātsyāyana, no fixed rule that the means of right knowledge should precede objects of right knowledge or should succeed them or be simultaneous with them. The order of precedence is never uniform. Look at the analogous cases : a drum precedes its sound, and illumination succeeds the sun, while smoke is synchronous with fire,

प्रमेया च तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् ॥ २ । १ । १६ ॥

प्रमेया prameyā, what is to be established ; च cha, and ; तुला tulā, something possessing weight, a pair of scales, a measure of weight ; प्रामाण्यवत् prāmāṇya-vat, like its being a means of right knowledge by being used as a weight.

77. The character of an object of right knowledge resembles that of a balance by which a thing is weighed.—16.

Just as a balance is an instrument for measuring weight, but is a measured object when it is itself weighed in another balance, so the senses, etc., are said to be instruments of right knowledge from one point of view, and objects of right knowledge from another point of view. The eye, for instance, is an instrument of perception as well as an object of perception. So also the means of right knowledge may, if occasion arises, be also regarded as objects of right knowledge.

प्रमाणतस्सिद्धेः प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः ॥२१११७॥

प्रमाणतः pramāṇa-taḥ, from the means of right knowledge; सिद्धेः siddheḥ, knowledge or proof being; प्रमाणानां pramāṇānām, of the means of right knowledge; प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धिप्रसङ्गः pramāṇa-antara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of the existence of other means of right knowledge.

78. If an object of right knowledge, continues the objector, is to be established by a means of right knowledge, this latter needs also to be established by another means of right knowledge.—17.

The objection stands thus:—

You say that an object of right knowledge is to be established by a means of right knowledge. I admit this, and ask how you establish the means of right knowledge itself. Since a means of right knowledge may also be regarded as an object of right knowledge, you are required to establish the so-called means of right knowledge, by another means of right knowledge, and so on.

तद्विनिवृत्तेर्वा प्रमाणसिद्धिवत्प्रमेयसिद्धिः ॥२१११८॥

तद्विनिवृत्तेः tat-vinivṛttech, in case of the cessation of the other means after the cognition of the means of right knowledge; वा vā, on the other hand; प्रमाणसिद्धिवत् pramāṇa-siddhi-vaṭ, as in the case of the proof or knowledge of the means of right knowledge; प्रमेयसिद्धिः prameya-siddhiḥ, proof of the object of right knowledge.

79. Or, he continues, if a means of right knowledge does not require another means of right knowledge for its establishment, let an object of right knowledge be also established without any means of right knowledge.—18.

A means of right knowledge stands in the same category as an object of right knowledge, if you are to establish either of them. If the means of right knowledge is accepted as self-established, the object of right knowledge must also, according to the objector, be accepted as self-established. In such a contingency perception, inference, etc., will be superfluous.

न प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ । १ । १९ ॥

न na, no; प्रदीपप्रकाशसिद्धिवत् pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhi-vaṭ, like proof of illumination of the lamp; तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof i. e. the means of right knowledge.

80. It is not so : the means of right knowledge are established like the illumination of a lamp.—19.

A lamp illumines a jar and our eye illumines the lamp. Though it is sometimes the lamp, and sometimes the eye, that illumines, you are bound to admit a general notion of illuminator. Similarly, you must admit a general notion of the means of right knowledge as distinguished from that of the objects of right knowledge. The means will not, of course, be regarded as such when included under the category of an object.

[The aphorism is also interpreted as follows :—Just as a lamp illumines itself and the other objects, the means of right knowledge establish themselves and the objects of right knowledge. Hence perception establishes itself and the objects of sense].

Note.—Objections raised in aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17 and 18 emanated from the Buddhist philosophy. The reply given in aphorisms 12, 13, 14, 15 and 19, represents the views of Brâhmanic philosophers who regard perception as a real act and objects as self-existent entities. According to the Buddhist philosophers, however, neither perception nor objects have any self-existence. They acquire an apparent or conditional existence, in virtue of a certain relation which exists between them. Cause and effect, long and short, prior and posterior, etc., are all relative terms. The whole world is a net-work of relations. The relations themselves are illusory, as the objects which are related have no self-existence. Hence the world is an illusion, or has a mere conditional existence. But where there is conditionality, there is no truth. Truth and conditionality are incompatible terms. That which neutralises all relations is the void or absolute which lies beyond the conditional world. To speak the truth, the world is an absolute nothing, though it has a conditional existence. *Vide* my Translation of the Mâdhyamika aphorisms in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society, Calcutta, for 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1899.

क्वचिन्नित्युत्तिदर्शनादनित्युत्तिदर्शनाच्च क्वचिदनेकान्तः

॥ २ । १ । २० ॥

क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases, e. g. lamp ; नित्युत्तिदर्शनात् nivṛitti-darśanât, from the observation of cessation ; अनित्युत्तिदर्शनात् anivṛitti-darśanât, from the observation of non-cessation or non-absence ; च cha, and ; क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases, e. g. jar ; अनेकान्तः an-eka-antah, not-one-ended, uncertain.

81. Seeing that in some cases other proofs are not required and

that in some cases there is need of other proofs, your argument is indecisive—20.

This is in reply to those who argue that just as a light does not require another light to illuminate it, even so the proofs, i. e. the means of right knowledge also may not require anything else to prove them ; in other words, that every means of right knowledge is also the means of its own right knowledge. The reply is that the example cannot be stretched so far, because there is nothing to distinguish the *hetu* (reason), viz. to be the illuminator, from the *udâharana* (example), viz. the lamp, in this respect. The means of right knowledge and a lamp both illuminate objects ; a lamp also illuminates itself ; but it does not therefore follow that the means of right knowledge also illuminates itself. For a lamp which illuminates objects, can also be illuminated by another lamp ; and it would then follow on the same analogy that the means of right knowledge which illuminates objects, may be also illuminated by other means. Thus your argument leads to opposite conclusions.

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् ॥ २ । १ । २१ ॥

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणानुपपत्तिः *pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-an-upapattiḥ*, non-establishment of the definition of perception ; **असमग्रवचनात्** *A-samagra-vachanât*, from incomplete statement.

82. An objector may say that the definition of perception as given before is untenable, because incomplete.—21.

Perception has been defined as knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense with its object. This definition is said to be defective, because it does not notice the conjunction of soul with mind, and of mind with sense, which are also causes of perception.

नात्ममनसोऽसन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः ॥ २ । १ । २२ ॥

na na, not ; **आत्ममनसः** *âtma-mansoh*, of soul and mind ; **सन्निकर्षाभावे** *sannikarṣa-abhâve*, in the absence of contact ; **प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः** *pratyakṣa-atpattiḥ*, production of perception.

83. Perception, it is said, cannot arise unless there is conjunction of soul with mind.—22.

From the contact of a sense with its object no knowledge arises unless, it is said, there is also conjunction of soul with mind. A sense coming in contact with its object produces knowledge in our soul, only if the sense is conjoined with the mind. Hence the conjunction of soul with mind should be mentioned as a necessary element in the definition of perception.

दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ २ । १ । २३ ॥

दिग्देशकालाकाशेषु dik-deśa-kāla-ākāśeṣu, in respect of direction, space, time and ether ; अपि api, also ; एवं evam, similar ; प्रसङ्गः prasaṅgaḥ, implication.

84. Were it so, observes one of the assembly then direction, space, time and ether should also be enumerated among the causes of perception.—23.

Direction, space, time and ether are also indispensable conditions in the production of knowledge. But even the objector does not feel the necessity of enumerating these among the causes of perception.

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वादात्मनो नानवरोधः ॥ २ । १ । २४ ॥

ज्ञानलिङ्गत्वाद् jñāna-liṅga-tvât, because cognition or knowledge is its mark ; आत्मनः ātmanah, of soul ; न na, not ; अनवरोधः anavarodhaḥ, non-exclusion.

85. The soul, we point out, has not been excluded from our definition, inasmuch as knowledge is a mark of the soul —24.

Perception has been described as knowledge, and knowledge implies the soul which is its abode. Consequently, in speaking of knowledge, the soul has, by implication, been mentioned as a condition in the production of perception.

तदयौगपदालिङ्गत्वान्न मनसः ॥ २ । १ । २५ ॥

तदयौगपदालिङ्गत्वाद् tat-ayaugapadya-liṅga-tvât, because non-simultaneity of cognitions is its mark ; च cha, and ; न na, not ; मनसः manasaḥ, of mind.

86. The mind, too, has not been omitted from our definition, inasmuch as we have spoken of the non-simultaneity of acts of knowledge —25.

Perception has been defined as knowledge. An essential characteristic of knowledge is that more than one act of knowing cannot take place at a time. This characteristic is due to the mind, an atomic substance, which is conjoined with the sense, when knowledge is produced. Hence, in speaking of knowledge, we have, by implication, mentioned the mind as a condition of perception.

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयोस्सन्निकर्षस्य स्वशब्देन

वचनम् ॥ २ । १ । २६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षनिमित्तत्वात् *pratyakṣa nimitta-tvât*, because it is the condition of perception ; इन्द्रियार्थयोः *indriya-arthayoḥ*, of sense and object ; सन्निकर्षस्य *sannikarṣasya*, of contact ; स्वशब्देन *sva-śabdena*, by identical term, specific ; वचनं *vachanam*, statement.

87. The contact of a sense with its object is mentioned as the special cause of perception —26.

There are many kinds of knowledge, such as perception, recollection, etc. Conjunction of soul with mind is a cause which operates in the production of all kinds of knowledge, while the contact of a sense with its object is the cause which operates only in perception. In our definition of perception we have mentioned only the special cause, and have omitted the common causes which precede not only perception, but also other kinds of knowledge.

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसाञ्चेन्द्रियार्थयोस्सन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात्

॥ २ । १ । २७ ॥

सुप्तव्यासक्तमनसां *supta-vyāsakta-manasām*. of minds asleep and inattentive; च *cha*, and ; इन्द्रियार्थयोः *indriya-arthayoḥ*, of sense and object ; सन्निकर्ष-निमित्तत्वात् *sannikarṣa-nimitta-tvât*, because contact is the condition.

88. The contact of a sense with its object is certainly the main cause, as perception is produced even when one is asleep or inattentive.—27.

Even a sleeping person hears the thundering of a cloud if his ear is open to it, and a careless person experiences heat if his skin is exposed to it.

तैश्चापदेशो ज्ञानविशेषाणाम् ॥ २ । १ । २८ ॥

तैः *taiḥ*, by these ; च *cha*, also ; अपदेशः *apadeśaḥ*, differentiation ; ज्ञानविशेषाणां *jñāna-viśeṣāṇām*, of particular cognitions.

89. By the senses and their objects are also distinguished the special kinds of knowledge.—28.

The special kinds of knowledge are the five varieties of perception, viz., by sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These are distinguished by the senses in whose spheres they lie, or by the objects which they illumine. Thus the visual perception is called eye-knowledge or colour-

knowledge, the auditory perception is called ear-knowledge or sound-knowledge, the olfactory perception is called nose-knowledge or smell-knowledge, the gustatory perception is called tongue-knowledge or taste-knowledge and the tactual perception is called skin-knowledge or touch-knowledge.

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ २ । १ । २९ ॥

व्याहतत्वात् vyâhata- tvât, because it is precluded or obstructed ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no argument.

90. (The above, says the objector, is) no argument, because it is precluded.—29.

The conclusion reached in the preceding three aphorisms is that the contact of the sense and the object, and not the contact of the sense and mind nor the contact of the soul and mind, should be stated to be the cause of perception. To this the objector puts in a rejoinder. The meaning is that if in certain circumstances, e. g. where the person is asleep or inattentive, perception takes place without the contact of the soul and mind, then there would be nothing to prevent several cognitions from being produced at one and the same time, and thus the tenet that the non-production of several cognitions simultaneously is the mark of the mind (Nyâya-sûtra, I. i. 16) would be violated. Therefore the sūtra I. i. 16 precludes, or is precluded by, the argument advanced in the preceding three aphorisms.

नार्थविशेषप्रायल्यात् ॥ २ । १ । ३० ॥

न na, not ; अर्थविशेषप्रायल्यात् artha viśeṣa-prābalyât, on account of the prevalence or intensity of a particular percept or sensible object.

91. (We reply that there is) no (such preclusion or violation). (In the case of a person who is asleep or inattentive perception takes place) through the intensity of the sensible object.—30.

The three aphorisms in question, Nos 87-89, do not imply that the contact of the soul and mind sometimes is, and sometimes is not, the cause of perception. They merely emphasise the fact that the contact of the sense and object is the principal cause of perceptual cognition. For the intensity of the object and the keenness of the sense directly establish contact of the object with the sense, and not of the sense with mind and the soul.

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रहणादुपलब्धेः ॥ २ । १ । ३१ ॥

प्रत्यक्षं pratyakṣam, perception ; अनुमानं anumānam, inference ; एकदेशग्रहणात् eka-deśa-grahṇāt, because of apprehension of a part ; उपलब्धेः upalabdheḥ, of cognition.

92. Perception, it may be urged, is inference, because it illumines only a part as a mark of the whole.—31.

We are said to perceive a tree, while we really perceive only a part of it. This knowledge of the tree, as a whole, derived from the knowledge of a part of it is, according to the objectors, a case of inference.

न प्रत्यक्षेण यावत्तावदप्युपनम्भात् ॥ २ । १ । ३२ ॥

n. na, no ; प्रत्यक्षेण pratyakṣeṇa, by perception ; यावत् तावत् yāvat tāvat, so much as that , अपि api, even ; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because there is cognition.

93. But this is not so, for perception is admitted of at least that portion which it actually illumines.—32.

The objectors themselves admit that a part is actually perceived. Hence, perception as a means of knowledge is not altogether denied, and it is accepted as different from inference.

साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देहः ॥ २ । १ । ३३ ॥

साध्यत्वात् sādhyatvāt, because it is what is to be established ; अवयविनि avayavini, in respect of the whole ; सन्देहः sandehaḥ, doubt.

94. There is, some say, doubt about the whole, because the whole has yet to be established.—33.

The objectors say that parts alone are realities and that there is no whole behind them. A tree, for instance, is yellow in some parts and green in other parts. If the tree was one whole, then the contradictory qualities of yellowness and greenness could not have belonged to it simultaneously. Hence the parts alone must, according to them, be regarded as real.

सर्वाग्रहणमवयव्यसिद्धेः ॥ २ । १ । ३४ ॥

सर्वाग्रहणं sarva-agrahaṇam, non-apprehension of all ; अवयव्यसिद्धेः avayavi-asiddheḥ, in case of non-existence of the whole.

95. If there were no whole, there would, it is replied, be non-perception of all.—34.

All signifies substance, quality, action, generality, particularity and intimate relation. None of these would be perceptible, if the whole were denied. Suppose that the parts alone are real. Then, since a part is not of fixed dimension, it may itself be divided into parts, these latter again into further parts, and so on, until we reach the atoms which are the ultimate parts. Now the atoms which possess no bulk are not perceptible. Similarly, the quality, action, etc., which inhere in the atoms, are also not perceptible. Consequently, if we deny that there is a 'whole,' neither the substance nor quality, etc., would be perceptible.

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तिश्च ॥ २ । १ । ३५ ॥

धारणाकर्षणोपपत्तेः dhāraṇa-ākarsaṇa upapattēḥ, because of the fact of holding and pulling ; च cha, and.

96. There is a *whole*, because we can hold, pull, etc.—35.

If there were no whole, we could not have held or pulled an entire thing by holding or pulling a part of it. We say, 'one jar,' 'one man,' etc. This use of 'one' would vanish, if there were no whole.

सेनावनवद्गृहणमिति चेन्नातीन्द्रियत्वादणूनाम् ॥२।१।३६॥

सेनावनवत् senā-vana-vat, like an army and a forest ; ग्रहणं grahaṇam, apprehension ; इति iti, so ; चेत् chet, if ; न na, no ; अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ati-indriya-tvāt, because of their being beyond the senses ; अणूनां aṇūnām, of the atoms.

97. The illustration from an army or a forest does not hold good, for atoms cannot be detected by the senses.—36.

If any one were to say that just as a single soldier or a single tree may not be seen from a distance, but an army consisting of numerous soldiers or a forest consisting of numerous trees is seen, so a single atom may not be perceptible, but a jar consisting of numerous atoms will be perceptible, and these atoms being called 'one jar,' the use of 'one' will not vanish, the analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because the soldiers and trees possess bulk and so are perceptible, whereas the atoms do not possess bulk and so are individually not perceptible. It is absurd to argue that, because soldiers and trees are perceptible in the mass, atoms are perceptible in the mass also : to avoid this conclusion, we must admit the existence of a whole beyond the parts.

रोधोपपत्तिसादृश्येनो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्रमाणम् ॥२।१।३७॥

रोधोपघातसादृश्येभ्यः rodha-upaghâta-sâdṛśyebhyaḥ, from obstruction (as in the case of a stream), disturbance (as in the case of an ants' nest) and (artificial) similarity ; व्यभिचारात् vyabichârât, as it errs ; अनुमानं anumānam, inference ; अप्रमाणं apramānam, not a means of right knowledge.

98. **Inference**, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it errs in certain cases *c, g*, when a river is banked, when something is damaged, and when similarity misleads, &c.—37.

If we see a river swollen, we infer that there has been rain ; if we see the ants carrying off their eggs, we infer that there will be rain ; and if we hear a peacock scream, we infer that clouds are gathering. These inferences, says an objector, are not necessarily correct, for a river may be swollen because embanked, the ants may carry off their eggs because their nests have been damaged, and the so-called screaming of a peacock may be nothing but the voice of a man.

नैकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्योऽर्थान्तरभावात् ॥ २।१। ३८ ॥

न na, no ; एकदेशत्राससादृश्येभ्यः ekadeśa-trâsa-sâdṛśyebhyaḥ, from the part, fear, and similarity ; अर्थान्तरभावात् artha antara-bhâvât, because it is something different.

99. It is not so, because our inference is based on something else than the part, fear and likeness.—38.

The swelling of a river caused by rain is different from that which results from the embankment of a part of it ; the former is attended by a great rapidity of currents, an abundance of foam, a mass of floating fruits, leaves, wood, etc. The manner in which ants carry off their eggs just before rain is quite different from the manner in which they do so when their nests are damaged. The ants run away quickly in a steady line when rain is imminent, but fear makes them fly in disorder when their nests are damaged. The screaming of a peacock which suggests gathering clouds is quite different from a man's imitation of it, for the latter is not natural. If in such cases any wrong inference is drawn, the fault is in the person, not in the process.

वर्त्तमानाभावः पततः पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः ॥ २।१। ३९ ॥

वर्त्तमानाभावः vartanâna-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of present time ; पततः patataḥ, of the falling ; पतितपतितव्यकालोपपत्तेः patita-patitavya-kâla-upapatteḥ, because of proof of the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will fall.

100. There is, some say, no present time because when a thing falls, we can know only the time through which it has fallen and the time through which it will yet fall.—39.

Inference has reference to three times. In the *a priori* inference we pass from the past to the present, in the *a posteriori* from the present to the past, and in the 'commonly seen' from the present to the present. It is, therefore, proper that we should examine the three times. The reason which leads some people to deny the present time is that when a fruit, for instance, falls from a tree, we recognise only the past time taken up by the fruit in traversing a certain distance and the future time which will yet be taken up by the fruit in traversing the remaining distance. There is no intervening distance which the fruit can traverse at the so-called present time. Hence, they say, there is no present time.

तयोऽप्यभावे वर्तमानाभावे तदपेक्षत्वात् ॥२११४०॥

तयोः tayoh, of these two ; अपि api, also ; अभावः abhâvaḥ non-existence ; वर्तमानाभावे vartamâna-abhâve, in the case of the non-existence of the present ; तदपेक्षत्वात् tat-apekṣa-tvât, because of being related to it.

101. If there is no present time, there will, it is replied, be no past and future times, because they are related to it.—40.

The past is that which precedes the present, and the future is that which succeeds it. Hence, if there is no present time, there cannot be any past or future time.

नातीतानागतयोरितरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः ॥ २ । १ । ४१ ॥

न na, not ; अतीतानागतयोः atita-anâgatayoh, of the past and the future ; इतरेतरापेक्षासिद्धिः itara-itara-apekṣâ-siddhiḥ, establishment by mutual dependence.

102. The past and future cannot be established by a mere mutual reference.—41.

If the past is defined as that which is not the future and the future is defined as that which is not the past, the definition would involve a fallacy of mutual dependency. Hence we must admit the present time, to which the past and future are related.

वर्तमानाभावे स्रव्वाग्रहणम्प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः ॥२११४२॥

वर्तमानाभावे vartamâna-abhâve, in the case of the non-existence of

the present; **सर्वग्रहणं** *sarva-agrahaṇam*, non-apprehension of all; **प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः** *pratyakṣa-an-upapattēḥ*, owing to impossibility of perception.

103. If there were no present time, sense perception would be impossible, knowledge would be impossible.—42.

If you deny the present time, there cannot be any perception which illumines only what is present in time; and, in the absence of perception, all kinds of knowledge would be impossible. Hence the present time is established by confutation or the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*.

कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्तेरुभयथा ग्रहणम् ॥ २ । १ । ४३ ॥

कृतताकर्तव्यतोपपत्तेः *kṛitatā-kartavyatā-upapattēḥ*, from the possibility of a thing having been accomplished and remaining to be accomplished; **उभयथा** *ubhayathā*, bothways; **ग्रहणं** *grahaṇam*, apprehension.

104. We can know both the past and the future, for we can conceive of a thing as made and as about to be made—43.

The present time is indicated by what continues, the past by what has been finished, and the future by what has not yet begun.

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यादुपमानासिद्धिः ॥२।१।४४॥

अत्यन्तप्रायैकदेशसाधर्म्यात् *atyanta prāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt*, from absolute, almost complete or partial similarity; **उपमानासिद्धिः** *upamāna-asiddhiḥ*, non-establishment of comparison.

105. **Comparison**, some say, is not a means of right knowledge, as it cannot be established either through complete or considerable or partial similarity.—44.

On the ground of complete similarity we never say “a cow is like a cow,” on the ground of considerable similarity we do not say that “a buffalo is like a cow,” and on the ground of partial similarity we do not say that “a mustard seed is like Mount Meru.” Hence comparison is regarded by some as not a means of right knowledge, for it has no precise standard.

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यादुपमानसिद्धेर्यथोक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः ॥२।१।४५॥

प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् *prasiddha-sādharmyāt*, from wellknown similarity; **उपमानसिद्धिः** *upamāna-siddhiḥ*, because of establishment of comparison; **उक्तदोषानुपपत्तिः** *ukta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ*, non-application of the defect urged.

106. This objection does not hold good, for comparison is established through similarity in a high degree.—45.

The similarity in a high degree exists between such well-known objects as a cow and a *bos gavæus*, etc.

प्रत्यक्षेणाप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः ॥ २ । १ । ४६ ॥

प्रत्यक्षेण *pratyakṣeṇa*, by perception ; अप्रत्यक्षसिद्धेः *apratyakṣa-siddheḥ*, because of establishment of what is not an object of perception.

107. Comparison, some say, is not different from inference, for both seek to establish the unperceived by means of the perceived—16.

We recognise a *bos gavæus* at first sight through its special similarity to a cow which we have often perceived. This knowledge of a previously unperceived object derived through its similarity to a perceived object is, it has been said, nothing but a case of inference.

नाप्रत्यक्षे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस्य पश्यामः ॥ २ । १ । ४७ ॥

न *na*, not ; अप्रत्यक्षे *apratyakṣe*, unperceived ; गवये *gavaye*, in a *bos gavæus* ; प्रमाणार्थम् *pramāṇa-artham*, the purpose of proof, utility as proof ; उपमानस्य *upamānasya*, of comparison ; पश्यामः *paśyāmaḥ*, we see.

108. It is not in a *bos gavæus unperceived* that we find the real matter of comparison.—17.

The matter of comparison is similarity, *e.g.*, between a cow and a *bos gavæus*. The *bos gavæus* in which we notice the similarity is first perceived, that is, on perceiving a *bos gavæus* we notice its similarity to a cow. Hence comparison supplies us with knowledge of a *perceived* thing, through its similarity to another thing also *perceived*. This characteristic distinguishes it from inference, which furnishes us with knowledge of an *unperceived* thing through that of a thing *perceived*.

तथेत्युपसंहारादुपमानसिद्धेर्नाविशेषः ॥ २ । १ । ४८ ॥

तथा *tathā*, *iti*, and thus ; उपसंहारात् *upasaṃhārāt*, from conclusion, summation ; उपमानसिद्धेः *upamāna-siddheḥ*, from the establishment of comparison ; न *na*, not ; अविशेषः *a-viśeṣaḥ*, non-difference.

109. There is non-difference, inasmuch as comparison is established through the compendious expression “so.”—18.

It is not true that comparison is identical with inference, because the former is established through the compendious expression “so.” ‘As is a cow, so is a *bos gavæus*’—this is an instance of comparison. This use of ‘so’ makes it clear that comparison is a distinct means of right knowledge.

शब्दोऽनुमानमर्थस्यानुपलब्धेरनुमेयत्वात् ॥२१॥४९॥

शब्दः śabdah, word ; अनुमानं anumānam, inference ; अर्थस्य arthasya, of the object ; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-cognition ; अनुमेयत्वात् anumeyatvât, because of its having to be inferred.

110. **Verbal testimony**, say some, is inference, because the object revealed by it is not perceived but inferred.—49.

Inference gives us the knowledge of an unperceived object, through the knowledge of an object which is perceived. Similarly, verbal testimony enables us to acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object, through the knowledge of a word which is perceived. The verbal testimony is, therefore, supposed by some to be inference, as the object revealed by both is unperceived.

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् ॥ २ । १ । ५० ॥

उपलब्धेः upalabdheḥ, of consciousness, cognition, apprehension ; अद्विप्रवृत्तित्वात् a-dvi-pravṛtti-tvât, not having a dual application.

111. In respect of perceptibility the two cases are not, continues the objector, different.—50.

In inference as well as in verbal testimony we pass to an unperceived object through an object which is perceived. In respect of perceptibility of the object through which we pass, the inference does not, continues the objector, differ from the verbal testimony.

सम्बन्धाच्च ॥ २ । १ । ५१ ॥

सम्बन्धात् sambandhât, from relation or connection ; च cha, and.

112. There is, moreover, adds the objector, the same connection. —51.

Just as in inference there is a certain connection between a sign (e.g., smoke) and the thing signified by it (e.g., fire), so in verbal testimony there is connection between a word and the object signified by it. So inference, says the objector, is not different from verbal testimony.

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्याच्छब्दादर्थसम्प्रत्ययः ॥२१॥५२॥

आप्तोपदेशसामर्थ्यात् āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyât, through force derived from the declaration by a reliable person ; शब्दार्थसंप्रत्ययः śabda-artha-sampratyaayah, complete intuition of the object from the word.

113. In reply, we say that there is reliance on the matter signified by a word, because the word has been used by a reliable person.—52.

In reference to the objections raised in aphorisms 49 and 50, we say that we rely on unseen matter, not simply because it is signified by words, but because they are spoken by a reliable person. There are, some say, paradise, nymphs, Uttarakurus, seven islands, ocean human settlements, etc. We accept them as realities, not because they are known through words, but because they are spoken of by persons who are reliable. Hence verbal testimony is not inference. The two agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, but the sign in one is different from the sign in the other. In the case of verbal testimony, the special point is to decide whether the sign (word) comes from a reliable person.

Aphorism 51 speaks of a certain connection between a word and the object signified by it. The present aphorism points out that the connection is not a natural one. We acknowledge that a word indicates a certain object, but we deny that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with the word. Hearing, for instance, the word "cow," we think of the animal signified by it, nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by nature or necessity. In the case of inference, however, the connection between a sign (e.g., smoke) and the thing signified (e.g., fire) is natural and necessary. Therefore, the connection involved in inference is not of the same kind as that involved in verbal testimony.

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेश्च सम्बन्धाभावः ॥२१॥५३॥

पूरणप्रदाहपाटनानुपलब्धेः pūraṇa-pradāha-pāṭana-anupalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of filling, burning, and splitting; च cha, and; सम्बन्धाभावः sambandha-abhāvaḥ, non-existence of connection.

114. There is no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, as we do not find that the words food, fire and hatchet, are accompanied by the actions filling, burning and splitting.—53.

If a word were naturally connected with the object signified by it, then by uttering the words food, fire and hatchet we should have found our mouth filled up (with food), burnt (with fire) and split (by a hatchet). But such is never the case. Hence there is no natural connection between a word and the object signified by it, and consequently verbal testimony is not inference.

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । १ । ५४ ॥

शब्दार्थव्यवस्थानात् śabda artha-vyavasthânât, from the fixity of (the intuition) of object from word ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhah, non-contradiction.

115. It cannot, says an objector, be denied that there is a fixed connection between words and their meanings.—54.

A particular word denotes a particular meaning, *e.g.* the word 'cow' denotes the animal of that name, but it does not denote a horse, a jar, or any other thing. There is, therefore, in the case of verbal testimony, a fixed connection between a word and its meaning as there is in the case of inference a fixed connection between a sign and the thing signified. Hence verbal testimony is considered by the objector to be a case of inference.

न सामयिकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य ॥ २ । १ । ५५ ॥

न na, not ; 'सामयिकत्वात् sāmayika-tvât, from being conventional ; शब्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस्य śabda-artha-sampratyayasya, of the intuition of object from word.

116. We reply, it is through convention that the meaning of a word is understood.—55.

The connection between a word and its meaning is conventional and not natural. The connection, though fixed by man, is not inseparable and cannot therefore be the basis of an inference.

जातिविशेषे चानियमात् ॥ २ । १ । ५६ ॥

जातिविशेषे jāti-viśeṣe, with particular classes ; च cha, and ; अनियमात् aniyamât, from absence of natural uniformity.

117. There is no universal uniformity of connection between a word and its meaning.—56.

The ṛiṣis, âryas and mlechchhas use the same word in different senses, *e.g.* the word "yava" is used by the âryas to denote a long-awned grain, but by the mlechchhas to denote a panic-seed. So the connection between a word and its meaning is not everywhere uniform, and consequently verbal testimony cannot be considered as inference.

तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः ॥ २ । १ । ५७ ॥

तत् tat, that, word ; अप्रामाण्यं a-prâmāṇyam, not a means of right knowledge, invalid ; अनृतव्याघात पुनरुक्त दोषेभ्यः anṛita-vyâghâta-punarukta-dōṣebhyah, owing to the defects of falsity, futility and repetition.

118. The *Veda*, some say, is unreliable, as it involves the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology.—57.

The *Veda*, which is a kind of verbal testimony, is not, some say, a means of right knowledge. It is supposed by them to be tainted with the faults of untruth, contradiction and tautology. For instance, the *Veda* affirms that a son is produced when the sacrifice for the sake of a son is performed. It often happens that the son is not produced, though the sacrifice has been performed.

There are many contradictory injunctions in the *Veda*, *e.g.*, it declares "let one sacrifice when the sun has risen," also "let one sacrifice when the sun has not risen," etc. There is such tautology as "let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice," etc.

न कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् ॥ २ । १ । ५८ ॥

न na, not ; कर्मकर्तृसाधनवैगुण्यात् karma-kartri-sadhana-vaigunyaât, from defect in the act, agent, or materials.

119. The so-called untruth in the *Veda* comes from some defect in the act, operator or materials of sacrifice.—58.

Defect in the act consists in sacrificing not according to rules, defect in the operator (officiating priest) consists in his not being a learned man, and defect in the materials consists in the fuel being wet, butter being not fresh, remuneration (to the officiating priest) being small, etc. A son is sure to be produced as a result of performing the sacrifice, if these defects are avoided. Therefore, there is no untruth in the *Veda*.

अभ्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात् ॥ २ । १ । ५९ ॥

अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya, arriving at a decision ; कालभेदे kâla-bhede, in the case of alteration of the time ; दोषवचनात् doṣa-vachanaât, there being the declaration of the defect.

120. Contradiction would occur if there were alteration of the time agreed upon.—59.

Let a person perform sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise if he has agreed upon doing it at either of the times. Two alternative courses being open to him, he can perform the sacrifice before sunrise or after sunrise, according to his agreement or desire. The *Veda* cannot be charged with the fault of contradiction, if it enjoins such alternative courses.

अनुवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ । १ । ६० ॥

अनुवादोपपत्तेः anuvâda-upapatteh, from the possibility of its being a re-inculcation ; च cha, and.

121. There is no tautology, because re-inculcation is of advantage.—60.

Tautology means a useless repetition, which never occurs in the Veda. If there is any repetition there, it is either for completing a certain number of syllables, or for explaining a matter briefly expressed, etc. "Let the first hymn be recited thrice," "let the last hymn be recited thrice"—such instances embody a useful repetition.

वाक्यविभागस्य चार्थग्रहणात् ॥ २ । १ । ६१ ॥

वाक्यविभागस्य vākya-vibhāgasya, of the division of speech ; च cha, and; अर्थग्रहणात् artha-grahanāt, from apprehension of different objects.

122. And because there is necessity for the classification of Vedic speech.—61.

It is necessary to divide the Vedic speech into classes based on special characters.

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् ॥ २ । १ । ६२ ॥

विध्यर्थवादानुवादवचनविनियोगात् vidhi-arthavāda-anuvāda-vachana-viniyogāt, from the distribution of speech as injunction, persuasion and re-inculcation.

123. The Vedic speech being divided on the principle of injunction, persuasion and re-inculcation —62.

The two main divisions of the Veda are (1) hymn and (2) ritual. The ritual portion admits of three sub-divisions, viz, injunctive, persuasive and re-inculcative.

विधिः विधायकः ॥ २ । १ । ६३ ॥

विधिः vidhi, injunction ; विधायकः vidhāyakaḥ, that which prescribes something positive.

124. An injunction is that which exhorts us to adopt a certain course of action [as the means of attaining good].—63.

The following is an injunction :—" Let him who desires paradise perform the fire-sacrifice." This is a direct command.

स्तुतिर्निन्दा परकृतिः पुराकल्प इति अर्थवादः ॥२॥१६४॥

स्तुतिः *stutiḥ*, praise ; निन्दा *nindā*, blame ; परकृतिः *para kṛtiḥ*, doing of others, failures of others ; पुराकल्पः *purā-kalpaḥ*, tradition, customs of old ; इति *iti*, such ; अर्थवादः *artha-vādaḥ*, persuasion.

125. Persuasion is effected through praise, blame, warning, and prescription.—64.

Praise is speech which persuades us to a certain course of action by extolling its consequences, *e.g.*, "By the Sarvajit sacrifice gods conquered all, there is nothing like Sarvajit sacrifice, it enables us to obtain everything and to vanquish every one, etc." Here there is no direct command, but the Sarvajit sacrifice is extolled in such a way that we are persuaded to perform it.

Blame is speech which persuades us to adopt a certain course of action by acquainting us with the undesirable consequences of neglecting it, *e.g.*, "One who performs any other sacrifice, neglecting the Jyotiṣṭoma, falls into a pit and decays there." Here one is persuaded to perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, the neglect of which brings about evil consequences.

Warning is the mentioning of a course of action, the obstruction of which by some particular person led to bad consequences, *e.g.*, on presenting oblation one is to take the fat first and the sprinkled butter afterwards, but alas ! the Charaka priests first took the sprinkled butter which was, as it were, the life of fire, etc. Here the foolish course of action adopted by the Charaka priests should serve as a warning to other priests who ought to avoid the course.

Prescription implies the mention of something as commendable on account of its antiquity, *e.g.*, "By this the Brāhmaṇas recited the Sāma hymn, etc."

विधिविहितस्यानुवचनम् अनुवादः ॥ २ ॥ १ ॥ ६५ ॥

विधिविहितस्य *vidhi-vihitasya*, of what is prescribed by injunction ; अनुवचनम् *anu-vachanam*, repetition ; अनुवादः *anuvādaḥ* re-inculcation.

126. Re-inculcation is the repetition of that which has been enjoined by an injunction.—65.

Re-inculcation may consist of (1) the repetition of an *injunction*, or (2) the repetition of that which has been *enjoined*. The first is called verbal re-inculcation and the second objective re-inculcation. In the Veda there is re-inculcation, as in ordinary use there is repetition. "Non-etera

nal not eternal”—this is a verbal repetition. “Non-eternal, possessing the character of extinction”—this is objective repetition.

नानुवादपुनरुक्तयोर्विशेषः शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः ॥२।१।६६॥

न na, not ; अनुवादपुनरुक्तयोः anuvāda-punaruktayoh, of re-inculcation and repetition ; विशेषः viśeṣah, difference ; शब्दाभ्यासोपपत्तेः śabda-abhyāsa-upapattēh, because of the existence of the repetition of words.

127. There is, some say, no difference between re-inculcation and tautology, as there is in either case a repetition of some expression already used.—66.

Re-inculcation is supposed by some to be a fault, inasmuch as it does not, according to them, differ from tautology.

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवदभ्यासान्नाविशेषः ॥२।१।६७॥

शीघ्रतरगमनोपदेशवत् śīghratara-gamana-upadeśa-vat, like the direction of going faster and faster which indicates intensity of action ; अभ्यासः abhyāsāt, from repetition ; न na, not ; अविशेषः a-viśeṣah, non-difference.

128. There is a difference, because re-inculcation serves some useful purpose, as, e.g., a command to go faster.—67.

Tautology consists of a useless repetition, but the repetition in the case of re-inculcation is useful, e.g., “go on, go on”—signifies “go faster.”

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् ॥२।१।६८॥

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवत् mantra ā, urveda-prāmānya-vat, like the validity of mantra or chant and of medical science ; च cha, and ; तत्प्रामाण्यम् tat prāmānyam, its validity ; आप्तप्रामाण्यात् āpta-prāmānyāt, from the authority of the reliable speaker.

129. The Veda is reliable like the spell and the medical science, because of the reliability of their authors.—68.

The spell counteracts poison, etc., and the medical science prescribes correct remedies. The authority which belongs to them is derived from their authors, the sages, who were reliable persons. The sages themselves were reliable, because (1) they had an intuitive perception of truths, (2) they had great kindness for living beings and (3) they had the desire of communicating their knowledge of the truths. The authors, (*lit.*, the seers and speakers) of the Veda were also the authors of the spell and medical science. Hence, like the spell and medical science, the Veda must be accepted as authoritative. The view that the Veda is authoritative because eternal, is untenable.

इति श्रीगौतममहर्षिप्रणीते न्यायदर्शने द्वितीयस्याध्यायस्य प्रथममाह्निकम् ॥ २ । १ ॥

BOOK II, CHAPTER II.

न चतुष्टमैतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् ॥२।२।१॥

न na, not ; चतुष्टम् chatuṣṭvam, to be four ; ऐतिह्यार्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावप्रामाण्यात् aitiḥya-arthâpatti-sambhava-abhâva-prâmāṇyât, because tradition, presumption, probability and non-existence are also means of right knowledge.

130. Some say that the means of right knowledge are more than four, because rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are also valid.—1.

In Book I, chapter I, aphorism 3, the means of right knowledge have been stated to be four, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Some say that there are other means of right knowledge, such as rumour, presumption, probability and non existence.

Rumour is an assertion which has come from one to another without any indication of the source from which it first originated, *e.g.*, in this fig tree there live goblins.

Presumption is the deduction of one thing from the declaration of another thing : *e.g.*, from the declaration that 'unless there is cloud, there is no rain,' we deduce that 'there is rain, if there is cloud.' A more familiar instance of presumption is this : the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day time. Here the presumption is that he eats in the night for it is impossible for a person to be fat if he does not eat at all.

Probability consists in cognising the existence of a thing from that of another thing in which it is included, *e. g.*, cognising the measure of an *adhaka* from that of a *droṇa* of which it is a fourth part, and cognising the measure of a *prastha* from that of an *adhaka* of which it is a quarter.

Of two opposite things, the *non-existence* of one establishes the existence of the other, *e.g.* the non existence of rain establishes the combination of wind and cloud. When there is a combination of wind and cloud, drops of water cannot fall, in spite of their weight.

शब्द ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावादनुमानेऽर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । २ ॥

शब्दे śabde. in word ; ऐतिह्यानर्थान्तरभावाद् aitiḥya-an-artha-antara-bhâvât, from existence of tradition as a non-different object ; अनुमाने anumâne, in

inference ; अर्थापत्तिसम्भवाभावानर्थान्तरभावाद् arthâpatti-sambhava-abhâva-an-
artha-antara-bhâvât, from existence of presumption, probability and non-
existence as non-different objects ; च cha, and ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ,
non-contradiction.

131. This, we reply, is no contradiction, since rumour is included in verbal testimony, and presumption, probability and non-existence are included in inference —2.

Those who maintain that rumour, presumption, probability and non-existence are valid, do not really oppose our division of the means of right knowledge into four, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

Rumour partakes of the general characteristics of verbal testimony, and is a special kind of it.

Presumption is explained as the knowledge of a thing derived through the consideration of it from the opposite standpoint. For instance, the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day time : here the presumption is that he eats in the night. The fact of his eating in the night has not been expressly stated, but is ascertained from this consideration that a person who does not eat during the day cannot be strong unless he eats in the night. It is evident that presumption, like inference, passes from a perceived thing to an unperceived one, because they are in some way connected.

Probability is inference, because it is the cognizance of a part from knowledge of a whole with which it is inseparably connected.

Non-existence is inference, inasmuch as it really infers the obstruction of a cause from the non-existence of its effect through a certain connection, *viz.*, if the obstruction occurs, the effect cannot occur.

Hence rumour, etc., are not independent means of right knowledge, but are included in the four, enumerated in Book I, Chapter I, aphorism 3.

अर्थापत्तिरप्रमाणमनैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । ३ ॥

अर्थापत्तिः arthâpattiḥ, presumption ; अप्रमाणं apramāṇam, not a means of right knowledge ; अनैकान्तिकत्वात् anaikântikatvât, because it is not one-pointed.

132.—Presumption, some say, is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty.—3.

“If there is no cloud, there will be no rain”—from this we are said to presume that if there is a cloud there will be rain. But it often happens that a cloud is not followed by rain. So presumption does not always lead to certainty.

अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् ॥ २ । २ । ४ ॥

अनर्थापत्तौ anarthâpattau, in respect of what is not a presumption; अर्थापत्त्यभिमानात् arthâpatti-abhimânât, from attribution of being presumption.

133. We reply : if there is any uncertainty, it is due to your supposing that to be a presumption which is not really so.—4.

“If there is no cloud, there will be no rain”—from this we are entitled to presume that if there is rain there must have been a cloud. But if you pretend to presume that “if there is a cloud, there will be rain,” your so-called presumption will be an invalid one.

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यञ्चानैकान्तिकत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । ५ ॥

प्रतिषेधाप्रामाण्यं pratiṣedha-aprâmânyam, invalidity of the contradiction, चा cha, and ; अनैकान्तिकत्वात् anaikântikatvât, from being not-one-pointed.

134. The objection itself, we say, is invalid, because it leads to uncertainty.—5.

“Presumption is not valid, because it leads to uncertainty”—this is your objection. In it there are two points for consideration, viz., (1) the validity of presumption and (2) the existence of presumption. Your objection refers to one of the points, viz. the validity of presumption. So you do not deny the existence of presumption. In some instances, however, your objection may refer to more points than one. In fact, the nature of your objection is not definite in itself, or, in other words, it leads to uncertainty. Hence your objection is invalid.

तत्प्रामाण्ये वा नार्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यम् ॥ २ । २ । ६ ॥

तत्प्रामाण्ये tat-prâmânye, if the contradiction be valid ; वा vâ, or, न na, not ; अर्थापत्त्यप्रामाण्यं arthâpatti-aprâmânyam, invalidity of presumption.

135. Or, if that be valid, then our presumption is not invalid.—6.

Perhaps you will say that your objection is valid, because you can ascertain in each case whether one or more points are referred to by the objection. Similarly, we shall say that our presumption is not invalid,

because we can ascertain in each case whether the presumption is capable of leading to more conclusions than one. Hence, if you say that your objection is valid, we shall say that our presumption is also valid.

नाभावप्रामाण्यं प्रमेयासिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ७ ॥

n na, not; *अभावप्रामाण्यं* abhâva-prâmâṇyam, non-existence to be a means of right knowledge ; *प्रमेयासिद्धेः* prameya-asiddheḥ, because of the non-existence of what is to be the object of right knowledge.

136. Some say that **non-existence** is not a means of right knowledge, because there is no object which is known by it.—7.

लक्षितेष्वलक्षणलक्षितत्वादलक्षितानां तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ८ ॥

लक्षितेषु lakṣiteṣu, in marked objects ; *अलक्षण लक्षितत्वात्* alakṣaṇa-lakṣitâtvât, from being marked by what is not a mark ; *अलक्षितानां* alakṣitânâm, of unmarked objects ; *तत्प्रमेयसिद्धेः* tat-prameya-siddheḥ, from their affirmation as objects of knowledge.

137. Non-existence, we reply, serves to mark out an object unmarked by the mark which characterises other objects.—8.

Suppose a person wants to bring a pot which is not blue. The absence of blueness is a mark which will enable him to mark out the particular pot he wants to bring, and to exclude the other pots which are blue. Thus an object may be known through the non-existence (absence) of its mark.

असत्यर्थे नाभाव इति चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः ॥ २ । २ । ९ ॥

असति asati, non-existent ; *अर्थे* arthe, in the case of an object ; *n na*, not ; *अभावः* abhâvaḥ, non-existence or absence of mark ; *इति चेत्* iti chet, if so ; *n na*, no ; *अन्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः* anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ, from affirmation of other marks.

138. If you say that the non-existence (absence) of a mark is impossible where there was no mark at all, it is, we reply, not so, because the non-existence (absence) is possible in reference to a mark elsewhere.—9.

We can, says an objector, talk of a mark being non-existent (absent), if it was previously existent (present). A pot is said to be not blue only in reference to its being blue previously. In reply, we say that it is not so. "Not-blue" is no doubt possible only in reference to "blue," but that blueness may exist elsewhere. For instance, we can talk of this pot being not blue, in contrast to that pot which is blue.

तत्सिद्धेरलक्षितेष्वहेतुः ॥ २ । २ । १० ॥

तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, from presence therein, i. e. in marked objects ; अलक्षितेषु alakṣiteṣu, in respect of unmarked objects , अहेतुः ahetuḥ, no mark.

139. Though a mark may distinguish the object which is marked, the non-existence (absence) of the mark cannot, some say, distinguish the object which is not marked.—10.

A blue pot is distinguished by the blueness which is its mark. But how can we, says the objector, distinguish an unmarked object by the non-existence (absence) of the mark which it does not possess ?

न लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ११ ॥

न na, no ; लक्षणावस्थितापेक्षासिद्धेः lakṣaṇa-avasthita-apekṣā-siddheḥ, from establishment by reference to objects in which marks are present.

140. This is not so, because the non-existence (absence) of a mark serves as a mark, in relation to the presence of the mark.—11.

We can speak of a pot being not blue, in relation to one which is blue. Hence, though not-blueness is not a positive mark, it serves as a (negative) mark, in relation to blueness.

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ । २ । १२ ॥

प्राक् prāk, prior ; उत्पत्तेः utpatteḥ, to production , अभावोपपत्तेः abhāva-upapatteḥ, from affirmation of non-existence ; च-cha, and

141. Moreover, we perceive non-existence as a mark antecedent to the production of a thing.—12.

There are two kinds of non-existence, viz , antecedent non-existence and subsequent non-existence. When we say that there will be a jar, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the halves which are destined to compose it. This is antecedent non-existence. Similarly, when we say that a jar has broken, we perceive the mark of non-existence of the jar in the parts which composed it. This is subsequent non-existence.

आदिमत्त्वादैनद्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचाराच्च ॥ २ । २ । १३ ॥

आदिमत्त्वाद् ādi mat-tvāt, because it has a beginning , ऐन्द्रियकत्वाद् aindriyaka-tvāt, because it is sensuous , कृतकवदुपचाराच्च kṛitaka vat-upachāra-āt, because it is treated as any other product. च-cha, and.

142. Sound is not eternal, because it has a beginning and is cognised by our sense and is spoken of as artificial.—13.

Sound is non-eternal, because it begins or arises from the concussion of two hard substances, *e.g.*, an axe and a tree, etc. Another ground for the non-eternality of sound is that it is cognised by our sense. Moreover, we attribute to sound the properties of an artificial object, *e.g.*, we speak of a sound being grave, acute, etc. This would be impossible, if it had been eternal.

Some say that the so-called beginning of a sound is merely a manifestation of it, that is, sound does not really begin, but is merely manifested by the concussion of two hard substances. In reply, we say that the concussion does not manifest, but produces a sound. You cannot suppose the concussion to be the manifester and sound the manifested, unless you can prove that the concussion and sound are simultaneous. But the proof is impossible, as a sound is heard at a great distance even after the concussion of the substances has ceased. So sound is not manifested by the concussion. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that sound is produced by the concussion, and that one sound produces another sound, and so on, until the last sound is heard at a great distance.

न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वान्नित्येष्वप्यनित्यवदुपचाराच्च ॥ २ । २ । १४ ॥

na na, no ; घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वात् *ghaṭa-abhâva-sâmânya-nitya-tvât*, because the non-existence of a pot after destruction and the genus which is cognisable through contact with the sense are eternal ; नित्येषु *nityeṣu*, in the case of eternal objects ; अनित्यवत् *anitya-vat*, as non-eternal ; उपचारात् *upachârât*, from treatment ; च *cha*, and.

143. Some will not accept this argument, because the non-existence of a jar and the genus of it are eternal, and eternal things are also spoken of as if they were artificial.—14.

Some say that it is not true that whatever has a beginning is non-eternal. Look ! the non-existence (destruction) of a jar which began when the jar was broken is eternal (indestructible). Whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal : this is also said to be an unsound argument. When, for instance, we perceive a jar, we perceive also its genus (*i.e.*, jar-ness), which is eternal. It is further said that we often attribute to eternal things the properties of an artificial object, *e.g.*, we speak of the extension of ether as we speak of the extension of a blanket.

तत्त्वभाक्तयोर्नानात्वविभागादव्यभिचारः ॥२।२।१५॥

तत्त्वभाक्तयोः tattva-bhâktayoh, of true and false eternal ; नानात्वविभागात् nânâ-tva-vibhâgât, from division as many ; अव्यभिचारः a-vyabhichârah, absence of uncertainty.

144. There is, we reply, no opposition because there is distinction between what is really eternal and what is partially eternal —15.

That which is really eternal belongs to the three times. But the non-existence (destruction) of a jar does not belong to three times, as it was impossible before the jar was broken. Hence the non-existence (destruction) of a jar which has a beginning is not really eternal.

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् ॥ २ । २ । १६ ॥

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात् santâna-anumâna-viśeṣaṇât, from the inference of continuity which is the distinguishing characteristic (of sound).

145. It is only the things cognised by our sense as belonging to a certain genus that must, we say, be inferred to be non-eternal.—16.

The objectors have said that things cognised by our sense are not necessarily non-eternal, e.g., as we perceive a jar, we also perceive its genus jar-ness, which is eternal. In reply, we say that not all things cognised by our sense are non-eternal, but only those that belong to a certain genus. A jar, for instance, is non-eternal, because we perceive it as belonging to the genus jar-ness. But jar-ness which is cognised by our sense is not non-eternal, because it does not belong to a further genus, named jar-ness-ness. Similarly, sound is non-eternal, because it is cognised by our sense as belonging to the genus called sound-ness.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—Sound is non-eternal, because it is inferred to advance in a series.

We do not say that whatever is cognised by our sense is non-eternal; our intention is to say that things cognised by our sense as advancing in a series are non-eternal. Sound is cognised in that manner (i.e., sound advances like a wave), and hence sound is non-eternal.

कारणद्रव्यस्य प्रदेशशब्देनाभिधानात् नित्यद्रव्यव्यभिचार इति ॥ २ । २ । १७ ॥

कारणद्रव्यस्य kâraṇa-dravyasya, of the causal substance ; प्रदेशशब्देन pradeśa-śabdēna, in terms of extension ; अभिधानात् abhidhânât, from declaration.

ration or designation , निन्येषु nityeṣu, in the case of eternal objects ; अपि api, also अव्यभिचारः a vyabhichârah, absence of uncertainty.

146. We further say that only artificial things are designated by the term extension.—17.

When we speak of the extension of ether, we really mean that the extension belongs to an artificial thing, which has for its substratum the ether. Hence we do not in reality attribute to eternal things the properties of artificial objects.

प्रागुच्चारणादनुपलब्धेरवरणाद्यनुपलब्धेरच ॥२।२।१८॥

प्राक् prâk, prior ; उच्चारणात् ucbhâranât, to pronunciation ; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension ; अवरणायनुपलब्धेः âvaranâ âdi-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of the causes of non-apprehension ; च cha, and

147. Sound is non-eternal, because neither do we perceive it before pronunciation, nor do we notice any veil which covers it.—18.

If sound were eternal, it would be perceived before pronunciation. You cannot say that sound really existed before pronunciation but was covered by some veil, for we do not notice any such veil.

तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादावरणोपपत्तिः ॥ २ । २ । १९ ॥

तदनुपलब्धेः tat-an-upalabdheḥ, of its non-apprehension ; अनुपलम्भात् an-upalambhât, from non-apprehension , अवरणोपपत्तिः âvaranâ-upapattiḥ, establishment of the causes of non apprehension.

148. The veil, some say, really exists, because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof.—19.

The objectors say :—If you deny the veil because it is not perceived, we deny the non-perception of the veil because it is also not perceived. The denial of non-perception is the same as the acknowledgment of perception, or, in other words, the veil is acknowledged to be existent.

अनुपलम्भादप्यनुपलब्धिसद्भाववन्नावरणानुपपत्तिरनुपलम्भात् ॥ २ । २ । २० ॥

अनुपलम्भात् an upalambhât, from non-apprehension ; अपि api, even ; अनुपलब्धिसद्भाववत् an upalabdhi-sadbhâvavat, like existence of non-apprehension ; न na, not , अवरणानुपपत्तिः âvaranâ an-upapattiḥ, non-establishment

of the causes of non-apprehension. अनुपलम्भात् an-upalambhât, from non-apprehension.

149. If you assert non-perception of the veil, though the non-perception is not perceived, we, continue the objectors, assert the existence of the veil, though it is not perceived,—20.

You admit non-perception of the veil, though you do not perceive it (non-perception) Similarly, we, the objectors, admit the existence of the veil, though we do not perceive it.

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनूपलब्धहेतुः ॥ २ । २ । २१ ॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् an-upalambha-âtmaka-tvât, from the nature of its being non-apprehension ; अनुपलब्धः an-upalabdheḥ, of non apprehension ; अहेतुः a-hetuh, not a mark.

150. This, we reply, is no reason, because non-perception consists of absence of perception.—21.

A veil is a thing fit to be perceived. Our non-perception of it indicates its absence. On the other hand, the non perception of a veil is not a thing fit to be perceived. Hence, non-perception of the non-perception leads us to nothing real,

अस्पर्शत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । २२ ॥

अस्पर्शत्वात् a-sparśa-tvât, being intangible.

151. Some say that sound is eternal, because it is intangible.—22.

Ether which is intangible is eternal. Sound must, similarly, according to some, be eternal, because it is intangible.

न कर्मानित्यत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । २३ ॥

न na, no ; कर्मानित्यत्वात् karma-anitya-tvât, because action is non-eternal.

152. This we deny, because action is non-eternal.—23.

Action is non-eternal, though it is intangible. Hence, intangibility does not establish eternality.

नाणुनित्यत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । २४ ॥

न, na, no ; अणुनित्यत्वात् aṇu-nitya-tvât, because atom is eternal.

153. An atom, on the other hand, is eternal though not intangible.—24.

Tangibility is not incompatible with eternality, *e.g.* atoms are tangible, yet eternal.

सम्प्रदानात् ॥ २ । २ । २५ ॥

सम्प्रदानात् sampradānāt, from delivery.

154. Sound, some say, is eternal, because of the traditionary teaching —25.

A preceptor could not have imparted knowledge to his pupils by means of sounds, if these were perishable (non-eternal). In fact, the traditionary teaching would, according to the objectors, be impossible, if the sounds were non-eternal.

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ २ । २ । २६ ॥

तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेः tat-antarāla-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension in the interval between them ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

155. This is, we reply, no reason, because sound is not perceived in the interval —26.

Suppose a preceptor delivers certain sounds (in the form of a lecture) which are received by his pupil. The sounds are not audible in the interval between the preceptor giving them and the pupil receiving them. They would never be inaudible, if they were eternal.

अध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । २७ ॥

अध्यापनात् adhyāpanāt, from teaching ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, absence of contradiction.

156. This, say the objectors, is no argument, because there is the teaching.—27.

The objectors say :—If the sounds, as soon as they came out of the preceptor, were destroyed and did not reach the pupil, there could not be any teaching carried on. But there is the teaching, hence sound does not perish, or, in other words, it is eternal.

उभयोः पक्षयोरन्यतरस्याध्यापनादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । २८ ॥

उभयोः ubhayoḥ, in both ; पक्षयोः pakṣayoḥ, views ; अन्यतरस्य anyatarasya, of the one or the other ; अध्यापनात् adhyāpanāt, from teaching ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

157. In whichever of the two senses it is accepted, the teaching does not offer any opposition.—28.

The word "teaching" may be interpreted either as (1) the pupil's receiving the sounds given by his preceptor, or as (2) the pupil's imitating the sounds of his preceptor, as one imitates dancing. Neither of these interpretations would support the eternality of sound. In consonance with the first interpretation we shall say that the sound coming out of the preceptor produces another sound, and so on, until the last sound reaches the pupil. This would make sound non-eternal. It is obvious that the second interpretation similarly proves the non-eternality of sound.

अभ्यासात् ॥ २ । २ । २९ ॥

अभ्यासात् abhyâ-ât, from repetition.

158. Sound, continue the objectors, is eternal, because it is capable of repetition.—29.

That which is capable of repetition is persistent or not perishable, e.g., one and the same colour can be repeatedly looked at, because it is persistent. One and the same sound can similarly be repeatedly uttered, hence it is persistent or not perishable.

नान्यत्वेऽप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात् ॥ २ । २ । ३० ॥

न na, no ; अन्यत्वे anya-tve, were it otherwise ; अपि api, even ; अभ्यासस्य abhyâsasya, of repetition ; उपचारात् upachâ-ât, from treatment or use.

159. It is, we reply, not so, because even if sounds were "other" (different), repetition could take place.—30

Repetition does not prevent perishableness, because repetition is possible even if the things repeated are "other" or different, e.g., he sacrifices twice, he dances thrice, etc. Here the two sacrifices are different, and yet we use the repetitive word 'twice'; similarly the three dances are different, and yet we use the repetitive word 'thrice.'

अन्यदन्यस्मादनन्यत्वादनन्यदित्यन्यताऽभावः ॥ २ । २ । ३१ ॥

अन्यत् anyat, other ; अन्यस्मात् anyasmât, from other ; अनन्यत्वात् an-anya-tvât, from not being other ; अनन्यत् an-anyat, not other ; इति iti, thus ; अन्यताऽभावः anya-tâ-abhâvah, non-existence of otherness.

160. Some say that there is no such thing as otherness, because what is called "other," in reference to some other, is not other in reference to itself.—31.

We maintain that repetition is possible even if the things repeated are "other" or different. Our position is said to be untenable: the term "other" is described as unmeaning, as nothing is other than itself.

तदभावे नास्त्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेक्षसिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ३२॥

तदभावे tat-abhāve, in the absence of otherness, न na, not; अस्ति asti, is; अनन्यता an-anya-tā, the being not-other; तयोः tayoh, of these; इतरेतरापेक्ष-सिद्धेः itara-itara-apēkṣa-siddheḥ, because existence depends of one upon that of the other.

161. In the absence of otherness there would, we reply, be no sameness, because the two exist in reference to each other.—32.

If there was no otherness, there would be no sameness. This would lead us to absurdity, as it would disprove both persistency and perishableness. Hence we must admit otherness, and if there is "other," there will be no flaw in our expression, viz., repetition is possible even if things were "other" or different.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्च ॥ २ । २ । ३३ ॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-apprehension of cause of destruction, च cha, and.

162. Sound, some say, is eternal, because we perceive no cause why it should perish.—33.

Whatever is non-eternal is destroyed by some cause. Sound is said to have no cause of destruction, hence sound is held by some to be not non-eternal, (i.e., is regarded as eternal)

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेस्सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः ॥ २ । २ । ३४॥

अश्रवणकारणानुपलब्धेः a-śravaṇa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from non apprehension of cause of non-hearing; सततश्रवणप्रसङ्गः satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of perpetual hearing.

163. But by the same argument, we are afraid, non-perception of the cause of inaudition would mean constant audition.—34.

If non-perception is to establish non-existence, we should not cease to hear, because we do not perceive any cause of our not hearing. But such a conclusion is absurd.

उपलभ्यमाने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेशः ॥ २ । २ । ३५ ॥

उपलभ्यमाने upalabhyamāne, in the case of being apprehended ; च cha, and, अनुप लब्धे an-upalabdheḥ, of non-apprehension , असत्त्वात् a-sat-tvât, from being non-existent ; अनपदेशः an-apadeśaḥ, not a mark.

164. Your position, we further say, is untenable, because there is no non-perception ; on the contrary, there is perception of the cause of inaudition.—35.

Suppose that a sound is produced by an axe striking against a tree. This sound will perish after producing another sound, which will again perish, giving rise to another, and so on, until the last sound is destroyed by some obstacle. In fact every sound that is produced is destined to perish. Hence there is no non-perception of the cause of inaudition ; on the contrary, there is perception of such a cause. Consequently, sound is not eternal.

पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्लेषाच्छब्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः ॥२१२३६॥

पाणिनिमित्त प्रश्लेषात् pāṇi nimitta-praśleṣât, from contact with the gong due to action of the hand , शब्दाभावे śabda-abhāve, in the absence of sound ; न na, not, अनुपलब्धिः an upalabdhiḥ, non apprehension.

165. There is, we again say, no non-perception, because the sound [of a gong] ceases on the contact of our hand [with the gong].—36

You cannot say that there is non-perception of the cause of cessation of sound, because we actually perceive that by the contact of our hand we can stop the sound of a gong.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥२१२३७॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेḥ vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-apprehension of the cause of destruction ; च cha, and ; अवस्थाने avasthāne, in persistence ; तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः tat nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of its eternality.

166. We call a thing eternal (persistent) if it continues to exist, and if we cannot perceive any cause why it should cease.—37.

Sound does not continue to exist, and the cause of its cessation is also perceived. Hence sound is not eternal.

अस्पर्शत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । ३६ ॥

अस्पर्शत्वात् a-sparsa-tvât, from being intangible ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiśedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

167. That the substratum of sound is intangible is no counter-argument.—38.

Sound has not for its substratum any of the tangible substances, *viz.*, earth, water, fire and air, for, it is found to be produced even where these do not exist. For instance, sound is produced in a vacuum which is devoid of smell, taste, colour and touch, which are the qualities of tangible substances. The reason why the sound produced in a vacuum does not reach our ears is that there is no air to carry it. Hence the substratum of sound is an intangible substance, *viz.*, ether.

It is a peculiarity of sound that it cannot co-abide with colour, etc. A tangible substance (*e.g.*, earth) which is the abode of smell may also be the abode of colour, taste or touch. But the substance, in which sound abides, cannot be the abode of any other qualities. This distinguishes the substratum of sound from the substrata of other qualities. This peculiar substratum is called ether.

The fact of having an intangible substratum is no bar to the non-eternality of sound. Sound, though its substratum is the intangible ether, is produced by the contact of two hard substances. One sound produces another sound (or a certain vibration), which again causes another sound (or vibration), and so on, until the last sound (or vibration) ceases owing to some obstacle. Sound is therefore non-eternal.

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेश्च समासे ॥ २ । २ । ३६ ॥

विभक्त्यन्तरोपपत्तेः vibhakti-antara-upapatteh, from affirmation of different divisions or inflections ; **च** cha, and ; **समासे** samāse, in the case of co-inherence, or of a compound.

168. Sound cannot be supposed to co-abide with other qualities, for there are also varieties of it.—9

In each tangible substance there is only one kind of smell, taste, touch or colour. If we suppose that sound abides with one or more of these qualities in a tangible substance, we must admit that sound is of one kind only. But sound is of various kinds, such as grave, acute, etc. ; and even the same sound may vary in degrees, according to the nature of the obstruction it meets. This proves that sound does not abide with other qualities in a tangible substance. It further proves that sound is not unalterable or eternal.

Also signifies that this aphorism is to be considered along with aphorism 2—2—38, in which a reason for the non-eternality of sound is given.

विकारादेशोपदेशात् संशयः ॥ २ । २ । ४० ॥

विकारादेशोपदेशात् vikāra-Ādeśa-upadeśāt, from the rule of modification and substitution ; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

169. From the injunction about modification and substitute there arises doubt.—10.

The word ' dadhi, 'conjoined with the word ' atra, ' becomes ' dadhyatra, ' by the rule of Sanskrit grammar. Looking at ' dadhi-atra ' and ' dadhyatra, ' we notice that there is *i* in the former and *y* in the latter. Here some say that *i* undergoes modification as *y*, while others say that *y* comes as a substitute for *i*. Consequently we are thrown into doubt whether letters really undergo modifications or take up substitutes.

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ विकारविवृद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ४१ ॥

प्रकृतिविवृद्धौ prakṛiti-vivṛiddhau, on the augmentation of the root ; विकारविवृद्धेः vikāra-vivṛiddheḥ, because there is augmentation of the modification.

170. If letters underwent modification, an increase of bulk in the original material would be attended by an increase of bulk in the modification —11.

If we accept the theory of modification, the letter *y* which originated from the short *i* must be supposed to be less in bulk than the *y* which originated from the long *i*. But in reality the *y* in both the cases is of the same bulk. Hence it is concluded that letters do not undergo modification, but take up other letters as substitutes.

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेर्विकाराणामहेतुः ॥ २ । २ । ४२ ॥

न्यूनसमाधिकोपलब्धेः nyūna-sama adhika-upalabdheḥ, from apprehension of less, same, and more ; विकाराणाम् vikāraṇām, of modifications ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

171. The foregoing argument, some say, is futile, because we find modification less than, equal to, and greater than, the original material.—12.

The bulk of the modification does not, in all cases, correspond to the bulk of the original material, e.g., thread is of less bulk than cotton which is its original material, a bracelet is equal in bulk to the gold of which it is made, and a banyan tree is greater in bulk than the seed from which it springs. Hence the argument against the theory of modification is, according to the objectors, baseless.

द्विविधस्यापि हेतोरभावादसाधनं दृष्टान्तः ॥२।२।४३॥

द्विविधस्य dvi-vidha-sya, of twofold ; अपि api, even ; हेतोः hetoḥ, reasons ; अभावात् abhāvât, owing to absence ; असाधनं a-sâdhanam, not a means of proof ; दृष्टान्तः dr̥ṣṭântaḥ, example .

172. On account of the absence of both the positive and negative marks of inference, we say, the example does not establish the point.—43.

The examples cited by the opponent are irrelevant. They are neither similar nor dissimilar to the case under consideration: they belong altogether to a different category. An example which can establish a point must contain the reason which is found present in the thing to be established. Not only are the examples not a means of proof here, but they are also not the examples required.

नातुल्यप्रकृतीनां विकारविकल्पात् ॥ २ । २ । ४४ ॥

न na, no ; अतुल्यप्रकृतीनां a tulya-prakṛitīnām, of different roots ; विकार-विकल्पात् vikâra-vikalpât, from difference of modifications .

173. It is not so, because we spoke of those modifications which originated from different materials.—44.

A modification may not correspond in bulk to its original material. But if the original materials are different, their modifications are expected to be different. Here *i* being different from *t*, their modifications are expected to be different. But *y* issues from *i* as well as *t*. Hence *y* is not a modification of *i* or *t*.

द्रव्यविकारे वैषम्यवद्वर्णविकारविकल्पः ॥ २ । २ । ४५ ॥

द्रव्यविकारे dravya-vikâre; in the case of the modification of substance in general ; वैषम्यवत् vaiṣamya-vat, as there is dissimilarity ; वर्णविकार-विकल्पः varṇa-vikâra-vikalpaḥ, difference of the modification of letter in general.

174. There is, says an objector, difference between a letter and its modification, as there is between a substance and its modification. —45.

According to the objector, there is difference between the letter *i* (or *t*) and its modification *y*, as there is difference between the substance cotton and its modification thread.

न विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः ॥ २ । २ । ४६ ॥

न na, no ; विकारधर्मानुपपत्तेः vikāra-dharma-an- upapatteḥ, because of non-establishment of the character of a modification

175. In reply, we say that it is not so, because the character of a modification does not exist here —16.

A modification must be of the same nature as its original material, though the former may not correspond in bulk to the latter. A bracelet is no doubt a modification of gold or silver, but a horse is not a modification of a bull. Similarly, *y*, which is a semi-vowel, is not a modification of *i* (or *ī*) which is a full vowel.

विकारप्राप्तानामपुनरापत्तेः ॥ २ । २ । ४७ ॥

विकारप्राप्तानाम् vikāra-prāptānām, of those which have undergone modification ; अपुनरापत्तेः a-punaḥ-āpatteḥ, from non-return to original form.

176. A thing which has undergone modification does not again return to its original form.—17.

Milk modified into curd does not again attain the state of milk. But *i* having reached the condition of *y* may again revert to its original form. Hence *y* is not a modification of *i*.

सुवर्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतुः ॥ २ । २ । ४८ ॥

सुवर्णादीनाम् suvarṇa-ādīnām, of gold and the like ; पुनरापत्तेः punaḥ-āpatteḥ, from return to original ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

177. Some say that this is untenable, because golden ornaments may again be converted into their original forms —18.

A golden bracelet is converted into a mass of gross gold which again may be modified into a bracelet. The objector, relying on the analogy of golden ornaments, says that in the case of letters the theory of modification does not suffer by *i* reaching the condition of *y* and again returning to its original form.

न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥ २ । २ । ४९ ॥

न na, not ; तद्विकाराणां tat-vikāraṇām, of its modifications ; सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात् suvarṇa-bhāva-a-vyatirekāt, from not giving up the nature of gold.

178. The analogy, we say, is inapt, because the modifications of gold (called ornaments) do not relinquish the nature of gold.—19.

A mass of gold when made into ornaments does not relinquish its own nature. But *i* when converted into *y* loses its own nature. Hence the analogy is unsuitable.

नित्यत्वे अविकारदनित्यत्वे चानवस्थानात् ॥ २ । २ । ५० ॥

नित्यत्वे nitya-tve, were letters eternal ; अविकारान् a-vikârât, from non-modification ; अनित्यत्वे a-nitya-tve, were they non-eternal ; च cha, and ; अनवस्थानात् an-avasthânât, from non-persistence.

179. If the letter were eternal it could not be modified, and if it were impermanent it could not abide long enough to furnish the material for modification.—50.

On the supposition of the letters being eternal, *i* cannot be modified into *y* ; and on the supposition of their being impermanent, *i* must perish before it can be modified into *y*.

**नित्यानामतीन्द्रियत्वात्तदुर्म्विकल्पाच्च वर्णविकाराणाम-
प्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । ५१ ॥**

नित्यानां nityânâm, of eternal ; अतीन्द्रियत्वात् ati-indriya-tvât, from being super-sensuous ; तदुर्म्विकल्पात् tat-dharma-vikalpât, from difference of attributes ; वर्णविकाराणां varṇa-vikârâṇâm, of the modifications of letters ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

180. Though the letters be eternal, their modification, says an objector, cannot be denied, as some of the eternal things are beyond the grasp of the senses, while others possess a different character.—51.

Just as some eternal things (as ether) are supersensuous while others (such as cowhood) are cognisable by the sense, so some eternal things as ether may be unmodifiable while others such as letters may be susceptible to modification.

अनवस्थायित्वे च वर्णोपलब्धिवत्तद्विकारोपपत्तिः ॥ २ । २ । ५२ ॥

अनवस्थायित्वे an-avasthâi-tve, in case of not persisting , च cha, and ; वर्णोपलब्धिवत् varṇa-upalabdhi vat, like apprehension of letters ; तद्विकारोपपत्तिः tat-vikâra-upapattiḥ, establishment of their modifications.

181. Even if the letters are impermanent, their modification, like their perception, is, according to the objector, possible.—52.

Even if you say that letters are impermanent, you admit that they abide long enough to be capable of being perceived. Why then cannot they abide long enough to be capable of being modified ?

**विकारधर्मित्वे नित्यत्वाभावात्कालान्तरे विकारो-
पपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ २ । २ । ५३ ॥**

विकारधर्मित्वे *vikāra-dharmi-tve*, where there is the character of undergoing modification ; नित्यत्वाभावात् *nitya-tva-abhāvāt*, from absence of eternality ; कालान्तरे *kāla-antare*, at another time ; विकारोपपत्तेः *vikāra-upapatteḥ*, from establishment of modification ; च *cha*, and , अप्रतिषेधः *a-pratiṣedhaḥ*, non-contradiction.

182. In reply, we say that our position is unassailable, because there is no eternalness where there is the character of modification and because your so-called modification presents itself at a time subsequent to the destruction of the original material.—53.

The letters cannot be modified if you say that they are eternal, because modification is the reverse of eternalness. When a thing is modified it assumes another nature, abandoning its own. Again, the letters cannot be modified if you say that they are impermanent, because there is no time for *i* (of *dadhi*) to be modified into *y* when *a* (of *atra*) follows. The sound 'dadhi' is produced (pronounced) at the first moment, exists (continuously) during the second moment, and perishes at the third moment. The sound "atra" is produced (pronounced) at the second moment, exists (continues) during the third moment, and perishes at the fourth moment. Now, *i* (of *dadhi*) cannot be modified into *y* until *a* (of *atra*) has come into existence. But *a* comes into existence at the third moment, when *i* has already perished. So, on the supposition of impermanency of letters, modification is impossible.

प्रकृत्यनियमाद्ब्रह्मविकाराणाम् ॥ २ । २ । ५४ ॥

प्रकृत्यनियमाद् *prakṛiti-a-niyamāt*, from non-restriction to the root ; ब्रह्मविकाराणां *brahma-vikāraṇām*, of the modifications of letters.

183. Letters are not modified, because there is no fixity as to the original material of their modification.—54.

In the case of real modifications there is a fixity as regards their original materials, e.g., milk is the original material of curd, but not *vice versa*. In the case of letters, however, there is no fixed rule, e.g., *i* is the

original material of *y* in dadhyatra (dadhi+atra), but *y* is the original material of *i* in vidhyati (vyadh+ya+ti). Hence the operation of modification is not really applicable to letters.

अनियमे नियमाद्वानियमः ॥ २ । २ । ५५ ॥

अनियमे a-niyame, in the case of non-restriction ; नियमात् niyamât, because of restriction, i. e. rule or uniformity ; न na, not ; अनियमः a-niyamaḥ, non-restriction.

184. Some say that there is no lack of fixity, because the absence of fixity itself is fixed.—55.

I is sometimes modified into *y*, and *y*, sometimes into *i*. So in respect of letters there is no fixity as to the original materials of their modification. This much, however, is fixed that there is no fixity, or in other words, the absence of fixity is fixed. Hence the objector, who is a quibbler, contends that there is fixity at least as to the negative aspect of modification.

नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ २।२।५६॥

नियमानियम विरोधात् niyama-aniyama-virodhât, owing to contradiction of restriction and non-restriction ; अनियमे aniyame, in respect of non-restriction ; नियमात् niyamât, there being restriction ; च cha, and ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

185. By saying that the absence of fixity is fixed, you cannot set aside our reason, because the fixity and its absence are contradictory terms.—56.

Our reason is that in respect of letters there is no fixity as to their modification. You contend that, though there is no fixity, the absence of fixity is fixed. Our reply is that, though the absence of fixity is fixed, it does not establish fixity as a positive fact, because fixity is incompatible with the absence of fixity.

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्द्दह्रासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यस्तु विकारोपपत्तेर्वर्णविकारः ॥ २ । २ । ५७ ॥

गुणान्तरापत्त्युपमर्द्दह्रासवृद्धिलेशश्लेषेभ्यः guṇa-antara-âpatti-upamarda-hrâsa-vṛddhi-leśa-śleṣe bhyah, from the ensuing of a different quality, overcoming, shortening, lengthening, dropping and incoming ; तु tu, but ; विकारोपपत्तेः vikâra-upapatteḥ, from establishment of modification ; वर्णविकारः varṇa-vikârah, modification of letters,

186. There is an apparent modification of letters in the case of their attaining a different quality, taking up substitutes, becoming short or long and undergoing diminution or augmentation.—57.

A letter is said to attain a different quality when, for instance, the grave accentuation is given to what was acutely accented. As an instance of a letter accepting a substitute, we may mention *gam* as becoming *gachchh*. A long vowel is sometimes shortened, e.g., *nadî* (in the vocative case) becomes *nadi*. A short vowel is lengthened, e.g., 'muni' (in the vocative case) becomes 'mune'. Diminution occurs in such cases as 'as + tas' becoming 'stas.' In 'devânâm' (deva + âm) *na* is an augment.

ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम् ॥ २ । २ । ५८ ॥

te te, they, letters ; विभक्त्यन्ताः vibhakti-antâh, with inflections ; पदम् padam, word.

187. The letters ended with an affix form a word.—58.

Words are of two kinds: *nouns* and *verbs*. A noun ends in a *sup* affix, e.g. *Râmas* (*Râma* + *su*), while a verb ends in a *tiñ* affix; e.g., *bhavati* (*bhû* + *ti*).

तदर्थे व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिसन्निधावुपचारात् संशयः ॥ २ । २ । ५९ ॥

तदर्थे tat-arthe, as to the object or meaning of the word ; व्यक्त्याकृतिजाति सन्निधौ vyakti-âkṛiti-jâti-sannidhau, invariable association with an individual, form and class ; उपचारात् upachârât, from use ; संशयः saṁśayah, doubt.

188. There is doubt what a word (noun) really means; as it invariably presents to us an **individual, form and genus**.—59.

The word 'cow' reminds us of an individual (a four-footed animal), its form (limbs) and its genus (cowhood). Now, it is asked, what is the real signification of a word (noun)—an individual, form or genus ?

याशब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानां व्यक्तावुपचाराद्व्यक्तिः ॥ २ । २ । ६० ॥

या शब्दसमूहत्यागपरिग्रहसंख्यावृद्ध्युपचयवर्णसमासानुबन्धानाम् yâ-śabda-samūha-tyāga-parigraha-samkhyâ-vṛiddhi-upachaya-varṇa-samâsa-anubandhânâm, of the word, that, i.e. any noun, collection, avoïding, accepting, number, growth, colour, connection, and propagation ; व्यक्ती vyakti, in the case of the individual ; उपचारात् upachârât, from use, व्यक्ति vyakti, individual.

189. Some say that the word (noun) denotes individual, because it is only in respect of individuals that we can use "that," "collection," "giving," "taking," "number," "waxing," "waning," "colour," "compound" and "propagation."—60.

"That cow is going"—here the term "that" can be used only in reference to an individual cow. Similarly, it is only in respect of individuals that we can use the expressions "collection of cows," "he gives the cow," "he takes the cow," "ten cows," "cow waxes," "cow wanes," "red cow," "cow-legs" and "cow gives birth to cow."

न तदनवस्थानात् ॥ २ । २ । ६१ ॥

n na, no ; तदनवस्थानात् tat-an-avasthânât, from its non-persistence.

190. A word (noun) does not denote an individual, because there is no fixation of the latter.—61.

Unless we take genus into consideration, the word cow will denote any individual of any kind. Individuals are infinite. They cannot be distinguished from one another, unless we refer some of them to a certain genus and others to another genus, and so on. In order to distinguish a cow-individual from a horse-individual, we must admit a genus called cow distinguished from a genus called horse.

**सहचरणस्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारणसामीप्ययोगसाधनाधिपत्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणमञ्जुकटराजशक्तुचन्दनगङ्गाशटकाक्ष
पुरुषेष्वतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः ॥ २ । २ । ६२ ॥**

सहचरण स्थानतादर्थ्यवृत्तमानधारण सामीप्य योग साधनाधिपत्येभ्यः saha-charaṇa-sthāna-tâdarthya-vṛitta-mâna-dhâraṇa-sâmîpya-yoga-sâdhana âdhipatyebhyaḥ, from association, place, purpose, function, measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance and supremacy ; ब्राह्मणमञ्जुकटराज शक्तुचन्दन गङ्गाशटकाक्ष पुरुषेषु brâhmaṇa-mañcha-kāṭa-râja-saktu chandana gaṅgâ-śakata-anna-puruṣeṣu, in respect of a brâhmaṇa, scaffold, mat, king flour, sandal wood, Gaṅgâ, cart bullock, food and person ; अतद्भावे a-tat-bhâve, in the absence of object or inherent meaning ; अपि api, even ; तदुपचारः tat-upachârâḥ, its use.

191. Though a word does not literally bear a certain meaning, it is used figuratively to convey the same, as in the case of Brahmana, scaffold, mat, king, flour, sandalwood, Ganges, cart, food and man, in

consideration of association, place, design, function, measure, containing, vicinity, conjunction, sustenance and supremacy.—62.

If the word does not denote an individual, how is it that we refer to an individual cow by the expression "that cow is feeding"? The answer is that, though the word cow may not literally mean an individual, we may refer to the same figuratively. There are such instances as:—'Feed the staff' means 'feed the Brāhmaṇa holding a staff,' 'the scaffolds shout' means 'men on the scaffolds shout,' 'he makes a mat' means 'he aims at making a mat,' 'Yama' (chastiser) means 'a king,' 'a bushel of flour' means flour measured by a bushel, 'a vessel of sandal-wood' means 'sandal-wood placed in a vessel,' 'cows are grazing on the Ganges' means 'cows are grazing in the vicinity of the Ganges,' 'a black cart' means a cart marked with blackness, 'food' means 'life' and 'this person (Bharadvāja) is a clan' means 'this person is the head of a clan.'

आकृतिस्तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ । ६३॥

आकृतिः ākṛtiḥ, form ; तदपेक्षत्वात् tat-apēkṣa-tvāt, as being dependent upon it ; सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ, from the establishment of the identity or position of an entity.

192. Some say that the word (noun) denotes form by which an entity is recognised.—63.

We use such expressions as 'this is a cow' and 'this is a horse' only with reference to the forms of the cow and the horse. Hence it is alleged by some that the word denotes form.

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात्प्रोक्षणादीनां मृद्गवके जातिः

॥ २ । २ । ६४ ॥

व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्ते vyakti-ākṛti-yukte, possessing individuality and form ; अपि/api, also ; अप्रसङ्गात् a-prasaṅgāt, from non-application. प्रोक्षणादीनाम् prokṣaṇa-ādīnām, of immolation, etc. ; मृद्गवके mṛit-gavake, in respect of an earthenware cow ; जातिः jātiḥ, class or genus.

193. Others say that the word (noun) must denote genus, otherwise why in an earthenware cow, possessed of individuality and form, do we not find immolation, etc. ?—64.

We can immolate a real cow, but not an earthenware cow, though the latter possesses individuality and form. The distinction between a real cow and an earthenware one is that the former comes under the

genus cow, but the latter does not. Hence it is urged by some that a word (noun) denotes genus.

नाकृतिव्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वाज्जात्यभिव्यक्तेः ॥ २ । २ । ६५ ॥

न na, no ; आकृति व्यक्त्यपेक्षत्वात् âkṛiti-vyakti-apekṣa-tvat, from being dependent upon form and individuality ; जात्यभिव्यक्तेः jâti-abhivyakteh, of the manifestation of the genus.

194. In reply, we say that it is not genus alone that is meant by a word (noun), because the manifestation of genus depends on the form and individuality.—65.

The genus abides in the individual, and the individual cannot be recognised except by its form. Hence genus has reference both to the form and individual, or, in other words, the genus alone is not the signification of a word.

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः ॥ २ । २ । ६६ ॥

व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयः vyakti âkṛiti-jâṭayaḥ, individual, form and genus ; तु tu, but ; पदार्थः padârthaḥ the object denoted by the word.

195. The meaning of a word (noun) is, according to us, the genus, form and individual.—66.

The word (noun) signifies all the three, though prominence is given to one of them. For the purpose of distinction, the individual is prominent. In order to convey a general notion, per-eminence is given to the genus. In practical concerns, much importance is attached to the form. As a fact, the word ' noun ' ordinarily presents to us the form, denotes the individual and connotes the genus.

व्यक्तिगुणविशेषाश्रयो मूर्तिः ॥ २ । २ । ६७ ॥

व्यक्तिः vyaktiḥ, individual ; गुणविशेषाश्रयः guṇa-viśeṣa-âśrayaḥ, the abode of particular attributes ; मूर्तिः mûrtiḥ, body, substance.

196. An **individual** is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.—67.

An individual is any substance which is cognised by the senses, as a limited abode of colour, taste, smell, touch, weight, solidity, tremulousness, velocity or elasticity.

आकृतिज्जातिलिङ्गाख्या ॥ २ । २ । ६८ ॥

आकृतिः ākṛtiḥ, form; जातिलिङ्गाख्या jāti-liṅga-ākhyā, that by which the genus and the marks of the genus are manifested.

197. The **form** is that which is called the token of the genus.—68.

The genus cowhood, for instance, is recognised by a certain collocation of the dewlap which is a form. We cannot recognise the genus of a formless substance.

समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः ॥ २ । २ । ६९ ॥

समानप्रसवात्मिका samāna-prasava-ātmikā, that the nature of which is to produce the same idea or cognition ; जातिः jātiḥ, genus, class.

198. **Genus** is that whose nature is to produce the same conception.—69.

Cowhood is a genus which underlies all cows. Seeing a cow somewhere, we acquire a general notion of cows (i.e., derive knowledge of cowhood). This general notion enables us on all subsequent occasions to recognise individual cows.



BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणात् ॥ ३ । १ । १ ॥

दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्याम् darśana-sparśanābhyām, by means of sight and touch; एकार्थग्रहणात् eka-artha grahaṇāt, because of the apprehension of the same object.

199. A sense is not soul because we can apprehend an object through both sight and touch.

“Previously I saw the jar and now I touch it:” such expressions will be meaningless if “I” is not different from eye which cannot touch and from skin which cannot see. In other words, the “I” or soul is distinct from the senses.

न विषयव्यवस्थानात् ३ । १ । २ ॥

न na, no ; विषयव्यवस्थानात् viṣaya-vyavasthānāt, owing to the particular relation or allocation of the senses to the objects.

200. This is, some say, not so because there is a fixed relation between the senses and their objects.

Colour, for instance, is an exclusive object of the eye, sound of the ear, smell of the nose, and so on. It is the eye that, according to the objectors, apprehends colour, and there is no necessity for assuming a soul distinct from the eye for the purpose of explaining the apprehension of colour.

तद्व्यवस्थानादेवात्मसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । १ । ३ ॥

तद्व्यवस्थानात् tat-vyavasthānāt, from that allocation ; एव eva, itself ; आत्मसद्भावात् ātma-sadbhāvat, because of the existence of the soul ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

201. This is, we reply, no opposition because the existence of soul is inferred from that very fixed relation.

There is a fixed relation between the senses and their objects, e.g., between the eye and colour, the ear and sound, and so on. It is the eye and not the ear that can apprehend colour, and it is the ear and not the eye that can apprehend sound. If a sense were the soul it could apprehend only one object, but “I” can apprehend many objects, that is, “I” can see colour, hear sound, and so on. Hence the “I” or soul which confers unity on the various kinds of apprehension is different from the senses each of which can apprehend only one object.

शरीरदाहे पातकाभावात् ॥ ३ । १ । ४ ॥

शरीरदाहे śarīra-dāhe, in burning the body, पातकाभावात् pātaka-abhāvāt, as there would be absence of sin.

202. If the **body** were soul there should be release from sins as soon as the body was burnt.

If a person has no soul beyond his body he should be freed from sins when the body is destroyed. But in reality sins pursue him in his subsequent lives. Hence the body is not soul.

The aphorism admits of another interpretation :—

If the **body** were soul there could arise no sin from killing living beings.

Our body varies in dimension and character with every moment. The body which exists at the present moment is not responsible for the sin which was committed at a previous moment inasmuch as the body which committed the sin is now non-existent. In other words, no sin would attach to the person who killed living beings if the soul were identical with our transient body.

तदभावः सात्मकप्रदाहेऽपि तन्नित्यत्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५ ॥

तदभावः tat-abhāvaḥ, absence of sin; सात्मकप्रदाहे sa-ātmaka-pradāhe, in burning the body endowed with a soul; अपि api, even; तन्नित्यत्वात् tat-nityatvāt, as the soul is eternal.

203. There would, says an objector, be no sin even if the body endowed with a soul were burnt, for the soul is eternal.

In the previous aphorism it was shown that the commission of sins would be impossible if we supposed the body to be the soul. In the present aphorism it is argued by an objector that we should be incapable of committing sins even on the supposition of the soul being distinct from our body, for such a soul is eternal and cannot be killed.

न कार्य्याश्रयकर्तृवधात् ॥ ३ । १ । ६ ॥

न na, no; कार्य्याश्रयकर्तृवधात् kārya-āśraya karṭṛi-badhāt, because there is killing of the body which is at once the cause and the field of experience, or killing of the field of experience i.e. the body and of its cause i.e. the senses, or killing of the embodied life of the soul.

204. In reply we say that it is not so because we are capable of killing the body which is the site of operations of the soul.

Though the soul is indestructible we can kill the body which is the seat of its sensations. Hence we are not incapable of committing sins by killing or murder. Moreover, if we do not admit a permanent soul beyond our frail body we shall be confronted by many absurdities such as "loss of merited action" (*kṛitābhāni*) and "gain of unmerited action" (*akṛitābhyāgama*). A man who has committed a certain sin may not suffer its consequences in this life and unless there is a soul continuing to his next life he will not suffer them at all. This is a "loss of merited action". Again, we often find a man suffering the consequences of action which he never did in this life. This would be a "gain of unmerited action," unless we believed that his soul did the action in his previous life.

सव्यदृष्टस्येतरेण प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ७ ॥

savya-dṛṣṭasya, of that which is seen by the left eye ; *इतरेण itareṇa*, by the other ; *प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् pratyabhijñānāt*, because there is recognition.

205. [There is a soul beyond the **sense**] because what is seen by the left eye is recognised by the right.

A thing perceived previously by the left eye is recognised now by the right eye. This would have been impossible if the soul were identical with the left eye or the right eye on the principle that the seat of recognition must be the same as the seat of perception. Consequently we must admit that there is a soul which is distinct from the left and right eyes and which is the common seat of perception and recognition.

नैकस्मिन्नासास्थिव्यवहिते द्वित्वाभिमानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ८ ॥

न na, no , *एकस्मिन् ekasmin*, in one and the same ; *नासास्थिव्यवहिते nā-ā-sthi-vyavahite*, separated by the nasal bone , *द्वित्वाभिमानात् dvitva-abhimānāt*, because there arises the conceit of duality of the eye

206. Some say that the eyes are not **two**: the conceit of duality arises from the single organ of vision being divided by the bone of the nose.

The objectors argue as follows :—

If the eyes were really two, *viz* , right and left, we would have been bound to admit a soul distinct from the senses as the common seat of

perception and recognition. But there is only one eye which is divided by the bridge of the nose and which performs the two functions of perception and recognition. Hence there is, according to the objectors, no soul beyond the eye.

एकविनाशे द्वितीयाविनाशान्नैकत्वम् ॥ ३ । १ । ९ ॥

एकविनाशे *eka-vināśe*, on the destruction of the one ; द्वितीयाविनाशात् *dvitīya-a-vināśāt*, as there is non-destruction of the other ; न *na*, not ; एकत्वम् *eka-tvam*, unity.

207. The eyes we reply, are really two because the destruction of one does not cause the destruction of the other.

If the organ of vision was only one, then on the destruction of that one (*i.e.*, one eye) there would be total blindness.

अवयवनाशोऽप्यवयव्युपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३ । १ । १० ॥

अवयवनाशे *avayava-nāśe*, on the destruction of a part ; अपि *api*, even ; अवयव्युपलब्धेः *avayavi upalabdheḥ*, as the whole is cognised ; अहेतुः *a-hetuḥ* no reason.

208. This is, some say, no argument, for the destruction of a part does not cause the destruction of the whole.

The objectors say :—Just as a tree does not perish though a branch of it has been destroyed, so there may not be total blindness though one eye (a part of the organ of vision) has been destroyed.

दृष्टान्तविरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । १ । ११ ॥

दृष्टान्तविरोधान् *dr̥ṣṭānta-virodhāt*, owing to conflict with the familiar instance ; अप्रतिषेधः *a-pratishedhaḥ*, non-opposition.

209. This is, we reply, no opposition to our argument inasmuch as your illustration is in apt.

The illustration of a tree and its branch is not quite apt, for a tree does not exist in its entirety but assumes a mutilated condition when a branch of it is cut off. The right eye, on the other hand, remains in a perfect condition and performs the full function of an eye even when the left eye is destroyed.

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् ॥ ३ । १ । १२ ॥

इन्द्रियान्तरविकारात् *indriya-antara-vikārāt*, as there takes place modification of another sense.

210. The soul is distinct from the senses, because there is an excitement of one sense through the operation of another sense.

When we see an acid substance, water overflows our tongue. In other words, in virtue of the operation of our visual sense there is an excitement in the sense of taste. This would be impossible unless there was a soul distinct from the senses. The soul seeing the acid substance remembers its properties; and the remembrance of the acid properties excites the sense of taste.

न स्मृतेः स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । १३ ॥

न na, no; स्मृतेः smṛteḥ, of memory, recollection; स्मर्तव्यविषयत्वात् smartavya-viṣaya-tvât, because it has the thing recollected as its object.

211. It is, some say, not so because **remembrance** is lodged in the object remembered.

Remembrance, according to the objectors, is lodged in the thing remembered and does not necessarily presuppose a soul.

तदात्मगुणसद्भावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । १ । १४ ॥

तदात्मगुणसद्भावात् tat âtma-guṇa-sadbhâvât, because of its existence as a quality of the soul; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-opposition.

212. This is, we reply, no opposition, because remembrance is really a quality of the soul.

Remembrance is based on perception, that is, one can remember only that thing which one has perceived. It often happens that seeing the colour of a thing we remember its smell. This would be impossible if remembrance was a quality of a sense, e.g., the eye which has never smelt the thing. Hence remembrance must be admitted to be a quality of a distinct substance called soul which is the common seat of perceptions of colour and of smell.

नात्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां मनसि सम्भवात् ॥ ३ । १ । १५ ॥

न na, no; आत्मप्रतिपत्तिहेतूनां âtma-pratipatti-hetûnâm, of the reasons or proofs of the existence of a separate soul; मनसि manasi, to the mind; सम्भवात् sambhavât, because of applicability.

213. There is, some say, no soul other than the mind because the arguments which are adduced to establish the "soul" are applicable to the mind,

The substance of the objection is this:—

We can apprehend an object by both the eye and the skin. It is true that the acts of seeing and touching the object by one agent cannot be explained unless we suppose the agent to be distinct from both the eye and the skin (*i.e.*, from the senses), let however the agent be identified with the mind.

ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् ॥ ३ । १ । १६ ॥

ज्ञातुः jñātuḥ, of the knower ; ज्ञानसाधनोपपत्तेः jñāna-sādhana-upapattēḥ, as there must be instruments of knowing; संज्ञाभेदमात्रम् samjñā-bheda-mātram, mere difference of name.

214. Since there is a knower endowed with an instrument of knowledge it is, we reply, a mere verbal trick to apply the name “ mind ” to that which is really the “ soul. ”

To explain the acts of seeing, touching, etc. you admit an agent distinct from the senses which are called its instruments. The sense or instrument by which the act of thinking is performed is called the “mind.” The agent sees by the eye, hears by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the tongue, touches by the skin and thinks by the “mind.” Hence we must admit the agent (soul) over and above the mind. If you call the agent as “ mind, ” you will have to invent another name to designate the instrument. This verbal trick will not, after all, affect our position. Moreover, the mind cannot be the agent as it is atomic in nature. An atomic agent cannot perform the acts of seeing, hearing, knowing, feeling, etc.

नियमश्च निरनुमानः ॥ ३ । १ । १७ ॥

नियमः niyamaḥ, rule ; च cha, and ; निरनुमानः nir-anumānaḥ, devoid of inference.

215. Your conclusion is moreover opposed to inference.

We admit a mind apart from the soul. If you deny any one of them or identify one with the other, an absurd conclusion will follow. Unless you admit the mind you will not be able to explain the internal perception. By the eye you can see, by the ear you can hear, by the nose you can smell, by the tongue you can taste and by the skin you can touch. By what sense do you carry on internal perception, *viz.*, thinking, imagining, etc. ? Unless you admit the mind for that purpose your conclusion will be opposed to inference.

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धाज्जातस्य हर्षभयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तेः

॥ ३ । १ । १८ ॥

पूर्वाभ्यस्तस्मृत्यनुबन्धात् pūrva-abhyasta smṛiti-anubandhāt, from association with, or sequence from, memory previously experienced ; जातस्य jātasya, of the new-born, the child ; हर्षभयशोकसंप्रतिपत्तेः harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ, on account of the occurrence of pleasure, fear and grief.

216. ('The soul is to be admitted) on account of joy, fear and grief arising in a child from the memory of things previously experienced.

A new-born child manifests marks of joy, fear and grief. This is inexplicable unless we suppose that the child perceiving certain things in this life remembers the corresponding things of the past life. The things which used to excite joy, fear and grief in the past life continue to do so in this life. The memory of the past proves the previous birth as well as the existence of the soul.

पद्मादिषु प्रबोधसंमीलनविकारवत्तद्विकारः ॥ ३ । १ । १९ ॥

पद्मादिषु padma-ādiṣu, in the case of the lotus, etc. ; प्रबोधसंमीलनविकारवत् prabodha-sammīlana-vikāra vat, like the modifications of opening and closing ; तद्विकारः tat-vikārah, its modifications.

217. It is objected that the changes of countenance in a child are like those of expanding and closing up in a lotus.

The objection stands thus :—

Just as a lotus which is devoid of memory expands and closes up by itself, so a child expresses joy, fear and grief even without the recollection of the things with which these were associated in the previous life.

नोष्णशीतवर्षकालनिमित्तत्वात् पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम्

॥ ३ । १ । २० ॥

न na, no ; उष्णशीतवर्षकालनिमित्तत्वात् uṣṇa-śīta-varṣa-kāla-nimitta-tvāt, because of their being caused by heat, cold, rain and season ; पञ्चात्मकविकाराणाम् pañcha-âtma-ka-vikāraṇām of the modifications or changes in things constituted by the five (elements).

218. This is, we reply, not so because the changes in inanimate things are caused by heat, cold, rain and season.

The changes of expansion and contraction in a lotus are caused by heat and cold. Similarly the changes of countenance in a child must be caused by something. What is that thing? It is the recollection of pleasure and pain associated with the things which are perceived.

प्रेत्याहाराभ्यासकृतात् स्तन्याभिलाषात् ॥ ३ । १ । २१ ॥

प्रेत्य pretya, transmigrating; अहाराभ्यासकृतात् âhâra-abhyâsa-kṛitât, produced by the habit of eating (in the previous life); स्तन्याभिलाषात् stanya abhilâṣât, from the desire for the mother's milk.

219. A child's desire for milk in this life is caused by the practice of his having drunk it in the previous life.

A child just born drinks the breast of his mother through the remembrance that he did so in the previous life as a means of satisfying hunger. The child's desire for milk in this life is caused by the remembrance of his experience in the previous life. This proves that the child's soul, though it has abandoned a previous body and has accepted a new one, remembers the experiences of the previous body.

अयसोऽयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत्तदुपसर्पणम् ॥ ३ । १ । २२ ॥

अयसः ayasaḥ, of the iron; अयस्कान्ताभिगमनवत् ayaskânta-abhigamana-vat, like the approach to the loadstone; तदुपसर्पणम् tat-upa-sarpanam, the approach of the infant.

220. Some deny the above by saying that a new-born child approaches the breast of his mother just as an iron approaches a loadstone (without any cause).

The objection runs thus :—

Just as an iron approaches a loadstone by itself, so does a child approach the breast of his mother without any cause.

नान्यत्र प्रवृत्त्यभावात् ॥ ३ । १ । २३ ॥

न na, no; अन्यत्र anyatra, elsewhere, प्रवृत्त्यभावात् pravṛitti-abhâvât, on account of absence of activity.

221. This is, we reply, not so because there is no approach towards any other thing.

You say that there is no cause which makes an iron approach a loadstone, or a child the breast of his mother. How do you then explain

that an iron approaches only a loadstone but not a clod of earth and a child approaches only the breast of his mother and not any other thing? Evidently there is some cause to regulate these fixed relations.

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ ३ । १ । २४ ॥

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् *vīta-rāga-janma-a-darśanāt*, because the rebirth of one who is free from desire is not observed.

222. We find that none is born without desire.

Every creature is born with some desires which are associated with the things enjoyed by him in the past life. In other words, the desire proves the existence of the creature or rather of his soul in the previous lives. Hence the soul is eternal.

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ३ । १ । २५ ॥

सगुणद्रव्योत्पत्तिवत् *sa-guṇa-dravya-utpatti-vat*, like the production of substances endowed with qualities ; तदुत्पत्तिः *tat-utpattiḥ*, its production.

223. Some say that the soul is not eternal because it may be produced along with desire as other things are produced along with their qualities.

The objection stands thus :—

Just as a jar, when it is produced, is distinguished by its colour, etc., so the soul when it is produced is marked by its desire, etc. Hence the desires do not pre-suppose the soul in the previous lives or, in other words, the soul is not eternal,

न संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाद्वागादीनाम् ॥ ३ । १ । २६ ॥

न *na*, no ; संकल्पनिमित्तत्वाद् *saṃkalpa-nimitta-tvāt*, because of their being caused by *saṃkalpa*, i.e. volition (springing from the recollection of past experience) ; वागादीनाम् *vāga-ādīnām*, of desire, etc.

224. This is, we reply, not so because the desire in a new-born child is caused by the ideas left in his soul by the things he enjoyed in his previous lives.

The desire implies that the soul existed in the previous lives or, in other words, the soul is eternal.

पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । २७ ॥

पार्थिवं *pārthivam*, earthy ; गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः *guṇa-antara-upalabdheḥ*,

because of the perception of the quality of the earth

225. Our body is earthy because it possesses the special qualities of earth.

In other worlds there are beings whose bodies are watery, fiery, airy or ethereal. Though our body is composed of all the five elements we call it earthy owing to the preponderance of earth in it.

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं तद्गुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । २८ ॥

पार्थिवाप्यतैजसं pârthiva-âpya-taijasam, composed of elements of earth, water, and fire; तद्गुणोपलब्धेः tat-guṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of their attributes.

226. The body is composed of the elements of earth, water and fire, as the attributes of these elements are perceived in it.

निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेश्चातुर्भौतिकम् ॥ ३ । १ । २९ ॥

निःश्वासोच्छ्वासोपलब्धेः niḥśvāsa uchchhvasa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of in-breathing and out breathing ; चातुर्भौतिकं châturbhautikam, composed of four elements

227. The body is composed of four elements, because it performs the operations of in-breathing and out-breathing.

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः पाञ्चभौतिकम् ॥ ३ । १ । ३० ॥

गन्धक्लेदपाकव्यूहावकाशदानेभ्यः gandha-kleda- pāka-vyûha-avakāśa-dāne-bhyaḥ, by reason of smell, wetness, digestion, circulation of blood, and room for movement ; पाञ्चभौतिकं pāñcha bhautikam, composed of five elements.

228. The body is composed of five elements, as it possesses smell, wetness, digestion, circulation of blood and room for movement.

In the body there are smell and moisture which are attributes of earth and water respectively. Digestion and circulation of blood are done respectively by fire and air. There is also in the body room for the movement of the other elements in it, and therefore ether is also present in it.

Gotama has not taken the trouble to refute these doubtful reasonings in the above three aphorisms. They are generally refuted by the authority of the Veda in the next aphorism.

श्रुतिप्रामाण्याच्च ॥ ३ । १ । ३१ ॥

श्रुतिप्रामाण्यात् śruti-prāmāṇyāt, from the authority of the Veda , च cha, and.

229. In virtue of the authority of scripture too.

That our body is earthy is proved by our scripture. In the section on "Dissolution into the primordial matter," there are such texts as : May the eye be absorbed into the sun, may the body be absorbed into the earth, etc. The sun is evidently the source of the eye and the earth of the body.

कृष्णसारे सत्युपलम्भाद्व्यतिरिच्य चोपलम्भात्संशयः ॥

३ । १ । ३२ ॥

कृष्णसारे kṛṣṇasāre, the eyeball ; सति sati, there being ; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because there is perception (of colour) ; व्यतिरिच्य vyatirichya, screening, removing ; च cha, and ; उपलम्भात् upalambhāt, because there is perception ; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

230 It is doubtful as to whether a sense is material or all-pervading because there is perception when there is (contact with) the eye-ball and there is perception even when the eye-ball is far off.

The eye-ball is said by some to be a material (elemental) substance inasmuch as its function is limited by its contact. A thing is seen when it has contact with the eye-ball, but it is not seen when the eye-ball is not connected. In other words, the eye-ball, like any other material substance, exercises its function only in virtue of its contact with things. Others hold that the eye-ball is a non-material all-pervading substance inasmuch as it can perceive things with which it has not come in contact. The eye-ball does not touch the things which it sees from a distance. Hence the question arises as to whether the eye-ball is a material or an all-pervading substance.

महदणुग्रहणात् ॥ ३ । १ । ३३ ॥

महदणुग्रहणात् mahat aṇu-grahanāt, because it apprehends both the large and the small.

231. It is contended that the eye-ball is not a material substance because it can apprehend the great and the small.

If the eye-ball had been a material substance it could have apprehended only those things which coincided with itself in bulk. But we

find it can apprehend things of greater and smaller bulk. So it is contended that the eye-ball is not a material substance.

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥ ३ । १ । ३४ ॥

रश्म्यर्थसन्निकर्षविशेषात् raśmi-artha-sannikarṣa viśeṣāt, from a special contact of the ocular ray with the object ; तद्ग्रहणम् tat-grahṇam, the apprehension of the large and the small.

232. (The Naiyayika's reply to the above is that) it is by the contact of the ray that the things great and small are apprehended.

The Naiyāyikas say that even on the supposition of the eye-ball being a material substance the apprehension by it of the great and the small will not be impossible. Their explanation is that though the eye-ball itself does not coincide with things which are greater or smaller in bulk, yet the rays issuing from the eye-ball reach the things in their entire extent. Hence in spite of the eye-ball being a material substance there is no impossibility for it to apprehend the great and the small.

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ३ । १ । ३५ ॥

तदनुपलब्धेरहेतुः tat-an-upalabdheḥ, because of its non-perception ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a cause.

233. Contact is not the cause because we do not perceive the ray.

The contact of a ray with a thing is not the cause of apprehension of the thing because we perceive no ray issuing from the eye ball.

नानुमीयमानस्य प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धिरभावहेतुः ॥ ३ । १ । ३६ ॥

न na, not ; अनुमीयमानस्य anumīyamānasya, of that which can be inferred ; प्रत्यक्षतः pratyakṣataḥ, by perception ; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-apprehension ; अभावहेतुः abhāva-hetuḥ, a mark of non-existence.

234. That we do not apprehend a thing through perception is no proof of non-existence of the thing because we may yet apprehend it through inference.

The ray issuing from the eye is not perceived as it is supersensuous. But it is established by inference like the lower half of the earth or the other side of the moon.

अव्यग्रपुण्यधर्मभेदाच्चोपलब्धिनियमः ॥ ३ । १ । ३७ ॥

द्रव्यगुणधर्मभेदात् dravya-guṇa-dharma-bhedât, according to differences of the nature of the substance and the attribute ; च cha, and ; उपलब्धिनियमः upalabdhi-niyamaḥ, rule of perception.

235 And perception depends upon the special character of the substance and its qualites.

A substance unless it possesses magnitude, or a quality unless it possesses obviousness, is not perceived. From the absence of magnitude and obvious colour the ray of the eye-ball is not perceived.

अनेकाद्वायत् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥३१॥३८॥

अनेकाद्वायत् an eka dravya-samavâyât, from combination in more than one substance, रूपविशेषात् rūpa viśeṣat, from peculiarity, i.e. perceptible intensity, of colour, च cha, and ; रूपोपलब्धिः rūpa-upalabdhiḥ, perception of colour.

236. A colour is perceived only when it abides in many things intimately and possesses obviousness.

The sun's ray is perceived as it possesses an obviousness in respect of colour and touch. But the ray of the eye-ball is not perceived as it is obvious neither in respect of colour nor in respect of touch.

कर्मकारितश्चेन्द्रियाणां व्यूहः पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः ॥ ३ । १ । ३९ ॥

कर्मकारितः karma-kâritaḥ, determined or organised by karma or deserts, च cha, and ; इन्द्रियानाम् indriyâṇâm, of the senses ; व्यूहः vyûhaḥ, order or assemblage, पुरुषार्थतन्त्रः puruṣa artha-tantraḥ, subservient to the purposes of the puruṣa or man.

237. And the senses subservient to the purposes of man have been set in order by his deserts.

The order referred to is as follows :—

The eye emits ray which does not possess the quality of obviousness and cannot consequently burn the thing it touches. Moreover, had there been obviousness in the ray it would have obstructed our vision by standing as a screen between the eye and the thing. This sort of arrangement of the senses was made to enable man to attain his purposes according to his merits and demerits.

मध्यन्दिनोल्काप्रकाशान्पलब्धिवत्तदन्पलब्धिः ॥३१॥४०॥

मध्यन्दिनेल्काप्रकाशानुपलब्धिषत् madhyandina-ulkā prakāśa-an-upalabdhi-
vat, like the non-perception of the light of a meteor at midday ; तदनुपलब्धिः
tat-an-upalabdhiḥ, its non-perception.

238. Some say that the ray of the eye (possesses obviousness of colour but it) is not perceived just as the light of a meteor at midday is not perceived.

The light of a meteor though possessing obviousness of colour is not perceived at midday because it is then overpowered by the light of the sun. Similarly, some say, the ray of the eye possesses obviousness of colour but it is not perceived during the day time on account of its being overpowered by the light of the sun.

न रात्रावप्यनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । ४१ ॥

न na, no ; रात्रौ rātrau, at night, अपि api, even; अनुपलब्धेः anupalabdheḥ, from its non-perception.

239. It is, we reply, not so because even in the night the ray of the eye is not perceived.

Had the ray of the eye possessed obviousness of colour it would have been perceived during the night when it cannot be overpowered by the light of the sun. As the ray of the eye is not perceived even during the night we must conclude that it does not possess obviousness of colour.

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद्विषयोपलब्धेरनभिर्व्यक्तितोऽनुपलब्धिः

॥ ३ । १ । ४२ ॥

बाह्यप्रकाशानुग्रहाद् bāhya-prakāśa-anugrahāt, through conjunction with, or co-operation of, external light; विषयोपलब्धेः viṣaya-upalabdheḥ, because perception of objects (takes place) ; अनभिर्व्यक्तिः an-abhivyakti-
taḥ, from non-manifestation ; अनुपलब्धिः an-upalabdhiḥ, non-perception.

240. The ray of the eye is not perceived in consequence of its unobviousness but not on account of its total absence because it reaches objects through the aid of external light.

In the eye there is ray which does not however possess an obvious colour. Had the eye possessed no ray it could not have perceived any object. Since the eye perceives objects, it possesses ray in it, and since it requires the aid of external light (such as the light of the sun) to perceive them it follows that the ray does not possess the quality of obviousness. This aphorism answers the objection raised in 3-1-35.

अभिव्यक्तौ चाभिभवात् ॥ ३ । १ । ४३ ॥

अभिव्यक्तौ abhivyaktau, in case of manifestation ; च cha, and (where co-operation of external light is not required) ; अभिभवात् abhibhavât, because it is overpowered.

241. And the invisibility of the ray of the eye cannot be due to its being overpowered (by an external light such as the light of the sun) because the overpowering is possible only of a thing which possessed obviousness.

It is only a thing which possesses obviousness or manifestation that can be overpowered or obscured. But how can we throw a thing into obscurity which never possessed manifestation ? We cannot therefore say that the ray of the eye is not perceived on account of its having been overpowered by an external light.

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च ॥ ३ । १ । ४४ ॥

नक्तञ्चरनयनरश्मिदर्शनाच्च naktañchara nayana-raśmi-darśanât, because the ray of the eye is seen in the case of prowlers by night , च cha, and.

242. There must be ray in the eye of man as we see it in the eye of animals that move about in the night.

We see that animals wandering by night, such as cats, possess ray in their eyes. By this we can conjecture that there is ray in the eye of man.

अप्राप्य ग्रहणं काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः ॥३॥१॥४५॥

अप्राप्य aprâpya, without reaching ; ग्रहणं grahaṇam, apprehension ; काचाभ्रपटलस्फटिकान्तरितोपलब्धेः kâcha-abhra-ṣaṭala-sphaṭika-antarita-upalabdheḥ, because of perception of things screened by glass, mica, and crystal.

243. Some say that the eye can perceive a thing even without coming in contact with it by means of its rays just as things screened from us by glass, mica, membrane or crystal are seen.

The objection raised in this aphorism controverts the Nyâya theory of contact (in pratyakṣa) and seeks to prove that the senses are not material substances.

कुड्यान्तरितानुपलब्धेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । १ । ४६ ॥

कुड्यान्तरिवानुपलब्धेः kuḍya antarita an-upalabdheḥ, because of non-perception of what is screened from view by a wall, अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

244. (The foregoing objection is not valid) because we cannot perceive what is screened from us by walls.

The eye cannot really perceive a thing without coming in contact with it by means of its rays. For instance, a thing which is screened from us by a wall is not perceived by our eyes.

अप्रतिघातात् सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः ॥ ३ । १ । ४७ ॥

अप्रतिघातात् a-pratighâtât, from non-obstruction ; सन्निकर्षोपपत्तिः sannikarṣa-upapattiḥ, establishment of contact.

245. There is a real contact because there is no actual obstruction (caused by glass, mica, membrane or crystal).

The ray issuing from the eye can reach an external object through glass, mica, etc., which are transparent substances. There being no obstruction caused by these substances, the eye comes really in contact with the external object.

आदित्यरश्मिः स्फटिकान्तरेऽपि दाह्योऽविघातात् ॥ ३।१।४८॥

आदित्यरश्मेः âditya-raśmeh, of the sun's ray ; स्फटिकान्तरे sphaṭika-antare, being screened by a crystal ; अपि api, even ; दाह्यं dâhye, towards a combustible substance ; अविघातात् ; a-vighâtât, from non-obstruction.

246. A ray of the sun is not prevented from reaching a combustible substance though the latter is screened by a crystal.

This is an example which supports the theory of contact, viz., a ray issuing from the eye passes actually through a crystal to an object lying beyond it.

नेतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ३ । १ । ४९ ॥

न na, no ; इतरेतरधर्मप्रसङ्गात् itara-itara-dharma-prasaṅgât, on account of implication of mutual properties.

247. It is, some say, not so because the character of one presents itself in the other.

The objection stands thus :—

If a ray issuing from the eye can reach an object screened by a wall, why can it not reach another object which is screened by a wall ?

According to the objector the property of the crystal presents itself in the wall.

आदर्शोदकयोः प्रसादस्वाभाव्याद्रूपोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः

॥ ३ । १ । ५० ॥

आदर्शोदकयोः ādarśa-udakayoḥ, in a mirror and in water ; प्रसादस्वाभाव्यात् prasāda svābhāvyāt, from natural clearness or transparency ; रूपोपलब्धिवत् rūpa-upalabdhi-vat, like the perception of colour or form ; तदुपलब्धिः tat-upalabdhiḥ, its perception.

248. In reply we say that the perception of a thing screened by a crystal takes place in the same manner as that of a form in a mirror or water owing to the possession of the character of transparency.

The form of a face is reflected on a mirror because the latter possesses transparency. Similarly, a thing is reflected on a crystal inasmuch as the latter is transparent. A wall which does not possess transparency can reflect nothing. It is therefore entirely due to the nature of the screens that we can or cannot perceive things through them.

दृष्टानुमितानां नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपत्तिः ॥ ३ । १ । ५१ ॥

दृष्टानुमितानां dṛṣṭa-anumitānām, of things seen and inferred ; नियोगप्रतिषेधानुपत्तिः niyoga-pratiṣedha-an-upapattiḥ, inapplicability of injunctions and prohibitions, assertions and denials.

249. It is not possible to impose injunctions and prohibitions on facts which are perceived or inferred to be of some fixed character.

A crystal and a wall are found respectively to be transparent and non transparent. It is not possible to alter their character by saying " let the crystal be non-transparent " and " let the wall be transparent." Likewise, a ray of the eye in passing to a thing is obstructed by a wall but not by a crystal. This is a perceived fact which cannot be altered by our words. Hence the theory of contact remains intact.

स्थानान्यत्वे नानात्वादवयविनानात्वादवयविनानास्थानत्वाच्च संशयः ॥ ३ । १ । ५२ ॥

स्थानान्यत्वे sthāna-anya-tve, from occupying different places ; नानात्वात् nānā-tvāt, because of diversity ; अवयविनानास्थानत्वात् avayavi-nānā-sthāna-

tvât, from a whole occupying different places; च cha, and; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

250. Since many things occupy many places and since also one thing possessing different parts occupies many places, there arises doubt as to whether the senses are more than one.

There is doubt as to whether there are as many senses as there are sensuous functions or whether all the functions belong to one sense possessing different parts.

त्वगव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५३ ॥

त्वक् tvak, skin, touch ; अव्यतिरेकात् a-vyatiirekât, from its non-exclusion.

251. Some say that the senses are not many as none of them is independent of touch (skin).

The eye, ear, nose and tongue are said to be mere modifications of touch (skin) which pervades them, that is, there is only one sense, viz., touch (skin), all others being merely its parts.

न युगपदर्थानुपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । ५४ ॥

न na, no ; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneously ; अर्थानुपलब्धेः artha-an-upa-labdheḥ, from non-perception of objects.

252. Touch is not the only sense because objects are not perceived simultaneously.

Had there been only one sense, viz., touch, it would have in conjunction with the mind produced the functions of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc., simultaneously. But we cannot perform different functions at once. This proves that the senses are many ; the mind which is an atomic substance being unable to come in contact with the different senses at a time cannot produce different functions simultaneously.

विप्रतिषेधाच्च नत्वगेका ॥ ३ । १ । ५५ ॥

विप्रतिषेधाच्च vipratishedhât, because there is obstruction ; च cha, and ; न na, not ; त्वक् tvak, touch ; एका ekâ, only one.

253. Touch cannot be the only sense prohibiting the function of other senses.

Touch can perceive only those objects which are near (contiguous) but it cannot perceive objects which are far off. As a fact we can per-

ceive colour and sound from a great distance. This is certainly not the function of touch but of some other sense which can reach distant objects.

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५६ ॥

इन्द्रियार्थपञ्चत्वात् indriya- artha- pañcha- tvât, because the objects of the senses are five.

254. Senses are five because there are five objects.

There are five objects, viz., colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch which are cognised respectively by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin. There are therefore five senses corresponding to the five objects.

न तदर्थबहुत्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५७ ॥

न na, no ; तदर्थबहुत्वात् tat-artha-bahu- tvât, because their objects are many.

255. Some say that the senses are not five because there are more than five objects.

The objects of sense are said to be many such as good smell, bad smell, white colour, yellow colour, bitter taste, sweet taste, pungent taste, warm touch, cold touch, etc. According to the objector there must be senses corresponding to all these objects.

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकाद्गन्धादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । १ । ५८ ॥

गन्धत्वाद्यव्यतिरेकात् gandha-tva-âdi-a-vyatirekât, because of the non-exclusion of the character of smell, etc. ; गन्धादीनां gandha-âdinâm, of smell, etc. ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-exclusion.

256. There is, we reply, no objection because odour (smell), etc. are never devoid of the nature of odour (smell), etc.

Good odour, bad odour, etc. are not different objects of sense but they all come under the genus odour. It is the nose alone that cognises all sorts of odour—good or bad. Similarly all colours—white, yellow, blue or green—are cognised by the eye. In fact there are only five objects which are cognised by the five senses.

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकादेकत्वम् ॥ ३ । १ । ५९ ॥

विषयत्वाव्यतिरेकात् viṣaya-tva-a-vyatirekât, because of the non-exclusion of the character of their being objects of sense ; एकत्वम् eka-tvam, unity,

257. Some say that there is only one sense as the so-called different objects of sense are not devoid of the character of an object.

The objection raised in this aphorism is as follows:—

The so-called different objects, *viz.*, colour, sound, smell (odour), taste (savour) and touch agree with one another in each of them being an object of sense. As they all possess the common characteristic of being an object of sense it is much simpler to say that the object of sense is only one. If there is only one object of sense, the sense must also be one only.

न बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः ॥३१॥६॥

n na, no, बुद्धिलक्षणाधिष्ठानगत्याकृतिजातिपञ्चत्वेभ्यः buddhi-lakṣaṇa-adhiṣṭhāna-gati-ākṛiti-jāti-pañcha-tvebhyah, because of fivefoldness of the states of consciousness which the senses produce, their sites, their movements, their shapes and their origins.

258. It is, we reply, not so because the senses possess five-fold character corresponding to the characters of knowledge, sites, processes, forms and materials.

The senses must be admitted to be five on the following grounds:—

(a) The characters of knowledge—There are five senses corresponding to the five characters of knowledge, *viz.*, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual.

(b) The sites—The senses are five on account of the various sites they occupy. The visual sense rests on the eyeball, the auditory sense on the ear-hole, the olfactory sense on the nose, the gustatory sense on the tongue, while the tactual sense occupies the whole body.

(c) The processes—There are five senses involving five different processes, *e. g.*, the visual sense apprehends a colour by approaching it through the (ocular) ray while the tactual sense apprehends an object which is in association with the body, and so on.

(d) The forms—The senses are of different forms, *e. g.*, the eye partakes of the nature of a blue ball, and the ear is not different from ether, etc.

(e) The materials—The senses are made up of different materials : the eye is fiery, the ear is ethereal, the nose is earthy, the tongue is watery, and the skin (touch) is airy.

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेस्तादात्म्यम् ॥ ३ । १ । ६१ ॥

भूतगुणविशेषोपलब्धेः bhûta-guṇa-viśeṣa-upalabdheḥ, on account of the perception of the specific attributes of the elements ; तादात्म्यम् tadâtmyam, identity.

259. The senses are essentially identical with the elements in consequence of the possession of their special qualities.

The five senses, *viz.*, the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin (touch), are essentially identical with the five elements, *viz.*, fire, ether, earth, water and air, whose special qualities, *viz.*, colour, sound, smell (odour), savour (taste) and tangibility, are exhibited by them.

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः पृथिव्याः॥ ३।१।६२॥

गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दानां gandha-rasa-rûpa-sparśa śabdânām, of smell, taste, form, touch, and sound ; स्पर्शपर्यन्ताः sparśa-paryantâḥ, those ending with touch ; पृथिव्याः pr̥thivyâḥ, of the earth.

260. Of odour (smell), savour (taste), colour, tangibility (touch) and sound those ending with tangibility belong to earth.

अप्तेजोवायूनां पूर्वं पूर्वमपोह्याकाशस्योत्तरः ॥३।१।६३॥

अप्तेजोवायूनाम् ap-tejo-vâyûnām, of water, fire and air ; पूर्वपूर्वम् pûrvaṃ pûrvaṃ, each preceding one ; अपोह्या apohya, discarding ; आकाशस्य âkâśasya, of ether ; उत्तरः uttarâḥ, the last.

261. Rejecting each preceding one in succession they belong respectively to water, fire and air ; the last (sound) belongs to ether.

The earth possesses four qualities, *viz.*, odour (smell), savour (taste), colour and tangibility. In water there are three qualities, *viz.*, savour, colour and tangibility; colour and tangibility are known to be the qualities of fire while tangibility and sound belong respectively to air and ether.

न सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । ६४ ॥

न na, no ; सर्वगुणानुपलब्धेः sarva-guṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, an account of the non-perception of all the attributes.

262. An objector says that it is not so because an element is not apparently found to possess more than one quality.

The substance of the objection is that the earth does not possess four qualities but only one quality, *viz.*, odour (smell) which is apprehended

by the nose.* Water does not possess three qualities but possesses only one quality, viz., savour (taste) which is apprehended by the tongue. Similarly the other elements do, each of them, possess only one quality.

एकैकश्येनोत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावादुत्तराणां

तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ३ । १ । ६५ ॥

एकैकश्येन *eka-eka-śyena*, one to one ; उत्तरोत्तरगुणसद्भावात् *uttara-uttara-guṇa-sadbhāvāt*, because of the existence of the attributes in each succeeding one ; उत्तराणाम् *uttarāṇām*, in the succeeding ones ; तदनुपलब्धिः *tat-anupa-labdhīḥ*, non-perception thereof.

263. The objector further says that the qualities belong to the elements, one to one, in their respective order so that there is non-perception of other qualities in them.

The substance of the objection is this :—

Odour (smell) is the only quality of the earth. Consequently the other three qualities, viz., savour (taste), colour and tangibility, alleged to belong to the earth, are not found in it. Savour (taste) is the only quality of water, hence the other two qualities, viz., colour and tangibility alleged to belong to water, are not found in it. Colour is the only quality of fire, and hence the other quality, viz., tangibility alleged to belong to fire, is not found in it. Tangibility is of course the quality of air and sound of ether.

विष्टं ह्यपरम्परेण ॥ ३ । १ । ६६ ॥

विष्टं *viṣṭam*, covered, interpenetrated ; हि *hi*, for ; अपरं *aparam*, one ; अपरेण *apareṇa*, by another.

264. Of the elements one is, according to the objector, often interpenetrated by others.

The objection is explained as follows:

The earth is often interpenetrated by water, fire and air and is consequently found to possess savour (taste), colour and tangibility besides odour (smell). Similar is the case with water, etc.

न पार्थिवाप्ययोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । ६७ ॥

न *na*, no ; पार्थिवाप्ययोः *pārthiva-āpyayoḥ*, of the earthy and the watery, of the terrene and aqueous ; प्रत्यक्षत्वात् *pratyakṣa-tvāt*, because of being perceptible.

265. It is, we reply, not so because there is visual perception of the earthy and the watery.

The Naiyayikas meet the foregoing objections by saying that the earth really possesses four qualities, water three, fire two, air one, and ether one. Had the earth possessed only odour (smell) and the water only savour (taste) then it would have been impossible for us to see the earthy and watery things. We are competent to see only those things which possess colour, and if the earth and water had not possessed colour how could we have seen them? Since we can see the earthy and the watery it follows that they possess colour. If you say that earth and water are visible because they are mixed with the fiery things which possess colour, why then the air and ether are also not visible? There is no rule that it is only the earth and water that can be mixed with fiery things but that the air and ether cannot be so mixed. Proceeding in this way we find that the earth, etc. do not each possess only one quality.

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात्तत्तत्प्रधानम् ॥ ३ । १ । ६८ ॥

पूर्वपूर्वगुणोत्कर्षात् pūrva-pūrva-guṇa-utkarṣāt, owing to the predominance of each preceding attribute ; तत्तत्प्रधानं tat-tat-pradhānam, each is predominant attribute of each corresponding element.

266. Owing to the predominance of one quality in an element, a sense is characterised by the quality which pre-dominates in its corresponding element.

The nose is characterised by odour (smell) which predominates in its corresponding element the earth ; the tongue is characterised by savour (taste) which predominates in its corresponding element the water ; the eye is characterised by colour which predominates in its corresponding element the fire ; the skin (touch) is characterised by tangibility which abides in its corresponding element the air while the ear is characterised by sound which is the special quality of its corresponding element the ether.

तद्व्यवस्थानन्तु भूयस्त्वात् ॥ ३ । १ । ६९ ॥

तद्व्यवस्थानं tat- vyavasthānam, distribution thereof ; तु tu, however ; भूयस्त्वात् bhūyastvāt, according to their fitness.

267. A sense as distinguished from its corresponding element is determined by its fineness.

A sense (*e.g.*, the nose) which is the fine part of an element (*e.g.*, the earth) is able to perceive a special object (*e.g.*, odour) owing to the act-force (*saṃskāra*, *karma*) of the person possessing the sense. A sense cannot perceive more than one object because it possesses the predominant quality of an element, *e.g.*, the nose possesses only odour which is the predominant quality of the earth, the tongue the savour of water, the eye the colour of fire, and so on.

सगुणानामिन्द्रियभावात् ॥ ३ । १ । ७० ॥

सगुणानां saguṇānām, of those attended with attributes ; इन्द्रियभावात् indriya-bhāvat, being themselves the senses.

268. A sense is really called as such when it is attended by its quality.

Some may say why a sense (the nose for instance) cannot perceive its own quality (odour). The reply is that a sense consists of an element endowed with its quality. It is only when a sense is attended by the quality that it can see an object. Now in perceiving an object the sense is attended by the quality but in perceiving its own quality it is not so attended. Consequently a sense cannot perceive its own quality.

तेनैव तस्याग्रहणाच्च ॥ ३ । १ । ७१ ॥

तेन tena, by that ; एव eva, alone ; तस्य tasya, its ; अग्रहणात् a-grahanāt, on account of non-apprehension ; च cha, and.

269. Moreover an object is never perceived by itself.

An eye can see an external object but it cannot see itself. On the same principle a sense cannot perceive its own quality.

न शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । १ । ७२ ॥

न na, no ; शब्दगुणोपलब्धेः śabda-guṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of perception of the attribute of sound.

270. It is, some say, not so because the quality of sound is perceived by the ear.

The objection stands thus:—


It is not true that a sense cannot perceive its own quality. The ear, for instance, can perceive sound which is its own quality.

तदुपलब्धिर्नितरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ३ । १ । ७३ ॥

तदुपलब्धिः tat-upalabdhiḥ, its perception ; इतरेतरद्रव्यगुणवैधर्म्यात् itara-
itara-dravya-guṇa- vaidharmyât, from difference from the attribute of
every other substance.

271. The perception of sound furnishes a contrast to that of
other qualities and their corresponding substrata.

The nose, tongue, eye and skin can respectively smell earth, taste
water, see colour and touch air only when they are attended by their
own qualities, viz, odour (smell), savour (taste), colour and tangibility.
But an ear when it hears sound is not attended by any quality. In fact
the ear is identical with the ether and hears sound by itself. By indirect
inference we can prove that sound is the special quality of the ether :
odour is the predominant quality of the earth, savour of water, colour of
the eye, and tangibility of the skin (touch): sound must therefore be the
quality of the remaining element, viz., the ether.



BOOK III, CHAPTER II.

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात् संशयः ॥ ३ । २ । १ ॥

कर्माकाशसाधर्म्यात् karma-ākāśa-sādharmyāt, owing to its resemblance to action and ether ; संशयः samśayaḥ, doubt.

272. Since the intellect resembles both action and ether there is doubt as to whether it is transitory or permanent.

Inasmuch as the intellect bears likeness to both action and ether in respect of intangibility, there arises the question whether it is transitory like an action or permanent like the ether. We find in the intellect the function of origination and decay which marks transitory things as well as the function of recognition which marks permanent things. " I knew the tree," " I know it " and " I shall know it "—these are expressions which involving the ideas of origination and decay indicate our knowledge to be transitory. " I who knew the tree yesterday am knowing it again today "—this is an expression which involving the idea of continuity indicates our knowledge to be permanent. Hence there is doubt as to whether the intellect which exhibits both kinds of knowledge is really transitory or permanent.

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । २ । २ ॥

विषयप्रत्यभिज्ञानात् viṣaya-pratyabhijñānāt, because of recognition of objects.

273. Some say that the intellect is permanent because there is recognition of objects.

The Sāṃkhyas maintain the permanency of the intellect on the ground of its capacity for the recognition of objects. A thing which was known before is known again now—this sort of knowledge is called recognition. It is possible only if knowledge which existed in the past continues also at the present, that is, if knowledge is persistent or permanent. Recognition would have been impossible if knowledge had been transitory. Hence the Sāṃkhyas conclude that the intellect which recognises objects is permanent.

साध्यसमत्वादहेतुः ॥ ३ । २ । ३ ॥

साध्यसमत्वात् sādhya-sama-tvāt, because the proof is the same as the thing to be proved ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no mark.

274. The foregoing reason is not, we say, valid inasmuch as it requires proof like the very subject in dispute..

Whether the intellect is permanent or not—this is the subject in dispute. The Sāṃkhyas affirm that it is permanent and the reason adduced by them is that it can recognise objects. The Naiyāyikas dispute not only the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas but also their reason. They say that the intellect does not recognise objects but it is the soul that does so. Knowledge cannot be attributed to an unconscious instrument, the intellect, but it must be admitted to be a quality of a conscious agent, the soul. If knowledge is not a quality of the soul, what else can be its quality? How is the soul to be defined? There is therefore no proof as to the validity of the reason, viz., that the intellect recognises objects.

न युगपदग्रहणात् ॥ ३ । २ । ४ ॥

न na, no ; युगपद yugapat, simultaneously; अग्रहणात् a-grahṇāt, because of non-perception.

275. Knowledge is neither a mode of the permanent intellect nor identical with it because various sorts of knowledge do not occur simultaneously.

The Sāṃkhyas affirm that knowledge is a mode of the permanent intellect from which it is not different. Knowledge, according to them, is nothing but the permanent intellect modified in the shape of an object which is reflected on it through the senses. The Naiyāyikas oppose this view by saying that if knowledge as a mode of the permanent intellect is not different from it, then we must admit various sorts of knowledge to be permanent. But as a fact various sorts of knowledge are not permanent, that is, we cannot receive various sorts of knowledge simultaneously. Hence knowledge is not identical with the permanent intellect.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने च विनाशप्रसङ्गः ॥ ३ । २ । ५ ॥

अप्रत्यभिज्ञाने a-pratyabhijñāne, during non-recognition ; च cha, and ; विनाशप्रसङ्गः vināśa-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of destruction.

276. And in the cessation of recognition there arises the contingency of cessation of the intellect.

If knowledge as a mode of the intellect is not different from it, then the cessation of recognition which is a kind of knowledge should be followed by the cessation of the intellect. This will upset the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas that the intellect is permanent. Hence knowledge is not identical with the intellect.

क्रमवृत्तित्वादयुगपदग्रहणम् ॥ ३ । २ । ६ ॥

क्रमवृत्तित्वाद् krama-vṛitti-tvât, owing to its operation being successive ; अयुगपत् a-yugapat, non-simultaneous ; ग्रहणम् grahaṇam, reception, apprehension.

277. The reception of different sorts of knowledge is non-simultaneous owing, according to us, to our mind coming in contact with different senses in succession.

The Naiyāyikas say that if knowledge as a mode of the permanent intellect had been identical with it, then there would have been neither a variety of knowledge nor origination and cessation of it. The different sorts of knowledge do not occur simultaneously because they are produced, according to the Naiyāyikas, by the mind which is atomic in dimension coming in contact with the senses in due succession.

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानञ्च विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् ॥ ३ । २ । ७ ॥

अप्रत्यभिज्ञानं a-pratyabhijñānam, non-recognition; च cha, and, विषयान्तरव्यासङ्गात् viṣaya-antara-vyāsaṅgât, due to occupation with another object.

278. The recognition (or knowledge) of an object cannot take place when the mind is drawn away by another object.

We cannot hear a sound by our ear when the mind conjoined with the eye is drawn away by a colour. This shows that knowledge is different from the intellect, and that the mind which is atomic in dimension serves as an instrument for the production of knowledge.

न गत्यभावात् ॥ ३ । २ । ८ ॥

न na, no ; गत्यभावात् gati-abhâvât, because of absence of motion.

279. The intellect cannot be conjoined with the senses in succession because there is no motion in it.

The mind which, according to the Naiyāyikas, is atomic in dimension can move from one sense-organ to another in succession to produce different kinds of knowledge. This is impossible in the case of the intellect which, according to the Sāṃkhyas, is not only permanent but also all-pervading and as such cannot change its place, that is, does not possess the tendency to be conjoined with the different sense-organs in succession. In fact there is only one internal sense called the mind, the other two so-called internal senses—intellect (Buddhi) and self-conceit

(Ahaṃkāra)—being superfluous. It is not all-pervading, and knowledge is not its mode. Knowledge classified as visual, olfactory, etc. is of different kinds which belong to the soul.

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत्तदन्यत्वाभिमानः ३।२।९॥

स्फटिकान्यत्वाभिमानवत् sphaṭika-anyatva-abhimāna-vat, like conceit that a crystal is other than what it is ; तदन्यत्वाभिमानः tat-anyatva-abhimānaḥ, the conceit of its being other than what it is.

280. A conceit of difference is said to arise in the intellect in the same way as the appearance of difference in a crystal.

As a single crystal appears to assume the different colours of different objects which are reflected on it, so the intellect though one appears, according to the Sāṃkhya, to be modified into different sorts of knowledge under the influence of different objects reflected on it through the senses.

स्फटिकेऽप्यपरापरोत्पत्तेः क्षणिकत्वाद्व्यक्तीनामहेतुः॥३।२।१०॥

स्फटिके sphaṭike, in the case of a crystal ; अपि api, even ; अपरापरोत्पत्तेः apara-apara-utpatteḥ, of diverse manifestations one after another ; क्षणिकत्वात् kṣaṇika-tvât, being momentary ; व्यक्तीनां vyaktīnām, of the individual manifestations ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no mark.

281. It is said to be absurd even in the case of a crystal being replaced by newer and newer ones which grow up owing to all individuals being momentary.

The Sāṃkhya says that as a crystal seems to be modified by the colours which are reflected on it, so the intellect seems to be modified by the objects which are reflected on it through the senses. In reality there is, according to the Sāṃkhya, neither any modification of the crystal nor that of the intellect. This theory has in the preceding aphorism been controverted by the Naiyāyikas and is in the present aphorism opposed by the Buddhists. According to the latter all things, including even our body, are momentary. A thing which exists at the present moment grows up into another thing at the next moment so that there is no wonder that in the course of moments there should grow up crystals of different colours or intellects of different modes. Hence the conclusion of the Sāṃkhyas that a crystal remains unaltered is, according to the Buddhists, untenable.

नियमहेत्वभावादयथादर्शनमभ्यन्तज्ञा ॥ ३ । २ । ११ ॥

नियमहेत्वभावात् niyama-hetu-abhāvāt, owing to the absence of any reason for the rule (of growth and decay) ; यथादर्शनं yathā-darśanam, exactly as seen ; अभ्यनुज्ञा abhyanuññā, assent.

282. Owing to the absence of any absolute rule we shall give our assent according to the nature of each occurrence.

It is not true that in every case there are at each moment newer growths. Our body no doubt undergoes increase and decrease but a piece of stone or a crystal does not, so that the doctrine of growth applies to the first case but not to the second. Hence there is no general rule that a thing at the lapse of a moment should be replaced by another thing which grows up in its place. *

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । २ । १२ ॥

न na, no ; उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-upalabdheḥ, because of the perception of the cause of production and destruction.

283. There is no absence of link as we perceive the cause of growth and decay.

The growth of a thing is the increase of its parts while the decay is the decrease of them. An ant-hill gradually increases in dimension before it attains its full growth while a pot decreases in dimension before it reaches its final decay. We never find an instance in which a thing decays without leaving any connecting link for another thing which grows in its place. There is in fact no linkless growth or linkless decay.

क्षीरविनाशे कारणानुपलब्धिवददध्युत्पत्तिवच्च

तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ३ । २ । १३ ॥

क्षीरविनाशे kṣīra-vināśe, in the case of the destruction of milk ; कारणानुपलब्धिवत् kāraṇa-anupalabdhi-vat, like the non-perception of the cause ; दध्युत्पत्तिवत् dadhi-utpatti-vat, like the production of curd ; च cha, and ; तदुत्पत्तिः tat-utpattiḥ, its production.

284. The growth of newer crystals in the place of an old one is comparable, according to some, to the growth of curd in the place of milk the cause of whose decay is not perceived.

The Buddhist says that there are things which grow and decay without the gradual increase and decrease of their parts. Of such things we do not find the cause of the first growth (origination) and the last decay (cessation), that is, there is no link between the thing which ceases

and another thing which grows in its place. The milk, for instance, ceases without leaving any connecting link for the curd which grows in its place. Similarly new crystals grow to take the place of an old one which decays without leaving any mark. The crystal which exists at the present moment is not the same one that existed at the previous moment. There is no connection whatsoever between them.

लिङ्गतोग्रहणान्नानुपलब्धिः ॥ ३ । २ । १४ ॥

लिङ्गतः *liṅgataḥ*, from the mark ; ग्रहणात् *grahaṇāt*, from perception ; न *na*, not ; अनुपलब्धिः *an-upalabdhiḥ*, non-perception.

285. There is no non-perception of the cause of final decay as it is cognisable by its mark.

The Naiyāyikas say that it is not true that we do not perceive the final decay of the milk which is the cause of the first growth of the curd. The mark attending the final decay of milk (that is, the disappearance of sweet flavour) is the cause of the destruction of the milk, and that attending the first growth of curd (that is, the appearance of acid flavour) is the cause of its production. So through the mark we really perceive the cause of decay of milk and growth of curd. But there is no such mark perceptible in the case of a crystal which at the lapse of a moment is said to be replaced by another crystal of a different character.

न पयसः परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् ॥ ३ । २ । १५ ॥

न *na*, not ; पयसः *payasaḥ*, of milk ; परिणामगुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावात् *pariṇāma-guṇa antara-prādurbhāvāt*, owing to the appearance or evolution of a different attribute or quality in virtue of transformation,

286. There is, it is alleged, no destruction of the milk but only a change of its quality.

The Sāṃkhya says that the milk as a substance is not destroyed to produce another substance called curd. In reality a quality of the milk, *viz* sweet flavour, is changed into another quality, *viz.*, acid flavour.

व्यूहान्तराद्द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं पूर्वद्रव्यनि-

वृत्तेरनुमानम् ॥ ३ । २ । १६ ॥

व्यूहान्तरात् *vyūha-antarāt*, from one set (of causes) ; द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदर्शनं *dravya-antara-utpatti-darśanam*, observation of the production of another

substance ; पूर्वद्रव्यनिवृत्तेः pūrva-dravya-nivṛtteḥ, of the cessation of the previous substance , अनुमानम् anumānam, inference.

287. Seeing that a thing grows from another thing whose parts are disjoined, we infer that the latter thing is destroyed.

Seeing that a thing grows after the component parts of another thing have been disjoined, we infer that the latter thing has really been destroyed. The curd, for instance, is not produced until the component parts of the milk have been destroyed. This shows that the growth of curd follows the decay of milk.

क्वचिद्विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः क्वचिच्चाप-

लब्धेरनेकान्तः ॥ ३ । २ । १७ ॥

क्वचित् kvachit, in some cases ; विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśa-kāraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, from the non-perception of the cause of destruction ; क्वचित् kva chit, in some cases ; च cha, and ; उपलब्धेः upalabdheḥ, from perception ; अनेकान्तः an-eka-antaḥ, not-one-ended, uncertain.

288. There will be an uncertainty of conclusion on the assumption that the cause of destruction is perceived in some cases and not perceived in others.

In the case of a jar being produced out of a piece of clay you say you perceive the cause of destruction of the clay and production of the jar, but in the case of the curd growing out of milk you say that you do not perceive the cause of destruction of the milk and production of the curd. This sort of perception in certain cases and non-perception in others will lead to an uncertainty of conclusion. As a fact in every case there is perception of the cause of destruction. Milk, for instance, is destroyed when there is the contact of an acid substance.

नेन्द्रियार्थयोस्तद्विनाशेऽपि ज्ञानावस्थानात् ॥ ३।२।१८ ॥

न na, not ; इन्द्रियार्थयोः indriya-arthayoḥ, of the sense and of the object ; तद्विनाशे tat-vināśe, on their destruction ; अपि api, also ; ज्ञानावस्थानात् jñāna-avasthānāt, from the continuance of cognition.

289. Knowledge belongs neither to the sense nor to the object because it continues even on the destruction thereof.

If knowledge had been a quality of the sense, it could not continue after the sense had been destroyed. But knowledge in the form of memory

is found actually to abide even after the sense has perished. Hence the sense is not the abode of knowledge. Similarly it may be proved that knowledge does not abide in the object.

युगपज्ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेश्च न मनसः ॥ ३ । २ । १९ ॥

युगपत् *yugapat*, simultaneously ; ज्ञेयानुपलब्धेः *jñeya-an-upalabdheḥ*, from the non-perception of the knowables ; च *cha*, and ; न *na*, not ; मनसः *manasaḥ*, of the mind.

290. It does not also belong to the mind the existence of which is inferred from the knowables not being perceived simultaneously.

As two or more things cannot be known (perceived) simultaneously, it is to be concluded that the mind which is an instrument of our knowledge is atomic in dimension. If we supposed this mind to be the abode of knowledge we could not call it an instrument in the acquisition of the same ; and knowledge as a quality of an atom would in that case become imperceptible. An atomic mind as the abode of our knowledge would stand moreover in the way of a *yogi* perceiving many things simultaneously through many sensuous bodies formed by his magical power.

तदात्मगुणत्वेऽपि तुल्यम् ॥ ३ । २ । २० ॥

तत् *tat*, it, the objection ; आत्मगुणत्वे *ātma-guṇa-tve*, were (cognition) an attribute of the soul ; अपि *api*, also ; तुल्यम् *tulyam*, the same.

291. Even if knowledge were a quality of the soul it would, says some one, give rise to similar absurdities..

The objection stands thus:—If the soul which is all-pervading were the abode of knowledge, there would be the simultaneous perceptions of many things in virtue of different sense-organs coming in contact with the soul simultaneously. But two or more things are never perceived simultaneously : the soul cannot therefore be the abode of knowledge, that is, knowledge cannot be a quality of the soul.

इन्द्रियमनसः सन्निकर्षाभावात् तदनुत्पत्तिः ॥ ३ । २ । २१ ॥

इन्द्रियैः *indriyaiḥ*, with the senses ; मनसः *manasaḥ*, of the mind ; सन्निकर्षाभावात् *saunnikarṣa-abhāvāt*, owing to absence of contact or connection ; तदनुत्पत्तिः *tat-an-utpattiḥ*, non-production of simultaneous cognitions.

292. There is, we reply, non-production of simultaneous cognitions on account of the absence of contact of the mind with many sense-organs at a time..

The Naiyāyikas say that the soul cannot perceive an object unless the latter comes in contact with a sense which is conjoined with the mind. Though many objects can come in proximity with their corresponding senses simultaneously, the mind which is atomic in dimension can come in conjunction with only one sense at a time. Hence two or more things are not perceived simultaneously although the soul which perceives them is all-pervading.

नोत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात् ॥३१२२॥

न na, no ; उत्पत्तिकारणानपदेशात् utpatti-kāraṇa-an-apadeśāt, owing to non-predication of cause of production.

293 This is held by some to be untenable as there is no ground for the production of knowledge.

The objection stands thus:—It has been argued by the Naiyāyikas that there is absence of production of simultaneous cognitions on account of the lack of contact of the senses with the mind. An opponent takes exception to the word “ production ” and says that knowledge cannot be said to be produced if it is regarded as a quality of the soul which is eternal.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेश्चावस्थाने तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः ॥३१२३॥

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धेः vināśak-āraṇa-an-upalabdheḥ, owing to non-perception of the cause of destruction ; च cha, and ; अवस्थाने avasthāne, in the case of the existence (of cognition in the soul), तन्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः tat-nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of its eternality.

294. If knowledge is supposed to abide in the soul there is the contingency of its being eternal as there is perceived no cause of its destruction.

Knowledge can never be destroyed if it is supposed to be a quality of the soul. A quality may be destroyed in two ways—(1) either by the destruction of its abode, or (2) by the production of an opposite quality in its place. In the case of knowledge neither of these is possible as the soul which is its abode is eternal and as we find no opposite quality taking its place. Hence it follows that if knowledge is a quality of the soul it is eternal. But as knowledge is not eternal it is not a quality of the soul.

अनित्यत्वग्रहाद्व्युद्भूतद्यन्तराद्विनाशः शब्दवत् ॥३१२४॥

अनित्यत्वग्रहात् a-nitya-tva-grahāt, from the observation of non-

eternality ; बुद्धेः buddheḥ, of cognition ; बुद्धयन्तरात् buddhi-antarāt, from another cognition ; विनाशः vināśaḥ, destruction ; शब्दवत् śabda-vat, as in the case of sound.

295. Cognitions being found to be non-eternal there is, we reply, destruction of one cognition by another like that of a sound.

We realize that cognition (knowledge) is not eternal when we observe that at one time there arises in us a certain kind of cognition (knowledge) and at the next time that cognition (knowledge) vanishes giving rise to another kind of cognition (knowledge). It has been asked how cognitions undergo destruction. Our reply is that one cognition vanishes as soon as it is replaced by another cognition which is opposed to it just as a sound-wave is destroyed by another sound-wave which takes its place.

**ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षान्मनसः स्मृत्युत्पत्तेर्न युग-
पदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ३ । २ । २५ ॥**

ज्ञानसमवेतात्मप्रदेशसन्निकर्षात् jñāna-samaveta-ātma-pradeśa-sannikarṣāt, from contact with a certain part of the soul in which cognition (in the form of impression) inheres ; मनसः manasaḥ of the mind ; स्मृत्युत्पत्तेः smṛiti-utpatteḥ, because of the production of recollection ; न na, not ; युगपत् yugapat, simultaneous ; उत्पत्तिः utpattiḥ, production.

296. Since recollection (memory) is produced, according to some, by the conjunction of the mind with a certain part of the soul in which knowledge (impression) inheres, there is no simultaneous production of many recollections.

If knowledge be a quality of the soul there is the possibility of many recollections being produced simultaneously inasmuch as the many impressions deposited in our soul by our past perceptions are liable at once to be revived and developed into recollections by the mind whose contact with the soul always remains constant. Some say that there is no such possibility of simultaneousness because recollections are produced, according to them, by the mind coming in contact with particular parts of the soul in which particular impressions inhere. As the mind cannot come in contact with all parts of the soul simultaneously, the many impressions deposited in different parts of the soul are not revived and developed into recollections at once.

नान्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वान्मनसः ॥ ३ । २ । २६ ॥

न na, not ; अन्तःशरीरवृत्तित्वात् antah-śarīra-vṛitti-tvāt, because it has its operation within the body ; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

297. This is, we reply, not so because it is within the body that the mind has its function.

It has been said in the preceding aphorism that recollections are produced by the mind coming in due order in conjunction with particular parts of the soul in which impressions inhere. This is, according to the Naiyāyikas, untenable because the mind cannot come in conjunction with the soul except in the body, and if the conjunction takes place in the body then there remains the possibility of simultaneous recollections.

साध्यत्वादहेतुः ॥ ३ । २ । २७ ॥

साध्यत्वात् sādhyatvāt, because it is the thing to be established ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

298. This is, some say, no reason because it requires to be proved.

The Naiyāyikas say that the mind comes in conjunction with the soul only within the limit of the body. Some oppose this by saying that until they receive sufficient proof they cannot admit that the conjunction takes place only in the body.

स्मरतः शरीरधारणोपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । २ । २८ ॥

स्मरतः smarataḥ, of the person recollecting ; शरीरधारणोपपत्तेः śarīra-dhāraṇa-upapatteḥ, because of the fact of his sustaining the body ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratisēdhaḥ, non-contradiction.

299. It is, we reply, not unreasonable because a person is found to sustain his body even while he performs an act of recollection.

If we suppose that a recollection is produced by the mind coming in conjunction with a particular part of the soul outside the body, we cannot account for the body being sustained during the time when the recollection is performed. The body in order that it may be sustained requires an effort which is supplied by the mind coming in conjunction with the soul. Now the effort which arises from the conjunction is of two kinds, viz., (1) the effort for sustaining, and (2) that for impelling (setting in motion). The body will be devoid of the first kind of effort if we suppose the mind to wander away from it for conjunction with the soul.

न तदाशुगतित्वान्मनसः ॥ ३ । २ । २९ ॥

न na, no; तत् tat, this; आगुगतिरन्तः āgu-gati-trāt, owing to swiftness; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind

300. This is, some say, not so because the mind moves swiftly.

Some meet the objection raised in the preceding aphorism by saying that the mind while producing a recollection by its conjunction with the soul outside the body can, on account of its swift motion, come back at once to the body to produce the effort required for the sustenance of the same.

न स्मरणकालानियमात् ॥ ३१३० ॥

न na, no; स्मरणकालानियमात् smaraṇa-kāla-aniyamāt, as there is no rule as to the time of recollection.

301. It is, we reply, not so because there is no fixed rule as to the duration of recollection.

The Naiyāyikas oppose the view expressed in the foregoing aphorism on the ground that the mind, if it is to be conjoined with the soul outside the body, may take a pretty long time to produce a recollection there, so that it may not come back to the body with sufficient quickness to produce the effort required for the sustenance of it.

आत्मप्रेरणयदुच्छाज्जताभिश्च न संयोगविशेषः ॥ ३१३१ ॥

आत्मप्रेरणयदुच्छाज्जताभिः ātma-preraṇa-yat-ricchehlā jña-tā-bhiḥ, in virtue of a direction of the soul, spontaneity or chance, and the characteristic of its being the knower, च cha, and; न na, no; संयोगविशेषः saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ, particular conjunction.

302. There is no peculiar conjunction of the soul with the mind either in virtue of the former sending the latter in search of what it wishes to recollect or through the latter being cognizant of what is to be recollected or through arbitrariness.

If we suppose the soul to send the mind to recollect a particular thing we encounter the absurdity of admitting that the soul already possesses the memory of what it is going to recollect. If on the other hand we suppose the mind to move out of its own accord for a particular recollection, we shall have to assume that the mind is the knower but in reality it is not so. We cannot even hold that the mind comes in conjunction with the soul arbitrarily for in that case there will remain no order then as to the occurrence of the objects of recollection.

व्यासक्तमनसः पादव्यथनेन संयोगविशेषेण समानम्॥३।२।३२॥

व्यासक्तमनसः vyāsakta-manasaḥ, of a man whose mind is absorbed in something else ; **पादव्यथनेन** pāda-vyathanena, by the hurting of his foot ; **संयोगविशेषेण** saṃyoga-viśeṣeṇa, with the particular conjunction ; **समानम्** samānam, similar.

303. This is, some say, parallel to the particular conjunction which occurs in a man who while rapt in mind hurts his foot.

If a man while looking eagerly at dancing hurts his foot with a thorn, he feels pain because his mind comes instantly in conjunction with his soul at the foot which has been hurt. Similarly the peculiar conjunction referred to in the foregoing aphorism takes place, according to some, through the mind being cognizant of what is to be recollected.

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानामयुगपद्भावादयुगपत्स्मरणम्॥३।२।३३॥

प्रणिधानलिङ्गादिज्ञानानां praṇidhāna-liṅga-ādi-jñānānām, of concentration and cognition of the marks, etc ; **अयुगपद्भावाद्** a-yugapat bhāvāt, owing to non-simultaneousness ; **अयुगपत्** a-yugapat, non-simultaneous ; **स्मरणं** smaraṇam, recollection.

304. Recollections are not simultaneous owing to the non-simultaneousness of the efforts of attention, operations of stimuli, etc.

A recollection is produced by the mind coming in conjunction with the soul in which impressions inhere. The production of recollection also presupposes efforts of attention, operations of stimuli, etc. As these do not occur simultaneously there is no simultaneousness of recollections.

ज्ञस्येच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वादारम्भनिवृत्त्योः ॥ ३ । २ । ३४ ॥

ज्ञस्य jñasya, of the knower ; **इच्छाद्वेषनिमित्तत्वाद्** ichchhā-dveṣa-nimittatvāt, because of their being caused by desire and aversion ; **आरम्भनिवृत्त्योः** ārambha-nivṛtityoh, of action and inaction.

305. Desire and aversion belong to the soul inasmuch as they are the causes of its doing an act or forbearing from doing the same.

The Sāṃkhyas say that knowledge is a quality of the soul (Puruṣa) while desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the qualities of

the internal sense (the mind). This is, according to the Naiyāyikas, unreasonable because a person does an act or forbear from doing it on account of a certain desire for or aversion against the same. The desire and aversion again are caused by the knowledge of pleasure and pain respectively. Hence it is established that knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain have all of them a single abode, that is, they are the qualities of a single substance called the soul.

तल्लिङ्गत्वादिच्छाद्वेषयोः पार्थिवाद्येष्वप्रतिषेधः ॥३२॥३५॥

तल्लिङ्गत्वात् tat-liṅga-tvât, because they are their marks ; इच्छाद्वेषयोः ichchhâ dveṣayoh, of desire and aversion ; पार्थिवाद्येषु pārthiva-âdyeṣu, in respect of the terrene, etc ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ non-obstruction.

306. It cannot, some say, be denied that desire and aversion belong to the body inasmuch as they are indicated by activity and forbearance from activity.

The Chârṇvâkas say that activity and forbearance from activity are the marks respectively of desire and aversion which again are the effects of knowledge. Now the body which is made of earth, etc. is the abode (field) of activity and forbearance from activity. Hence it is also the abode of knowledge, desire, aversion, etc.

परश्चादिष्वारम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥ ३ । २ । ३६ ॥

परश्चादिषु paraśu-âdiṣu, in the axe, etc ; आरम्भनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् ârambha-nivṛitti-darśanât, from the observation of action and inaction.

307. This is, we reply, unreasonable because activity and forbearance from activity are found in the axes and the like.

Just as an axe, which is found sometimes to split a tree and at other times not to split it, is not a receptacle of knowledge, desire and aversion, so the body which is made of earth, etc. is not an abode of knowledge, etc., though we may find activity and forbearance from activity in it.

नियमानियमौ तु तद्विशेषकौ ॥ ३ । २ । ३७ ॥

नियमानियमौ niyama-aniyamau, regularity and irregularity ; तु tu, but ; तद्विशेषकौ tat-viśeṣakau, their distinguishing marks.

308. The regularity and irregularity of possession demarcate the soul and matter.

A material thing is by nature inactive but becomes endowed with activity when it is moved by a conscious agent. There is no such irregularity or uncertainty as to the possession of activity, etc. by the soul. Knowledge, desire, aversion, etc. abide in the soul through an intimate connection, while these belong to matter through a mediate connection. We cannot account for the function of recognition, etc. if we assume knowledge to abide in the material atoms a conglomeration of which forms the body. Those who suppose the body to be the seat of knowledge cannot admit the efficacy of deserts and can offer no consolation to sufferers.

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यादकृताभ्यागमाच्च न मनसः ॥३१॥३२॥

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाद् yathokta-hetu-tvât, for the reasons already given; पारतन्त्र्याद् pâratantryât, from subserviency; अकृताभ्यागमाद् a-kṛita-abhyâgamât, from usurpation of the unearned; च cha, and; न na, not; मनसः manasaḥ, of the mind.

309. The mind is not the seat of knowledge on account of reasons already given, on account of its being subject to an agent and owing to its incapacity to reap the fruits of another's deeds.

The mind cannot be the seat of knowledge because it has already been shown in aphorism 1. 1. 10 that desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the marks of the soul. Had the mind been the abode of knowledge it could have come in contact with the objects of sense independent of any agent. Since it cannot do so it is to be admitted to be a material thing serving the purpose of an instrument in the acquisition of knowledge. If you say that the mind itself is the agent you will have to admit that it is not an atom but possessed of magnitude like the soul so that it can apprehend knowledge, etc. which are its qualities. In order to avoid the simultaneousness of many perceptions it will further be necessary to assume an internal sense of an atomic dimension like the mind as we understand it. These assumptions will lead you to accept in some shape the tenets of the Naiyāyikas. On the supposition of the mind (or body) being the seat of knowledge and consequently of merits and demerits, it will be possible for work done by a person not to produce its effects on him after death and it may even necessitate a person to suffer for work not done by him. Hence the mind is not the seat of knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain.

परिशेषाद्यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेश्च ॥ ३ । २ । ३६ ॥

परिशेषात् pariśeṣāt, by exhaustion; यथोक्तहेतूपपत्तेः yathâ-ukta-hetu-upa-
patteḥ, from the operation of the reasons already given; च cha, and.

310. Knowledge, etc. must be admitted to be qualities of the soul by the principle of exclusion and on account of arguments already adduced.

Knowledge is a quality which inheres in a substance. That substance is neither the body nor the sense nor the mind. It must therefore be the soul. The body cannot be the abode of knowledge because it is a material substance like a pot, cloth, etc. Knowledge cannot belong to the sense as the latter is an instrument like an axe. Had the sense been the abode of knowledge there could not be any recollection of things which were experienced by the sense before it was destroyed. If knowledge were a quality of the mind many perceptions could be simultaneous. But this is impossible. Hence the abode of knowledge is not the mind, but it is the soul which is permanent so that it can perceive a thing now as well as remember one perceived in the past.

स्मरणन्त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् ॥ ३ । २ । ४० ॥

स्मरणं smaraṇam, recollection; तु tu, but; आत्मनः ātmanah, of the soul; ज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् jñā-svābhāvyāt, because its nature is to be the knower.

311. Memory belongs to the soul which possesses the character of a knower.—43.

The soul is competent to recollect a thing because it possesses the knowledge of the past, present and future.

**प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रि-
तसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधा-
नसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयाऽर्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः**

॥ ३ । २ । ४१ ॥

प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरो-
धातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयाऽर्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः; prañidhāna-
nibandha-abhyāsa-liṅga-lakṣaṇa-sādṛśya-parigraha-āśraya-āśrita-samban-
dha-ānantarya-viyoga-eka-kārya-virodha-atīśaya-prāpti-vyavadhāna-sukha-
duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-bhaya-arthitva-kriyā-rāga-dharma-adharma-nimit-
tebhyaḥ, from the causes of concentration, context, repetition, mark, cha-
racteristic, similarity, relationship, container, contained, connectio n,

immediacy, separation, co-efficient, opposition, excess, acquisition, distance, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, entreaty, action, passion, merit and demerit.

312. Memory is awakened by such causes as attention, context, exercise, signs, marks, likeness, possession, relation of refuge and refugee, immediate subsequence, separation, similar employment, opposition, excess, receipt, intervention, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, fear, entreaty, action, affection and merit and demerit.

Attention—enables us to fix the mind on one object by checking it from wandering away to any other object.

Context—is the connection of subjects such as proof, that which is to be proved, etc.

Exercise—is the constant repetition which confirms an impression.

Signs—may be (1) connected, (2) inseparable (intimate), (3) correlated or (4) opposite, e.g., smoke is a sign of fire with which it is connected; horn is a sign of a cow from which it is inseparable an arm is a sign of a leg with which it is correlated; and the non-existent is a sign of the existent by the relation of opposition.

Mark—a mark on the body of a horse awakens the memory of the stable in which it was kept.

Likeness—as the image of Devadatta drawn on a board reminds us of the real person.

Possession—such as a property awakens the memory of the owner and *vice versa*.

Refuge and refugee—such as a king and his attendants.

Immediate subsequence—as sprinkling the rice and pounding it in a wooden mortar.

Separation—as of husband and wife.

Similar employment—as of fellow-disciples.

Opposition—as between a snake and ichneumon.

Excess—awakening the memory of that which exceeded.

Receipt—reminding us of one from whom something has been or will be received.

Intervention—such as a sheath reminding us of the sword.

Pleasure and pain—reminding us of that which caused them.

Desire and aversion—reminding us of one whom we liked or hated.

Fear—reminding us of that which caused it, e g , death.

Entreaty—reminding us of that which was wanted or prayed for.

Action—such as a chariot reminding us of the charioteer.

Affection—as recollecting a son or wife.

Merit and demerit—through which there is recollection of the causes of joy and sorrow experienced in a previous life.

कर्मनवस्थायिग्रहणात् ॥ ३ । २ । ४२ ॥

कर्मनवस्थायिग्रहणात् karma-anavasthâyi-grahanât, because of the cognisance of momentary events by action.

313. Knowledge perishes instantly because all actions are found to be transitory.

Does knowledge perish instantly like a sound or does it continue like a pot ? Knowledge perishes as soon as it is produced in virtue of its being an action. In analysing an action, such as the falling of an arrow, we find that the arrow undergoes a series of movements in the course of its falling to the ground. Similarly in examining an act of knowledge we find that a series of steps are undergone by the act in the course of its production. These steps perish one after another in due succession. Hence it is clear that knowledge is transitory. If knowledge were permanent we could say, "I am preceiving a pot," even after the pot has been removed from our sight. Since we cannot use such an expression we must admit that knowledge is not permanent but transitory.

अव्यक्तग्रहणमनवस्थायित्वा विद्युत्सम्पाते रूपाव्यक्त- ग्रहणवत् ॥ ३ । २ । ४३ ॥

अव्यक्तग्रहणं a-vyakta-grahanam, cognition of the indistinct; अनवस्थायित्वात् an avasthâyi-tvât, being unenduring; विद्युत्सम्पाते vidyut-sampâte, on the flash of lightning; रूपाव्यक्तग्रहणवत् rūpa-avyakta-grahana-vat, like the indistinct cognition of form.

314. An opponent fears that if knowledge were transitory no object could be known distinctly just as there is no distinct apprehension of colour during a flash of lightning.

The fear of the opponent arises thus :—If knowledge were transitory it could not at a moment apprehend an object in its entirety, that is, could not apprehend the infinite number of its properties at once. Hence the object could only be known indistinctly. As a fact, however, we can know things distinctly. Hence knowledge is not transitory.

हेतूपादानात् प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा ॥ ३ । २ । ४४ ॥

हेतूपादानात् *hetu upādânât*, from the reason advanced, प्रतिषेद्धव्याभ्यनुज्ञा *pratisheddhavya-abhyanuñjâ*, admission of what is sought to be disproved.

315. From the argument advanced you have, we reply, to admit that which you went to disprove.

In the previous aphorism the opponent feared that if knowledge were transitory no object could be apprehended distinctly. The Naiyāyika removes the fear by saying that objects are apprehended indistinctly not owing to the transitoriness of knowledge but on account of our apprehending only their general qualities. The knowledge which takes cognizance of objects as possessed of both the general and special qualities is distinct but that which concerns itself only with the general qualities is indistinct.

The aphorism may be explained in another way:—The very illustration cited by you, *viz*, that there is distinct apprehension during a flash of lightning leads you to admit the transitoriness of knowledge which you went to disprove.

*** प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्यभिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्तद्ग्रहणम् ॥३।२।४५॥**

प्रदीपार्चिःसन्तत्य भिव्यक्तग्रहणवत्. *pradīpa-archiḥ-santati-abhivyakta-graṇa-vat*, like the apprehension of that which is illuminated by the stream of the rays of the lamp ; तद्ग्रहणं *tat-graṇam*, distinct apprehension.

316. Although knowledge is transitory there is distinct apprehension through it as there is one through the series of momentary rays of a lamp.

Though the series of rays emitted by a lamp are transitory the apprehension through them is distinct. Similarly though our knowledge is transitory there is no obstacle to our apprehension being distinct.

द्रव्ये स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः संशयः ॥ ३ । २ । ४६ ॥

द्रव्ये *dravye*, in a substance; स्वगुणपरगुणोपलब्धेः *sva-guṇa-paragūṇa-*

* Vāhaspatī reads a *n*, to show that the opponent's apprehension is unfounded.

upalabdheḥ, from the perception of its own as well as of other attributes ; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

317. From our perceiving in a substance the qualities of itself as well as of others there arises, says an opponent, a doubt as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a quality of its own.

In water we perceive liquidity which is one of its natural qualities as well as warmth which is an adventitious one. One may therefore ask as to whether the knowledge perceived in our body is a natural quality of the latter or is a mere adventitious one.

यावच्छरीरभावित्वादूर्पादीनाम् ॥ ३ । २ । ४७ ॥

यावच्छरीरभावित्वान् yāvat śarīra-bhāvi-tvāt, because (form, etc.) endure as long as the body does ; रूपादीनां rūpa-ādīnām, of form, etc.

318. [Knowledge is not a natural quality of the body because it furnishes a contrast to] colour, etc. which as natural qualities of the body do exist as long as the latter continues.

Knowledge, according to the Naiyāyika, is not a natural quality of the body because it may not continue quite as long as the body does. But such is not the case with colour, etc. which as natural qualities of the body do always exist with it. Hence knowledge is merely an adventitious quality of the body.

न पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ३ । २ । ४८ ॥

न na, no ; पाकजगुणान्तरोत्पत्तेः pāka-ja-guṇa-antara-utpatteh, because of the production of other attributes caused by the action of heat.

319. It is, says an opponent, not so because other qualities produced by maturation do arise.

It has been stated that a substance and its natural qualities co-exist with each other and that knowledge not being always co-existent with the body is not a natural quality of the latter. An opponent in order to maintain that a substance and its natural qualities are not necessarily co-existent cites the instance of a jar whose natural colour is blue but which assumes a red colour through maturation in fire.

प्रतिद्वन्द्वसिद्धेः पाकजानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । २ । ४९ ॥

प्रतिद्वन्द्वेः pratidvandvi siddheh, from the production of opposites ;
 वाक्यानाम् Ākajñān, in the case of attributes caused by the action of
 heat ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction

320. This is, we reply, no opposition because maturation occurs if there is production of opposite qualities.

A jar which was blue may through maturation become red but it is never totally deprived of colour which is its natural quality. But a body (dead) may be totally devoid of knowledge which is therefore not a natural quality of it. In the case of maturation moreover a quality is replaced by an opposite one with which it cannot co-abide, e. g., the blueness of a jar may through maturation assume redness but cannot co-abide with the same. In the case of the body however knowledge is not replaced by an opposite quality. Hence knowledge is not a natural quality of the body.

शरीरव्यापित्वात् ॥ ३ । २ । ५० ॥

शरीरव्यापित्वात् śarīra-vyāpi-tvāt, because it pervades the body.

321. [Knowledge, says an opponent, is a natural quality] because it pervades the whole body.

The opponent tries to prove that knowledge is a natural quality of the body because it pervades, according to him, the whole body and the numerous parts of it. But this, according to the Naiyāyika, is unreasonable as it leads to the assumption of numerous seats of knowledge, that is, souls in the body destructive of all order and system as to the feeling of pleasure, pain, etc.

न केशनखादिष्वनुपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । २ । ५१ ॥

na, no ; केशनखारिषु keśa-nakha-āliṣu, in the hair, nails, etc ; अनुपलब्धेः an-upalabdheh, because of non-perception.

322. [Knowledge does not pervade the whole body] as it is not found in the hair, nails, etc.

Knowledge does not pervade the whole body, e. g., it is not found in the hair, nails, etc. It cannot therefore be a natural quality of the body.

This aphorism may also be explained as follows:—

It is not true that a substance should be entirely pervaded by its natural qualities. Colour, for instance, is a natural quality of the body but it does not pervade the hair, nails, etc.

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वाच्छरीरस्य केशनखादिष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥३।२।५२॥

त्वक्पर्यन्तत्वात् tvak-paryanta-tvât, because of ending with the skin; शरीरस्य śarīrasya, of the body; केशनखादिषु keśa-nakha-ādiṣu, in the hair, nails, etc., अप्रसङ्गः a-prasaṅgaḥ, non-following.

323. The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there is, says an opponent, no possibility of knowledge abiding in the hair, nails, etc.

The hair, nails, etc. are not, according to the opponent, part of the body as they are not bounded by touch (cuticle). Knowledge cannot consequently abide in them

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows :—

The body being bounded by touch (cuticle) there is no possibility of colour abiding in the hair, nails, etc.

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ३ । २ । ५३ ॥

शरीरगुणवैधर्म्यात् śarīra-guṇa-vaidharmyât, from dissimilarity to attributes of the body

324. Knowledge, we reply, is not a quality of the body because of its difference from the well-known qualities of the same.

The Naiyāyika says :—

The qualities of the body are of two kinds, viz: (1) those which are cognised by the external senses e. g., colour, and (2) those which are not cognised by them, e. g., gravity. Knowledge does not come under either of the categories as it is uncognizable by the external senses and is at the same time cognizable on account of our being aware of the same.

The aphorism may also be explained as follows :—

The qualities of the body are cognized by the external senses but knowledge is not so cognized. Consequently knowledge cannot be a quality of the body.

न रूपादीनामितरेतरवैधर्म्यात् ॥ ३ । २ । ५४ ॥

न na, no; रूपादीनां rūpa-ādīnām, of form, etc.; इतरेतरवैधर्म्यात् itara-itara-vaidharmyât, from dissimilarity of one to another.

325. This is, says the opponent, not so because of the mutual difference in character of the colour, etc.

The opponent argues :—

If you say that knowledge is not a quality of the body because it differs in character from other well-known qualities of the same, I should say that the well-known qualities themselves differ from each other, *e. g.*, the colour is cognized by the eye but the touch is not. You cannot on this ground say that colour is a quality of the body but touch is not.

ऐन्द्रियकत्वादरूपादीनामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ३ । २ । ५५ ॥

ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् *aindriyaka-tvât*, from being sensible; रूपादीनाम् *rûpa-âdinâm*, of form, etc; अप्रतिषेधः *a-pratisedhaḥ*, non-contradiction.

326. There is, we reply, no objection to colour, etc. being qualities of the body because these are cognized by senses.

The colour, etc. may differ from touch, etc. in respect of certain aspect of their character but they all agree in one respect, *viz*, that they are all cognisable by one or another of the external senses. But knowledge is not so cognized and cannot therefore be a quality of the body.

ज्ञानायौगपद्यादेकं मनः ॥ ३ । २ । ५६ ॥

ज्ञानायौगपद्यात् *jñāna-ayaugapadyât*, from non-simultaneity of cognitions; एकं *ekam*, one, मनः *manah*, mind.

327. The mind is one on account of the non-simultaneousness of cognitions.

If there were more minds than one, they could come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could be produced simultaneously. As many cognitions are never produced at once the mind must be admitted to be one.

न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः ॥ ३ । २ । ५७ ॥

न *na*, no; युगपत् *yugapat*, simultaneously; अनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः *an-ekakriyâ-upalabdheḥ*, from the perception of more than one action or change.

328. It is, says an opponent, not so because we do cognize many acts simultaneously.

The objection stands thus:—A certain teacher while walking on a road holds a waterpot in his hand. Hearing wild sounds he, out of fear, looks at the road, recites a sacred text and thinks of the nearest place

of safety. The teacher is supposed in this instance to perform visual perception, auditory perception, recollection, etc., simultaneously. This would be impossible if there were only one mind.

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत्तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् ॥ ३ । २ । ५८ ॥

अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् *alâta-chakra-darśina-vat*, like the observation of a circle of fire caused by a revolving firebrand ; तदुपलब्धिः *tat-upalabdhīḥ*, their perception ; आशुसंचारात् *âśu-sañchâ ât*, from rapid movement.

329. The appearance of simultaneousness is, we reply, due to the mind coming in contact with different senses in rapid succession like the appearance of a circle of firebrand.

Just as a firebrand while whirling quickly appears to form a continuous circle, so the mind moving from one sense to another in rapid succession appears to come in contact with them simultaneously. Hence the cognitions produced by the contact appear to the simultaneous though in reality they are successive.

यथोक्तहेतुत्वाच्चाणुः ॥ ३ । २ । ५९ ॥

यथोक्तहेतुत्वात् *yathâ-ukta-hetu-tvât*, from the reasons already stated ; चा *cha*, and ; अणुः *aṇuh*, atomic.

330. And on account of the aforesaid reasons the mind is an atom.

If the mind were possessed of magnitude it could come in contact with many senses at a time so that many cognitions could take place simultaneously. Since this has been found to be impossible the mind is an atom.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात्तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ३ । २ । ६० ॥

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् *pûrva-kṛita-phala-anubandhât*, following as the fruit of acts previously done ; तदुत्पत्तिः *tat-utpattiḥ*, its production.

331. The body is produced as the fruit of our previous deeds (deserts).

Our present body has been made up of elements endowed with the fruits of merit and demerit of our previous lives.

भूतेभ्यो मूर्त्युपादानवत् तदुपादानम् ॥ ३ । २ । ६१ ॥

भूतेभ्यः *bhûtebhyah*, from the elements ; मूर्त्युपादानवत् *mûrti-upâdâna-vat*, like the formation of bodies ; तदुपादानम् *tat-upâdânam*, its production.

332. The formation of our body of elements, says an opponent, resembles that of a statue of stone, etc.

The objection stands thus:—Just as a statue is formed of stone, clay, etc., which are devoid of deserts, our body has been made up of elements which are not endowed with the fruits of our previous merits and demerits.

न साध्यसमत्वात् ॥ ३ । २ । ६२ ॥

न na, no ; साध्यसमत्वात् sādhya-sama-tvât, because this is the same as the thing to be established.

333. It is, we reply, not so because the statement requires proof.

To prove that our body is formed of elements which are devoid of deserts, the opponent cites the instance of a statue made up of clay or stone, which is supposed to bear no connection whatsoever with deserts. The Naiyāyika replies that the very example cited requires to be verified for clay, etc. are made of atoms which have actually a reference to deserts as they comport themselves in such a way as to work out the designs of Retributive Justice.

नोत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वान्मातापित्रोः ॥ ३ । २ । ६३ ॥

न na, no ; उत्पत्तिनिमित्तत्वात् utpatti-nimitta-tvât, because of their being the conditions of production ; मातापित्रोः mâtâ-pitroh, of the blood and the seed.

334. Not so because father and mother are the cause of its production.

The formation of our body cannot be compared to that of a clay-statue because the body owes its origin to the sperm and blood of our father and mother while the statue is produced without any seed at all.

तथाहारस्य ॥ ३ । २ । ६४ ॥

तथा tathâ, so ; आहारस्य âhârasya, of the food.

335. So too eating is a cause.

The food and drink taken by the mother turns into blood which develops the embryo (made up of the sperm of the father) through the various stages of formation of the *arbuda* (a long round mass), *mamsa-peti*

(a piece of flesh), *kalala* (a round lump), *kaṇḍarā* (sinews), *śirah* (head), *paṇi* (hands), *pāda* (legs), etc. Eating is therefore a cause of production of our body but not of a clay-statue.

प्राप्नो चानियमात् ॥ ३ । २ । ६५ ॥

प्राप्नो prāptau, in the case of union ; च *cha*, and ; *अनियमात्* aniyamāt, because there is no uniformity.

336. And there is desert because of uncertainty even in the case of union.

All unions between husband and wife are not followed by the production of a child (body). Hence we must acknowledge the desert of the child to be a co-operative cause of its birth.

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं कर्म ॥३॥२॥६६॥

शरीरोत्पत्तिनिमित्तवत् śarīra-utpatti-nimitta-vat, as it is the condition of the production of the body ; *संयोगोत्पत्तिनिमित्तं* samyoga-utpatti-nimittam, condition of the production of (generative) union ; *कर्म* karma, desert.

337. Desert is the cause not only of the production of the body but also of its conjunction with a soul.

Just as the earth, etc., independent of a person's desert, are unable to produce his body, so the body itself as a seat of particular pleasures and pains is unable to be connected with a soul without the intervention of the desert of the latter.

एतेनानियमः प्रत्युक्तः ॥ ३ । २ । ६७ ॥

एतेन etena, by this ; *अनियमः* a-niyamaḥ, absence of uniformity ; *प्रत्युक्तः* prati-uktaḥ, answered.

338. By this the charge against inequality is answered.

Some persons are found to possess a healthy body while others an unhealthy one ; a certain body is beautiful while another ugly. This inequality in the formation of the body is due to the desert acquired by the persons in their previous lives.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows:—

338. By this the charge against uncertainty is answered.

It is due entirely to the interference of the desert that the union between husband and wife is not always followed by the production of a child (body).

तददृष्टकारितमिति चेत् पुनस्तत्प्रसङ्गोऽपवर्गे ॥३।२।६८॥

तत् tat, that ; अदृष्टकारितम् adṛṣṭa-kāritam, caused by adṛṣṭa ; इतिचेत् iti chet, should you say, पुनः punaḥ, again, तत्प्रसङ्गः tat-prasaṅgaḥ its implication ; अपवर्गे apavarge, in the case of release.

339. If the the body was attached to a soul only to remove the inexperience of the latter, then the same inexperience would recur after the soul had been emancipated (released).

An opponent says that there is no necessity for admitting the desert and that the body which is made up of elements is connected with a soul only to enable the latter to experience objects and realize its distinction from matter (prakṛiti). As soon as the soul satisfies itself by the experience and attains emancipation (release) it is separated from the body for ever. The Naiyāyika asks: "Why is not the soul, even after emancipation (release), again connected with a body to regain its experiential power?" Since the opponent does not admit desert there is nothing else to stop the connection.

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च संयोगानुच्छेदः ॥ ३।२।६९॥

मनःकर्मनिमित्तत्वाच्च manah-karma-nimitta-tvāt, from its being caused by the action of the mind ; च cha, and ; संयोगानुच्छेदः samyoga-an-uchchhedah, non-termination of conjunction.

340. And there will be no cessation of the conjunction if it is caused by the desert of the mind.

Those who maintain that the desert is a quality of the mind cannot explain why there should at all be a separation of the body from the mind which is eternal. If it is said that the very desert which connected the body with the mind does also separate it therefrom, we shall be constrained to admit an absurd conclusion that one and the same thing is the cause of life and death.

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गश्च प्रायणानुपपत्तेः ॥ ३।२।७०॥

नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः nitya-tva-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of eternality ; च cha, and ; प्रायणानुपपत्तेः prāyaṇa-an-upapatteḥ, from non-proof of departure.

341. Owing to there being no reason for destruction we should find the body to be eternal.

If the body is supposed to be produced from elements independent of deserts, we should not find anything the absence of which will cause

its destruction. In the event of the destruction being arbitrary, there will be no fixed cause to effect emancipation or rebirth thereafter as the elements will always remain the same.

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववदेत स्यात् ॥ ३ । २ । ७१ ॥

अणुश्यामतानित्यत्ववत् anu-śyāma-tā-nitya-tva-vat, like the sternality of the darkness of the atom; एतत् etat, this; स्यात् syât, may be.

342. The disappearance of the body in emancipation (release) is, according to an opponent, eternal like the blackness of an atom.

The opponent says:—Just as the blackness of an atom suppressed by redness through contact with fire does not reappear, so the body which has once attained emancipation (release) will not reappear.

नाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ३ । २ । ७२ ॥

न na, no; अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् a-kṛita-abhyāgama-prasaṅgāt, from implication of the acquisition of the unearned.

343. This is, we reply, not so because it would lead us to admit what was undemonstrable.

The argument employed in the previous aphorism is, according to the Naiyāyika, futile for it cannot be proved that the blackness of an atom is suppressed by redness through contact with fire, for it is possible that the blackness is altogether destroyed.

The aphorism may also be interpreted as follows;—

This is, we reply, not so, because it would lead us to acknowledge the consequence of actions not done by us.

Unless we acknowledge deserts there will be no principle governing the enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain. The absence of such a principle will be repugnant to all evidences—perception, inference and scripture.

BOOK IV.—CHAPTER I.

प्रवृत्तिर्यथोक्ता ॥ ४ । १ । १ ॥

प्रवृत्तिः pravṛtitiḥ, activity ; यथोक्ता yathâ-uktâ, as explained.

344. Activity, as it is, has been explained.

The definition of activity is to be found in aphorism 1-1-17.

तथा दोषाः ॥ ४ । १ । २ ॥

तथा tathâ, similarly ; दोषाः doṣâḥ, faults.

345. So the faults.

The definition of faults has been given in aphorism 1-1-18. The faults which co-abide with intellect in the soul are caused by activity, produce rebirths and do not end until the attainment of final release (apavarga).

तत्त्रैराश्यं रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् ॥ ४ । १ । ३ ॥

तत्त्रैराश्यम् tat-trai-râśyam, their threefoldness ; रागद्वेषमोहार्थान्तरभावात् râga-dveṣa-moha-artha-antara-bhâvât, according to the differences of affection, aversion, and stupidity, or attraction, repulsion and confusion.

346. The faults are divisible in three groups, as all of them are included in affection, aversion and stupidity.

The faults are divided in three groups, viz., affection, aversion and stupidity. Affection includes lust, avarice, avidity and covetousness. Aversion includes anger, envy, malignity, hatred and implacability. Stupidity includes misapprehension, suspicion, arrogance and carelessness.

नैकप्रत्यनीकभावात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४ ॥

न na, no ; एकप्रत्यनीकभावात् eka-prati-anika-bhâvât, because they are only the opposites of the same thing, namely true knowledge.

347. It is, some say, not so, because they are the opposites of one single thing.

The objection stands thus :—There is no distinction between affection, aversion and stupidity, as all of them are destructible by one single thing, viz., perfect knowledge. The three, in so far as they are destructible by one single thing, are of a uniform character.

व्यभिचारादहेतुः ॥ ४ । १ । ५ ॥

व्यभिचारात् vyabhichārāt, on account of erring ; अहेतुः a-hetuh, not a mark.

348. This reason, we reply, is not good, because it is erratic.

To prove that there is no distinction between affection, aversion and stupidity, the opponent has advanced the reason that all the three are destructible by one single thing. This reason is declared by the Naiyāyika to be erratic, because it does not apply to all cases, *e. g.*, the blue, black, green, yellow, brown and other colours, although they are different from one another, are destructible by one single thing, *viz.*, contact with fire.

तेषां मोहः पापीयान्नामूढस्येतरोत्पत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । ६ ॥

तेषां teṣāṃ, among them ; मोहः mohaḥ, stupidity, confusion ; पापीयाद् pāpiyān the worst ; न na, not ; अमूढस्य a-mūḍhasya, of the non-stupid ; इतरोत्पत्तेः itara-utpatteh, because of the production of the other two.

349. Of the three, stupidity is the worst, because in the case of a person who is not stupid, the other two do not come into existence.

There are three faults, *viz.*, affection, aversion and stupidity, of which the last is the worst, because it is only a stupid person who may be influenced by affection and aversion.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावादर्थान्तरभावो दोषेभ्यः ॥४१॥७॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावाद् nimitta-naimittika-bhāvāt, owing to the relation of cause and effect ; अर्थान्तरभावः artha-antara bhāvah, condition of being a different object ; दोषेभ्यः doṣebhyaḥ, from faults.

350. There is then, says an opponent, a difference between stupidity and other faults owing to their interrelation of cause and effect.

The opponent argues as follows :—Since stupidity is the cause of the other two faults, it must be different from them. In fact there cannot be the relation of cause and effect between two things which are not different from each other,

न दोषलक्षणावरोधान्मोहस्य ॥ ४ । १ । ८ ॥

न na, no; दोषलक्षणावरोधाद् doṣa-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt, from inclusion by the definition of fault; मोहस्य mohasya, of stupidity.

351. It is, we reply, not so, because faults as already defined include stupidity.

Stupidity is indeed a fault because it is homogeneous with or possesses the character of the same as defined in aphorism 1-1-18.

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्च तुल्यजातीयानामप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । ९ ॥

निमित्तनैमित्तिकोपपत्तेश्चैः nimitta-naimittika-upapattēḥ, from the relation of cause and effect; च cha, and; तुल्यजातीयानां tulya-jātyānām, of homogeneous things; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction,

352. And there is, we reply, no prohibition for homogeneous things to stand in the relation of cause and effect.

It is not proper to exclude stupidity from the faults on the mere ground that they stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. In fact the homogeneous things such as two substances or two qualities may stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, e. g., in the case of a jar being produced from its two halves we notice the relation of cause and effect between the jar and the halves which are homogeneous with each other.

आत्मनित्यत्वे प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः ॥ ४ । १ । १० ॥

आत्मनित्यत्वे ātma-nitya-tve, the soul being eternal. प्रेत्यभावसिद्धिः pretya-bhāva-siddhiḥ, proof of re-birth, of existence after passing away.

353. Transmigration is possible if the soul is eternal.

Transmigration defined in 1-1-19 belongs to the soul and not to the body. The series of births and deaths included in it is possible only if the soul is eternal. If the soul were destructible, it would meet with two unexpected chances, viz., destruction of actions done by it (kṛita-hāni) and suffering from actions not done by it (akṛitābhyāgama).

व्यक्ताद्व्यक्तानां प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् ॥ ४ । १ । ११ ॥

व्यक्ताद् vyaktāt, from the manifested; व्यक्तानाम् vyaktānām, of the manifested; प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यात् pratyakṣa-prāmāṇyāt, from the authority of perception.

354. There is evidence of perception as to the production of the distinct from the distinct.

It is found that jars, etc., which are distinct, are produced from earth, etc., which are also distinct. Similarly our body is produced from the elements.

न घटाद् घटानिष्पत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । १२ ॥

न na, no; घटाद् ghaṭât, from the pot; घटानिष्पत्तेः ghata-a-niṣpatteḥ from the non-production of the pot.

355. It is, some say, not so, because a jar is not produced from another jar.

The objection stands thus:—You cannot say that there is the production of a distinct thing from another distinct thing, *e. g.*, a jar is not produced from another jar.

व्यक्ताद्घटनिष्पत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । १३ ॥

व्यक्ताद् vyaktât, from the manifested, i.e. earth; घटनिष्पत्तेः ghaṭa-niṣpatteḥ, from the production of the pot; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

356. There is, we reply, no prohibition for a jar being produced from a distinct thing.

A jar may not be produced from another jar but it is certainly produced from another distinct thing, *viz.*, from its bowl-shaped halves. There is therefore no bar against the production of the distinct from the distinct.

अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात् ॥ ४ । १ । १४ ॥

अभावाद् abhâvât, from non existence; भावोत्पत्तिः bhâva-utpattiḥ, production of existence; न na, no; अनुपमृद्य an-upamṛdya, without destroying; प्रादुर्भावात् prâdurbhâvât, as there is production.

357. Some say that entity arises from non-entity, as there is no manifestation unless there has been destruction.

A sprout cannot come into existence, unless the seed from which it comes has been destroyed. This shows that there is no manifestation of effect without the destruction of its cause.

व्याघातादप्रयोगः ॥ ४ । १ । १५ ॥

व्याघातात् vyāghātāt, on account of obstruction, inconsistency ; अप्रयोगः a-prayogaḥ, non-application of the argument.

358. It is, we reply, not so, because such an expression, inconsistent as it is, cannot be employed

To say that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing which is its cause, is a contradiction in terms, for if that which, according to you, destroys the cause and takes the place thereof, was not existent prior to the destruction, then it cannot be said to be a destroyer, and if it existed prior to the cause, then it cannot be said to come into existence on the destruction thereof.

नातीतानागतयोः कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् ॥ ४ । १ । १६ ॥

न na, not ; अतीतानागतयोः atīta anāgatayoh, to the past and the future; कारकशब्दप्रयोगात् kāraka-śabda-prayogāt, from application of the word doer.

359. There is, says the objector, no inconsistency, because terms expressive of action are figuratively applied to the past and future.

The objector says as follows :—There is no impropriety in the statement that a thing comes into existence by destroying another thing which is its cause, for terms expressive of action are figuratively employed to denote that which is not existent now but which existed in the past or will exist in the future, *e. g.*, he congratulates himself on the son that is to be born. In the sentence “a sprout comes into existence by destroying its cause” —the term expressive of destruction is figuratively applied to the sprout that will come into existence in the future.

न विनष्टेभ्योऽनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । १७ ॥

न na, no ; विनष्टेभ्यः vinaṣṭebhyaḥ, from what has been destroyed ; अनिष्पत्तेः a-niṣpatteḥ, as there is no production.

360. It is, we reply, not so because nothing is produced from things destroyed.

A sprout does not spring from a seed already destroyed. Hence we can lay down the general rule that entity does not arise from non-entity.

क्रमनिर्दृशादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । १८ ॥

क्रमनिर्देशात् krama-nirdeśât, from the declaration of order or procession ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

361. There is no objection if destruction is pointed out only as a step in the processes of manifestation.

In connection with earth, water, heat, etc., a seed undergoes destruction of its old structure and is endowed with a new structure. A sprout cannot grow from a seed, unless the old structure of seed is destroyed and a new structure is formed. It is in this sense allowable to say that manifestation is preceded by destruction. This does not preclude a seed from being the cause of a sprout. But we do not admit an unqualified assertion that production springs from destruction or entity arises from non-entity.

ईश्वरः कारणं पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् ॥ ४ । १ । १६ ॥

ईश्वरः īśvaraḥ, the lord ; कारणं kāraṇam, cause, पुरुषकर्माफल्यदर्शनात् puruṣa-karma-â-phalya-darśanât, from seeing the failure of the acts of man.

362. God, says some one, is the sole cause of fruits, because man's acts are found occasionally to be unattended by them.

Seeing that man does not often attain success proportionate to his exertions, some one infers that these are entirely subservient to God who alone can provide them with fruits.

न पुरुषकर्माभावे फलानिष्पत्तेः ॥४॥१॥२०॥

न na, no ; पुरुषकर्माभावे puruṣa-karma-abhâve, in the absence of the act of man ; फलानिष्पत्तेः phala-a-niṣpatteḥ, because of non-production of fruit.

363. This is, some are afraid, not so, because in the absence of man's acts there is no production of fruits.

The fear referred to arises thus:—If God were the only source of fruits, man could attain them even without any exertions.

तत्कारितत्वादहेतुः ॥ ४ । १ । २१ ॥

तत्कारितत्वात् tat-kârita-tvât, from their being caused to arise by him ; अहेतुः a-hetuh, not a cause.

364. Since fruits are awarded by God, man's acts, we conclude, are not the sole cause thereof.

Man performs acts which are endowed with fruits by God. The acts become fruitless without His grace. Hence it is not true that man's acts produce fruits by themselves

God is a soul specially endowed with qualities. He is freed from misapprehension, carelessness, etc., and is enriched with merit, knowledge and concentration. He possesses eight supernatural powers (such as the power of becoming as small as an atom) which are the consequence of His merit and concentration. His merit, which conforms to His will, produces merit and demerit in each person and sets the earth and other elements in action. God is, as it were, the father of all beings. Who can demonstrate the existence of Him who transcends the evidences of perception, inference and scripture ?

अनिमित्ततो भावोत्पत्तिः कण्टकतैक्षण्यादिदर्शनात् ॥४१२२॥

अनिमित्ततः a-nimitta-taḥ, from no cause, भावोत्पत्तिः bhāva-utpattiḥ, production of existence or entity ; कण्टकतैक्षण्यादिदर्शनात् kaṇṭakataikṣṇya-ādi-darśanāt, from the observation of the sharpness of a thorn, and the like.

365. From an observation of the sharpness of thorn, etc., some say that entities are produced from no cause.

The objectors argue as follows:—Thorns are by nature sharp, hills beautiful, and stones smooth. None has made them so. Similarly our bodies, etc., are fortuitous effects which did not spring from a cause, that is, were not made by God.

अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वान्नानिमित्ततः ॥ ४ । १ । २३ ॥

अनिमित्तनिमित्तत्वात् a-nimitta-nimitta-tvāt, being caused by no-cause ; न na, not, अनिमित्ततः a-nimitta-taḥ, from no cause.

366. Entities cannot be said to be produced from no-cause, because the no-cause is, according to some, the cause of the production.

An opponent has said that entities are produced from no-cause. Some critics point out that the use of the fifth case-affix in connection with no-cause indicates that it is the cause.

निमित्तानिमित्तयोरर्थान्तरभावादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । २४ ॥

निमित्तानिमित्तयोः nimitta-a-nimittayoḥ, between cause and no cause ;
अर्थान्तरभावात् artha-antara-bhāvât, there being the relation of two different
objects ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

367. The aforesaid reason presents no opposition, because cause and no-cause are two entirely different things.

Cause and no-cause cannot be identical, *e. g.*, a jar which is waterless cannot at the same time be full of water. The doctrine involved in this aphorism does not differ from the one explained in 3-2-66 according to which our body cannot be made up independent of our desert (Karma).

सर्वमनित्यमुत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । २५ ॥

सर्वं sarvam, all ; अनित्यं a nityam, non eternal ; उत्पत्तिविनाशधर्मकत्वात् utpatti-vinâśa-dharmaka tvât, because of their possessing the character of production and destruction.

368. All, says some one, are non-eternal, because they possess the character of being produced and destroyed.

All things including our body which is material and our intellect which is immaterial are non-eternal inasmuch as they are subject to the law of production and destruction. All things which are produced and destroyed are non-eternal.

नानित्यतानित्यत्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । २६ ॥

न na, no ; अनित्यतानित्यत्वात् a-nitya tā-nitya-tvât, non-eternalness being eternal.

369. These are, we reply, not so, because of the non-eternalness being eternal.

If non-eternalness pervades all things you must admit it to be eternal. Hence, all are not non-eternal, for there is at least one thing, *viz.*, non-eternalness, which is eternal.

तदनित्यत्वमग्नेर्दाह्यं विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् ॥४॥१॥२७॥

तदनित्यत्वम् tat-a-nitya-tvam, non-eternalness of that (*i. e.* non-eternalness) ; अग्नेः agneḥ, in the case of fire ; दाह्यं dāhyam, combustibile, fuel ; विनाश्यानुविनाशवत् vinâśya-anu-vinâśa-vat, like the destruction following after the destructible.

370. Some hold non-eternalness to be not eternal on the analogy of a fire which dies out after the combustibles have perished.

The objection is explained as follows:—Just as a fire dies out as soon as the things which caught it have perished, so the non-eternalness disappears as soon all non-eternal things have passed away. Hence, non-eternalness is not eternal.

नित्यस्याप्रत्याख्यानं यथोपलब्धि व्यवस्थानात् ॥४॥१॥२८॥

नित्यस्य nityasya, of the eternal ; अप्रत्याख्यानं a-pratyākhyānam, non-denial ; यथोपलब्धि yathā-upalabdhi, according to perception or knowledge ; व्यवस्थानात् vyavasthānāt, from regulation.

371. There is no denial of the eternal, as there is a regulation as to the character of our perception.

Whatever is perceived to be produced or destroyed is non-eternal and that which is not so is eternal, *e. g.*, there is no perceptual evidence as to the production or destruction of ether, time, space, soul, mind, generality, particularity and intimate relation. Consequently these are eternal.

सर्वं नित्यम्पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । २९ ॥

सर्वं sarvam, all ; नित्यं nityam, eternal ; पञ्चभूतनित्यत्वात् pañcha-bhūta-nitya-tvāt, owing to the eternalness of the five elements.

372. Some say that all are eternal, because the five elements are so.

The elements which are the material causes of all things are eternal, consequently the things themselves are eternal.

नोत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ४ । १ । ३० ॥

न na, no ; उत्पत्तिविनाशकारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-vināśa-kāraṇa-uplabdheḥ, owing to perception of the causes of production.

373. These are, we reply, not so, because we perceive the causes of production and destruction.

All things are non-eternal because we find them to be produced and destroyed. Whatever is produced or destroyed is non-eternal.

तल्लक्षणावरोधादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । ३१ ॥

तल्लक्षणावरोधात् tat-lakṣaṇa-avarodhāt, from inclusion by its definition ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

374. This is, some say, no refutation, because the character of the elements is possessed by the things which are produced or destroyed.

The objector says as follows:—A thing which is made up of an element, possesses the character of the element. Since the element is eternal, the thing also must be so.

नोत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः ॥ ४ । १ । ३२ ॥

न na, no ; उत्पत्तितत्कारणोपलब्धेः utpatti-tat-kârana-upalabdheḥ, owing to perception of production and its cause.

375. This is, we reply, no opposition because we perceive production and the cause thereof.

An effect inherits the character of its cause but the two are not identical, *e g.*, ether is the cause of sound, although the former is eternal and the latter non-eternal.

Moreover we actually perceive that things are produced which convince us of their non-eternalness. If production is regarded as a mere vision of a dream, then the whole world is no better than an illusion which can serve no practical purpose.

If all things were eternal there could be no effort or activity on our part to attain any object. Hence all are not eternal.

न व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । ३३ ॥

न na, no; व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः vyavasthâ-an-upapatteh, from the impossibility of uniformity.

376. If all things were eternal there would be no regulation of time.

Some say that things are eternal, because they existed even before they were produced and will continue even after they are destroyed. But this view, contends the Naiyāyika, is absurd. It destroys all regulation with regard to time, for if all things were perpetually existent, there could not be any use of such expressions as “was produced” and “will be destroyed” which presuppose a thing which was non-existent to come into existence or one which is existent to lose its existence.

सर्वं पृथग्भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । ३४ ॥

सर्वं sarvam, all ; पृथक् prithak, diverse ; भावलक्षणपृथक्त्वात् bhāva-lakṣaṇa-prithak-tvât, owing to diversity of the marks of existence.

377. Some say that all are aggregates because each consists of several marks.

A jar, for instance, is an aggregate consisting of several parts, such as bottom, sides, back, etc., and several qualities, such as, sound, smell, taste, colour, touch, etc. There is not a single entity devoid of its several parts or qualities.

[This refers to the Buddhist doctrine which denies a substance apart from its qualities and a whole apart from its parts as is evident from the writings of Nāgārjuna*, Ārya Deva† and others.]

नानेकलक्षणैरेकभावनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । ३५ ॥

न na, no ; अनेकलक्षणैः an-eka-lakṣaṇaiḥ, by several marks ; एकभावनिष्पत्तेः eka-bhāva-niṣpatteḥ, because of constitution of one entity.

378. These are, we reply, not so because by several marks one single entity is constituted.

The Naiyāyika says that there is certainly a substance apart from its qualities and a whole apart from its parts, e. g., we must admit an entity called a jar as [the substratum of its several qualities, such as colour, smell, etc., and its several parts such as bottom, sides, back, etc.

[The Buddhists] oppose this view by saying that the substance

लक्ष्यालक्षणमन्यत्वे स्यात्तल्लक्ष्यमलक्षणम् ।

तयोरभावोऽनन्यत्वे विष्पष्टं कथितं त्वया ॥

(Mādhyamika Sūtra. Chap. I. page 64 ; Prof. Poussin's edition.)

रूपादित्यतिरेकेण यथा कुम्भो न विद्यते ।

वाय्वादित्यतिरेकेण तथा रूपो न विद्यते ॥ इति ॥

(Mādhyamika Sūtra, Chap. I, page 71 ; Poussin's edition.)

† सर्वं एव घटोऽदृष्टो रूपे दृष्टे हि जायते ।

अथातः कस्तत्त्वविज्ञानं घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यपि ॥

एतेनैव विचारेण सुगन्धि मधुरं मृदु ।

प्रतिषेधयितव्यानि सर्वाण्युत्तममुद्दिना ॥

(Śāntaka quoted in the Mādhyamika Vṛitti, p. 71.)

‡ इह तु काठिन्यादित्यतिरेकपृथिव्याद्यसम्भवे सति न युक्तो विशेषणविशेष्यभावः । तीर्थि-
कैर्यतिरिक्तलक्ष्याभ्युपगमात्तदुत्पत्तेन विशेषणाभिधानमदुष्टमिति चेत् । नैतदेवं नहि तीर्थिकपरि-
कल्पिता युक्तिविधुराः पदार्थाः स्वसमयेऽभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्याः । प्रमाणान्तरादेरप्यभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गात् ।

(Mādhyamikā Vṛitti. Chap. I. p. 66 ; Poussin's edition.)

independent of its qualities and the whole independent of its parts admitted by the Naiyāyikas are opposed to reason and cannot be accepted as realities though there is no harm in acknowledging them as "appearances"* for the fulfilment of our practical purposes.]

लक्षणव्यवस्थानादेवाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । ३६ ॥

लक्षणव्यवस्थानात् lakṣaṇa-vyavasthānāt, from the distribution of marks; एव eva, surely ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

379. There is, moreover, no opposition on account of the very distribution of the marks.

The Naiyāyika says as follows:—Our conclusion is unassailable owing to the marks abiding in one single entity. A jar, for instance, possesses two marks, *viz*, tangibility and colour, by each of which it can be identified.

If there were no jar beyond its tangibility and colour we could not use such expression as "I see the jar which I touched yesterday." To enable us to ascertain the identity there must be a substance called jar beyond its tangibility and colour which are two distinct qualities belonging to the same substance.

The opponent, has said that "all are aggregates." (Whence, we ask, does the aggregate arise if there are no units? The very reason given that "each consists of several marks" presupposes an "each" or unity or entity beyond the marks or aggregate.

सर्वमभावो भावेष्वितरेतराभावसिद्धेः ॥ ४ । १ । ३७ ॥

सर्वं sarvam, all ; अभावः a-bhāvaḥ, non-existence ; भावेषु bhāveṣu, in entities ; इतरेतराभावसिद्धेः itara-itara-abhāva-siddheḥ, from proof of mutual non-existence.

380. All are non-entities because the entities are non-existent in relation to one another,

In the expression "a horse is not a cow" there is the non-existence of "cow" in the "horse" and in the expression "a cow is not a horse" there is the non-existence of "horse" in the "cow." As a fact every thing is non-existent in so far as it is not identical with another thing.

* घटः प्रत्यक्ष इत्यत्र तु नहि घटो नाम कश्चिद्योऽप्रत्यक्षः पृथगुपलब्धो यस्योपचारात्प्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात् । नीलादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य घटस्याभावादौपचारिकं प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति चेत् । एवमपि सुतरामुपचारे न युक्त उपवर्गमात्रस्याश्रयस्याभावात् । नहि खरविषाणे तैश्चयमुपपद्यते ।

(Mādhyaṃikā Vṛitti. p. 70, Chap. I; Poussin's edition.)

न स्वभावसिद्धेर्भावानाम् ॥ ४ । १ । ३८ ॥

n na, no ; स्वभावसिद्धेः sva-bhāva-siddheḥ, from existence by own nature ; भावानाम् bhāvanām, of entities.

381. It is, we reply, not so because the entities are existent in reference to themselves.

A cow is a cow though it is not a horse : a thing is existent in reference to itself though it is non-existent in so far as it is not another thing.

न स्वभावसिद्धिरापेक्षिकत्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । ३९ ॥

n, no ; स्वभावसिद्धिः sva-bhāva-siddhiḥ, proof of own nature ; आपेक्षिकत्वात् āpekṣika-tvāt, being relative.

382. Some say that entities are not self-existent inasmuch as they exist in relation to one another.

The objection is explained as follows :—

A thing is called short only in relation to another thing which is long, and *vice versa* ; the long and short are inter-related.

[This refers to the Mādhyamika Buddhist doctrine* of “ relation ” according to which all things are inter-dependent and nothing is self-existent,]

व्याहतत्वादयुक्तम् ॥ ४ । १ । ४० ॥

व्याहतत्वाद् vyāhata-tvāt, being inconsistent ; अयुक्तम् a-yuktaṁ, not rational.

383. The doctrine, we reply, is unreasonable because it hurts itself.

If the long and short are inter-dependent then neither of them can be established in the absence of the other ; if neither of them is self-existent, then it will be impossible to establish the inter-relation ; and in the absence of all relations the doctrine of the opponent will fall to the ground.

ॐ न सम्भवः स्वभावस्य युक्तः प्रत्ययहेतुभिः ।

स्वभावः कृतको नाम भविष्यति पुनः कथम् ॥

(Mādhyamika Sūtra, Chap. XV, p. 93 ; B. T. Society's edition.)

[The Mādhyamikas say that there is no reality* underlying any entity, and that the entities exist only by virtue of their mutual relations which are mere illusions. Viewed from the standpoint of absolute truth the world is void, Śūnya,† but measured by the standard of "relation" or "condition" it possesses an apparent existence which serves all our practical purposes.]

सङ्ख्यैकान्तसिद्धिः कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥४१॥४१॥

सङ्ख्यैकान्तसिद्धिः saṅkhyā-eka-anta-a-siddhiḥ, non-proof of the fixity of number ; कारणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् kāraṇa-an-upapatti-upapattibhyām, by proof and disproof of cause.

381. Neither through the reason being given nor through the reason being omitted there is the establishment of the fixity of number.

Some say that there is only *one* thing (Brahma) pervading all the so-called varieties. Others say that things are of *two* kinds, viz., the eternal and the non-eternal. Certain philosophers find *three* things, viz., the knower, knowledge and the knowable, while others treat of *four* things, viz., the agent of knowledge, means of knowledge, object of knowledge and act of knowledge. In this way the philosophers indulge themselves in a fixed number of things. The Naiyāyikas oppose them by saying that there is no reason to establish the fixity of number. The fixed number is the *Sādhya* or that which is to be proved and the reason is that which is to prove it. Now, is the reason included in the *Sādhya* or excluded from it? In either case the fixity of number will be unfixed. If, on the other hand, the reason is not different from the *Sādhya*, there is no means to establish the *Sādhya*.

न कारणावयवभावात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४२ ॥

न na, no ; कारणावयवभावात् kāraṇa-avayava-bhāvāt, the cause being a member or part.

* शून्यविद्ये नहि विद्यते क्वचित् अन्तरिक्षि शकुनस्य वा पद्म् ।

यन्न विद्यति स्वभावतः क्वचित् सा न जातु परहेतु भविष्यति ॥

(Ārya Ratnākara Sūtra quoted in Mādhyamika Vṛitti, Chap. I. 24 ; B. T. Society's edition.)

† स्वभाव परभावञ्च भावञ्चाभावमेव च ।

ये पश्यन्ति न पश्यन्ते तत्त्वं हि बुद्धशासने ॥

(Mādhyamika Sūtra, Chap. XV, p. 96 ; B. T. Society's edition.)

385. This is, some say, not so, because the reason is a part of the number.

The objection is this:—

The number of things is fixed, and there is no disturbance of the fixity on the score of the reason being included in, excluded from, or identical with, the number, for the reason is a part of the number and as such is not different from it.

निरवयवत्वादहेतुः ॥ ४ । १ । ४३ ॥

nir-avayava-tvât, being without a member or part ; *अहेतुः a-hetuḥ*, no reason.

386. The reason, we reply, is not valid because there is no part available for the purpose.

The opponent has argued that the number is fixed and that the reason is only a part of it. The Naiyāyika counterargues that the number cannot be fixed until the reason is fixed and it will be absurd to fix the number with an unfixed reason. The reason which is asserted by the opponent to be a part of the number will remain unfixed until the number itself is fixed.

The doctrine of the fixity of number, opposed as it is to the evidences of perception, inference and scripture, is a false doctrine which cannot refute the variety of things established through the speciality of their characters. If there is an agreement as to the number of things on the ground of their general characters, and difference on the ground of their special characters, then the doctrine of fixity is admittedly to be abandoned.

सद्यः कालान्तरे च फलनिष्पत्तेः संशयः ॥ ४ । १ । ४४ ॥

सद्यः sadyaḥ, immediately ; *कालान्तरे kâla-antare*, at another time ; *च cha*, and ; *फलनिष्पत्तेः phala-niṣpatteḥ*, on account of production of fruit ; *संशयः saṁśayaḥ*, doubt.

387. There arises doubt as to the fruit which is produced either instantly or after a long interval.

Seeing that some action such as *cooking* produces its effect immediately while another action such as *ploughing* does not bring about any effect until sometime has passed away, a certain person asks whether

the fruit of maintaining the sacred fire will be produced immediately or after a considerable lapse of time.

कालान्तरेणानिष्पत्तिर्हेतुविनाशात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४५ ॥

कालान्तरेण kâla-antarena, after a lapse of time ; अनिष्पत्तिः a-niṣpattiḥ, non-production ; हेतुविनाशात् hetu-vināśāt, because of the destruction of the cause.

388. It cannot, says some one, be produced after a lapse of time because the cause has disappeared.

The objection is this:—

The fruit (*viz.*, the attainment of heaven) cannot be produced after our death because the action (*viz.*, maintaining the sacred fire) calculated to produce the fruit was destroyed before our death.

प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्वृक्षफलवत्तत् स्यात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४६ ॥

प्राक् prāk, prior ; निष्पत्तेः niṣpattēḥ, to production ; वृक्षफलवत् vṛikṣa-phala-vat, like the fruit of a tree ; तत् tat, that . स्यात् syāt, will be.

389. This fruit, we reply, before it is produced, bears analogy to the fruit of a tree.

Just as a tree, whose roots are now nourished with water, will be able to produce fruits in the future, so the sacred fire which is maintained now will enable the maintainer to attain heaven after death. The doctrine involved here has been explained in aphorism 3-2- 60.

नासन्न सन्न सदसदसत्सतोर्वैधर्म्यात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४७ ॥

न na, no ; असत् a-sat, non-existent , न na, not , सत् sat, existent ; न na, not ; सदसत् sat-a-sat, existent-and-non-existent ; असत्सतोः asat-satoḥ, of the non-existent and existent ; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyât, owing to dissimilarity, difference.

390. Some say that the fruit, anterior to its production, is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, because existence and non-existence are incongruous.

The fruit (or any effect) anterior to its production was not non-existent because the material causes are so regulated that each one thing is not produced from each other thing promiscuously. We cannot suppose the fruit to have been existent prior to its production because a thing cannot be said to come into existence if it had already an existence. The fruit was not both existent and non-existent prior to

its production because existence and non-existence are incompatible with each other.

[The aphorism refers to the Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy which maintains that the effect, before it is produced, is neither existent nor non-existent nor both, as is evident from the writings of Nāgārjuna* and Ārya Deva†.]

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात् ॥ ४ । १ । ४८ ॥

उत्पादव्ययदर्शनात् utpāda-vyaya-darśanāt, from the observation of production and destruction.

391. It is, we reply, a fact that the fruit before it was produced was non-existent because we witness the production and destruction.

When a jar is produced we find that it was non-existent prior to the production.

बुद्धिसिद्धन्तु तदसत् ॥ ४ । १ । ४९ ॥

बुद्धिसिद्धं buddhi-siddham, established by the understanding ; तु tu, but ; तत् tat, that ; असत् a-sat, non-existent.

392. That it was non-existent, is established by our understanding.

It is only when a thing is non-existent that we can apply ourselves to the production of it by means of suitable materials. A weaver, for instance, sets himself to work for a web which is non-existent but which he knows he can make by means of threads.

आश्रयव्यतिरेकाद्वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवदित्यहेतुः ॥४।१।५०॥

सतश्च तावदुत्पत्तिरसत् न युज्यते ।
न सतश्चासत्तश्चेति पूर्वमेवोपपादितम् ॥
नैवास्तो नैव सतः प्रत्ययार्थस्य युज्यते ।
न सत्तासन्न सदसत् धर्मो निर्वर्तते सदा ॥

(Nāgārjuna's, Mādhyamika Sūtra, Chap. VII, p. 51 ; B. T. Society's edition.)

† सदसत्सदसच्चेति यस्य पक्षो न विद्यते ।
उपारम्भश्चिरेणापि तस्य वक्तुं शक्यते ॥

(Ārya Deva's Śataka quoted in the Mādhyamika Vṛitti, Chap. I p. 4 ; B. T. Society's edition.)

आश्रयव्यतिरेकात् āśraya-vyatirekāt, in the absence of a receptacle ; वृक्षफलोत्पत्तिवत् vṛkṣa phala-utpatti-vat, like the production of the fruit of a tree ; इति iti, this ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no reason.

393. Some say that the analogy to the fruit of a tree is ill-founded because a receptacle is wanting.

It has been stated that the fruit obtainable from maintaining the sacred fire bears analogy to the fruit of a tree. An opponent finds fault with the analogy by showing that the tree which produces fruits now is the same tree which was previously nourished with water, but the body which is alleged to attain heaven after death is not the same body which maintained the sacred fire. The two bodies being different their analogy to the tree is ill-founded.

प्रीतेरात्माश्रयत्वादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । ५१ ॥

प्रीतिः prīteḥ, of pleasure, satisfaction ; आत्माश्रयत्वाद ātmā āśraya-tyāt, having the soul as its receptacle or support ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

394. The foregoing objection, we reply, is unreasonable because the soul is the receptacle of happiness.

It is not our body that maintains the sacred fire or attains heaven. In reality the soul is the receptacle for both these acts. The soul which maintained the sacred fire is identical with the soul which enjoys happiness in heaven. Consequently a receptacle is not wanting and the analogy to the tree is not ill-founded.

न पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्द्देशात् ॥४१॥५२॥

न na, no ; पुत्रपशुस्त्रीपरिच्छदहिरण्यान्नादिफलनिर्द्देशात् putra paśu-strī-parichchada-hiraṇya-anna ādi-phala-nirdeśāt, because the fruits declared are son, cattle, wife, clothes, gold, food etc.

395. The soul, some say, cannot be the receptacle for the fruits which are mentioned, viz., a son, a wife, cattle, attendants, gold, food, etc.

The objection is this :—

If the fruit consists merely of happiness it can be lodged in the soul. But the soul cannot be the receptacle for such fruits as a son, a wife, cattle, etc. which are mentioned in the scripture.

तत्सम्बन्धात् फलनिष्पत्तेस्तेषु फलवदुपचारः ॥४१॥५३॥

तत्सम्बन्धात् tat-sambandhât, through connection with them ; फलनिष्पत्तेः phala-niṣpatteḥ, because of production of fruit ; तेषु teṣu, in them ; फलवदुपचारः phala-vat-upachârah, predication as fruit.

396. The fruit, we reply, is attributed to them because it is produced through their conjunction.

In reality the fruit is happiness. We attribute the name fruit to a son, wife, etc., because happiness is produced through them.

विविधबाधनायोगाद्दुःखमेव जन्मोत्पत्तिः ॥४१॥५४॥

विविधबाधनायोगात् vividha-bâdhanâ-yogât, through connection with various distresses, दुःखं duḥkham, pain ; एव eva, surely ; जन्मोत्पत्तिः janma-utpattiḥ, production of birth.

397. Birth is a pain because it is connected with various distresses.

Birth is stated to be a pain because it signifies our connection with the body, the senses and the intellect which bring us various distresses. The body is the abode in which pain resides, the senses are the instruments by which pain is experienced, and the intellect is the agent which produces in us the feeling of pain. Our birth as connected with the body, the senses and the intellect is necessarily a source of pain.

न सुखस्यान्तरालनिष्पत्तेः ॥ ४ । १ । ५५ ॥

न na, not ; सुखस्य sukhasya, of pleasure ; अन्तरालनिष्पत्तेः antarâlaniṣpatteḥ, because of production during intervals.

398. Pleasure is not denied because it is produced at intervals.

We cannot altogether deny the existence of pleasure which often arises amidst pains.

बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेर्वेदयतः पर्येषणदोषादप्रतिषेधः ॥४१॥५६॥

बाधनाऽनिवृत्तेः bâdhanâ-a-nivṛtiteḥ, there being non-cessation of distress ; वेदयतः vedayataḥ, of the feeling person ; पर्येषणदोषात् paryeṣaṇa-doṣât, from the fault of pursuit ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

399. This is, we reply, no opposition because distresses do not disappear from a person who enjoys one pleasure and seeks another.

The substance of the Naiyāyika's reply is this:— Pleasure itself is to be regarded as pain because even a person who enjoys pleasure is tormented by various distresses. His objects may be completely frustrated or fulfilled only partially, and while he attains one object he cannot resist the temptation of pursuing another which causes him uneasiness.

दुःखविकल्पे सुखाभिमानाच्च ॥ ४ । १ । ५७ ॥

दुःखविकल्पे duḥkha-vikalpe, in a form of pain ; सुखाभिमानात् sukha-abhīmānāt, from a conceit of pleasure ; च cha, and.

400. And because there is conceit of pleasure in what is only another name for pain.

Some persons thinking that pleasure is the *summum bonum* are addicted to the world which causes them various distresses through birth, infirmity, disease, death, connection with the undesirable, separation from the desirable, etc. It is therefore clear that one who pursues pleasure does in reality pursue pain, or, in other words, pleasure is a synonym for pain.

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धादपवर्गाभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ५८ ॥

ऋणक्लेशप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धात् ṛina-kleśa-pravṛitti-anubandhāt, because debts, troubles and activity pursue us to the end ; अपवर्गाभावः apavarga-abhāvaḥ, absence of release.

401. There is, some say, no opportunity for us to attain release because of the continual association of our debts, troubles and activities.

The objection stands thus:— The scripture declares that as soon as we are born we incur three debts which we must go on clearing off until the time of our decay and death ; and troubles are our constant companions, while activities pursue us throughout our life. There is then no opportunity for us to attain release.

The three debts are:—

Debt to sages (Rishi-ṛina)—which can be cleared off only by undergoing a course of student life.

Debt to gods (Deva-ṛina)—from which we can be freed only by performing sacrifices.

Debt to our progenitors (Pitri-ṛina)—which cannot be cleared off except by begetting children.

Activity has been defined in 1-1-17 and 1-1-18,

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेर्गुणशब्दानुवादे निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः ॥

॥ ४ । १ । ५६ ॥

प्रधानशब्दानुपपत्तेः pradhâna-śabda-an-upapatteḥ, from failure of the word in the principal sense ; गुणशब्देन guṇa śabdena, by the word in the secondary sense ; अनुवादः anuvādaḥ, interpretation ; निन्दाप्रशंसोपपत्तेः nindā-prasamsā-upapatteḥ, because of the establishment of blame and praise.

402. If an expression is inadmissible in its literal sense we are to accept it in its secondary meaning to suit blame or praise.

“As soon as a person is born he incurs three debts”—this expression, inadmissible as it is in its literal sense, is to be taken in its secondary meaning, *viz.*, “as soon as a person enters the life of a householder, he incurs three debts the clearing off of which brings him credit.” The expression “until the time of our decay and death” signifies that “as long as we do not arrive at the fourth stage when we are to adopt the life of a mendicant.” If the scriptural texts are interpreted in this way, it becomes clear that our whole life does not pass away in the mere clearing off of our debts.

समारोपणादात्मन्यप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । १ । ॥ ६० ॥

समारोपणात् samāropanāt, through transferring ; आत्मनि ātmani, to the soul ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

403. There is no lack of opportunity for our release because the sacrifices (to be performed for clearing off our debts) are trusted to the soul.

A Brahman, while old, should refrain from all searches after sons, wealth and retinue. Śruti (Veda) instructs him to retire from the world when he has trusted to his soul the sacrifices which he used to perform to clear off his debts. By so doing he will imagine that his soul is the sacrificial fire in which his physical actions are offered as oblations. Freed from all debts, he will live on alms and find an ample opportunity for effecting his own release.

As regards the division of life into stages, there is the authority of Itihāsa, Purāṇa and Dharma Śāstra.

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेश्च फलाभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ६१ ॥

पात्रचयान्तानुपपत्तेः pātra-chaṣa-anta-an-upapatteḥ, because of the non-proof of performances ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death; च cha, and, फलाभावः phala-abhāvaḥ, absence of fruit.

404. Because the performances ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death cannot reasonably be supposed (to have been prescribed for all without distinction), there would be an absence of fruits (which could impede release)

For a householder keeping alive the sacrificial fire it is prescribed that at his death the sacrificial vessels should be collected and burnt with his body. Such a man continues to perform acts till the end and these acts must produce results which must be exhausted by experiencing them before release can be attained. But these acts are not meant for those who retire from the world and have no desire for sons, wealth or other worlds. Therefore, so far as such men are concerned, the Vedic injunctions in respect of the sacrificial vessels and the like do not cause any obstacle to the attainment of release.

सुषुप्तस्य स्वप्नादर्शने क्लेशाभाववदपवर्गः ॥ ४ । १ । ६२ ॥

सुषुप्तस्य suṣuptasya, of one in deep sleep ; स्वप्नादर्शने svapna-a-darśane, in not seeing dreams ; क्लेशाभाववत् kleśa-a-bhāva-vāt, like absence of troubles; अपवर्गः apavargah, release.

405. As there is no distress in a person who is sound asleep and sees no dream, so there is no association of troubles in one who attains release.

A person who has, through the knowledge of Brahma, attained release, is freed from all bonds of lust, pleasure, pain, etc.

[The word *kleśa* (here rendered as trouble) is a technical term very extensively used in the Buddhist Sanskrit and Pāli literature to signify depravity, defilement, corruption or passion. *Kleśa*, called in Pāli *kilesa*, is the cause of all sinful actions and consequently of rebirths. Arhatship consists in the annihilation of *kleśa*. The Pāli Piṭakas enumerate ten *kilesas*, of which five are prominent. The ten *kilesas* are:—

लोभो (greed), दोषो (hatred), मोहो (stupidity), मानो (pride), द्दिट्ठि (heretical view), विचिकित्छा (doubt), धीनम् (sloth), उद्विग्नम् (arrogance), अहिरिका (shamelessness) and अनोत्तप्यम् (recklessness).

The Buddhist Sanskrit books enumerate six *kleśas* and twenty-four *upakleśas*.

षट्क्लेशाः ॥

सगः प्रतिघो मानोऽविद्या कुदृष्टिर्विचिकित्सा चेति ॥

(Dharmasaṅgraha LXVII.)

चतुर्विंशतिरूपक्लेशाः । तद्यथा ॥

क्रोध उपनाहो घ्नः प्रदाश ईर्ष्या मात्सर्यं शाठ्यं माया मदो विहिंसाह्रीरनपन्नपा
स्त्यानमश्राद्धयं कौसीद्यं प्रमादो मुषितस्मृतिर्विक्षेपोऽसंप्रजन्यं कौकृत्यं मिदं वितर्को
विचारश्चेति ॥

(Dharmasaṅgraha LXIX.)

The word *kleśa* used in the Nyāya Sūtra 4-1 58, 4-1 62, 4-1 63 and 4-1 64 evidently conveys the meaning of moral depravity. *Hīna-kleśa* (हीनक्लेश) used in 4-1 63 rings in my ears as a phrase borrowed from the Buddhist philosophy.]

न प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिसन्धानाय हीनक्लेशस्य ॥ ४ । १ । ६३ ॥

न na, no ; प्रवृत्तिः pravṛtitiḥ, activity ; प्रतिसन्धानाय prati-sandhānāya, for binding again to birth ; हीनक्लेशस्य hīna-kleśa-sya, of one whose troubles have disappeared.

406. The activity of one who has got rid of the troubles does not tend to obstruction.

Activity does not present any obstacle to release (apavarga) in respect of a person who is freed from the troubles of lust, hatred and stupidity. In his case activity produces neither merit nor demerit, and consequently no re-birth.

न क्लेशसन्ततेः स्वाभाविकत्वात् ॥ ४ । १ । ६४ ॥

न na, no ; क्लेशसन्ततेः kleśa-santateḥ, of the stream of troubles ; स्वाभाविकत्वात् svābhāvika-tvāt, being natural.

407. There is, some say, no end of troubles because these are natural.

The objection raised here is this:—None can attain release because it is impossible to get rid of troubles which are natural (beginningless).

प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावानित्यत्ववत्स्वाभाविकेऽप्यनित्यत्वम् ॥ ४ । १ । ६५ ॥

प्राक् prāk, prior ; उत्पत्तेः utpatteḥ, to production ; अभावानित्यत्ववत् svābhāva-a-nitya-tva vat, like the non-eternality of non-existence ; स्वाभाविके svābhāvika, in the natural ; अपि api, also ; अनित्यत्वम् a-nitya-tvam, non-eternality.

408. Even the natural, says some one, are non-eternal like the non-existence that was antecedent to production.

The objection raised in the previous aphorism is answered by some one as follows:—

A non-existence antecedent to production is natural (beginningless) but it disappears as soon as the production takes place. Similarly the troubles are natural (beginningless) but they terminate as soon as release is attained.

A jar before it is produced is non-existent. This non-existence is called antecedent non-existence. It has no beginning but it has an end for it disappears as soon as the jar is produced. The troubles like the antecedent non-existence are beginningless but not endless.

[It is only an existence, that is, an existent thing, that can be called eternal or non-eternal. We cannot apply the epithets " eternal " and " non-eternal " to non-existence except in a figurative sense.]

अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववद्वा ॥ ४ । १ । ६६ ॥

अणुश्यामताऽनित्यत्ववत् *anu-śyāma-tā-a-nitya-tva-vat*, like the non-eternality of the darkness of the atom ; वा *vā*, or.

409. Or non-eternal like the blackness of an atom.

An earthy atom, which is naturally black, changes its colour when it is baked red in the kiln. Likewise the troubles which are natural disappear as soon as release is attained.

न सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वाच्च रागादीनाम् ॥ ४ । १ । ६७ ॥

न *na*, no ; सङ्कल्पनिमित्तत्वात् *saṅkalpa-nimitta-tvāt*, being caused by will or deliberation ; च *cha*, and ; रागादीनां *rāga-ādīnām*, of desire, etc.

410. It is, we reply, not so because affection, etc. are caused by misapprehension.

The Naiyāyika says:—There is no necessity for us here to admit that a thing which is natural (beginningless) may not be endless. The troubles are not in fact natural (beginningless) because they are caused by activity which springs from our affection, aversion and stupidity. These last are generated by our misapprehension. The troubles not being natural, there is no lack of opportunity for us to attain release.

Book IV.—CHAPTER II.

दोषनिमित्तानां तत्त्वज्ञानादहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥ ४ । २ । १ ॥

दोषनिमित्तानां doṣa-nimittānām, of the causes of faults ; तत्त्वज्ञानात् tattva-jñānāt, through knowledge of the truth ; अहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ahaṅkāra-nivṛtitiḥ, cessation of ahaṅkāra.

411. Through knowledge about the true nature of the causes of faults, there is cessation of egotism.

Egotism is stupidity of the form "I am." It consists of the notion, "I am," entertained by a person in respect of what is not self. It disappears as soon as we attain knowledge about the true nature of the faults which are caused by all objects such as body, etc. enumerated in aphorism 1—1—9

दोषनिमित्तं रूपादयो विषयाः सङ्कल्पकृताः ॥ ४ । २ । २ ॥

दोषनिमित्तं doṣa-nimittam, the cause of faults ; रूपादयः rūpa-ādayaḥ, form, etc ; विषयाः viśayaḥ, objects ; सङ्कल्पकृताः saṅkalpa-kṛitāḥ, adopted by the will.

412. The colour and other objects, when regarded as good, become the causes of faults.

It is only when we look upon colour or any other object as a source of enjoyment that it becomes a cause of our affection, aversion or stupidity.

तन्निमित्तन्त्ववयवमभिमानः ॥ ४ । २ । ३ ॥

तन्निमित्तं tat-nimittam, their cause ; तु tu, but ; अवयवमभिमानः avayavi-abhimānaḥ, regard as a whole.

413. The faults are caused through a conception of the *whole* apart from its *part*.

The faults are produced if a man or woman looks upon each other as a *whole*, viz., as a male or female with all his or her paraphernalia of teeth, lips, eyes, nose, etc., together with their secondary marks ; and they are shunned if he or she looks upon each other by *parts* only, viz., upon his or her hair, flesh, blood, bone, nerve, head, phlegm, bile, excrement, etc., all of which are frail. The notion of the *whole* engenders lust while that of the *parts* produces equanimity. We must regard every thing from the standpoint of evil, e. g., the rice boiled with poison is looked upon by a worldly man as rice and by an ascetic as poison.

विद्याऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् संशयः ॥ ४ । २ । ४ ॥

विद्याऽविद्याद्वैविध्यात् vidyā-a-vidyā-dvaidhyāt, from twofoldness of knowledge and of ignorance ; संशयः samśayaḥ, doubt.

414. Owing to the apprehension and non-apprehension being each of two kinds, there arises a doubt as to the existence of a whole apart from its parts.

There are two kinds of apprehension, viz., real and unreal. The apprehension of water in a tank is real while that of mirage as a mass of water is unreal. The non-apprehension is also of two kinds, viz., real and unreal. The non-apprehension of a hare's horn (which is non-existent) is a real non-apprehension while that of the ether (which is existent) is an unreal non-apprehension. The apprehension and non-apprehension being both real and unreal there arises a doubt as to whether there is really a whole apart from its parts. If we apprehend a whole apart from its parts, our apprehension may be unreal. If we do not apprehend a whole, our non-apprehension too may be unreal.

तदसंशयः पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ५ ॥

तदसंशयः tat-a-samśayaḥ, no doubt about it; पूर्वहेतुप्रसिद्धत्वात् pūrva-hetu-prasiddha-tvāt, having been established by reasons already stated.

415. There is no room for doubt with regard to the existence of a whole already established through arguments.

No one has yet set aside the arguments employed in aphorism 2—1—34 to establish a whole apart from its parts.

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि तर्हि न संशयः ॥ ४ । २ । ६ ॥

वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः vṛitti-an-upapatteḥ, from absence of proof of inclusion ; अपि api, also ; तर्हि tarhi, then ; न na, not ; संशयः samśayaḥ doubt.

416. There is, says some one, no room for doubt even with regard to the non-existence of a whole on account of the impossibility of the whole residing anywhere.

In the preceding aphorism the Naiyāyika has said that there is no doubt as to the existence of a whole apart from its parts as demonstrated in aphorism 2—1—34. In the present aphorism his opponent says that there is no doubt as to the non-existence of a whole apart from its parts because neither the whole can reside in its parts nor the latter in the

former. One affirms that there is a whole while the other affirms that there is a no-whole. In either case there is no room for doubt.

कृतस्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वादवयवानामवयव्यभावः ॥ ४ । २ । ७ ॥

कृतस्नैकदेशावृत्तित्वात् kṛitsna-eka-deśa-a-vṛitti tvât, because of not being co-extensive with the whole; अवयवानाम् avayavânâm, of the parts; अवयव्यभावः avayavi-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of the whole.

417. There is, says the objector, no whole because its parts reside in it neither totally nor partially.

A part does not occupy the whole in its totality owing to the difference of their dimension; neither does it occupy the whole partially because the part can reside neither in itself nor in another part.

तेषु चावृत्तेरवयव्यभावः ॥ ४ । २ । ८ ॥

तेषु teṣu, in them; च cha, and; अवृत्तेः a-vṛitteḥ, because of non-residence; अवयव्यभावः avayavi-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of the whole.

418. Also because the whole does not, continues the objector, reside in its parts.

The whole does not reside in each of its parts separately on account of the difference of their dimension. Neither does it reside in some of its parts collectively because in that case it loses its connection with the other parts.

पृथक् चावयवेभ्योऽवृत्तेः ॥ ४ । २ । ९ ॥

पृथक् prīthak, other; च cha, and; अवयवेभ्यः avayavebhyaḥ, than the parts; अवृत्तेः a-vṛitteḥ, because of non-residence.

419. Owing to the lack of residence, affirms the objector, there is no whole apart from its parts.

The whole does not exist as the relation between it and its parts is not that of the container and the contained.

न चावयव्यवयवाः ॥ ४ । २ । १० ॥

न na, not; च cha, and; अवयवी avayavī, the whole, अवयवाः avayavāḥ, parts.

420. And the parts are not the whole.

The objector says that the relation between the whole and its parts is not that of identity. No one says that the thread is the web or the pillar is the house.

एकस्मिन् भेदाभावाद्भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेरप्रश्नः ४।२।११॥

एकस्मिन् ekasmin, in one ; भेदाभावाद् bheda-abhâvât, owing to absence of difference ; भेदशब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः bheda-śabda-prayoga-an-upapattēḥ, because of impropriety of use of the word difference ; अप्रश्नः a-praśnaḥ, no question.

421. There is, we reply, no room for the question owing to the impropriety in the use of the term "variety" in reference to what is *one*.

In aphorism 4—2—7 an opponent raised the question as to whether the whole occupied its parts totally or partially. The Naiyāyika disposes of the question by saying that there is no room for it because the terms "totally" and "partially" cannot be applied to "*one*." The term "totally" is employed only in the case of several things of which no one has been left out while the word "partially" refers to an aggregate of which some parts have been left out. Now, neither the term "totally" nor the term "partially" is applicable to what is "*one*", that is, to a "*whole*." In the case of a whole the employment of language implying variety is unjustifiable.

अवयवान्तराभावेऽप्यन्तेरहेतुः ॥ ४ । २ । १२ ॥

अवयवान्तराभावे avayava-antara-abhâve, in the absence of another part ; अपि api, also ; अवृत्तेः a-vṛittēḥ, owing to non-residence or non-function ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, no mark or reason or argument.

422. The question, we further reply, is unreasonable because even if one part could be the residence of another part, it would not be the residence of the *whole*.

When we speak of a whole residing in its parts we must not understand that the term residence refers to any space, in fact it refers to the relation of refuge and refugee. A refuge is that with which the refugee is inseparably connected and without which it can never exist. Hence there is no impossibility of the whole residing in its parts.

केशसमूहे तैमिरिकोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥ ४ । २ । १३ ॥

केशसमूहे keśa-samūhe, in respect of a collection of hairs; तैमिरिकोपलब्धिः taimirika-upalabdhi-vat, like the perception of one affected with a dimness of sight; तदुपलब्धिः tat -upalabdhiḥ, its perception.

423. The perception of a “whole” bears analogy to that of a collection of hairs by a person affected with a dimness of sight.

Just as a person of dim sight cannot perceive hairs separately but can perceive them in a mass, so we cannot perceive the atoms separately but can perceive them in a mass in the form of a jar or the like.

**स्वविषयानतिक्रमेणोन्द्रियस्य पटुमन्दभावाद्विषयग्रहणस्य
तथा भावो नाविषये प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ४ । २ । १४ ॥**

स्वविषयानतिक्रमेण sva-viṣaya-an-atikrameṇa, by reason of its not going beyond its own object ; इन्द्रियस्य indriyasya, of the sense ; पटुमन्दभावात् paṭu-manda-bhāvāt, according to keenness and dullness ; विषयग्रहणस्य viṣaya-graḥaṇa-sya, of the apprehension of object ; तथा tathā, like ; भावः bhāvaḥ, condition ; न na, no ; अविषये a-viṣaye, to what is not its object ; प्रवृत्तिः pravṛtitiḥ, operation.

424. A sense is inoperative in reference to what is not its object because its acuteness or dullness of apprehension is restricted to its own object which it cannot transcend.

The eye, whether it is acute or dim, cannot apprehend a sound. Similarly the ear, sharp or dull, cannot see a colour. All senses have their special objects to which their operation is restricted. An atom which is supersensuous, cannot be apprehended by any of our senses—no matter whether these are acute or dim. Each hair being perceptible, its collection also is capable of being perceived whereas the atoms being imperceptible their collection cannot be perceived. As we can perceive the collection of atoms in the shape of a jar or the like, we must admit that the collection or the whole is a reality independent of its parts (the atoms).

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गश्चैवमाप्रलयात् ॥ ४ । २ । १५ ॥

अवयवावयविप्रसङ्गः avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ, relation of whole and parts ; च cha, and ; एव evam, then ; आ â, up ; अप्रलयात् pralayât, to pralaya, dissolution.

425. The whole and its parts should in that case be supposed to continue up to the time of annihilation.

Even if we admit the existence of a whole and its parts, we cannot suppose them to continue for ever because they are subject to destruction at the time of annihilation. A whole has got its parts and the parts again have their parts which do not cease until they become non-existent at the time of annihilation.

न प्रलयोऽणुसद्भावात् ॥ ४ । २ । १६ ॥

न na, no ; प्रलयः pralayaḥ, dissolution ; अणुसद्भावात् Anu-sad-bhāvāt, owing to the existence of the atom.

426. There is, we reply, no annihilation because there are atoms.

There will never come a time when there will be an utter annihilation, for things will even then continue to exist in the state of atoms. An atom is a thing of the smallest dimension, that is, a thing which is not capable of being of smaller dimension.

परं वा त्रुटेः ॥ ४ । २ । १७ ॥

परं param, beyond ; वा vâ, or ; त्रुटेः truteḥ, of truti, a minute part.

427. An atom is that which is not capable of being divided.

An atom is not divisible into further parts.

[Two atoms make a *dryanuka* (dyad) and three *dryanukas* make a *tryasareṇu* (triad). All things which we perceive are composed of *tryasareṇus*. An atom (anu) is finer than a *dryanuka* and the latter finer than a *tryasareṇu*]

आकाशव्यतिभेदात् तदनुपपत्तिः ॥ ४ । २ । १८ ॥

आकाशव्यतिभेदात् ākāśa vyatibhedāt, owing to interpenetration of ether ; तदनुपपत्तिः tat-an-upapattiḥ, its non-proof.

428. There is, says some one, an impossibility of such a thing, as it is divided throughout by ether.

The Naiyayika defines the atom as a whole which has no parts, that is, a thing which is not divisible into further parts. Some one controverts the definition by saying that an atom is not devoid of parts because it is intersected by ether *within* and *without*.

आकाशासर्वगतत्वं वा ॥ ४ । २ । १९ ॥

आकाशासर्वगतत्वं ākāśa-a-sarva-gata-tvam, non-omnipenetration of ether ; वा vâ, or.

429. Else there would not be the omnipresence of the ether.

The ether would not be called omnipresent if it could not reside within the atoms

अन्तर्बहिश्च कार्थ्यद्रव्यस्य कारणान्तरवचनादकार्ये तदभावः

॥ ४ । २ । २० ॥

अन्तः antah, in ; बहिः bahih, out ; च cha, and ; कार्थ्यद्रव्यस्य kârya-dravya-sya, of the effect substance ; कारणान्तरवचनात् kâraṇa-antara-vachanât, owing to declaration of another cause ; अकार्ये a-karye, in a non-effect ; तदभावः tat-a-bhâvaḥ, its absence.

430. There is no " within " "without " of an eternal thing. The terms are applicable only to factitious things inasmuch as they imply constituents other than those which are seen.

The word " within " refers to that constituent of a thing which is enclosed by another constituent thereof while the word " without " refers to the constituent which encloses another constituent, but is not enclosed by it. These terms cannot be applied to eternal things such as atoms which do not possess constituents some of which may enclose the rest.

शब्दसंयोगविभवाच्च सर्वगतम् ॥ ४ । २ । २१ ॥

शब्दसंयोगविभवात् śabda-samyoga-bibhavât, owing to universality of conjunction of sound ; च cha, and ; सर्वगतं sarva-gatam, all-penetrating.

431. The ether is omnipresent because of the universality of its conjunction which is a cause of sound.

Owing to sound being produced everywhere it is inferred that the ether is omnipresent. If a certain place were devoid of contact with ether there would be no sound there. There is in fact a conjunction of ether everywhere:

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि चाकाशधर्माः ॥ ४ । २ । २२ ॥

अव्यूहाविष्टम्भविभुत्वानि a-vyûha-viṣṭambha-vibhu-tvâni, characteristics of not being massed, not offering obstruction, and being universal ; च cha, and ; आकाशधर्माः âkâśa-dharmâḥ, the attributes or properties of ether.

432. The ether possesses three properties, viz., that it is not repeated, that it does not obstruct and that it is all-pervading.

The ether is not repelled because it does not possess any form, it does not obstruct because it is intangible, and it is all-pervading because it is omnipresent.

मूर्तिमताञ्च संस्थानोपपत्तेरवयवसद्भावः ॥ ४ । २ । २३ ॥

मूर्तिमतां mûrti-matâm, of things possessing a form ; च cha, and ; संस्थानोपपत्तेः sanisthâna-upapatteḥ, from proof of position, shape ; अवयवसद्भावः avayava-sad- bhâvaḥ, existence of parts.

433. There are, says some one, parts in an atom because a thing that is endowed with a form must also possess a collocation of parts.

The objection stands thus:—

An atom is divisible into parts because it possesses a form, that is, it is of a limited dimension.

[The ether, soul, space and time being of unlimited dimensions are not divisible into parts]

संयोगोपपत्तेश्च ॥ ४ । २ । २४ ॥

संयोगोपपत्तेः samyoga-upapatteḥ, from proof of conjunction ; च cha, and.

434. An atom, continues the objector, must possess parts because it is capable of being conjoined with another atom.

The objection is this:—

The fact that atoms possess the quality of conjunction proves that they have parts, because an atom can come in conjunction with another only in some of its parts.

अनवस्थाकारित्वादनवस्थानुपपत्तेश्चाप्रतिषेधः ॥ ४ । २ । २५ ॥

अनवस्थाकारित्वात् an-avasthâ-kâri-tvât, as causing instability, regression ; अनवस्थानुपपत्तेः an-avasthâ-an- upapatteḥ, because of unreasonableness of regression ; च cha, and ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

435. The doctrine of the indivisibility of atom cannot, we reply, be refuted because such a refutation would give rise to a *regressus ad infinitum* which is not proper.

If you say that an atom is divisible into parts, you will have to admit that those parts again are divisible into further parts. This would give rise to a *regressus ad infinitum* which should, if possible, be avoided. If all things were indefinitely divisible we should find a large thing and a small one to be of equal dimension as both would possess an infinite number of parts. A thing although indefinitely divided should not lose itself. There must remain a particle, *viz.*, an atom which should not perish even at the time of annihilation.

**बुद्ध्या विवेचनात्तु भावानां याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिस्तन्त्वपकर्ष-
णे पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४ । २ । २६ ॥**

बुद्ध्या buddhyā, by the understanding ; विवेचनात् vivechanāt, from separation ; तु tu, but ; याथात्म्यानुपलब्धिः yāthātmya-an-upalabdhiḥ, non-perception of reality ; तन्त्वपकर्षणे tantu-apakarsaṇe, on the separation of the threads ; पटसद्भावानुपलब्धिवत् pata-sadbhāva-an-upalabdhi-vaṭ, like the non-perception of the existence of fabric ; तदनुपलब्धिः tat-an-upalabdhiḥ, its non-perception ;

436. Things, some say, do not possess a reality if they are separated from our thoughts, just as there is no reality in a web separated from its threads.

The objection is this:—

Things do not possess a reality independent of our thoughts just as a web does not possess a reality independent of its threads. Hence it is our thoughts alone that are real, external things are all unreal. [This aphorism refers to the doctrine of the Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy explained in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.] *

व्यहतत्वादहेतुः ॥ ४ । २ । २७ ॥

व्याहतत्वात् vyāhata-tvāt, being obstructed ; अहेतुः a-hetuḥ, not a mark.

437. The reason, we reply, is not good as it hurts itself.

* बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।

यस्मात् तस्माद् अनभिलाप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः ।

(लंकावतार सूत्र, २ परिवर्त्त, पृष्ठ ५०)

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधार्यते ।

यस्मादनाभिलाप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च देशिताः ॥

लंकावतार सूत्र १० परिवर्त्त, पृ० ११५ ॥

The Naiyāyika says that his opponent's reason, *viz.*, that things do not possess a reality if they are separated from our thoughts, is self-destructive because if things are capable of being separated from our thoughts they cannot be said to be unreal, and on the other hand if things are unreal they are incapable of being separated from our thoughts. The opponent commits a contradiction by saying that things are unreal and at the same time by going to separate them from our thoughts.

तदाश्रयत्वादपृथग्ग्रहणम् ॥ ४ । २ । २८ ॥

tat-āśraya-tvāt, because an effect is dependent on the cause.
अपृथक्ग्रहणम् a-prīthak-grahāṇam, non-apprehension as separate.

438. There is, we reply, no separate perception of a refuge and its refuge.

A web being the refuge of its threads, the perception of the former includes that of the latter so that there are no separate perceptions of them. If our thoughts were the refuge of external things, then there would be no separate perceptions of them. But the opponent's argument, *viz.*, that "if things are separated from our thoughts," makes it manifest that our thoughts are not the refuge of external things.

प्रमाणतश्चाऽर्थप्रतिपत्तेः ॥ ४ । २ । २९ ॥

प्रमाणतः *pramāṇa-taḥ*, by means of proof ; *च* *cha*, and ; *अर्थप्रतिपत्तेः* *artha-pratīpatteḥ*, because of establishment of object.

439. And things are established by evidences.

The reality of things is proved by evidences such as perception. Every thing requires an evidence for its establishment. The very assertion that "things are not real if they cannot be separated from our thoughts" must be based on an evidence if it is to commend itself to our acceptance. Hence we cannot deny things if they are established by evidences.

प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् ॥ ४ । २ । ३० ॥

प्रमाणानुपपत्त्युपपत्तिभ्याम् *pramāṇa-an-upapatti-upapatti-bhyām*, by reason of application and non-application of proofs.

440. The non-reality of things is demonstrated neither by evidence nor without them.

The proposition that "there is nothing" cannot be proved in any way. If you say that there is an evidence to prove it, you hurt your own proposition, *viz.*, that, there is nothing. If again you say that there is no evidence, how do you then establish your proposition ?

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवदयं प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः ॥ ४।२।३१ ॥

स्वप्नविषयाभिमानवत् svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-vat, like the idea of objects seen in a dream ; अयं ayam, this ; प्रमाणप्रमेयाभिमानः pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ, idea of proof and the object of proof.

441. The concept of the means and the objects of knowledge, says some one, bears analogy to that of things appearing in a dream.

The means and the objects of knowledge are as delusive as things appearing in a dream.

[The aphorism 4-2-31 and 4-2-32 evidently refer to the Buddhist doctrine of "non-reality" expounded in the Ārya Upāli-pṛicchā-Samādhī rāja-sūtra, Ārya-gaṇa-gaṇja-sūtra, Mādhyamika-sūtra, Ārya-ratnāvalī, Lalitavistara-sūtra and other Mahāyāna works.*]

मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावद्वा ॥ ४।२।३२ ॥

मायागन्धर्वनगरमृगतृष्णिकावत् māyā-gandharva-nagara-mṛiga-triṣṇikā-vat, like illusion, the city of the celestial musicians, and mirage ; वा वा, or.

442. It may, continues the objector, be likened to jugglery, the city of the celestial quirksters or a mirage.

The means and the objects of knowledge are as unreal as things exhibited in jugglery, etc.

हेत्वभावादसिद्धिः ॥ ४।२।३३ ॥

हेत्वभावाद् hetu-a-bhāvāt, owing to non existence of cause ; असिद्धिः a-siddhiḥ non-proof.

ॐ यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथोत्पादस्तथा स्थानं तथा भङ्ग उदाहृतम् ॥ Mādhyamika-Sūtra, Chap. VII.

यथैव गन्धर्वपुरं मरीचिका यथैव माया सुपिनं यथैव ।

स्वभावस्तथा तु निमित्तभावना तथोपमानं जानत सर्वधर्मान् ॥

(Quoted in Mādhyamikā Vṛitti, p. 57).

माया मरीचि समो हि विकल्पः । (Ārya-Upāli-pṛicchā, quoted in M. V. 63)

मायोपमा गगनविद्युत्समोदकचन्द्रसन्निभमरीचिसमाः । (Ārya-Samādhīrāja-Bhaṭṭāraka quoted in Mādhamikā Vṛitti, Chap. XX(.)

443. This cannot, we reply, be proved, as there is no reason for it.

There is no reason that the concept of the means and the objects of knowledge should bear an analogy to the concept of things appearing in a dream but not to that of things appearing in our wakeful state. If you, to prove the unreality of things in a dream, adduce the reason that these are not perceived in our wakeful state, we would, to prove the reality of the means and the objects of knowledge, adduce the reason that these are perceived in our wakeful state.

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवच्च स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः ॥ ४ । २ । ३४ ॥

स्मृतिसङ्कल्पवत् *smṛiti-saṅkalpa-vat*, like memory and imagination; च *cha*, and ; स्वप्नविषयाभिमानः *svapna-viṣaya-abhimānaḥ*, idea of object seen in a dream.

444. The concept of things in a dream arises in the same way as remembrance and imagination.

The things that appear in a dream are not unreal. We can conceive of them in a dream just as we can do in our wakeful state. Our concept of things in the dream is due to our memory and imagination.

It is by a reference to the knowledge in our wakeful condition, that we ascertain our knowledge in the dream to be unreal. But in the event of there being only one condition, *viz.*, that of wakefulness, the analogy to the dream would not be appropriate.

**मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशस्तत्त्वज्ञानात् स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाश-
वत् प्रतिबोधे ॥ ४ । २ । ३५ ॥**

मिथ्योपलब्धिविनाशः *mithyā-upalabdhi-vināśaḥ*, destruction of false perception or cognition ; तत्त्वज्ञानात् *tattva-jñānāt*, from knowledge of reality ; स्वप्नविषयाभिमानप्रणाशवत् *svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-praṇāśa-vat*, like the destruction of the idea of things seen in a dream ; प्रतिबोधे *prati-bodhe*, on awakening.

445. Our false apprehension is destroyed by a knowledge of the truth, just as our concept of objects in a dream comes to an end on our awaking.

In the case of jugglery, the city of the celestial quirksters and the mirage, our apprehension, if it is false, consists of our imputing "that" to what is "not that" just as when we mistake a post for a man. The

objects of the apprehension are, however, not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination.

Jugglery (māyā) consists of a false apprehension produced in others by an artifice through the use of materials similar to those originally announced by him.

Just as our concept of objects in a dream passes away as soon as we are awake, so also our false apprehension of objects disappears as soon as we attain a true knowledge of those objects.

बुद्धेश्चैवं निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् ॥ ४ । २ । ३६ ॥

बुद्धेः buddheḥ, of the understanding, of (false) knowledge; च cha, also; एवं evam, likewise ; निमित्तसद्भावोपलम्भात् nimitta-sadbhāva-upalambhāt, from perception or cognition of the cause and its existence.

446. There is therefore no denial of false knowledge, inasmuch as we perceive that there is a cause for that knowledge.

It has already been shown that our *concept* of objects in a dream is unreal, inasmuch as we do not actually perceive them at that time, but that the *objects* of the dream are not unreal, inasmuch as they arise from our memory and imagination. In fact, the objects that give rise to false knowledge are never unreal, although the knowledge itself may be false.

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदाच्च मिथ्याबुद्धेर्द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः ॥४॥२॥३७॥

तत्त्वप्रधानभेदात् tattva-pradhāna -bhedāt, owing to the distinction of the reality and the primary idea or appearance; मिथ्याबुद्धेः mithyā-buddheḥ, of false knowledge ; द्वैविध्योपपत्तिः dvai-vidhya-upapattiḥ, proof of twofoldness.

447. And false knowledge involves a two-fold character on account of the distinction between the essence and appearance of its object.

When we mistake a post for a man, our knowledge assumes the form "that is man." Our knowledge of the post, in so far as it is called "that", is a true knowledge, but in so far as it is described as "man", is a false knowledge. This falsity of knowledge is due to our recognition of certain properties common to the post and the man.

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् ॥ ४ । २ । ३८ ॥

समाधिविशेषाभ्यासात् samādhi -viśeṣa-abhyāsāt, from the practice of a particular contemplation.

448. The knowledge of truth is rendered habitual by a special practice of meditation.

Meditation is the soul's union with the mind abstracted from the senses whose contact with objects does not produce any perception. The knowledge of the truth is rendered habitual by the repeated practice of this meditation.

नार्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् ॥ ४ । २ । ३६ ॥

न na, no ; अर्थविशेषप्राबल्यात् artha-viśeṣa-prābalyāt, owing to predominance of certain objects.

449. Meditation, some say, is not practicable by reason of the predominance of certain external objects.

There are innumerable obstacles to meditation, *e. g.*, hearing the thundering noise of a cloud, one is prevented from practising meditation.

क्षुदादिभिः प्रवर्त्तनाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ४० ॥

क्षुदादिभिः kṣut-âdi-bhīḥ, by hunger, etc. ; प्रवर्त्तनात् pravarttanât, from incitement ; च cha, and

450. And by reason of our being impelled to action by hunger, etc.

Hunger and thirst, heat and cold, disease, etc. sometimes prevent us from practising meditation.

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् तदुत्पत्तिः ॥ ४ । २ । ४१ ॥

पूर्वकृतफलानुबन्धात् pūrva-kṛta-phala-anubandhât, from sequence of fruits of previous acts ; तदुत्पत्तिः tat-utpattiḥ, its production.

451. It arises, we reply, through possession of the fruits of our former works.

We acquire a habit of practising meditation in consequence of our good deeds of a previous life.

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु योगाभ्यासोपदेशः ॥ ४ । २ । ४२ ॥

अरण्यगुहापुलिनादिषु aranya-guhâ pulina-âdi-ṣu, in forests, caves and river bank ; योगाभ्यासोपदेशः yoga-abhyâsa-upadeśaḥ, instruction of the practice of yoga or contemplation.

452. We are instructed to practise meditation in such places as a forest, a cave or a sand-bank.

The meditation practised in these places is not seriously disturbed by any obstacle.

अपवर्गेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्गः ॥ ४ । २ । ४३ ॥

अपवर्गे *apavarge*, in release ; अपि *api*, also ; एवं *evam*, similar ; प्रसङ्गः *prasaṅgaḥ*, implication.

453. Such possibilities may occur even in release.

Even a person who has attained release may be disturbed by the violence of an external object.

न निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ४४ ॥

न *na*, no ; निष्पन्नावश्यम्भावित्वात् *niṣpanna-avaśyambhāvi-tvāt*, being inevitable only where (a body has already been) formed.

454. It is, we reply, not so, because knowledge must spring up only in a body already in the state of formation.

A violent external object produces knowledge only in a body which has been formed, in consequence of our previous deeds, and which is endowed with senses, etc.

तदभावश्चापवर्गे ॥ ४ । २ । ४५ ॥

तदभावः *tat-abhāvaḥ*, its non-existence ; च *cha*, and ; अपवर्गे *apa-varge*, in release.

455. And there is absence of a body in our release.

Our merits and demerits having already been exhausted, we cannot get a body after we have attained release. Release is the perfect freedom from all sufferings : it consists in a complete destruction of all the seeds and seats of sufferings.

तदर्थं यमनियमाभ्यामात्मसंस्कारो योगाच्चाध्यात्मविध्युपायैः ॥ ४ । २ । ४६ ॥

तदर्थं *tat-artham*, to that end ; यमनियमाभ्यां *yama-niyamābhyām*, by means of external and internal self-control ; आत्मसंस्कारः *ātma-saṁskāraḥ*, purification of the soul ; योगात् *yogāt*, from treatise on yoga or contemplation ; च *cha*, and ; अध्यात्मविध्युपायैः *adhyātma-vidhi-upāyaiḥ*, by means of injunctions and practices regarding the soul.

456. For that purpose there should be a purifying of our soul by abstinence from evil and observance of certain duties as well as by following the spiritual injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute.

In order to attain release we must practise meditation after the soul has been purified by our abstinence, etc. The injunctions gleaned from the Yoga institute refer to penances, the controlling of our breaths, the fixing of our mind, etc.

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासस्तद्विदौश्च सह संवादः ॥ ४ । २ । ४७ ॥

ज्ञानग्रहणाभ्यासः jñāna-grahṇa-abhyāsaḥ, study of the science of the soul and constant application to it ; तद्विदौः tat-vidyauḥ, with those who are versed in it ; च cha, and ; सह saha, with ; संवादः saṁvādaḥ, conversation.

457. To secure release, it is necessary to study and follow this treatise on knowledge as well as to hold discussions with those learned in that treatise

The spiritual injunctions furnished by the Yoga institute cannot be properly assimilated unless we have already acquired a true knowledge of the categories explained in the Nyāya Śāstra. It is therefore very useful to study the Nyāya Śāstra and to hold discussions with persons learned in the Śāstra.

**तं शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोर्थिभिरनसूयिभिरभ्यु-
पेयात् ॥ ४ । २ । ४८ ॥**

तं taṁ conversation ; शिष्यगुरुसब्रह्मचारिविशिष्टश्रेयोर्थिभिः śiṣya-guru-sabrahmachāri-viśiṣṭa-śreyorthibhiḥ, with disciples, preceptors, fellow students, and seekers after the supreme good ; अनसूयिभिः an-asūyibhiḥ, with unenvious ; अभ्युपेयात् abhyupeyāt, resort to.

458. One should enter upon discussions with unenvious persons, such as disciples, preceptors, fellow-students and seekers of the *summum bonum*.

The epithet "unenvious" excludes those who do not seek truth but desire victory. Discussion has been defined in aphorism 1—2—1.

प्रतिपक्षहीनमपि वा प्रयोजनार्थमर्थित्वे ॥ ४ । २ । ४९ ॥

प्रतिपक्षहीनं pratipakṣa-hīnam, without advancing opposition ; अपि api, even ; वा vā, or ; प्रयोजनार्थं prayojana-artham, for the sake of the purpose ; अर्थित्वे arthi-tve, where one needs it.

459. In case of a necessity for the search of truth, discussion may be held even without an opposing side.

A person desirous of knowledge may submit his views for examination by simply expressing his curiosity for truth without an attempt to establish the views.

**तरवाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं जल्पवितण्डे बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं
कण्टकशाखावरणवत् ॥ ४ । २ । ५० ॥**

तरवाध्यवसायसंरक्षणार्थं tattva-adhyavasāya-samrakṣaṇa-arthaṁ, for the sake of the conservation of the true and certain knowledge about reality ; जल्प-वितण्डे jalpa-vitaṇḍe, sophistry and cavil ; बीजप्ररोहसंरक्षणार्थं vija-praroḥa-samrakṣaṇa-arthaṁ, for the sake of the preservation of the shoots from seeds ; कण्टकशाखावरणवत् kaṇṭaka-śākhā-āvaraṇa-vat, like the fencing or covering of thorns and branches.

460. Wranglings and cavils may be employed to keep up our zeal for truth just as fences of thorny boughs are used to safeguard the growth of seeds.

Certain talkative people propound philosophies which are mutually opposed, while others violate all sense of rectitude out of a bias for their own side. Seeing that these people have not attained true knowledge and are not freed from faults, we may, in our disputation against them, employ wranglings and cavils which do not in themselves deserve any profit or encomium.

ताभ्यां विग्रह्य कथनम् ॥ ४ । २ । ५१ ॥

ताभ्यां tābhyām, by means of them, sophistry and cavil ; विग्रह्य vigr-ihya, for overcoming ; कथनं kathanam, statement.

461. Sophistry and cavil should be employed also in declaring the truth to overcome the attack of the erratic.

Book V.—CHAPTER I.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यप्राप्त्य-
प्राप्तिप्रसङ्ग प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशयप्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्यवि-
शेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य कार्यसमाः॥५।१।१॥

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्य विकल्पसाध्य प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्ग प्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशय-
प्रकरणाहेत्वर्थापत्त्य विशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्य कार्यसमाः sâdharma-vaidhar-
mya-utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sâdhya-prâpti-aprâpti-pra-
saṅga-pratidṛṣṭânta-anutpatti-saṁśaya-prakaraṇa-ahetu-arthâpatti-aviśe-
ṣa-upapatti-upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-nitya-anitya-kârya-samâh, identicals
in respect of resemblance, difference, addition, subtraction, questionable,
unquestionable, alternative, thing to be established, presence, absence,
regression, counter-example, non-production, doubt, topic, non-reason,
presumption, non-difference, demonstration, perception, non-perception,
eternal, non-eternal, and effect.

462. Futilities are as follows:—(1) Balancing the homogeneity,
(2) balancing the heterogeneity, (3) balancing an addition, (4) balancing
a subtraction, (5) balancing the questionable, (6) balancing the
unquestionable, (7) balancing the alternative. (8) balancing the
reciprocity, (9) balancing the co-presence, (10) balancing the mutual
absence, (11) balancing the infinite regression, (12) balancing the
counterexample, (13) balancing the non-produced, (14) balancing the
doubt, (15) balancing the controversy, (16) balancing the non-reason,
(17) balancing the presumption, (18) balancing the non-difference,
(19) balancing the non-demonstration, (20) balancing the perception,
(21) balancing the non-perception, (22) balancing the non-eternality,
(23) balancing the eternality and (24) balancing the effect.

Futility, which is a fallacious argument, has been in general terms
defined in aphorism 1-2-18. The twentyfour kinds of futility enunciated
here will each be defined in due course. The fallacious characters of the
twentyfour kinds will also be exposed in separate aphorisms.

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यामुपसंहारे तदुर्मविपर्ययोपपत्तेः
साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमौ ॥ ५ । १ । २ ॥

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्याम् sâdharmya-vaidharmyâ-bhyâm, by means of resemblance and difference ; उपसंहारे upasamhâre, in case of a conclusion ; तद्वर्त्म-विपर्ययोपपत्तेः tat-dharma-viparyaya-upapattēh, on account of the absence of that characteristic ; साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यसमी sâdharmya-vaidharmya-samau, identicals in respect of resemblance and difference.

463. If against an argument based on a homogeneous or heterogeneous example one offers an opposition based on the same kind of example, the opposition will be called “balancing the homogeneity” or “balancing the heterogeneity”.

Balancing the homogeneity — A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the homogeneity of sound with the non-eternal pot on the ground of both being products. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be based on the homogeneity of sound with the eternal sky on the alleged ground of both being incorporeal. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called “balancing the homogeneity”, which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the homogeneity of examples employed by them.

Balancing the heterogeneity.—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
whatever is not non-eternal is not a product,
as the sky.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal,
as a pot.

The argument, *viz.*, sound is non-eternal, is based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-non-eternal sky, which are mutually incompatible. The opposition, *viz.*, sound is eternal, is said to be based on the heterogeneity of sound from the not-incorporeal pot which are alleged to be incompatible with each other. This sort of opposition, futile as it is, is called "balancing the heterogeneity", which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the heterogeneity of examples employed by them.

गोत्वाद्वोसिद्धिवत्तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १ । ३ ॥

गोत्वाद् *go-tvât*, from bovineness, the generic idea of a cow ; गोसिद्धिवत् *go-siddhi-vat*, like the proof of a cow ; तत्सिद्धिः *tat-siddhiḥ*, its proof.

464. That is, we say, to be established like a cow through cowhood (or cow-type).

The Naiyāyika says:—If the opposition referred to in the previous aphorism is to be valid it must be based on the example, homogeneous or heterogeneous, exhibiting a universal connection between the reason and the predicate such as we discern between a cow and cowhood or a universal disconnection between the reason and the absence of the predicate such as we discern between a cow and absence of cowhood. In the argument—"sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like a pot", the homogeneous example "pot" exhibits a universal connection between productivity and non-eternality, all products being non-eternal, but in the opposition—"sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the sky"—the homogeneous example "sky" does not exhibit a universal connection between incorporeality and eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal. A similar observation is to be made with regard to the opposition called "balancing the heterogeneity." In the opposition "sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, whatever is not eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot", the heterogeneous example "pot" does not exhibit a universal disconnection between incorporeality and absence of eternality because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are incorporeal but not eternal.

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोर्धर्मविकल्पादुभयसाध्यत्वाच्चोत्कर्षाप-
कर्षवर्ण्यवर्ण्यविकल्पसाध्यसमाः ॥ ५ । १ । ४ ॥

साध्यदृष्टान्तयोः sādhya-dṛṣṭāntayoh, of the thing to be established and the example ; धर्मविकल्पात् dharma-vikalpāt, from exchange or mutual transfer of properties; उभयसाध्यत्वात् ubhaya-sādhya-tvāt, both being in need of proof; च cha, and; उत्कर्षावकर्षवर्णवर्णविकल्पसाध्यसमाः utkarṣa-apakarṣa-varṇya-avarṇya-vikalpa-sādhya-samāḥ, identicals in respect of addition, subtraction, doubtful, not-doubtful, alternative and the thing to be established.

465. The subject and example alternating their characters or both standing in need of proof, there occur (futilities called) "balancing an addition", "balancing a subtraction", "balancing the questionable", "balancing the unquestionable", "balancing the alternative" and "balancing the reciprocity.

Balancing an addition.—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on an additional character thereof, the opposition will be called "balancing an addition."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is non-eternal (and corporeal),
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal as well as corporeal).

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it must also be corporeal like it; if it is not corporeal let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing an addition" which aims at showing an equality of the argument of two sides in respect of an additional character (possessed by the example and attributed to the subject).

Balancing a subtraction.—If against an argument based on a certain character of the example one offers an opposition based on another character wanting in it, the opposition will be called "balancing a subtraction."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers the following futile opposition:—

Sound is non-eternal (but not audible).
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal but not audible.)

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal like a pot, it cannot be audible, for a pot is not audible; and if sound is still held to be audible, let it be also not non-eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing a subtraction” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of a certain character wanting in the example (and consequently also in the subject).

Balancing the questionable.—If one opposes an argument by maintaining that the character of the example is as questionable as that of the subject, the opposition will be called “balancing the questionable.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of sound is called in question, why is not that of the pot too called in question, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to set aside the argument on the ground of its example being of a questionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the questionable” which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the questionable character of the subject as well as of the example.

Balancing the unquestionable.—If one opposes an argument by alleging that the character of the subject is as unquestionable as that of the example, the opposition will be called “balancing the unquestionable.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that if the non-eternality of a pot is held to be unquestionable, why is not that of sound too held to be so, as the pot and sound are both products? His object is to render the argument unnecessary on the ground of its subject being of an unquestionable character. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the unquestionable" which aims at showing the equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the unquestionable character of the example as well as of the subject.

Balancing the alternative.—If one opposes an argument by attributing alternative character to the subject and the example, the opposition will be called "balancing the alternative."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal and formless,
because it is a product,
like a pot (which is non-eternal and has forms).

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound are both products, yet one has form and the other is formless: why on the same principle is not one (the pot) non-eternal and the other (sound) eternal? This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the alternative" which aims at showing an equality of the arguments of two sides in respect of the alternative characters attributed to the subject and example.

Balancing the reciprocity.—If one opposes an argument by alleging a reciprocity of the subject and the example, the opposition will be called “balancing the reciprocity.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

A pot is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like sound.

The opponent alleges that the pot and sound being both products one requires proof for its non-eternality as much as the other does. Sound is to be proved non-eternal by the example of a pot and the pot is to be proved non-eternal by the example of sound. This leads to a reciprocity of the pot (example) and sound (subject) resulting in no definite conclusion as to the eternality or non-eternality of sound. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the reciprocity” which brings an argument to a stand-still by alleging the reciprocity of the subject and the example.

किञ्चित्साधर्म्यादुपसंहारसिद्धेर्वैधर्म्यादप्रतिषेधः ॥५।१।५॥

किञ्चित् kiñchit, partial ; साधर्म्यात् sâdharmyât, from resemblance ; उपसंहारसिद्धेः upasamhâra-siddheḥ, from proof of the conclusion ; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyât, from difference ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

466. This is, we say, no opposition because there is a difference between the subject and the example although the conclusion is drawn from a certain equality of their characters.

The Naiyâyika says:—The futilities called “balancing an addition,” “balancing a subtraction,” “balancing the questionable,” “balancing the unquestionable” and “balancing the alternative” are all based on the false supposition of a complete equality of the subject and the example. Though there is no denial of an equality of the subject and the example in certain characters, there is indeed a great difference between them in other characters.

Sound is non-eternal.

because it is a product,

like a pot.

In this argument although there is an equality of "sound" and "pot" in respect of their being both products, there is a great difference between them in other respects. A cow possesses some characters in common with a *bos gavaeus* but there is no complete identity between them. No body can commit the futilities mentioned above if he bears in mind the equality of the subject and the example only in those characters which are warranted by the reason (middle term). In the case of the futility called "balancing an addition" it is clear that the equality supposed to exist between the pot and sound in respect of corporeality is not warranted by the reason (*viz.* being a product), because there are things, such as intellect or knowledge, which are products but not corporeal. Similarly with regard to the futility called "balancing a subtraction," the reason (*viz.* being a product) does not justify an equality of sound and pot in respect of their being not audible. As regards the futilities called "balancing the questionable" and "balancing the unquestionable," we cannot ignore the difference between the subject and the example without putting an end to all kinds of inference. The futility called "balancing the alternative" introduces an equality between the pot and sound in respect of a character (*viz.* being eternal) which is not warranted by the reason, *viz.* being a product.

साध्यातिदेशाच्च दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

साध्यातिदेशात् *sādhya-atideśāt*, from extension of the thing to be established ; च *cha*, and ; दृष्टान्तोपपत्तेः *dṛṣṭānta-upapatteḥ*, because of proof of the example.

467. And because the example happens to surpass the subject.

The futility called "balancing the reciprocity" is based on the false supposition that the example stands exactly on the same footing as the subject. But that one surpasses the other is evident from aphorism 1-1-25 which states that the example does not stand in need of proof as to its characters.

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is a product,

like a pot.

In this argument sound (the subject) may not be known by some to be non-eternal but a pot (the example) is known by all to be a product as well as non-eternal. "Balancing the reciprocity" is therefore a fallacious argument.

**प्राप्य साध्यमप्राप्य वा हेतोः प्राप्या अविशिष्टत्वाद्-
प्राप्या असाधकत्वाच्च प्राप्यप्राप्तिसमौ ॥ ५ । १ । ७ ॥**

प्राप्य prāpya, reaching, covering ; साध्यम् sādhyam, the thing to be established ; अप्राप्य a-prāpya, not reaching ; वा vā, or ; हेतोः hetoh, of the mark or reason ; प्राप्या prāptyā, by the fact of covering or co-extension ; अविशिष्टत्वाद् a viśiṣṭa-tvāt, being undistinguished or identical ; अप्राप्या a-prāptyā, by reason of non-co-extension ; असाधकत्वाद् a sādhaḥka-tvāt, not being a means of establishment ; च cha, and ; प्राप्यप्राप्तिसमौ prāpti-aprāpti-samau, identicals in respect of presence and absence.

468. If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate or on the mutual absence of them one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence or mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from or being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence" or "balancing the mutual absence."

Balancing the co-presence.—If against an argument based on the co-presence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of co-presence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-distinguished from the predicate, be called "balancing the co-presence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke,
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The arguer has taken the smoke to be the reason and the fire to be the predicate. The opponent raises a question as to whether the smoke is present at the same site which is occupied by the fire or is absent from that site. If the smoke is present with the fire at the same site, there remains, according to the opponent, no criterion to distinguish the reason from the predicate. The smoke is, in his opinion, as much a reason for the fire as the fire for the smoke. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the co-presence" which aims at stopping an argument on the alleged ground of the co-presence of the reason and the predicate.

Balancing the mutual absence.—If against an argument based on the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate, one offers an opposition based on the same kind of mutual absence, the opposition will, on account of the reason being non-conducive to the predicate, be called "balancing the mutual absence."

A certain person, to prove that there is fire in the hill, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire,
because it has smoke,
like a kitchen.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The hill has smoke.
because it has fire,
like a kitchen.

The opponent asks: "Is the smoke to be regarded as the reason because it is absent from the site of the fire?" "Such a supposition is indeed absurd." The reason cannot establish the predicate without being connected with it, just as a lamp cannot exhibit a thing which is not within its reach. If a reason unconnected with the predicate could establish the latter, then the fire could be as much the reason for the smoke as the smoke for the fire. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the mutual absence" which aims at bringing an argument to a close on the alleged ground of the mutual absence of the reason and the predicate.

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् पीडने चाभिचारादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । ८॥

घटादिनिष्पत्तिदर्शनात् ghaṭa-ādi-niṣpatti-darśanāt, from the observation of the production of the pot and the like ; पीडने pīḍane, in the case of oppression ; च cha, and ; अभिचारान् abhichārāt, from spells ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣe-dhaḥ, non-contradiction.

469. This is, we say, no opposition because we find the production of pots by means of clay as well as the oppression of persons by spells.

A potter cannot produce a pot without getting clay within his reach but an exorcist can destroy persons by administering spells from a distance. Hence it is clear that a thing is accomplished sometimes by the cause being present at its site and sometimes by being absent from it. "Balancing the co-presence" and "balancing the mutual absence" which attach an undue importance to the proximity or remoteness of sites, are therefore totally fallacious arguments.

दृष्टान्तस्य कारणानपदेशात् प्रत्यवस्थानाच्च प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

दृष्टान्तस्य dṛiṣṭāntasya, of the example ; कारणानपदेशात् kāraṇa-an-apa-deśāt, from non-application of the cause ; प्रत्यवस्थानात् prati-avasthānāt, from counter-opposition ; च cha, and ; प्रतिदृष्टान्तेन prati-dṛiṣṭāntena, by a counter-example ; प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तसमौ prasaṅga-pratidṛiṣṭānta-samau, identicals in respect of regression and counter-example.

470. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the example having been established by a series of reasons or on the ground of the existence of a mere counter-example, the opposition will be called "balancing the infinite regression" or "balancing the counter-example."

Balancing the infinite regression.—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If sound is proved to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, how is the pot again to be proved as non-eternal? The reason which proves the non-eternality of the pot is to be proved by a further reason. This gives rise to an infinite regression which injures the proposition "sound

is non-eternal" not less than the proposition "sound is eternal." This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the infinite regression" which aims at stopping an argument by introducing an infinite regression which is said to beset the example.

Balancing the counter-example.—A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is held to be non-eternal by the example of a pot, why it should not be held to be eternal by the example of the sky? If the example of the sky is set aside, let the example of the pot too be set aside. This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the counter-example" which aims at setting aside an argument by the introduction of a counter-example.

प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्गनिवृत्तिवत्तद्विनिवृत्तिः ॥ ५ । १ । १० ॥

प्रदीपोपादानप्रसङ्गनिवृत्तिवत् *pradīpa-upādāna prasāṅga-nivṛtti-vat*, like the cessation of the need for a collection of lamps ; तद्विनिवृत्तिः *tat-vinivṛtṭiḥ*, its cessation.

471. The example does not, we say, require a series of reasons for its establishment just as a lamp does not require a series of lamps to be brought in for its illumination.

The Naiyāyika says:—

An example is a thing the characters of which are wellknown to an ordinary man as well as to an expert. It does not require a series of reasons to reveal its own character or to reveal the character of the subject with which it stands in the relation of homogeneity or heterogeneity. In this respect it resembles a lamp which illumines itself as well as the things lying within its reach.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

In this argument the pot is the example which is so well-known that it requires no proof as to its being a product or being non-eternal.

Hence the opposition called "balancing the infinite regression" is not founded on a sound basis.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे च नाहेतुर्दृष्टान्तः ॥ ५ । १ । ११ ॥

प्रतिदृष्टान्तहेतुत्वे *pratidr̥ṣṭānta-hetu-tve*, the counter-example being a reason ; च *cha*, and ; न *na*, not , अहेतुः *a-hetuḥ*, not a reason , दृष्टान्तः *dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*, the example.

472. The example, we say, cannot be set aside as unreasonable only because a counter-example is advanced as the reason.

The Nāiyāyika says:—

The opponent must give a special reason why the counter-example should be taken as specially fitted to lead to a conclusion and the example should not be taken as such. Until such a special reason is given, the counter-example cannot be accepted as leading to a definite conclusion. In fact a mere counter-example without a reason (middle term) attending it cannot be conducive to any conclusion. Hence we must rely on an example attended by reason but not on a counter example unattended by reason.

Sound is eternal,
like the sky.

This opposition which is founded on a mere counter-example is therefore to be rejected as unreasonable.

प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणाभावादनुत्पत्तिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १२ ॥

प्राक् *prāk*, prior ; उत्पत्तेः *utpatteḥ*, to production ; कारणाभावात् *kāraṇa-abhāvāt*, from the non-existence of the cause; अनुत्पत्तिसमः *an-utpatti-samaḥ*, identical in respect of non-production.

473. If one opposes an argument on the ground of the property connoted by the reason being absent from the thing denoted by the subject while it is not yet produced, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-produced."

A certain person, to prove that sound is non-eternal, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is a non-effect of effort,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that the property connoted by the reason, *viz.*, being an effect of effort, is not predicable of the subject, *viz.*, sound (while it is not yet produced). Consequently sound is not non-eternal, it must then be eternal. There is, according to the opponent, an apparent agreement between the two sides as to the sound being non-eternal on account of its being a non-effect-of-effort. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the non-produced” which pretends to show an equality of the argument of two sides assuming the thing denoted by the subject to be as yet non-produced.

तथाभावादुत्पन्नस्य कारणोपपत्तेर्न कारणप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १।१३॥

tathābhāvāt *tathā-bhāvāt*, from the nature given to a thing when it is produced ; *उत्पन्नस्य* *utpannasya*, of the thing produced ; *कारणोपपत्तेः* *kāraṇa-upapattēḥ*, owing to proof of the cause ; *न* *na*, not ; *कारणप्रतिषेधः* *kāraṇa-pratiṣedhaḥ*, contradiction of the cause.

474. This is, we say, no opposition against our reason so well predicable of the subject which becomes as such only when it is produced.

The Naiyāyika disposes of the futile opposition called “balancing the non-produced” by stating that the subject can become as such only when it is produced, and that there is then no obstacle to the property of the reason being predicated of it. The opposition, *viz.*, “sound (while non-produced) is eternal, because it is not then an effect of effort,” carries no weight with it, since we do not take the sound to be the subject before it is produced. Sound, while it is produced, is certainly an effect of effort and as such is non-eternal.

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोरैन्द्रियकत्वे समाने नित्यसाधर्म्याः ।

संशयसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १४ ॥

सामान्यदृष्टान्तयोः sāmānya-dṛṣṭāntayoh, of the genus and the (individual put forward as) example ; ऐन्द्रियाकत्वे aindriyaka-tve, being sensible ; समाने samāne, equally ; नित्यानित्यसाधर्म्यात् nitya-anitya-sādharmyāt, from resemblance of things eternal (genus) and non-eternal (individual) ; संशयसमः saṁśaya-samaḥ, identical in respect of doubt.

475. If one opposes an argument on the ground of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal consequent on the example and its genus (or type) being equally objects of perception the oppositon will be called “balancing the doubt.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is non-eternal or eternal (?)
because it is an object of perception,
like a pot or pot-ness.

The opponent alleges that sound is homogeneous with a pot as well as pot-ness inasmuch as both are objects of perception; but the pot being non-eternal and pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) being eternal there arises a doubt as to whether the sound is non-eternal or eternal. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the doubt” which aims at rejecting an argument in consequence of a doubt arising from the homogeneity of the eternal and the non-eternal.

साधर्म्यात्संशये न संशयो वैधर्म्यादुभयथा वा
संशयेऽत्यन्तसंशयप्रसङ्गो नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमाच्च *सामान्य-
स्याप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । १५ ॥

साधर्म्यात् sādharmyāt, from resemblance ; संशये saṁśaye, doubt arising ; न na, and ; संशयः saṁśayaḥ, doubt ; वैधर्म्यात् vaidharmyāt, from difference ; उभयथा ubhaya-thā, in both ways ; वा vā, or ; संशये saṁśaye, doubt arising ;

*The term *sāmānya* in the sense of “general notion, genus or type” was evidently taken from the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

अत्यन्तसंशयप्रसंगः atyanta-saṁśaya-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of unending doubt ; नित्यत्वानभ्युपगमात् nitya-tva-an-abhyupagamāt, from non-admission of eternality ; च cha, and ; सामान्यस्य sāmānya-sya, of the genus ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

476. This is, we say, no opposition because we do not admit that eternality can be established by the homogeneity with the genus : a doubt that arises from a knowledge of the homogeneity vanishes from that of the heterogeneity, and that which arises in both ways never ends.

The Naiyāyika says:—

Sound cannot be said to be eternal on the mere ground of its homogeneity with pot-ness (the genus of pots or pot-type) but must be pronounced to be non-eternal on the ground of its heterogeneity from the same in respect of being a product. Though on the score of homogeneity we may entertain doubt as to whether sound is eternal or non-eternal, but on the score of heterogeneity we can pronounce it undoubtedly to be non-eternal. In this case we must bear in mind that we cannot ascertain the true nature of a thing unless we weigh it in respect of its homogeneity with as well as heterogeneity from other things. If even then there remains any doubt as to its true nature, that doubt will never end.

उभयसाधर्म्यात् प्रक्रियासिद्धेः प्रकरणसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १६ ॥

उभयसाधर्म्यात् ubhaya-sādharmyāt, from resemblance to both ; प्रक्रियासिद्धेः prakriyā-siddheḥ, because of proof of the operation (of the subject and its opposite), प्रकरणसमः prakaraṇa-samaḥ, identical in respect of the topic

477. "Balancing the controversy" is an opposition which is conducted on the ground of homogeneity with (or heterogeneity from) both sides.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is audible.
like sound-ness.

The opponent alleges that the proposition, *viz.* sound is non-eternal, cannot be proved because the reason, *viz.*, audibility which is homogeneous with both sound (which is non-eternal) and soundness (which is eternal), provokes the very controversy for the settlement of which it was employed. This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the controversy” which hurts an argument by giving rise to the very controversy which was to be settled.

प्रतिपक्षात् प्रकरणसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः

॥ ५ । १ । १७ ॥

प्रतिपक्षात् pratipakṣât, from the counter-subject ; **प्रकरणसिद्धेः** prakaraṇa-siddheḥ, because of proof of the topic ; **प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः** pratishedha-an-upapattiḥ, non-proof of the contradiction ; **प्रतिपक्षोपपत्तेः** pratipakṣa-upapatteḥ, because of proof of the counter-subject

478. This is, we say, no opposition because it provokes a controversy which has an opposing side.

The Naiyāyika says:—The opposition called “balancing the controversy” cannot set aside the main argument because it leads to a controversy which supports one side quite as strongly as it is opposed by the other side.

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेर्हेतोरहेतुसमः ॥ ५ । १ । १८ ॥

त्रैकाल्यासिद्धेः traikālyā-a-siddheḥ, because of non-operation in all the three times ; **हेतोः** hetoḥ, of the reason ; **अहेतुसमः** a-hetu-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-reason.

479. “Balancing the non-reason” is an opposition which is based on the reason being shown to be impossible at all the three times.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here “being a product” is the reason or sign for “being non-eternal” which is the predicate or significate

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

The reason or sign is impossible at all the three times because it cannot precede, succeed, or be simultaneous with the predicate or significate.

(a) The reason (or sign) does not precede the predicate (or significate) because the former gets its name only when it establishes the latter. It is impossible for the reason to be called as such before the establishment of the predicate.

(b) The reason (or sign) does not succeed the predicate (or significate) because what would be the use of the former if the latter existed already ?

(c) The reason (or sign) and the predicate (or significate) cannot exist simultaneously for they will then be reciprocally connected like the right and left horns of a cow.

This sort of futile opposition is called "balancing the non-reason" which aims at setting aside an argument by showing that the reason is impossible at all the three times.

न हेतुतः साध्यसिद्धेस्त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः ॥ ५ । १ । १९ ॥

न na, no ; हेतुतः hetu-taḥ, from the reason ; साध्यसिद्धेः sādhyasiddheḥ, from the establishment of the thing to be established ; त्रैकाल्यासिद्धिः traikālya-a-siddhiḥ, non-proof of operation in the three times.

480. There is, we say, no impossibility at the three times because the predicate or significate is established by the reason or sign.

The Naiyayika says:—The knowledge of the knowable and the establishment of that which is to be established take place from reason which must precede that which is to be known and that which is to be established.

प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २० ॥

प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तेः pratiṣedha-an-upapattēḥ, from non-proof of contradiction or opposition ; प्रतिषेद्धव्याप्रतिषेधः pratiṣeddhavya-a-pratiṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction of the thing to be contradicted.

481. There is, we further say, no opposition of that which is to be opposed, because the opposition itself is impossible at all the three times.

It being impossible for the opposition to precede, succeed or be simultaneous with that which is to be opposed, the opposition itself is invalid and consequently the original argument holds good.

अर्थापत्तिः प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेरर्थापत्तिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २१ ॥

अर्थापत्तिः arthâpatti-taḥ, from presumption ; **प्रतिपक्षसिद्धेः** prati-pakṣa-siddheḥ, from proof of counter-subject, **अर्थापत्तिसमः** arthâpatti-samaḥ, identical in respect of presumption.

482. If one advances an opposition on the basis of a presumption the opposition will be called “balancing the presumption.”

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound is presumed to be eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The opponent alleges that if sound is non-eternal on account of its homogeneity with non-eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being a product), it may be concluded by presumption that sound is eternal on account of its homogeneity with eternal things (e.g. in respect of its being incorporeal). This sort of futile opposition is called “balancing the presumption” which aims at stopping an argument by setting presumption as a balance against it.

**अनुक्तस्यार्थापत्तेः पक्षहानेरुपपत्तिरनुक्तत्वादनैकान्तिकत्वा-
च्चार्थापत्तेः ॥ ५ । १ । २२ ॥**

अनुक्तस्य an-ukta-sya, of thing not stated ; **अर्थापत्तेः** arthâpatteḥ, from presumption ; **पक्षहानेः** pakṣa-hāneḥ, of injury to, or loss of, position ; **उपपत्तिः** upapattiḥ, proof ; **अनुक्तत्वात्** an-ukta-tvât, because it is unsaid ; **अनैकान्तिकत्वात्** an-aiikantika-tvât, because of multifariousness ; **अर्थापत्तेः** arthâpatteḥ, of presumption.

483. If things unsaid could come by presumption, there would, we say, arise a possibility of the opposition itself being hurt on account of the presumption being erratic and conducive to an unsaid conclusion.

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal.
like the sky.

If by presumption we could draw a conclusion unwarranted by the reason, we could from the opposition cited above draw the following conclusion:—

Sound is presumed to be non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

This would hurt the opposition itself. In fact the presumption as adduced by the opponent is erratic. If one says that "sound is non-eternal because of its homogeneity with non-eternal things", the presumption that naturally follows is that "sound is eternal because of its homogeneity with eternal things" and *vice versa*. There is no rule that presumption should be made in one case and not in the case opposed to it; and in the event of two mutually opposed presumptions no definite conclusion would follow. Hence the opposition called "balancing the presumption" is untenable.

**एकधर्मापपत्तेरविशेषे सव्याविशेषप्रसङ्गात् सद्भावेपपत्ते-
रविशेषसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २३ ॥**

एकधर्मापपत्तेः *eka-dharma-upapattēḥ*, from proof of one property; अविशेषे *aviśeṣe*, in case of non-difference; सव्याविशेषप्रसङ्गात् *sarva-aviśeṣa-prasaṅgāt*, from implication of non-difference in all respects; सद्भावेपपत्तेः *sadbhāva-upapattēḥ*, because of proof of existence; अविशेषसमः *a-viśeṣa-samaḥ*, identical in respect of non-difference.

484. If the subject and example are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of a certain property on account of their possessing in common the property connoted by the reason, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property on account of their being existent: this sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-difference."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If the pot and sound are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality in consequence of their both being products, it follows as a conclusion that all things are mutually non-different in respect of the possession of every property in consequence of their being existent. Therefore, no difference existing between the eternal and the non-eternal, sound may be treated as eternal. This sort of opposition is called “balancing the non-difference” which aims at hurting an argument by assuming all things to be mutually non different.

क्वचिदुर्म्मानुपपत्तेः क्वचिज्ज्ञोपपत्तेः प्रतिषेधाभावः ॥५॥ १। २४॥

क्वचित् kva chit, in some cases ; धर्मानुपपत्तः dharma-anupapatteḥ, from non-proof of the property ; क्वचित् kva chit, in some cases ; च cha, and ; उपपत्तेः upapatteḥ, from proof ; प्रतिषेधाभावः pratiṣedha-abhāvaḥ, absence of contradiction.

485. This is, we say, no opposition because the property possessed in common by the subject and the example happens in certain instances to abide in the reason while in other instances not to abide in it.

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

Here the pot and sound possessing in common the property of being a product are treated as non-different in respect of the possession of non-eternality. On the same principle if all things are treated as non-different in consequence of their being existent, we would like to know in what respect they are non-different. If they are treated as non-different in respect of non-eternality, then the argument would stand thus:—

All things are non-eternal,
because they are existent,
like (?)

In this argument “all things” being the subject, there is nothing left which may serve as an example. A part of the subject cannot be cited as the example because the example must be a well-established thing

while the subject is a thing which is yet to be established. The argument, for want of an example, leads to no conclusion. In fact all things are not non-eternal since some at least are eternal. In other words, non-eternality abides in some existent things and does not abide in other existent things. Hence all things are not mutually non-different and the opposition called "balancing the non-difference" is unreasonable.

उभयकारणोपपत्तेरुपपत्तिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २५ ॥

उभयकारणोपपत्तेः ubhaya kârāṇa-upapattēḥ, from proof of causes of both ; उपपत्तिसमः upapatti-samaḥ, identical in respect of proof.

486. If an opposition is offered by showing that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons the opposition will be called "balancing the demonstration."

A certain person demonstrates the non-eternality of sound as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition by the alleged demonstration of the eternity of sound as follows:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal,
like the sky.

The reason in the first demonstration supports the non-eternality of sound while that in the second demonstration supports the eternity of sound, yet both the demonstrations are alleged to be right. The opponent advanced the second apparent demonstration as a balance against the first to create a dead-lock. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the demonstration".

उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानादप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २६ ॥

उपपत्तिकारणाभ्यनुज्ञानात् upapatti-kârāṇa-abhyanuññânât, from admission of cause of proof (of the counter-subject) ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratiṣedhaḥ non-contradiction.

487. This is, we say, no opposition because there is an admission of the first demonstration.

The Naiyāyika says:—

The opponent having asserted that both the demonstrations are justified by reasons, has admitted the reasonableness of the first demonstration which supports the non-eternality of sound. If to avoid the incompatibility that exists between the two demonstrations, he now denies the reason which supports non-eternality we would ask why does he not deny the other reason which supports eternality of sound, for he can avoid incompatibility by denying either of the reasons. Hence the opposition called “balancing the demonstration” is not well-founded.

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावेऽप्युपलम्भादुपलब्धिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २७ ॥

निर्दिष्टकारणाभावे nirdiṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhāve, in the absence of the known cause ; अपि api, even ; उपलम्भाद् upalambhāt, from perception ; उपलब्धिसमः upalabdhī-samaḥ, identical in respect of perception.

488. If an opposition is offered on the ground that we perceive the character of the subject even without the intervention of the reason, the opposition will be called “balancing the perception.”

A certain person, to prove the non eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

Sound can be ascertained to be non-eternal even without the reason that it is a product, for we *perceive* that sound is produced by the branches of trees broken by wind. This sort of opposition is called “balancing the perception” which aims at demolishing an argument by setting up an act of perception as a balance against it.

कारणान्तरादपि तद्वर्मेपपत्तेरप्रतिषेधः ॥ ५ । १ । २८ ॥

कारणान्तरात् kāraṇa-antarāt, from other causes ; अपि api, also. तद्वर्मेपपत्तेः tat-dharma-upapattēḥ, from proof of that property ; अप्रतिषेधः a-pratīṣedhaḥ, non-contradiction.

489. This is, we say, no opposition because that character can be ascertained by other means as well.

The Naiyâyika says that the argument, *viz.*, "sound is non-eternal because it is a product, like a pot," implies that sound is proved to be non-eternal through the reason that it is a product. It does not deny other means, such as perception, etc., which also may prove sound to be non-eternal. Hence the opposition called "balancing the perception" does not set aside the main argument.

**तदनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भादभावसिद्धौ तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेरनुप-
लब्धिसमः ॥ ५ । १ । २६ ॥**

तदनुपलब्धेः tat-an-upalabdheḥ, from non-cognition of that ; **अनुपलम्भात्** an-upalambhât, from non-perception ; **अभावसिद्धौ** abhâva-siddhau, non existence being established ; **तद्विपरीतोपपत्तेः** tat-viparita-upapattēḥ from proof of its opposite ; **अनुपलब्धिसमः** an-upalabdhi-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-perception.

490. If against an argument proving the non existence of a thing by the non-perception thereof, one offers an opposition aiming at proving the contrary by the non-perception of the non-perception, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-perception."

In aphorsim 2-2-18 the Naiyâyika has stated that there is no veil which covers sound for we do not perceive such a veil. In aphorsim 2-2-19 his opponent has stated that there is a veil because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof. If the non-perception of a thing proves its non-existence, the non-perception of the non-perception must, in the opinion of the opponent, prove the existence of the thing. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the non-perception" which aims at counteracting an argument by setting up non-perception as a balance against it.

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वादनुपलब्धेरहेतुः ॥ ५ । १ । ३० ॥

अनुपलम्भात्मकत्वात् an upalambhâtmaka-tvât, being of the nature of non-perception ; **अनुपलब्धेः** an-upalabdheḥ, of non-cognition ; **अहेतुः** a-hetuḥ, not a reason.

491. The reasoning through non-perception is not, we say, sound, because non-perception is merely the negation of perception.

The Naiyâyika says:—Perception refers to that which is existent while non-perception to that which is non-existent. The non-perception of non-perception which signifies a mere negation of non-perception cannot

be interpreted as referring to an existent thing. Hence the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" is not well-founded.

ज्ञानविकल्पानाञ्च भावाभावसंवेदनादध्यात्मम् ॥५॥१॥३१॥

ज्ञानविकल्पानाम् jñāna-vikalpānām, of diverse forms of cognition ; च cha, and , भावाभावसंवेदनाद् bhāva-abhāva-samvedanāt, from consciousness of existence and non existence ; अध्यात्मम् adhi-ātmam, in the soul.

492. There is, moreover, an internal perception of the existence as well as of the non-existence of the various kinds of knowledge.

There are internal perceptions of such forms as "I am sure," "I am not sure," "I have doubt," "I have no doubt", etc., which prove that we can perceive the non existence of knowledge as well as the existence thereof. Hence the non-perception itself is perceptible, and as there is no non-perception of non-perception, the opposition called "balancing the non-perception" falls to the ground.

साधर्म्यात्तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यसमः ॥

५ । १ । ३२ ॥

साधर्म्यात् sādharmyāt, through resemblance ; तुल्यधर्मोपपत्तेः tulya-dharma-upapatteḥ, because of proof of equal properties ; सर्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् sarva-anityatva-prasaṅgāt, from implication of non-eternality of all ; अनित्यसमः anitya-samaḥ, identical in respect of non-eternality.

493. If one finding that things which are homogeneous possess equal characters, opposes an argument by attributing non-eternality to all things, the opposition will be called "balancing the non-eternality".

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—

If sound is non-eternal on account of its being homogeneous with a pot which is non-eternal, it will follow as a consequence that all things are non-eternal because they are in some one or other respect homogeneous

with the pot— a consequence which will render all inferences impossible for want of heterogeneous examples. This sort of opposition is called “balancing the non-eternal” which seeks to counteract an argument on the alleged ground that all things are non-eternal.

साधर्म्यादसिद्धेः प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्याच्च ॥

५ । १ । ३३ ॥

साधर्म्यात् sādharmyāt, through resemblance ; असिद्धेः a-siddheḥ, because of non-establishment ; प्रतिषेधासिद्धिः pratiṣedha-asiddhiḥ, non-establishment of contradiction ; प्रतिषेध्यसाधर्म्यात् pratiṣedhya-sādharmyāt, through resemblance to what is to be contradicted ; च cha, and.

494. The opposition, we say, is unfounded because nothing can be established from a mere homogeneity and because there is homogeneity even with that which is opposed.

The Naiyāyika says:—

We cannot ascertain the character of a thing from its mere homogeneity with another thing: in doing so we must consider the logical connection between the reason and the predicate. Sound, for instance, is non-eternal not merely because it is homogeneous with a non-eternal pot but because there is a universal connection between “being a product” and “being non-eternal.” Hence it will be unreasonable to conclude that all things are non-eternal simply because they are homogeneous with a non-eternal pot in some one or other respect. Similarly a mere homogeneity of all things with the eternal sky in some one or other respect, does not prove all things to be eternal. The opposition called “balancing the non-eternal” is therefore not founded on a sound basis.

**द्रष्टान्ते च साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रज्ञातस्य धर्मस्य हेतुत्वा-
त्तस्य चोभयथाभावान्नाविशेषः ॥ ५ । १ । ३४ ॥**

द्रष्टान्ते dṛṣṭānte, in the example ; च cha, and ; साध्यसाधनभावेन sādhyasādhana-bhāvena, by the relation of the thing to be established and the means of establishing it ; प्रज्ञातस्य prajñātasya, of the known ; धर्मस्य dharmasya, of property ; हेतुत्वात् hetu-tvāt, being the reason ; तस्य tasya, its ; च cha, and ; उभयथा ubhaya-thā, both ways ; भावात् bhāvat, from existence ; न na, not ; अविशेषः a-viśeṣaḥ, non-difference.

495. There is, we say, no non-distinction, because the reason is known to be the character which abides in the example as conducive to the establishment of the predicate and because it is applied in both ways.

The Naiyāyika says that we are not justified in concluding that all things are non-eternal because there is no character in respect of which "all things" may be homogeneous with a pot. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion we must consider the reason as being that character of the example (and consequently of the subject) which bears a universal connection with the character of the predicate. The pot possesses no such character in common with "all things." The reason moreover is applied in the homogeneous as well as in the heterogeneous ways. We cannot draw a conclusion from a mere homogeneity of the subject with the example in a certain respect. The opposition called "balancing the non-eternal" is therefore unreasonable.

नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः ॥ ५ । १ । ३५ ॥

नित्यं nityam, eternally ; अनित्यभावाद् anitya-bhāvāt, from the nature of being non-eternal ; अनित्ये anitye, in the non-eternal ; अनित्यत्वोपपत्तेः anitya-tva-upapattēḥ, from proof of eternality ; नित्यसमः nitya-samaḥ, identical in respect of eternal.

496. If one opposes an argument by attributing eternality to all non-eternal things on the ground of these being eternally non-eternal, the opposition will be called "balancing the eternal."

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product,
like a pot.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus:—You say that sound is non eternal. Does this non-eternality exist in sound always or only sometimes? If the non-eternality exists *always*, the sound must also be always existent, or, in other words, sound is eternal. If the non-eternality exists only *sometimes*, then too the sound must in the absence of non-eternality be pronounced to be eternal. This sort of opposition is called "balancing the eternal" which counteracts an argument by setting up eternality as a balance against it.

प्रतिषेध्ये नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्रति-
षेधाभावः ॥ ५ । १ । ३६ ॥

प्रतिषेध्ये *pratishedhye*, in what is to be contradicted ; नित्यं *nityam*, eternally ; अनित्यभावात् *anitya-bhāvāt*, from the nature of being non-eternal ; अनित्ये *anitye*, in the non-eternal ; नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः *nityatva-upapatteḥ*, from proof of eternality ; प्रतिषेधाभावः *pratishedha-abhāvaḥ*, absence of contradiction.

497. This is, we say, no opposition because the thing opposed is always non-eternal on account of the eternality of the non-eternal.

The Naiyāyika says :—

By speaking of eternality of the non-eternal you have admitted sound to be *always* non-eternal and cannot now deny its non-eternality. The eternal and non-eternal are incompatible with each other : by admitting that sound is non-eternal you are precluded from asserting that it is also eternal. Hence “balancing the eternal ” is not a sound opposition.

प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात्कार्यसमः ॥ ५ । १ । ३७ ॥

प्रयत्नकार्यानेकत्वात् *prayatna-kārya-aneka-tvāt*, from the diversity of the effects of effort ; कार्यसमः *kārya-samaḥ*, identical in respect of effect.

498. If one opposes an argument by showing the diversity of the effect of efforts, the opposition will be called “balancing the effect.”

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person offers a futile opposition thus :—

The effect of effort is found to be of two kinds, *viz.* (1) the production of something which was previously non-existent, *e. g.* a pot, and (2) the revelation of something already existent, *e. g.* water in a well. Is sound an effect of the first kind or of the second kind ? If sound is an effect of the first kind it will be non-eternal but if it is of the second kind it will be eternal. Owing to this diversity of the effect of effort, it is not possible to conclude that sound is non-eternal. This sort of opposition is called “balancing the effect.”

कार्यान्यत्वे प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वमनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः ॥५॥१॥३८॥

कार्यान्यत्वे (kārya-anya-tve, in respect of the otherness of the effect; प्रयत्नाहेतुत्वम्, prayatna-a-hetu-tvam, effort is not the cause; अनुपलब्धिकारणोपपत्तेः an-upalabdhi-kāraṇa-upapattēh, because of proof of the cause of non-perception.

499. Effort did not give rise to the second kind of effect, because there was no cause of non-perception.

The Naiyāyika answers the opposition called "balancing the effect" as follows :—

We cannot say that sound is revealed by our effort because we are unable to prove that it existed already. That sound did not exist previously is proved by our non-perception of the same at the time. You cannot say that our non-perception was caused by a veil because no veil covered sound. Hence sound is an effect which is not revealed but produced.

प्रतिषेधेऽपि समानो दोषः ॥ ५ । १ । ३९ ॥

प्रतिषेधे pratiṣedhe, in the case of contradiction ; अपि api, also ; समानः samānaḥ, similar ; दोषः doṣaḥ, defect.

500. The same defect, we say, attaches to the opposition too.

A certain person argued;—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person opposed it saying that sound would not be non-eternal if "effect" meant a thing revealed.

The Naiyāyika observes that if an argument is to be set aside owing to an ambiguous meaning of the word "effect", why is not the opposition too set aside on the same ground? The reason in the argument is as erratic as that in the opposition. Just as there is no special ground to suppose that the "effect" in the argument signified "a thing produced and not revealed," so also there is no special ground to suppose that the word in the opposition signified "a thing revealed and not produced." Hence the opposition called "balancing the effect" is self-destructive.

सर्वत्रैवम् ॥ ५ । १ । ४० ॥

सर्वत्र sarvatra, everywhere ; एवम् evam, similarly.

501. Thus everywhere.

If a special meaning is to be attached to the opposition, the same meaning will have to be attached to the original argument. In this respect there will be an equality of the two sides in the case of all kinds of opposition such as "balancing the homogeneity", etc.

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधदोषवद्दोषः ॥ ५ । १ । ४१ ॥

प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे pratishedha-vipratishedhe, in respect of the contradiction of a contradiction ; प्रतिषेधदोषवत् pratishedha-doṣa-vat, as in the case of defect in contradiction ; दोषः doṣaḥ, defect

502. Defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition just as it attaches to the opposition.

A certain person to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

A certain other person, seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus :—

Sound is eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

(Here "effect" may mean "a thing revealed by effort")

The arguer replies that sound cannot be concluded to be eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean "a thing produced by effort").

The opponent rises again to say that sound cannot also be concluded to be non-eternal because the reason "effect" is erratic (which may mean a thing revealed by effort). So the defect which is pointed out in the case of the opposition, may also be pointed out in the case of the opposition of the opposition.

प्रतिषेधं सदोषमभ्युपेत्य प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे समानो दोष-
प्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ ५ । १ । ४२ ॥

प्रतिषेधं pratishedham, contradiction ; सदोषं sadoṣam, with defect, defective ; अभ्युपेत्य abhyupetya, admitting for the sake of argument ; प्रतिषेधविप्रतिषेधे pratishedha-vipratishedhe, in case of contradiction of a contradiction ; समानः samānaḥ, similar, same ; दोषप्रसंगः doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ, implication of defect ; मतानुज्ञा mata-anujñā, admission of an opinion.

503. If one admits the defect of his opposition in consequence of his statement that an equal defect attaches to the opposition of the opposition, it will be called "admission of an opinion."

A certain person lays down a proposition which is opposed by a certain other person. The first person, viz. the disputant, charges the opposition made by the second person, viz. the opponent, with a defect, e.g., that the reason is erratic. The opponent instead of rescuing his opposition from the defect with which it has been charged by the disputant, goes on charging the disputant's opposition of the opposition with the same defect. The counter-charge which the opponent brings in this way is interpreted by the disputant to be an admission of the defect pointed out by him. The disputant's reply consisting of this kind of interpretation is called "admission of an opinion."

स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे हेतुनिर्देशे परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात्समानो दोष इति ॥ ५ । १ । ४३ ॥

स्वपक्षलक्षणापेक्षोपपत्त्युपसंहारे svapakṣa-lakṣaṇa-apekṣa-upapatti-npasamhāre, in the conclusion by demonstration (in the opposite side) of, instead of removing, the defect in one's own side ; हेतुनिर्देशे hetu-nirdeśe, in the statement of reason ; परपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् para-pakṣa-doṣa-abhyupagamāt, from admission of the defect of other side ; दोषः doṣaḥ, defect , इति iti, it is.

504. "Admission of an opinion" also occurs when the disputant instead of employing reasons to rescue his side from the defect with which it has been charged, proceeds to admit the defect in consequence of his statement that the same defect belongs to his opponent's side as well.

Six-winged disputation (Ṣaṭpakṣī kathā).

Disputant—to prove the non-eternality of sound says:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is an effect of effort.

This is the first wing.

Opponent—seeing that the effect is of diverse kinds, offers an opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here “effect” means a thing which already existed and is now revealed by effort).

This is the second wing.

Disputant—seeing that the reason “effect” is erratic, charges the opposition with a defect thus:—

Sound is *not* eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

(Here the reason “effect” is erratic meaning (1) either a thing that did not previously exist and is now produced or (2) a thing that already existed and is now revealed by effort).

This is the third wing.

Opponent— finding that the reason “effect,” which is erratic, proves neither the eternity nor the non-eternity of sound, brings a counter-charge against the disputant thus:—

Sound is also *not* non-eternal,
because it is an effect of effort.

He alleges that the defect (*viz.* the erraticity of the reason) with which his opposition (*viz.* sound is eternal) is charged, also attaches to the opposition of the opposition made by the disputant (*viz.* sound is *not* eternal or non-eternal).

This is the fourth wing.

Disputant—finding that the counter-charge brought against him amounts to his opponent’s admission of self-defect says:—

The opponent by saying that “sound is also not non-eternal” has admitted that it is also not eternal. In other words, the counter-charge has proved the charge, that is, it has indicated that the opponent admits the disputant’s opinion.

This is the fifth wing.

Opponent— finding that the disputant instead of rescuing his argument from the counter-charge has taken shelter under his opponent’s admission of the charge says:—

The disputant by saying that "sound is also not eternal" has admitted that it is also not non-eternal. In other words, if the counter-charge proves the charge, the reply to the counter-charge proves the counter-charge itself.

This is the sixth wing.

The first, third and fifth wings belong to the disputant while the second, fourth and sixth to the opponent. The sixth wing is a repetition of the fourth while the fifth wing is a repetition of the third. The sixth wing is also a repetition of the meaning of the fifth wing. The third and fourth wings involve the defect of "admission of an opinion." All the wings except the first three are unessential.

The disputation would have come to a fair close at the third wing if the disputant had pointed out that the word "effect" had a special meaning, *viz.*, a thing which did not previously exist but was produced.

The disputant and the opponent instead of stopping at the proper limit has carried on their disputation through six wings beyond which no further wing is possible. After the six-winged disputation has been carried on, it becomes patent that neither the disputant nor the opponent is a fit person to be argued with.

BOOK V.—CHAPTER II.

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः प्रतिज्ञासन्न्या-
सो हेत्वन्तरमर्थान्तरं निरर्थकमविज्ञातार्थमपार्थक्यमप्राप्त-
कालं न्यूनमधिकं पुनरुक्तमननुभाषणमज्ञानमप्रतिभा विक्षेपो
मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं निरनुयोज्यानुयोगोऽपसिद्धान्तो
हेत्वाभासाश्च निग्रहस्थानानि ॥ ५ । २ । १ ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहानिः Pratijñā-hāniḥ, injury to the proposition; प्रतिज्ञान्तरं prati-
jñā-antaram, change of proposition; प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः pratijñā-virodhaḥ, conflict
of proposition; प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः pratijñā-sannyāsaḥ, abandonment of proposition;
हेत्वन्तरं hetu-antaram, change of the reason; अर्थान्तरं artha-antaram, change
of topic; निरर्थकं nir-arthakam, meaningless; अविज्ञातार्थं a-vijñāta-artham,
unintelligible; अपार्थक्यं apa-arthakam, senseless; अप्राप्तकालं a-prāpta-kālam,
before-time, disordered, misarranged, न्यूनं nyūnam, deficient; अधिकं adhi-
kam, too much, superfluous, verbose; पुनरुक्तं punar-uktam, repetition; अननु-
भाषणं an-anubhāṣaṇam, non-reply, silence; अज्ञानं a-jñānam, ignorance;
अप्रतिभा a-pratibhā, want of ready wit; विक्षेपः vikṣepaḥ, evasion, diversion;
मतानुज्ञा, mata-anujñā, admission of an opinion; पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं paryanuyo-
jya-upeṣaṇam, overlooking the censurable; निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः niranuyojya-
anuyogaḥ, censuring the non-censurable; अपसिद्धान्तः apa-siddhāntaḥ,
contrary tenet; हेत्वाभासाः hetu-ābhāsaḥ, pseudo-marks; च cha, and; निग्र-
हस्थानानि nigrāha-sthānāni, grounds of defeat, occasions for rebuke.

505. The occasions for rebuke are the following:—

1. Hurting the proposition, 2. Shifting the proposition, 3. Op-
posing the proposition, 4. Renouncing the proposition, 5. Shifting
the reason, 6. Shifting the topic, 7. The meaningless, 8. The unintel-
ligible, 9. The incoherent, 10. The inopportune, 11. Saying too little,
12. Saying too much, 13. Repetition, 14. Silence, 15. Ignorance,
16. Non-ingenuity, 17. Evasion, 18. Admission of an opinion,
19. Overlooking the censurable, 20. Censuring the non-censurable,
21. Deviating from a tenet, and 22. The semblance of a reason.

The definition of “an occasion for rebuke” has been given in apho-
rism 1-2-19. “An occasion for rebuke” which is the same as “a ground of
defeat”, “a place of humiliation” or “a point of disgrace” arises generally

in connection with the proposition or any other part of an argument and may implicate any disputant whether he is a discutient, wrangler or caviller.

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा स्वदृष्टान्ते प्रतिज्ञाहानिः ॥५॥२॥॥

प्रतिदृष्टान्तधर्माभ्यनुज्ञा pratidṛṣṭānta-dharma-abhyānujñā, admission of the property of the counter example; **स्वदृष्टान्ते** *sva-dṛṣṭānte*, in one's own example; **प्रतिज्ञाहानिः** *pratijñā-hāniḥ*, injury to the proposition.

506. "Hurting the proposition" occurs when one admits in one's own example the character of a counter-example.

A disputant argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is cognisable by sense,

Whatever is cognisable by sense is non-eternal

as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense,

Therefore sound is non-eternal.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus :—

A genus (*e. g.*, potness or pot-type), which is cognisable by sense, is found to be eternal, why cannot then the sound which is also cognisable by sense, be eternal ?

The disputant being thus opposed says :—

Whatever is cognisable by sense is eternal

as a pot,

Sound is cognisable by sense,

Therefore sound is eternal.

By thus admitting in his example (pot) the character of a counter-example (genus or type), he has hurt his own proposition (*viz.* sound is non-eternal). A person who hurts his proposition in this way deserves nothing but rebuke.

प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे धर्मविकल्पात्तदर्थनिर्द्देशः प्रतिज्ञा-

न्तरम् ॥ ५ । २ । ३ ॥

प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे pratijñāta-artha-pratiṣedhe, there being opposition to the object or topic proposed; धर्मविकल्पात् dharma-vikalpāt, through a different property; तदर्थनिर्देशः tat-artha-nirdeśaḥ, statement of that object; प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् pratijñā-antaram, change of proposition.

507. "Shifting the proposition" arises when a proposition being opposed one defends it by importing a new character to one's example and counter-example.

A certain person argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense
like a pot.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus:—

Sound is eternal,
because it is cognisable by sense like a genus (or type).

The first person in order to defend himself says that a genus (or type) and a pot are both cognisable by sense, yet one is all-pervasive and the other is not so: hence the sound which is likened to a pot is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

The defence thus made involves a change of proposition. The proposition originally laid down was:—

Sound is non-eternal,

while the proposition now defended is:

Sound is non-all-pervasively non-eternal.

A person who shifts his proposition in this way is to be rebuked inasmuch as he has not relied upon his original reason and example.

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वविरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः ॥ ५ । २ । ४ ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः pratijñā-hetvoh, of the proposition and the reason; विरोधः virodhaḥ, contradiction; प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः pratijñā-virodhaḥ, conflict of proposition.

508. "Opposing the proposition" occurs when the proposition and its reason are opposed to each other.

Substance is distinct from quality,

because it is perceived to be non-distinct from colour, etc.

In this argument it is to be observed that if substance is distinct from quality, it must also be distinct from colour, etc. which constitute the quality. The reason, *viz.* substance is non-distinct from colour, etc., is opposed to the proposition, *viz.* substance is distinct from quality. A person who thus employs a reason which opposes his proposition is to be rebuked as a fool.

पक्षप्रतिषेधे प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनं प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः ॥५।२।५॥

पक्षप्रतिषेधे pakṣa-pratiṣedhe, there being opposition to the subject; प्रतिज्ञातार्थापनयनम् pratijñāta artha apanayanam, removal of the object proposed; प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासः pratijñā-sannyāsaḥ, abandonment of the proposition.

509. A proposition being opposed if one disclaims its import, it will be called "renouncing the proposition."

A certain person argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person offers an opposition thus:—

Just as a genus (or type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal, so a sound is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal. The first person, as a defence against the opposition, disclaims the meaning of his proposition thus:—

Who says that sound is non-eternal?

This sort of denial of the import of one's own proposition is called "renouncing the proposition" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

अविशेषोक्ते हेतौ प्रतिषिद्धे विशेषमिच्छतो हेत्वन्तरम्

॥ ५ । २ । ६ ॥

अविशेषोक्ते a-viśeṣa-ukte, stated without particulars, of a general character; हेतौ hetau, reason, mark; प्रतिषिद्धे pratiṣiddhe, being opposed; विशेष विशेषam, particular or special character; इच्छतः ichchhataḥ, of one who desires; हेत्वन्तरम् hetu-antaram, change of reason.

510. "Shifting the reason" occurs when the reason of a general character being opposed one attaches a special character to it.

A certain person, to prove the non-eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is non-eternal,

because it is cognisable by sense.

A certain other person says that sound cannot be proved to be non-eternal through the mere reason of its being cognisable by sense, just as a genus (or type) such as pot-ness (or pot-type) is cognisable by sense and is not yet non-eternal.

The first person defends himself by saying that the reason, *viz.* being cognisable by sense, is to be understood as signifying that which comes under a genus (or type) and is as such cognisable by sense. Sound comes under the genus (or type) "soundness" and is at the same time cognisable by sense; but a genus or type such as pot-ness or pot-type does not come under another genus or type (such as pot-ness-ness or pot-type-type) though it is cognisable by sense. Such a defence, which consists in shifting one's reason, rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् ॥ ५. १. २१७ ॥

प्रकृतात् prakrītāt, real, under consideration; अर्थात् arthāt, from the object; अप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थम् a-pratisambaddhārtham, importing an un-correlated, irrelevant object; अर्थान्तरम् artha-antaram, change of topic or object.

511. "Shifting the topic" is an argument which setting aside the real topic introduces one which is irrelevant.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is eternal (proposition),

because it is intangible (reason).

Being opposed by a certain other person he attempts, in the absence of any other resource, to defend his position as follows:—

Hetu, which is the Sanskrit equivalent for "reason," is a word derived from the root "hi" with the suffix "tu". A word, as a part of a speech, may be a noun, a verb, a prefix or an indeclinable. A noun is defined as etc. etc.

The defence made in this way furnishes an instance of defeat through non-relevancy. The person who makes it deserves rebuke.

वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवन्निरर्थकम् ॥ ५ । २ । ८ ॥

वर्णक्रमनिर्देशवत् varṇa-krama-nirdeśa-vat, like the statement of the order of letters (in the alphabet); निरर्थकम् nir-arthakam, meaningless.

512. "The meaningless" is an argument which is based on a non-sensical combination of letters into a series.

A certain person, to prove the eternality of sound, argues as follows:—

Sound is eternal,

because k, c, ṭ, t and p are j, v, g, ḍ and d,

like jh, bh, gh, ḍh and dh.

As the letters k, c, ṭ, etc. convey no meaning, the person who employs them in his argument deserves rebuke.

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञातमविज्ञातार्थम् ॥

५ । २ । ९ ॥

परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां pariṣat-prativāḍibhyāṃ, by the assembly and the opponent ; त्रिः triḥ, three times; अभिहितं abhihitam, stated ; अपि api, even; अविज्ञातं a-vijñātam, not understood ; अविज्ञातार्थं a-vijñāta-artham, unintelligible

513. "The unintelligible" is an argument, which although repeated three times, is understood neither by the audience nor by the opponent.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no means of self-defence, attempts to hide his inability in disputation by using words of double entendre or words not in ordinary use or words very quickly uttered which as such are understood neither by his opponent nor by the audience although they are repeated three times. This sort of defence is called "unintelligible" which rightly furnishes an occasion for rebuke.

पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थमपार्थकम् ॥ ५ । २ । १० ॥

पौर्वापर्यायोगात् paurvya-âparya-a-yogât, owing to absence of sequence; अप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थम् a-pratisambaddha-artham, of unconnected import ; अपार्थकम् apa-arthakam, senseless.

514. "The incoherent" is an argument which conveys no connected meaning on account of the words being strung together without any syntactical order.

A certain person being opposed by another person and finding no other means of self-defence, argues as follows:—

Ten pomegranates, six cakes, a bowl, goat's skin and a lump of sweets.

This sort of argument, which consist of a series of unconnected words, is called "the incoherent" which rightly presents on occasion for rebuke.

अवयवविपर्ययासवचनमप्राप्तकालम् ॥ ५ । २ । ११ ॥

अवयवविपर्ययासवचनं avayava-viparyâsa-vachanam, statement without the order of the member of an argument ; अप्राप्तकालं a-prâpta-kâlam, disordered,

515. "The inopportune" is an argument the parts of which are mentioned without any order of precedence.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—

The hill has fire (proposition).

Whatever has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example).

Because it has smoke (reason).

The hill has fire (conclusion).

The hill has smoke (application).

This sort of argument is called "the inopportune" which rightly presents an occasion for rebuke. Since the meaning of an argument is affected by the order in which its parts are arranged, the person who overlooks the order cannot establish his conclusion and is therefore rebuked.

हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् ॥ ५ । २ । १२ ॥

हीनं hīnam, deficient ; अन्यतमेन anya-tamena, by any one ; अपि api, even ; अवयवेन avayavena, member ; न्यूनम् nyûnam, deficient.

516. If an argument lacks even one of its parts, it is called "saying too little."

The following is an argument which contains all its five parts:—

1. The hill has fire (proposition),
2. Because it has smoke (reason),
3. All that has smoke has fire, as a kitchen (example),
4. The hill has smoke (application),
5. Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

As all the five parts or members are essential, a person who omits even one of them should be scolded as "saying too little."

हेतूदाहरणाधिमधिकम् ॥ ५ । २ । १३ ॥

हेतूदाहरणाधिकं hetu-udâharana-adhikam, consisting of more than one reason or example ; अधिकम् adhikam, verbose, redundant.

517. "Saying too much" is an argument which consists of more than one reason or example.

A certain person, to prove that the hill has fire, argues as follows:—

- The hill has fire (proposition),
 Because it has smoke (reason),
 And because it has light (reason),
 like a kitchen (example),
 and like a furnace (example),

In this argument the second reason and the second example are redundant.

A person, who having promised to argue in the proper way (according to the established usage), employs more than one reason or example is to be rebuked as "saying too much."

शब्दार्थयोः पुनर्वचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात् ॥ ५ । २ । १४ ॥

शब्दार्थयोः śabda-arthayoḥ, of the word and the object ; पुनर्वचनं punar-vachanam, restatement ; पुनरुक्तं punar-uktam, repetition ; अन्यत्र anyatra, elsewhere ; अनुवादात् anuvâdât, than re-inculcation, anuvâda.

518. "Repetition" is an argument in which (except in the case of reinculcation) the word or the meaning is said over again.

"Repetition of the word—Sound is non-eternal,
sound is non-eternal.

Repetition of the meaning—Sound is non-eternal,
echo is perishable, what is heard is impermanent, etc.

A person who unnecessarily commits repetition is to be rebuked as a fool.

Reinculcation has been explained in aphorism 2-1-65.

अर्थादापन्नस्य स्वशब्देन पुनर्वचनम् ॥ ५ । २ । १५ ॥

अर्थात् arthât, from context ; आपन्नस्य âpannasya, of what has followed ; स्वशब्देन sva-śabdena, by its own name ; पुनर्वचनं punar-vachanam, restatement.

519. "Repetition" consists also in mentioning a thing by name although the thing has been indicated through presumption.

"A thing possessing the character of a product is non-eternal"—this is a mere repetition of the following:—

"A thing not possessing the character of a product is not non-eternal."

विज्ञातस्य परिषदा त्रिरभिहितस्त्युच्चारणमननुभाषणम् ॥ ५ । २ । १६ ॥

विज्ञातस्य vijñâtasya, of what has been understood ; परिषदा pariṣadâ, by the assembly ; त्रिः triḥ, three times ; अभिहितस्य abhihita-sya, of what has been declared ; अपि, even ; अप्रत्युच्चारणम् a-prati-uchchâraṇam, non-reply ; अननुभाषणम् an-anubhâṣaṇam, non-reply.

520. "Silence" is an occasion for rebuke which arises when the opponent makes no reply to a proposition although it has been repeated three times by the disputant within the knowledge of the audience.

How can a disputant carry on his argument if his opponent maintains an attitude of stolid silence? The opponent is therefore to be rebuked.

अविज्ञातज्ञानम् ॥ ५ । २ । १७ ॥

अविज्ञातम् a-vijñātam, the not-understood; च cha, and ; अज्ञानं a-jñānam ignorance.

521. "Ignorance" is the non-understanding of a proposition.

Ignorance is betrayed by the opponent who does not understand a proposition although it has been repeated three times within the knowledge of the audience. How can an opponent refute a proposition the meaning of which he cannot understand? He is to be rebuked for his ignorance.

उत्तरस्याप्रतिपत्तिरप्रतिभा ॥ ५ । २ । १८ ॥

उत्तरस्य uttarasya, of the answer; अप्रतिपत्तिः a-pratipattiḥ, non-suggestion; अप्रतिभा a-pratibhā, want of ready wit.

522. "Non-ingenuity" consists in one's inability to hit upon a reply.

A certain person lays down a proposition. If his opponent understands it and yet cannot hit upon a reply, he is to be scolded as wanting in ingenuity.

कार्यव्यासङ्गात् कथाविच्छेदो विक्षेपः ॥ ५ । २ । १९ ॥

कार्यव्यासङ्गात् kārya-vyāsaṅgāt, through pretext of other business; कथाविच्छेदः kathā-vicchedaḥ, cutting short a discussion; विक्षेपः vikṣepaḥ, evasion, diversion.

523. "Evasion" arises if one stops an argument on the pretext of going away to attend another business.

A certain person having commenced a disputation in which he finds it impossible to establish his side, stops its further progress by saying that he has to go away on a very urgent business. He who stops the disputation in this way courts defeat and humiliation through evasion.

स्वपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ॥ ५ । २ । २० ॥

स्वपक्षदोषाभ्युपगमात् sva-pakṣa-doṣa-abhyupagamāt, by admitting defect

in one's own side ; परपक्षे para-pakṣe, in the opposite side ; दोषप्रसङ्गः doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ, attribution of defect ; मतानुज्ञा mata-anujñā, admission of an opinion.

524. "The admission of an opinion" consists in charging the opposite side with a defect by admitting that the same defect exists in one's own side.

A certain person addressing another person says:—"You are a thief."

The other person replies :—"You too are a thief."

This person, instead of removing the charge brought against him, throws the same charge on the opposite side whereby he admits that the charge against himself is true. This sort of counter-charge or reply is an instance of "admission of an opinion" which brings disgrace on the person who makes it.

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्यानिग्रहः पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् ॥ ५।२।२१॥

निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्य nigrāha-sthāna-prāptasya, of one who has reached the ground of defeat ; अनिग्रहः a-nigrāhaḥ, not defeating ; पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् par-yanuyojya-upēkṣaṇam, overlooking the censurable.

525. "Overlooking the censurable" consists in not rebuking a person who deserves rebuke.

It is not at all unfair to censure a person who argues in a way which furnishes an occasion for censure. Seeing that the person himself does not confess his short-coming, it is the duty of the audience to pass a vote of censure on him. If the audience failed to do their duty they would earn rebuke for themselves on account of their "over-looking the censurable."

अनिग्रहस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥

५।२।२२॥

अनिग्रहस्थाने a-nigrāha-sthāne, in case of non-defeat ; निग्रहस्थानाभियोगः nigrāha-sthāna-abhiyogaḥ, accusation of defeat ; निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः nir-anu-yojya-anuyogaḥ, censuring the non-censurable.

526. "Censuring the non-censurable" consists in rebuking a person who does not deserve rebuke.

A person brings discredit on himself if he rebukes a person who does not deserve rebuke.

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्यानियमात्कथाप्रसङ्गोऽपसिद्धान्तः ॥ ५ २ ॥ २३ ॥

सिद्धान्तं siddhântam, tenet ; **अभ्युपेत्य** abhyupetya, accepting ; **अनियमात्** a-niyamât, through departure, or wandering ; **कथाप्रसंगः** kathâ-prasaṅgaḥ, disputation ; **अपसिद्धान्तः** apa-siddhântaḥ, contrary to tenet.

527. A person who after accepting a tenet departs from it in the course of his disputation, is guilty of "deviating from a tenet."

A certain person promises to carry on his argument in consonance with the Sāṃkhya philosophy which lays down that (1) what is existent never becomes non-existent, and (2) what is non-existent never comes into existence, etc. A certain other person opposes him by saying that all human activity would be impossible if the thing now non-existent could not come into existence in the course of time and that no activity would cease if what is existent now could continue for ever. If the first person being thus opposed admits that existence springs from non-existence and non-existence from existence, then he will rightly deserve rebuke for his deviation from the accepted tenet.

हेत्वाभासाश्च यथोक्ताः ॥ ५ १ २ ॥ २४ ॥

हेत्वाभासाः hetu-âbhâsâḥ, pseudo-marks ; **च** cha, and ; **यथोक्ताः** yathâ-uktâḥ, as stated before.

528. "The fallacies of reason" already explained do also furnish occasions for rebuke.

From aphorism 1-2-4 it is evident that the fallacies are mere semblances of a reason. A person who employs them in a disputation does certainly deserve rebuke.

There are infinite occasions for rebuke of which only twenty-two have been enumerated here.



APPENDIX A.

NYÂYA-SÛCHÎ-NIBANDHA

of

VÂCHASPATI MIŚRA

[Based on the text edited by Dr. Gaṅgânâtha Jhâ, M. A., D. Litt.,
and published in the Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Bonares.]

The Nyâya-Śāstra contains five books, ten chapters, eighty-four topics, five hundred and twenty-eight aphorisms, one hundred and ninety-six measures, and eight thousand, three hundred and eighty-five syllables.

[Book=adhyâya, Chapter=âhnikā, *lit.* a daily portion, Topic=prakaraṇa, Aphorism=Sûtra, Measure=pada, Syllable=akṣara.]

Adhyâya—I: Âhnikā.—1: Prakaraṇas—7 : Sûtras—41.

1. Statement of the subject matter (viśaya), purpose (prayojana) and relation (sambandha) of the Śāstra—Ss. 1-2.
2. Definition of Pramāṇa (Instrument of Right Cognition)—Ss. 3-8.
3. Definition of Prameya (Object of Right Cognition)—Ss. 9-22.
4. Definition of the pre-requisites (pûrva aṅga) of a Nyâya—Ss. 23-25.
5. Definition of Siddhânta (Tenet) which is the basis of a Nyâya—Ss. 26-31.
6. Definition of Nyâya (Process of Ratiocination or Reasoning)—Ss. 32-39.
7. Definition of processes subsidiary (uttara aṅga) to a Nyâya—Ss. 40-41.

Adhyâya—I: Âhnikā-2 : Prakaraṇas-4 : Sûtras-20.

1. Definition of Kathâ (Controversy)—Ss. 1-3.
2. Definition of Hetvâbhâsa (Fallacious Marks of Inference)—Ss. 4-9.
3. Definition of Chhala (lit. Fraud, Quibble)—Ss. 10-17.
4. Definition of Liṅgadoṣa (General Fault in Marks of Inference) due to incapacity of the arguer (Puruṣa-aśakti)—Ss. 18-20.

Adhyāya—II: Āhnikā-1: Prakaraṇas-9: Sūtras-68.

1. Examination of Saṃśaya (Doubt)—Ss. I-7.
2. Examination of Pramāṇa generally—Ss. 8-20.
3. Examination of Pratyakṣa (Perception)—Ss. 21-32.
4. Examination incidentally of Avayavī (the whole)—Ss. 33-36.
5. Examination of Anumāna (Inference)—Ss. 37-38.
6. Examination (introductory) of the present time—Ss. 39-43.
7. Examination of Upamāna (Analogy)—Ss. 44-48.
8. Examination of Śabda (lit. word, Testimony) generally—Ss. 49-56.
9. Examination of Śabda in particular (the Veda)—Ss. 57-68.

Adhyāya—II: Āhnikā 2: Prakaraṇas-4: Sūtras-69.

1. Examination of the fourfold division of Pramāṇa—Ss. 1-12.
2. Examination of the doctrine of the non-eternality of Śabda—Ss. 13-39.
3. Examination of the doctrine of Śabda-pariṇāma (Transformation of word)—Ss. 40-57.
4. Examination of Śabda-Śakti (Force of Word)—Ss. 58-69.

Adhyāya—III : Āhnikā-1: Prakaraṇas-9: Sūtras-73.

1. The Soul is over and above the Senses—Ss. 1-3.
2. The Soul is different from the Body—Ss. 4-6.
3. Refutation (incidentally) of the doctrine that the Eye is only one—Ss. 7-14.
4. The Manas (Mind) is not the Soul—Ss.—15-17.
5. The Soul is eternal—Ss. 18-26.
6. Examination of the Body—Ss. 27-31.
7. Examination of the materiality (bhautika-tva) of the Indriya (Sense)—Ss. 32-51.
8. The Indriya is manifold—Ss. 52-61.
9. Examination of Artha (Sense and Object of Sense)—Ss. 62-73.

Adhyāya-III : Āhnikā-2:-Prakaraṇas 7 : Sūtras—72.

1. The Buddhi (Cognition) is not eternal—Ss. 1-9.
2. Introduction of the doctrine of Transiency (kṣaṇa-bhaṅga)—Ss. 10-17.
3. The Buddhi is an attribute of the Soul—Ss. 18-41.
4. The Buddhi perishes as soon as produced (utpanna-apavargitva)—Ss. 42-45.

5. The Buddhi is not a quality of the Body—Ss. 46-55.
6. Examination of the Manas—Ss. 56-59.
7. The Body is produced by Adṛiṣṭa (Deserts)—Ss. 60-72.

Adhyāya-IV : Āhnikā-1: Prakaraṇas-14: Sūtras-67.

1. Examination of the Faults and Pravṛitti (Activity)—Ss. 1-2.
2. Doṣa (Fault) is threefold—Ss. 3-9.
3. Examination of Pretya-bhāva (Re-birth)—Ss. 10-13.
4. The Upādāna (material) cause of the Universe is not the Śūnya (Void)—Ss. 14-18.
5. Īśvara (God) is not the Upādāna of the Universe—Ss. 19-21.
6. Chance is not the Upādāna—Ss. 22-24.
7. Refutation of the doctrine that all is non-eternal (Sarva-anitya-tva)—Ss. 25-28.
8. Refutation of the doctrine that all is eternal (Sarva-nitya-tva)—Ss. 29-33.
9. Refutation of the doctrine that all is discrete (Sarva-prithak-tva)—Ss. 34-36.
10. Refutation of the doctrine that all is void (Sarva-śūnya-tā-)—Ss. 37-40.
11. Refutation of the doctrine that the Reality is one or otherwise fixed in number (Saṃkhyā-ekānta-vāda)—Ss. 41-43.
12. Examination of Phala (Fruit)—Ss. 44-53.
13. Examination of Duḥkha (Pain)—Ss. 54-57.
14. Examination of Apavarga (Release)—Ss. 58-67.

Adhyāya-IV : Āhnikā 2 : Prakaraṇas-6 : Sūtras—51.

1. Production of Tattva-jñāna (Knowledge of Reality)—Ss. 1-3.
2. Incidental examination of the relation of the whole (avayavi) and parts (avayava)—Ss. 4-17.
3. Examination of the Partless (niravayava, e. g. Atom)—Ss. 18-25.
4. Refutation of the doctrine of the transiency of external objects (bhāya-artha-bhaṅga)—Ss. 26-37.
5. How Tattva-Jñāna is developed—Ss. 38-49.
6. How Tattva-Jñāna is maintained—Ss. 50-51.

Adhyāya-V: Āhnikā-1: Prakaraṇas-17: Sūtras-43.

1. Introduction of Parity of Reasoning (Jāti): (24): Identicals (2) in respect of Resemblance and Difference—Ss. 1-3.
2. Identicals (6) in relation to the Sādhya (subject) and Dṛṣṭānta (Example): that is, arising from the diverse properties of the Subject and the Example—Ss. 4-6.
3. Identicals (2) in respect of the extension or non-extension of the Hetu (Mark) to the Sādhya (subject)—Ss. 7-8.
4. Identicals (2) in respect of regression and counter example—Ss. 9-11.
5. Identical (1) in respect of non-production—Ss. 12-13.
6. Identical (1) in respect of doubt—Ss. 14-15.
7. Identical (1) in respect of the Topic—Ss. 16-17.
8. Identical (1) in respect of non-Mark—Ss. 18-20.
9. Identical (1) in respect of Presumption—Ss. 21-22.
10. Identical (1) in respect of Non-difference—Ss. 23-24,
11. Identical (1) in respect of Demonstration—Ss. 25-26.
12. Identical (1) in respect of Cognition—Ss. 27-28.
13. Identical (1) in respect of Non-Cognition—Ss. 29-31.
14. Identical (1) in respect of the Non-eternal—Ss. 32-34.
15. Identical (1) in respect of the Eternal—Ss. 35-36.
16. Identical (1) in respect of the Effect—Ss. 37-38.
17. Futile Controversy of Six Steps—Ss. 39-43.

Adhyāya V : Āhnikā-2 : Prakaraṇas-7 : Sūtras-24.

1. Enunciation of the five Errors of the opponent depending upon the one or the other of the Proposition and the Mark—Ss. 1-6,
2. The four Errors leading to failure to establish the desired proposition—Ss. 7-10.
3. The three Errors leading to misrepresentation of one's own conclusion—Ss. 11-13.
4. The Error of Repetition—Ss. 14-15.
5. The four Errors leading to failure to reply—Ss. 16-19.
6. The three Errors of acquiescence in a defect, failure to attack, and misplaced attack—Ss. 20-22.
7. The two Errors of Inconsistency and Fallacies—Ss. 23-24.

APPENDIX B. SÛTRAS OMITTED

IN THE SECOND EDITION.

न चैकदेशोपलब्धिखयविसद्भावात् ॥ २ । १ । ३२ ॥

1. Moreover, the perception is not merely of a part, for there is a whole behind the part.

The perception of a part does not exclude perception of the whole, of which it is a part. If you touch the hand, leg or any other limb of a person, you are said to touch the person. Similarly, if you perceive a part of a thing, you are said to perceive the thing. A part implies the whole, and perception of a part implies perception of the whole.

प्रमाणतोऽनुपलब्धेः ॥ २ । १ । ५३ ॥

2. There is, in the case of verbal testimony, no perception of the connection.

The connection between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of inference, is obvious to perception. For instance, the inference that "the hill is fiery, because it is smoky" is based on a certain connection between smoke and fire which is actually perceived in a kitchen or elsewhere. The connection between a word and the objects signified by it, which is the basis of verbal testimony, is not obvious to perception. The word Uttarakuru, for instance, signifies the country of the name, but the connection between the word and the country is not perceived, as the latter lies beyond our observation. Hence, verbal testimony is not inference.

विमर्शहेत्वनुयोगे च विप्रतिपत्तेः संशयः ॥ २ । २ । १३ ॥

3. There is doubt about the nature of sound, because there are conflicting opinions supported by conflicting reasons.

Some say that sound is a quality of ether, and that it is all-pervading, eternal, and capable of being manifested. Others say that sound, like smell, etc., is a quality of the substance in which it abides, and is capable of being manifested. Sound is said by others to be a quality of ether

and to be subject to production and destruction, like knowledge. Others again say that sound arises from the concussion of elements, requires no abode, and is subject to production and destruction. Hence, there arises doubt about the true nature of sound.

वर्णत्वाव्यतिरेकाद्वर्णविकाराणामप्रतिषेधः ॥२।२।५०॥

4. There is, according to the objector, no inaptness in the analogy, as the modification of a letter does not relinquish the general notion of letters.

Just as gold is modified into a bracelet without relinquishing the general notion of gold, so the letter *i* undergoes modification as *y* without relinquishing the general notion of letters.

सामान्यवतो धर्मयोगो न सामान्यस्य ॥२।२।५१॥

5. A quality belongs, we reply, to a thing possessing a general notion, but not to the general notion itself.

A bracelet is a modification of a ring, inasmuch as both of them are gold which possesses the general notion of goldness. The letter *y* cannot be a modification of the letter *i*, because they have not as their common basis another letter which possesses the general notion of letterness.

अपरिसङ्ख्यानाञ्च स्मृतिविषयस्य ॥३।१।१५॥

6. Also because the things remembered are innumerable.

If memory were lodged in things, we could remember innumerable things at a time. But none can remember more things than one at a time. Hence memory must be supposed to be a quality of a separate substance called soul (endowed with a mind).

अव्यभिचाराञ्च प्रतीघातो भौतिकधर्मः ॥३।१।३८॥

7. The senses are material substances inasmuch as they invariably receive obstruction.

Nothing can offer obstruction to a non-material all-pervading substance. The senses receive obstruction from wall, etc., and are therefore material substances.

नेन्द्रियान्तरार्थानुपलब्धेः ॥३।१।५३॥

8. It is, we reply, not so because the objects of other senses are not perceived by touch (skin).

If there had been only one sense, viz., touch (skin), then it could have seen colour, heard sound and so on. But a blind man possessing

the sense of touch cannot see colour. Hence it is concluded that senses are many.

त्वगवयवविशेषेण धूमोपलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः ॥३।१।५४॥

9. Perception of various objects of sense is comparable to that of smoke by a special part of touch.

Just as smoke is perceived by a special part of touch located in the eye, so sound, smell etc., are perceived by special parts of touch specially located.

व्याहतत्वादहेतुः ॥३।१।५५॥

10. This is, according to us, absurd as it involves contradiction.

It has been said that touch is the only sense by the special parts of which special functions are performed. Now it is asked whether the special parts of touch do not partake of the nature of senses. If they do, then the senses are many. If on the other hand they do not partake of the nature of senses, then it is to be admitted that colour, sound, etc., are not cognisable by the senses.

संसर्गाच्चानेकगुणग्रहणम् ॥३।१।५६॥

11. And it is through their commixture, continues the objector, that there is the apprehension of more than one quality.

The objector further says as follows:—

The earth possesses only odour (smell), and if sometimes savour (taste) is also found there it is because the earth is then mixed with water. Similarly if there is odour (smell) in water it is because the earth is mixed with it.

न हेत्वभावात् ॥३।२।१०॥

12. It is, we reply, not so because there is no proof.

The Sāṃkhya says that the variety of knowledge arises from the same intellect appearing to be modified by the various objects which are reflected on it through the senses. The various modes which the intellect undergoes, that is, the various kinds of knowledge are not real but only apparent. The Naiyāyikas dispose of this view by saying that there is no proof as to the unreality of the modes, that is, the various kinds of knowledge, inasmuch as they are found to originate and cease in due order in consequence of the contact of senses and their objects and *vice versa*.

प्रातिभवत्तु प्रणिधानादनपेक्षे स्मार्त्ते यौगपद्यप्रसङ्गः ॥३।२।३५॥

13. [It is not true that] there is possibility of simultaneousness in the case of recollections which are independent of the efforts of attention, etc., just as in the case of cognitions derived from impressions of equal vividness not dependent on stimuli.

Some say that recollections which are not dependent on the efforts of attention, etc., may be simultaneous like several cognitions or acts of knowledge that are produced from impressions of equal vividness without the aid of external stimuli. But this view is untenable because neither the recollections nor the several acts of knowledge are simultaneous. The acts of knowledge, though derived from impressions of equal vividness, will appear in succession according to the amount of attention paid to them, and the recollections though not dependent on the efforts of attention will appear one after another in proportion to the strength of stimuli that revive them.

कुम्भादिष्वनुपलब्धधेरहेतुः ॥३।२।३६॥

14. It is unreasonable also on account of the non-perception of knowledge in pots and the like.

In a pot there is activity indicated by the conglomeration of different earthy parts while in sand there is forbearance from activity indicated by the disruption of the parts from one another. Yet there is no knowledge, desire or aversion in a pot or sand. Hence the body is not the seat of knowledge, desire or aversion.

बुद्ध्यवस्थानात् प्रत्यक्षत्वे स्मृत्यभावः ॥३।२।३७॥

15. If knowledge were permanent it would always be perceptible so that there would be no recollection.

If there is knowledge it is perceptible and as long as there is perception there is no recollection. Hence on the supposition of knowledge being permanent there would be a total absence of recollection.

उपपन्नश्च तद्वियोगः कर्मक्षयोपपत्तेः ॥३।२।३८॥

16. And the separation between the soul and the body is effected by the termination of the deserts,

It is in virtue of its deserts that a soul is joined with a particular body and it is by the exhaustion of the deserts that the separation between the two takes place. The soul cannot be separated from the body until it attains perfect knowledge through the cessation of ignorance and lust.

न करणाकरणयोरारम्भदर्शनात् ॥३१॥७४॥

17. It is not reasonable, because the body is found to be produced in case of both fulfilment and non-fulfilment of its ends.

In the previous aphorism it was stated that the body was produced only to enable the soul to experience objects and to realize its distinction from matter (prakṛiti). In the present aphorism the Naiyāyika points out the worthlessness of the statement by showing that the body is produced irrespective of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its ends, that is, it is produced in the case of the soul experiencing objects and realizing its distinction from matter as well as in the case when the soul remains enchained on account of its failure to realize its distinction from matter.

In a certain school of philosophy the desert is supposed to be a quality of the atoms and not of the soul. In virtue of the desert atoms are said to combine together into a body (endowed with a mind) to enable the soul to experience objects, and realize its distinction from matter. This school of philosophy fails to explain why the soul after it has attained emancipation (release) is not again connected with a body inasmuch as the atoms composing the body are never devoid of deserts.

न सद्यः कालान्तरोपभोग्यत्वात् ॥३१॥७५॥

18. The fruit, we reply, is not immediate because it is enjoyable after a lapse of time.

The fruit of maintaining the sacred fire is the attainment of heaven which is not possible until the time of death when the soul departs from our body.

अधिकाराच्च विधानं विद्यान्तरवत् ॥३१॥७६॥

19. An injunction must be appropriate to its occasion just as a topic must be appropriate to the treatise which deals with it.

A treatise on Logic which is to deal with its own special problems cannot be expected to treat of etymology and syntax which form the subject of a separate treatise. A sacred book which professes to deal with the life of a householder can appropriately bestow every encomium

on him. A cereain Vedic text extols *karma* by saying that immortality is attained by the force of one's own acts, while another text lays down as a compliment to asceticism that immortality cannot be attained except through renunciation . Some text declares emphatically that it is by the knowledge of Brahman alone that one can attain immortality, there is no other way to it. There are again certain texts which attach an equal importance to study, sacrifice ann charity each of which is to be performed by us at the different stages of our life. Hence a text which aims at extolling the life of a householder can, without creating any missapprehension in us, lay down that as soon as we are born we incur three debts which we must go on clearing off until the time of our decay and death.

अनुवादे त्वपुनरुक्तं शब्दाभ्यासादर्थविशेषोपपत्तेः ॥५१॥५॥

20. In reinculcation there is no repetition in as much as a special meaning is deduced from the word which is repeated.

The hill has fire (proposition),
Because it has smoke (reason),
All that has smoke has fire
as a kitchen (example),
The hill has smoke (application),
Therefore the hill has fire (conclusion).

In this argument the "conclusion" is a mere repetition of the "proposition" and yet it serves a special purpose.



APPENDIX C.

Vatsyayana's Commentary on the Nyaya-Sutras of Gotama.

(SUMMARY)

BOOK I: CHAPTER I.*Topic 1 : Subject-matter, purpose and relations : Sûtras 1-2.*

Pramâṇa (Means of Proof) is connected with Artha (Object), because the success of activity (pravṛitti) depends on the establishment of the Artha by means of Pramâṇa. Activity consists in the effort to acquire or to avoid an Artha after its cognition by means of Pramâṇa. Artha is pleasure, cause of pleasure, pain, cause of pain. The knower (pramâtâ), the means of knowledge (pramâṇa), the knowable (prameya) and knowledge (pramiti),—these four terms comprehend artha-Tattva, the truth about the Object. By Tattva (reality) is meant, in the case of an existent thing, the being existent, and, in the case of a non-existent thing, the being non-existent. In other words, an existent something which always appears as existent and in a particular form and is never known in any other form, is called a reality. Similarly in the case of a non-existent thing. But how can a thing which does not exist be known? The pramâṇa which reveals an existent thing, reveals a non-existent thing as well. Absence of cognition, while the pramâṇas are operative, is the test of non-existence.

The Nyâya-Sûtras groups existent things under sixteen classes (I. i. 1). They constitute its subject-matter : Its purpose is to teach how to know them in their true character. Among these sixteen classes it is the knowledge of the reality of the soul and other knowables (I. i. 9) which is the cause of the attainment of the supreme good (niḥśreyasa). One attains the supreme good by thoroughly realising the four subjects established in the Nyâya-Sûtras, namely the thing to be avoided (*i.e.*, pain), its causes (*i.e.*, desire and ignorance), absolute avoidance, and the means of such avoidance (*i.e.*, true knowledge) which is to be secured.

It is true that Pramâṇa and Prameya comprise *all* objects. Doubt and the rest (I. i. 1) are included in them. These have been separately mentioned to show that they have received special treatment in the Nyâya-Sûtras. Four Sciences (Vidyâ) have been propounded for the benefit of mankind : Vârttâ, vocation, the science of agriculture, trade, commerce, etc., which produces wealth (artha), supplies the physical needs of man ; Daṇḍanîti, the rule of the rod, polity, controls his passions, desires and emotions and enables him to enjoy the amenities (kāma) of social life ; Trayî, the three Vedas (Ṛik, Yajus and Sâma), which deals with the

sacrifice of Agnihotra, etc., enriches his religious experience (dharma); and Ânvikṣikî, the science of reflection, critique, which deals with the soul, etc., ministers to his spiritual needs and helps him to attain Release (mokṣa). Nyâya-vidyâ is this fourth science of Ânvikṣikî. If the Nyâya did not treat of doubt and the rest as its special subjects, it would not be distinguished from a pure science of the self like the Upaniṣads.

Nyâya (reasoning) has no scope where the object either is not perceived or is already ascertained, but only where it is doubted. As has been said, "Ascertainment is the determination of the object by means of opposite views after first impression" (I. i. 41). The order of sequence is : first impression, doubt, opposite views, application of Nyâya (reasoning), determination of the object, ascertainment, knowledge of reality. On this account, Saṃs'aya (Doubt) in the form of "what this may be," which is indeterminate cognition consisting of the mere first impression of an entity, is separately mentioned, though it is included in the class of Prameya (knowable.)

Prayojana (Purpose) is that by which one is prompted to act. It is an object which one desires to secure or desires to reject. Purpose pervades all living beings, all acts and all systems of knowledge. For its promotion does Nyâya proceed.

Nyâya is the investigation of objects by the application of the processes of proposition, etc. (I. i. 32) which are the Pramâṇas (means of knowledge) such as Perception, etc. Inference based on perception and revelation is called Anvikṣâ, re-view, that is, review of what has been viewed by perception and revelation. The system of knowledge which proceeds by this method, is Ânvikṣikî, Nyâya-vidyâ, Nyâya-s'âstra. Inference which is contradicted by perception and revelation, is pseudo-nyâya, false reasoning.

Vâda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍâ are the three forms of discourse or controversy (Kathâ). Vâda and Jalpa have definite ends in view; Vitaṇḍâ has not. Vâda (assertion or discussion) has the ascertainment of the truth as its object. In Jalpa (sophistry) the opponent only seeks personal victory. Vitaṇḍâ (cavil) is merely destructive criticism. If it advances a proposition of its own, it ceases to be itself; if it does not, it becomes a meaningless jargon.

Dṛiṣṭânta (Example) is an object of perception in respect of which the observation of common people and of experts is unobstructed. It is a Prameya. It has been separately mentioned on account of its importance. Both inference and revelation rest upon it : without it neither inference nor

revelation would be possible. The application of Nyâya depends upon it. The position taken up by an opponent is assailed on the ground of its contradiction to the Example ; by agreement with it one's own position is established. The Nihilist (nâstika) abandons his nihilism if he admits an Example. If he does not admit one he robs himself of the weapon with which to strike down the opponent. It makes possible to define the Udâharaṇa (instance), the third member of a Nyâya or syllogism (I. i. 36, 37).

When an object is at last known in the form "Such and such exists," it is called a Siddhânta, an established tenet, a conclusion. It is also a Prameya. It has been separately mentioned because Vâda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍâ find scope only where there exists a diversity of siddhântas or principles of discourse, and not otherwise.

Avayavas (Members), that is, the five beginning with Pratijñâ (Proposition) (I. i. 32), are so called with reference to the concatenation of words considered as a whole, which completes the establishment of the object to be established. In them combine all the Pramâṇas : Pratijñâ (Proposition) (is the enunciation for demonstration to another of the object obtained from) Âgama (revelation, Testimony) ; Hetu (Reason or Mark) is (the vehicle of) Anumāna (Inference) ; Udâharaṇa (Instance) is (an object of) Pratyakṣa (Perception) ; Upanayana (Application) is Upamâna (Comparison) ; Nigamana (Conclusion) shows the convergence of all towards the same object. Such is the Nyâya *par excellence*. Vâda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍâ proceed by means of it. The ascertainment of the specific character of a reality depends upon it. For this reason, the members have been separately mentioned, though, as forms of Sound, they are included in the general class of the Prameya,

Tarka (Hypothesis) is neither included in the Pramâṇas nor is it an additional Pramâṇa, but is subservient to the Pramâṇas, and as such conduces to tattva-jñâna, knowledge of reality. For instance : Is birth the result of past acts or is it the result of causes other than past acts ? The object being thus unknown, there follows rational doubt or conjecture : if birth is the result of acts, then termination of birth is possible through the termination of the cause ; but if it is the result of causes other than acts, then the termination of the cause being beyond the power of man, the termination of birth is also impossible. Or, if birth is accidental, then as it happens by accident, it will happen again ; the cause of cessation therefore cannot be expected ; hence the termination of birth is not possible. Tarka subserves the Pramâṇas which proceed to establish one out of the alternative

suppositions, namely that birth is due to action. It conduces to tattva-jñāna, knowledge of reality, through an analysis of the subject-matter of tattva-jñāna. Tarka which is of such a character, in association with the Pramāṇas, helps in the establishment as well as in the elimination of the object. For this reason it has been separately mentioned, though it is included in the Prameya.

Nirṇaya (Ascertainment) is tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth. It is the result of the Pramāṇas. Vāda (discussion) ends with it. For its maintenance are Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā. Tarka (hypothesis) and Nirṇaya (ascertainment) help carry on the affairs of the world. For this reason Nirṇaya though included in the Prameya, has been separately mentioned.

Vāda is discussion in which different speakers take part, each seeking to make good his own hypothesis, and which ends with the establishment of one or other of the hypotheses. It has been separately mentioned to emphasise its special feature. By the use of it as so defined tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth, is attained.

Jalpa (sophistry) and Vitaṇḍā (cavil) are varieties of Vāda, and are employed to keep up the effort in the pursuit of truth.

Hetvābhāsas (Fallacies of Reason) have been mentioned separately from Nigrahasthānas (Occasions for Rebuke,) because they furnish ground of attack in Vāda, while Nigrahasthānas do so in Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā.

Chhala (Quibble), Jāti (Futility) and Nigrahasthānas have distinctions of their own and are therefore separately mentioned.

Thus is Ānvīkṣikī divided by the topics of the Pramāṇas, etc. It is the light of all sciences, the way of all actions, the foundation of all pious acts. It is this which has been recited among the four Sciences.

And the tattva-jñāna, knowledge of truth, produced by Ānvīkṣikī for the realisation of the supreme good, should be understood according to the scope of each science. In the present Science of the Soul it means knowledge of the truth about the soul, etc., and the realisation of the supreme good means the attainment of Release.

The supreme good does not arise immediately after the knowledge of the truth about the soul, etc. False knowledge in many forms exists in regard to the prameyas from the soul to release (I. i. 9). *E.g.* the soul does not exist; the not-soul is looked upon as the soul, pain as pleasure, the non-eternal as the eternal, non-release as release, the cause of fear as not the cause of fear, the ugly as the pleasant, what is fit to be avoided as not so; there is no karma (action) nor the fruit of karma; saṃsāra (stream of births and deaths) is not due to doṣa or faults; there is no animal or embodied soul or entity or soul which is to depart and, after departing, to come

back ; birth has no reason behind it, therefore cessation of births in future comes about by itself, hence existence after departing from life has a beginning but no end ; it has a cause, but karma is not its cause ; re-birth does not require a soul, but is brought about by the disjunction and conjunction of the body, the senses and the stream of ideas and sensations ; in release we fear there is cessation of all action, in release which means separation from everything much that is good is lost, hence how can an intelligent man like such release which is unconsciousness, the cessation of all experience of pleasure ?

From such false knowledge arise attraction for things agreeable and aversion to things disagreeable. Under the influence of attraction and aversion spring up untruthfulness, envy, delusion or attachment, greed, and other faults. The faults incite to acts of vice with the body, speech and mind. Vices produce *adharmā*, demerit. Virtues produce *dharma*, merit. In the text (I. i. 2) *pravṛitti*, activity, has the sense of its products, merit and demerit. It is the cause of good or evil birth.

Birth is the appearance of the body, the senses and the intellect, or cognition (*buddhi*) as an aggregate. It is the condition of Pain which is known as disagreeable feeling, hindrance, suffering, burning.

These conditions, namely false knowledge, faults, activity, birth and pain, ever following without interruption, constitute *saṃsāra* or the wheel of life. Knowledge of truth removes false knowledge. On the removal of false knowledge faults disappear. On the disappearance of faults activity ceases. On the cessation of activity birth does not take place. In the absence of birth there is no pain. In the absence of pain absolute success, *i. e.* release, which is the supreme good, is attained.

Knowledge of truth is the opposite of the false notions mentioned above. And therefore just as food mixed with honey and poison is unacceptable so is also pleasure tainted with pain.

The method of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* is threefold : enumeration, definition and examination. First is given the division of the subject enumerated, and then the definition of each division. Next is given the subdivision of the subject enumerated and defined.

The subdivisions of *Pramāṇa* are *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Anumāna* (inference), *Upamāna* (comparison) and *Śabda* (word).

Pratyakṣa is the *vṛitti* (modification) of each sense according to each object appropriate to it. *Vṛitti* is proximity or knowledge. Whenever there is proximity there is knowledge of reality. The consequence of knowledge is the idea of avoidance or acquisition or indifference.

Anumāna is the knowledge of the object after the observation of the previously known mark.

Upamāna is the knowledge of an object by means of its resemblance to a known object.

Śabda is that by which an object is designated, i. e., made known as such and such.

The four pramāṇas sometimes operate conjointly and sometimes individually according to the nature of the prameya. Thus : the existence of the soul is known from testimony, by inference (I. i. 10), and by perception through a particular conjunction of the internal organ with the soul brought about by the power of meditation of a Yogī. In the case of heaven there can be neither the observation of a mark nor perception. When the rumbling of a cloud is heard, the cloud is not an object of perception or of testimony, but of inference from the sound. In the case of one's own hand there is neither inference nor testimony.

Pramiti, knowledge, which is thus the result of the pramāṇas, ultimately rests on perception. The object of enquiry which is obtained from testimony, is sought to be known by means of the observation of the mark ; that which is inferred from the observation of the mark, is sought to be seen by perception ; and when the object is realised in perception the enquiry ceases.

Topic 2 : Definition of Pramāṇas : Sūtras 3-5.

Gotama now proceeds to give the definition of each of the four pramāṇas.

Perception is the knowledge which is produced from the contact of the sense with the object. The contact of the soul with the mind and of the mind with the sense is not mentioned, because it is common to cognitions produced by all the pramāṇas. The definition only gives the specific cause of perceptual knowledge. The knowledge of the object produced from the contact of the sense with the object takes the form of "colour", "taste", etc. The words, colour, taste, etc. are the names of the viśayas or contents of the knowledge. But the name-words have no operation at the time of the production of the knowledge of the object ; they operate only when use has to be made of the knowledge. Hence the knowledge of the object produced from the contact of the sense with the object is independent of words. Again, mirage is also produced from the contact of the sense with the object. But it is not perception, because it is erratic, unreal. Perceptual knowledge must be unerring, real. For the same reason doubt or uncertain knowledge, e. g. be that a post or a man, a cloud of smoke or of dust, is not

perceptual knowledge. Moreover, the latter must be discreet, specific, particular, and not general such as is produced from the contact of the soul with the mind alone.

The soul, etc. as well as pleasure, etc. are also objects of perception. But their perception is not produced from the contact of the sense with the object.

Manas, the mind, is a sense, but it has been separately mentioned because of its distinctive character. The senses are constituted by the elements, are restricted each to its own province, and possess attributes. The mind, on the other hand, is not constituted by the elements, and is all-extensive and without attribute. Hence it is said that perceptual knowledge of the soul, etc., which is produced from a particular conjunction of the soul and the mind, is not produced from the contact of the sense with the object. Otherwise, the doctrine that the mind is a sense which has been established in the Vais'eṣika-Sūtras, is also admitted in the Nyāya-Sūtras, according to the rule of interpretation that the doctrine of another which is not controverted, is approved.

Inference is the knowledge the antecedents of which are the observation of the connection between the mark and the thing marked, and the observation of the mark (liṅga, sign). Recollection of the mark follows from the observation of the mark and the thing marked as connected. By means of recollection and the observation of the mark an unperceived object is inferred.

Inference of succession is of three kinds : (1) from cause to effect, (2) from effect to cause, and (3) from change of position, as, *e.g.*, the inference of the movement of the sun from its change of position in the sky. Inference of co-existence is as of the fire by smoke ; that is, when two objects have been previously known as co-existent, the presence of one, though not perceived, is inferred from the presence of the other. Inference also takes place by the method of exhaustion or residue ; *e.g.* Vais'eṣika-Sūtras, II. i. 25. Again, where the connection of the mark and the thing marked is not an object of perception, inference of the thing marked which is unperceived, may yet take place through the resemblance of the mark to some other object *e.g.*, the inference of the soul by means of desire, etc. ; desire, etc. are attributes, attributes reside in substances, the substance in which desire, etc. reside, is the soul.

The sphere of perception is the present ; that of inference is the present, past and future,

Comparison makes an object known through its resemblance to a known object, *e. g.* as the cow so the *bos gavaeus*. Comparison subserves perception. It enables one to know an object designated by a particular name.

Testimony is the direction of an *Āpta*, *i. e.* of one, be he a seer or a man of culture or a savage, who possesses true knowledge and is truthful. The object of testimony may be of this world or of the other world. The testimony of common people is confined to the things of this world; the testimony of seers embraces things of the other world also. Both kinds of testimony are *pramāṇa*: the former is based on actual experience; the latter, on inference.

It is by means of these four *pramāṇas* and not otherwise, that the affairs of gods, men and lower animals are conducted.

Topic 3 : Definition of Prameya (knowable) : Sūtras 9-22.

The *pramāṇas* make known the soul, the body, the senses, object, cognition, the mind, activity, faults, re-birth, the fruit, pain and release. The soul is the seer of all, the experiencer of all, the all-knower, the all-reacher. The body is the field of its experience. The senses are the instruments of its experience. The objects of the senses are the things to be experienced. The experience is cognition. The senses do not extend to all objects. That which embraces all objects is the inner sense, the mind. Activity and faults are the causes which accomplish the soul's experiences of the body, the senses, the objects, cognition, and pleasure. This body is neither its first nor its last. There is no beginning of its past bodies. Its future bodies will end only when release is attained. This is re-birth. The fruit is the action of pleasure and pain with their causes on the soul. Pain is a constant companion of pleasure and enters as an element in its experience. For this reason, and not to ignore the experience of pleasure as an agreeable feeling, pleasure has not been separately mentioned. Release is the negation of all possibility of births and deaths, the total annihilation of all pain. It is the final fruit of a process of self-culture of which the successive stages are withdrawal from the world and concentration upon the self, meditation, thoughtfulness, and dispassion.

There are innumerable *prameyas* such as substance, attribute, action, genus, species, combination (*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, I. i. 4) and their varieties. In the *Nyāya-Sūtras* twelve *prameyas* have been specially taught, because knowledge of the truth about them leads to release, while false knowledge about them leads to the stream of births and deaths.

The soul cannot be apprehended through the contact of the senses. It is known from testimony and from inference by the marks of desire, aversion,

activity, pleasure, pain and cognitions. Desire, aversion and activity imply recollection of past experiences of pleasure and pain, the power of selection of one particular object out of many as the cause of pleasure or of pain, and the adaptation of activity towards its acquisition or avoidance. They therefore prove the existence of a single entity which witnesses a multitude of objects. Pleasure and pain also persist in memory ; the sight of their causes revives their memory. There must be therefore an entity in which pleasure and pain sink into oblivion. Cognition involves doubt and determination. The performer of the two functions must be one and the same.

Some deny the existence of the soul and maintain that there is only a series of conscious states severally corresponding to specific objects. But they also do not admit that the same series re-appears in other bodies. Even so it cannot be said to have influence in the same body at successive periods of time ; for the two cases do not materially differ from each other. In the individual body there is only one soul, for one can recollect only what one has seen, and not what has been seen by another, or has not been seen at all. Similarly souls are different in different bodies, for one does not recollect what has been seen by another. Those who deny the existence of the soul fail to explain these phenomena.

The body is the field or vehicle of the soul's experience, because the movement towards the acquisition or avoidance of an object takes place in the body, because the efficiency of the senses varies according to the health or disease of the body, and because the resonance of pleasure and pain appears in the body.

The instruments of experience, *i. e.*, the senses, are the powers of smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. The elements of the earth, water, fire, air and ether are their respective causes. Smell, taste, sight, touch and sound are respectively the attributes of the elements and the objects of the senses.

Cognition is not, as some hold, the modification of an unconscious or insentient instrument or organ called buddhi, intellect. Consciousness cannot spring from unconsciousness. Buddhi, intellect or reason, is not the medium of cognition, but cognition itself.

Memory, inference, testimony, doubt, ready wit, dream, cognition, conjecture, feeling of pleasure, etc. and desire, etc. are marks of the mind. The senses are not their cause. They must have some other cause. That is the mind. Simultaneous non-production of cognitions even while the senses are in contact with their objects is also the mark of the mind.

Activity is the start or action of the body, speech and mind. In the Sûtra (I. i. 17) the mind is intended by the word "buddhi".

Faults move the knower to activity. They are attraction, aversion and stupidity. Where there is false knowledge there are attraction and aversion. Their existence in others is known from their acts.

Re-birth or transmigration is connection again with the body, the senses, the mind and cognition, whether here or elsewhere. The condition of recurrent births and deaths has no beginning and ceases on the attainment of release.

Fruit is the experience of pleasure or of pain. It is inevitable so long there is connection with the body, the senses, objects and cognition.

The mark of pain is bāḍhanâ, *i. e.*, obstruction or hindrance, suffering, burning. The element of pain is present in all things, the body, the senses, the objects, etc. They impede the activity of the soul.

Release is everlasting deliverance from birth which is the source of pain. This is the state which arises when the present birth ends and another birth does not take place. This state continuing unlimited is called Apavarga, release. Abhaya, Ajara, Amṛityupada, Brahmakṣemaprâpti are its other descriptions. Abhaya is fearless: in release there is no longer any fear of saṃsâra. Ajara is undecaying. This disproves the doctrine that Brahman modifies (pariṇâma) as the fabric of the universe of names and forms. If Brahman undergoes modification as a whole, then as a whole it becomes other than it is, and therefore liable to destruction. If, on the other hand, it should modify in part, then being divisible it would be equally liable to destruction. Amṛityupada is the status of non-death or immortality. This is in answer to the Vainâs'ikas who hold that release is the extinction of the mind like the extinction of a lamp. Brahmakṣemaprâpti is the attainment of the bliss of Brahman.

Some think that permanent pleasure, like the largeness of the soul, is manifested in the state of release, and that the absolutely released soul enjoys pleasure as so manifested. But there is no evidence, neither perception, nor inference, nor testimony, that permanent pleasure, like the largeness of the soul, is manifested in the state of release. If manifestation of permanent pleasure takes place at a particular time, then it is a product and therefore requires a cause. If, on the other hand, the manifestation, like pleasure, is ever present, then a soul in bondage will also enjoy it as much as a released soul. If you say that the manifestation of pleasure is a product and that the conjunction of the soul and mind is its cause, then another contributory cause is required. For, in the state of saṃsâra, the conjunction

of the soul and mind requires the aid of dharma or acts of virtue to produce the cognition of pleasure. But if in the state of release the conjunction of the soul and mind is an independent cause of the cognition of pleasure, then in the case of the cognition of colour, etc. the senses also will not be needed. If, again, dharma or acts of virtue be the contributory cause, then a cause of dharma is required, because it is a product. If, on the other hand, you say that virtue born of Yogic meditation or trance is the cause, then, as a product, it is liable to destruction, and as such it would negate unlimited enjoyment of pleasure, for, as an effect, the enjoyment will cease with the cessation of its cause. If you say that the manifestation of pleasure is ever present but that the connection of the soul with the body, etc. prevents its experience in the state of *saṃsāra*, your position would be untenable. The body, etc. have been created to subserve the purpose of the soul's enjoyment. To say that they would obstruct such enjoyment is a contradiction in terms. On the other hand, there is no reason to infer that a soul without a body can have any experience. Instructions about release and the activity of the seekers of release do not furnish any such reason. For these are directed not to the attainment of a desired object but to the termination of what is not desired. There is no good which is not interpenetrated with evil. The avoidance of evil therefore necessarily entails the avoidance of good as well. It is impossible to avoid evil separately. If you say that, as a matter of fact, people forsake visible temporary pleasure and long for permanent pleasure, we would rejoin that it would be better to suppose that in the same way after transcending the visible temporary body, senses and cognition, the released soul obtains permanent body, senses and cognition. In this way, the identity of soul in the case of the released will also be accomplished. The eternity of the body, etc. is no more opposed to the *pramāṇas* and therefore impossible to assume than the eternity of pleasure. When a revealed text predicates everlasting pleasure of a released soul, by pleasure it means non-existence of pain. Instances of such use of the word are plentiful in popular parlance. Should a man strive after release being attracted by the prospect of eternal pleasure, he cannot attain release, for attraction is a bond, and while the bond exists no one can be released. Now, if the soul's attraction for eternal pleasure is abandoned, then on its abandonment attraction for eternal pleasure does not become an obstacle. Such being the case eternal pleasure may accrue to the released soul or may not accrue. But the attainment of release does not stand on the horns of a dilemmaic doubt.

Topic 4 : Definition of the preliminaries of a Nyâya : Sûtras 23-25.

Doubt is consideration in expectation of a distinction. Expectation

of a distinction is the cognition that one does not find the characteristic which will determine one or another of two or more possible objects as a particular object. It arises (1) from the observation of common properties only appertaining (*a*) to objects of the same class, or (*b*) to objects of the same and different classes, or (2) from contradiction, e. g., the soul exists, the soul does not exist, or (3) from irregularity of perception and non-perception (for example, see text).

Purpose is the object which is determined as fit to be acquired or fit to be avoided. It is the resolution which induces activity for the acquisition or avoidance of such an object.

An Example is an object which is understood by people of insight in the same way as by common people who do not possess intellectual excellence either by nature or by training.

Topic 5 : Definition of Siddhânta : Sûtras 26-31.

A tenet is the statement of the complete demonstration of an object as of a particular character. It may relate to the subject matter (1) of a system of knowledge or (2) of a topic of discussion or (3) of an admission made with a view to the examination of its special nature.

The senses are the powers of smell, etc., the objects of the senses are smell, etc., the earth, etc. are the elements, objects are known by the *pramāṇas*—these are examples of tenets common to all systems of knowledge. Non-existence cannot come into existence, existence cannot pass into non-existence, conscious entities do not change, there are intrinsic differences in the objects of the body, senses and mind as well as in their respective causes—these are peculiar to the *Sāṃkhyas*, while among the special tenets of the *Yogas* are : elemental creation is due to the act of the *puruṣa*, the faults and activity are the causes of acts, conscious entities are endowed with their respective attributes, the non-existent can be brought into existence, what is produced can be destroyed.

The knower is other than the body or the senses, because, e. g., the same object is apprehended by sight and touch (III. i. 1)—this is the example of a leading or governing tenet. For from its establishment follows the establishment of the following : the senses are more than one ; the senses are restricted to their respective objects ; they are known by the apprehension of their own objects, and are the means of the knower's cognition of objects ; substance is other than the attributes of smell, etc., and is the substratum of attributes ; consciousness comprehends all objects.

The following is an example of an admitted tenet : Let it be assumed without examination that sound is a substance. Is it eternal or is it

non-eternal? Being a substance it must be either eternal or non-eternal. Let us examine its special character.

Topic 6 : Definition of Nyāya : Sūtras 32-39.

The avayavas or members are the integral parts of an argument designed to establish a particular object. They are five in number. Some add five more, *viz.* inquiry, doubt, capacity, purpose and removal of doubt. But they are not integral parts of a Nyāya. Inquiry is for the sake of the true knowledge of an object which is yet unknown. True knowledge is for the sake of the acquisition or avoidance of the object or of indifference to it. When one makes such an inquiry another proceeds to demonstrate the object. Inquiry therefore cannot be a part of the argument or demonstration. Similarly, doubt which gives rise to the inquiry, embraces contradictory attributes and therefore cannot be an antecedent or proximate condition of cognition; for only one or the other of two contradictory attributes can be the truth. Capacity is the capacity of the pramāṇas to make the prameya known to the knower, if the prameya is capable of being known at all. It cannot properly be a part of the demonstrative argument. Purpose is the ascertainment of the truth. It is the result of the argument and not its part. Removal of doubt is the censure of the opposite view and its preclusion for the sake of grasping the truth. It is not a part of the argument. Inquiry and the rest help to fix the object to be ascertained; proposition and the other four members help to demonstrate the truth about it.

Proposition is the enunciation of a thing as possessing the attribute which is going to be demonstrated. E. g. Sound is non-eternal.

Reason is the means of the demonstration of the attribute in question through the generic nature of the attribute as shown by its existence in the Example. E. g. because it is a product. A product which is non-eternal, has been seen.

The reason may be negative also. E. g. Sound is non-eternal, because products which are eternal, are the soul and similar substances.

The sādhyā or the thing to be demonstrated may be an attribute, *e.g.* non-eternality of sound, or a thing possessing an attribute, *e.g.* non-eternal sound. In the text (I. i. 36) "Tat" refers to the latter as "dharma," attribute, is separately mentioned. A Dṛṣṭānta, Example, becomes an Udāharaṇa, Instance or reference, when it possesses the attribute as possessing which the thing in question is to be demonstrated, as a necessary consequence of another attribute which it possesses in common with the thing. The instance therefore is the statement of the relation between the two attributes as of

that which is to be demonstrated and that which is the means of its demonstration. E. g. The attribute, to be a product, is common to sound and a pot; in the pot the attribute, to be a product, is the cause of the attribute, to be non-eternal; the attribute, to be non-eternal, is to be demonstrated in the case of sound; therefore a pot possessing the attribute of non-eternality which is to be demonstrated in the case of sound as a necessary consequence of its attribute of being a product which it possesses in common with sound, fulfils the function of an Instance in the argument. Similarly an Instance may be of the negative kind. E. g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a product; non-products are eternal, such as the soul, etc. Here the soul, etc. are negative Instances.

The force of the Reason and the Instance is very subtle, difficult to understand, to be comprehended only by great scholars.

Application is the statement which brings forward the attribute as such and such or not as such and such which the thing to be demonstrated possesses in common with the Instance. Application is either positive or negative according as the Instance or the Reason is positive or negative. E. g. a pot is a product, non-eternal; so is sound a product. The attribute of sound that it is a product is thus brought forward. Similarly, the soul is not a product, eternal; so is not sound. By the negation its attribute of being a product is brought forward (The Instance shows the universal concomitance of the reason and the thing to be demonstrated. Application is the bringing forward of such a reason in the thing to be established.)

Nigamana or conclusion is the bringing together of the Proposition, Reason, Instance and Application. E. g. sound is non-eternal, because it is a product.

In the statement of the argument consisting of the members the pramāṇas appear together and through mutual connection demonstrate the object. Their concurrence is shown thus: The proposition that sound is non-eternal, comes from Testimony. For, Perception and Inference corroborate it, and he who is not a *Ṛṣi*, is not independent of them. Inference is the Reason, because resemblance is discovered in the Instance. The Instance is an object of Perception. Comparison is the Application. Conclusion is the exhibition of the capacity of all of them to demonstrate one single object. Their mutual connection or inter-relation appears thus: The Proposition renders the operation of the reason, etc. possible. The Reason furnishes the means of demonstration; is brought forward in the Instance and the thing to be demonstrated; and by its predication makes the re-statement of the proposition in the Conclusion possible. The

Instance furnishes the resemblance or difference as the means of the demonstration of the thing; and makes Application possible through resemblance to it. Without Application the attribute which is the cause of demonstration cannot be brought forward in the thing, and it cannot in consequence demonstrate the object. Without Conclusion the proposition, etc., as isolated, cannot operate towards the same end and therefore cannot produce demonstration.

The function of the Proposition is to connect the attribute to be demonstrated with the thing. The function of the Reason is to state that the attribute to be demonstrated, whether it be similar or dissimilar to the Instance, is the cause of demonstration. The function of the Instance is to show that the two attributes are related in the same substratum as the thing to be demonstrated and the means of demonstration. The function of Application is the establishment of the co-existence of the attribute which is the means of demonstration with the attribute which is to be demonstrated. Conclusion serves the purpose to exclude contrary suggestions against the establishment of the relation of that which is to be demonstrated and that which is the means of demonstration between the attributes present in the Instance.

On the clear definition of the Reason and Instance there cannot arise multiplicity of Futility and Occasion for Rebuke (Cf. I. ii. 20) through varieties of opposition by means of resemblance and difference. He who uses Futility offers opposition without determining the inferential relation of the two attributes in the Instance. The inferential relation of the two attributes being grasped as established in the Instance, the attribute which is determined as the means of demonstration, is adopted as the reason, and not mere resemblance nor mere difference.

Topic 7 : Definition of the Accessories of a Nyāya : Sūtras 40—41.

Tarka, Hypothesis, is cogitation or conjecture, for the sake of knowledge of truth, in respect of an unknown object by the elimination of contrary suppositions. To take the example of the soul: Is it a product or a non-product? This is Vimarśa's, contraposition of two opposite attributes. Assent is given to the one or the other according as the reason for such assent is forthcoming. If the soul is a non-product, it will experience the fruit of its action, and will on the eradication of the cause of re-birth attain release; saṃsāra and release will thus be possible. If it is a product, these will not be possible. For its connection with the body, etc. will not be the result of its action. Neither will there be the experience of the fruit of its own action. In this situation one gives one's assent to the

supposition which is based on reason, *i.e.* serves to explain the phenomena of re-birth and release. Cogitation or conjecture (Ūha) in this form is called Tarka, hypothesis. This is not knowledge of the truth which ascertains, determines, makes certain that the soul is such and such and nothing else. It is for the purpose of the knowledge of the truth. It leaves the supposition to which assent is given, to hold the field undisputed ; after which knowledge of the truth is produced through the force of the pramāṇas..

Ascertainment is the determination of an object, after doubt, by means of the thesis and the counter-thesis. Here thesis means affirmation ; and counter-thesis, negation. In a controversy one of these ultimately must cease and the other must stand. Ascertainment is the determination which will stand. But the determination of an object cannot be possible by means of thesis and counter-thesis. What really happens is this : The speaker supports the object proposed with reasons and attacks its negation. The opponent contradicts the reasons put forward by the speaker and repels the attack on the negation urged by himself. In the result the reasons and attacks either of the speaker or of the opponent cease. That which remains, whether the thesis or the counter-thesis, is one, and by means of it the object is determined. Such determination is ascertainment.

Vimars'a, contraposition, helps Nyāya by distinguishing two contrary positions, and has reference to contraries residing in the same substratum. But where contradictory attributes of the individuals of a class spring from causes inherent in the individuals, there is not contraposition but collocation. E. g. some substances are active, some are inactive. Again, in the same substratum contradictory attributes may appear at different times. E. g. a substance may be active at one moment and inactive at another moment.

Contraposition is not required in every case of ascertainment. In perception the determination of an object through the contact of the sense and object is ascertainment. Similarly in matters of Śāstra and Discourse there is no room for Contraposition. For Śāstra, *e.g.* by Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice one attains heaven, there can be no doubt. In Discourse both the speaker and the opponent are sure of their grounds. Contraposition applies only in cases of Examination or investigation.

Book I : Chapter ii.

Topic 8 : Definition of Kathā (Discourse) : Sūtras 1—3.

There are three forms of Discourse, Vāda or discussion (with elders), and Jalpa or sophistry and Vitaṇḍā or cavil (among rivals). Vāda consists in the advancement of the thesis and counter-thesis, *i.e.* contradictory

attributes residing in the same substratum ; *e.g.* the soul exists, the soul does not exist. Such contradictories as reside in different substrata, *e.g.* the soul is eternal, cognition is non-eternal, do not form thesis and counter-thesis. In Vâda the thesis is maintained by means of the *pramâṇas*, the counter-thesis is attacked or negated by showing its absurdity, and *vice versa*. When in the process one is silenced the other is established. There is no room for the Occasion for Rebuke in Vâda, as its place has been assigned to Jalpa (I. ii. 2). One form of Occasion for Rebuke, *viz.* the fallacy of reason called the contradictory (I. ii. 6) is permitted in Vâda, as also are "Saying too little" (V. ii. 12) and "Saying too much" (V. ii. 13). In the text (I. ii. 1), "Pramâṇatarka", though included in "Avayava," are separately mentioned to show that the establishment of the thesis only is to be done by *pramâṇas*, and the negation by *tarka*. In Vâda the maintenance of the thesis and the negation of the counter-thesis may be done also by the *pramâṇas*, *e.g.* perception, etc., independently of the five members of a Nyâya. The maintenance of the thesis and the negation of the counter-thesis are equally the functions of Vâda whereas negation is the main function of Jalpa.

As in Vâda the thesis is maintained by means of *pramâṇas* and the counter-thesis is negated by means of *tarkas*, so in Jalpa these two objects are achieved by means of *Chhala*, *Jāti* and *Nigrahasthāna*. These however fulfil a negative function, as is clear from their definitions (I. ii. 10, 18, 19). They therefore do not directly serve to maintain or establish the thesis. But they do so indirectly by lending support to the *pramâṇas* establishing the thesis, by the negation of the counter-thesis (*vide* IV. ii. 50). Jalpa thus subserves Vâda.

Vitāṇḍā, on the other hand, is mere negation. It lends no support to the maintenance either of the thesis or of any counter-thesis. Nor does it seek to establish any thesis of its own. It is not directed to any such end. In this it is distinguished from Jalpa.

Topic 9 : Definition of Fallacy of Reason : Sûtras : 4-9.

Fallacies of Reason lack the characteristic of a mark of inference in a given case but appear as such a mark as they may be marks of inference in other cases. They fall into five classes. (1) The erratic is not confined to one or the other of two contradictory attributes, *e. g.* where the eternality of sound is to be established, untouchability cannot be the mark of inference, for while a pot which possesses touch is non-eternal, the atoms which also possess touch are eternal. Again, the soul which is without touch is eternal, whereas

cognition which is also touchless is non-eternal. (2) The contradictory is the mark which contradicts the very tenet on which it rests. E. g. A modification loses its identity as it cannot be eternal; though it loses its identity, it still exists as it cannot be destroyed. The reason that a modification cannot be eternal is contradicted by the speaker's own tenet that a modification which is losing of identity still exists. For that which loses its identity ceases to exist. Existence and loss of identity are contradictory attributes and cannot abide together. (3) Where the subject matter of the topic is advanced as the reason for the desired inference, the mark is said to be identical with the topic, e.g. it is not known whether sound is eternal or non-eternal. Eternality and non-eternality are in this case the contradictory attributes the contraposition of which starts the discussion of the topic. To advance as a reason for the desired inference that sound is eternal or that sound is non-eternal is to stop the discussion altogether and to make the determination of the truth impossible. (4) The mark which itself stands in need of proof equally as the subject is called identical with the subject. (For example see text, I. ii. 8). (5) The time-expired mark : the commentary has been fully given in the text.

Topic 10 : Definition of Quibble : Sûtras : 10-17.

Quibble consists in playing upon (1) words, (2) ideas and (3) metaphors. E. g. (1) A quadruped means an animal and not a table. (2) To say that a particular Brâhmaṇa is learned is not to say that learning is an attribute of the genus Brâhmaṇa so that all Brâhmaṇas are learned. (3) The scaffolds cry, means that the men on the scaffolds for execution cry, and not the wooden structures. Between verbal and metaphorical quibbles there is this distinction that while in the former there is supposition of a different sense, in the latter there is negation of the existence of a sense.

Topic 11 : Definition of General Faults in Marks of Inference due to incapacity of the speaker : Sûtras : 18-20.

These are Jâti and Nigrahasthâna. Jâti literally means that which is born. Here it means whatever reply is provoked or called into being by the reason advanced by the opponent. It is applied to negative the opponent's reason through resemblance and difference. Where the reason brings forward the resemblance to the Instance, Jâti opposes the reason by bringing forward the difference from the Instance, and *vice versa*.

Nigrahasthâna is ground of defeat. Examples of Nigrahasthâna are self-contradictory or wrong conclusion, failure to reply, etc.

The varieties of Jâti and Nigrahasthâna are manifold (see I. ii. 20, V. i. 1 and V. ii. 1).

BOOK II : CHAPTER 1.

Topic 12 : Doubt : Sûtras : 1—7.

Ascertainment has been defined (Sûtra I. i. 41) as the determination, after raising doubts, of an object by means of thesis and counter-thesis. Doubt has been defined in Sûtra I. i. 23. But some doubt the possibility of doubt. Their arguments are stated below :

(1) An attribute belonging to objects of the same class which is either wholly unknown or wholly known cannot cause doubt.

(2) An attribute which is cognised as belonging to two definite objects of the same class cannot cause doubt, because the objects are thereby cognised.

(3) Cognition of a common attribute cannot raise doubt in respect of the object possessing the attribute, as an attribute is different from an object.

(4) Cognition of a common attribute cannot cause doubt because cognition is opposed to doubt.

(5)—(8) The same objections apply *mutatis mutandis* to the case of an attribute belonging to objects of different classes.

(9) Cognition of the attribute of one of two possible objects, e. g., "Be it a man or a post," also cannot cause doubt, because cognition of the attribute means cognition of the object.

(10) Differences of opinion and irregularity of perception and non-perception also cannot be the cause of doubt unless one becomes aware of these differences and of the irregularity, and when one becomes aware of them he has cognition of them and cognition is opposed to doubt.

(11) Those who hold different opinions in respect of an object are certain about their own opinions.

(12) The irregularity of perception and non-perception is also fixed in itself.

(13) If cognition of common attributes be a cause of doubt then doubt will never cease, because even when the objects are determined the common attributes will still belong to them and enter into cognition along with them.

To the above our reply is as follows :

(1) The Sûtra (I. i. 23) does not mean that common attributes themselves are causes of doubt. It means that cognition of common attributes causes doubt. This is clear from the expressions "Apekṣā", "Upapatti" and

“Dharma”. Apekṣā is need, expectancy, of cognition. Upapatti is existence, the cognition that common attributes are present. Dharma, attribute, is an object and implies the cogniser.

(2) That an attribute is common to two objects of the same class refers to a previous experience when the two objects were cognised. The cognition of the attribute subsequently fails to decide which of the objects is the thing that now stands before the eyes. This decision can be arrived at by the cognition of the attribute which differentiates one of the objects from the other. Hence there is room for doubt.

(3) The Sūtra does not say that the cognition of one object is the cause of doubt in respect of a different object.

(4) It is true that cognition is opposed to doubt. But the cause of doubt is not the cognition of the common attribute but non-cognition *i. e.*, uncertainty, as to the distinctive attribute.

(5)—(8) The same replies apply to the objections in regard to the doubt caused by the cognition of the common attributes of heterogeneous objects.

(9) When an object is cognised as such its specific character is cognised. For this reason, doubt does not arise in respect of it.

(10)—(12). As regards differences of opinion and irregularity of perception and non-perception, their certainty and fixity cannot prevent doubt, because what is wanted to be known is the specific character which will determine which opinion and which perception and non-perception are true. So long as this distinctive attribute is not cognised there must be doubt.

(13) The Sūtra does not say that the cognition of common attributes alone causes doubt. Doubt depends upon the non-cognition of the distinctive attribute. When this is known doubt ceases. Hence perpetual doubt is not entailed.

In every critical examination of an object the thesis and counter-thesis should be thus established first by the removal of objections to them.

Topic 13 : The Pramāṇas in general : Sūtras : 8-20.

Some thinkers maintain that Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word are not pramāṇas (sources of knowledge) because it cannot be shown that they exist before, after, or along with, the prameyas (objects of knowledge). If Perception, *e. g.* cognition of smell, etc. by the senses, exists as a pramāṇa before the existence of the smell, etc., then the definition of Perception as cognition produced from the contact of the senses and

objects does not hold good. On the other hand, if Perception as a *pramāṇa* comes after the cognition of the *prameya*, then it is useless as the *prameya* has already been otherwise cognised. Lastly, if the *pramāṇas* co-exist with the *prameyas* then there would be simultaneity of several cognitions and the inference of the mind by the non-simultaneity of cognitions would be demolished.

To the above objection, we reply as follows :—

The fallacy of the objector's reasoning lies in this that he has distributed the *pramāṇas*, and has compounded the *prameyas*, in respect of time. The *prameyas* (like the *pramāṇas*) do some come before, some after, and some along with, the *pramāṇas*. Thus, the sun's rays appear before their effect, the blooming of the lotus ; a lamp which illumines an object in a dark room comes after the object ; where the existence of fire is inferred by the existence of the smoke the cause and object of cognition appear at the same time. There is therefore no hard and fast rule as to the relative position of the *pramāṇas* and the *prameyas* in time. Moreover, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are correlative terms as the cause and the object of cognition. Where the *pramāṇa* follows the *prameya* the correlation still exists, as a "cook" is always a cook even when he is not actually cooking.

Then, what does the objection establish ? Is it the negation of the existence of the *pramāṇas* or the knowledge of their non-existence ? It cannot be the former because when you proceed to negate their existence you thereby admit their existence, for what is non-existent cannot be negated. It cannot be the latter, because your very argument becomes a *pramāṇa* as it makes known the non-existence of the *pramāṇas*, Perception, etc.

The reason advanced by the objector again can be turned equally against himself. The reason is "non-existence in the past, future and present". The negation cannot precede the thing to be negated, *i. e.* the *pramāṇas*, because there is then nothing to be negated. If it follows, then in the absence of the negation, the *pramāṇas* cannot be called the thing to be negated. If it co-exists with the *pramāṇas*, then the existence of the thing to be negated being admitted the negation becomes useless.

Again, the opponent's reasoning is invalid if he cannot cite a familiar instance (I. i. 32) in support of the reason. If he cites a familiar instance then this being an object of perception, Perception as a *pramāṇa* is admitted by him and his negation of all *pramāṇas* falls to the ground. The reason thus becomes what is known as the fallacy of the contradictory reason

(I. ii. 6). Further, we have already shown that in the reasoning of five members all the *pramāṇas* are combined. The opponent cannot say that the *pramāṇas* are valid in his reasoning and not in the reasoning of others.

The reason, "non-existence in the past, future and present", advanced by the opponent, does not also stand scrutiny. For *pramāṇas* do operate subsequently as when the existence of a flute is inferred by its tune.

The *pramāṇas* are thus established. *Pramāṇa* and *prameya* are, however, correlative terms. Whatever is the cause of cognition is *pramāṇa*; whatever is the object of cognition is *prameya*. When the nature, character and strength of a *pramāṇa* is under examination it is a *prameya*, just as scales and weights by which things are measured may themselves be objects of measurement. Thus the soul, being the object of cognition, is a *prameya* (knowable); as it is an independent agent in the act of cognition, it is the knower. Cognition, being the cause of apprehension, is *pramāṇa*; as an object of apprehension, it is a *prameya*. Where it is neither *pramāṇa* nor a *prameya* it is *pramiti* (knowledge).

Now, admitting all this, asks the opponent, are the *pramāṇas*, Perception, etc., established by other *pramāṇas* or are they independent of any *pramāṇa*? Our answer is that to admit the need of other *pramāṇas* would entail infinite regression which is illogical, while to say that the *pramāṇas* do not stand in need of establishment would imply that the soul and other *prameyas* also do not require to be established and that the *pramāṇas* themselves are futile. Our reply therefore is that just as a lamp which is a cause of perception is itself made known by the contact of the eye which is also a cause of perception, in other words, just as Perception is the *pramāṇa* of Perception, so the *pramāṇas*, Perception, etc., are established by themselves mutually. It is not necessary that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* should belong to different classes of objects. It is seen that the soul knows itself by itself in such cases as "I feel pleasure, I feel pain." So also is the mind inferred by the mind, non-simultaneity of heterogeneous cognitions being the mark of its inference. Moreover, nothing is known to exist which cannot be cognised by the four *pramāṇas*. There is therefore no reason to assume other *pramāṇas*.

Some are of opinion that just as a lamp reveals itself as well an object without the aid of another lamp so the *pramāṇas* reveal themselves as well as their objects and do not require the aid of other *pramāṇas*. This view cannot be accepted. For there are objects such as a pot which do not reveal *themselves* but *require pramāṇas*. *Is there any special reason to account for the difference in the two cases?* If there is no such reason, the example

cited leads to no conclusion but stands by itself. If there is such a reason then the example presents a special case and does not establish a general rule.

Topic 14: Of Perception: Sûtras : 21—32.

Some think that the definition of Perception (I. i. 4) is incomplete as it does not include the contact of the soul and the mind, whereas in the absence of such contact there can be no perception. We also hold that the contact of the soul and the mind is also necessary for the production of perception. Others think that the contact of the sense and the object is the cause of perception because the one precedes the other. In that case space, position, time and ether would also be the cause of perception for they always precede it. But they are not. Let us now explain why the contact of the soul and the mind and the contact of the mind and the sense have not been included in the definition of perception. Cognition is an attribute of the soul and is the mark of its existence (I. i. 10), and non-simultaneity of cognitions has been assigned as the mark of the existence of the mind (I. i. 16). It has thus been mentioned that the contact of the soul and the mind and of the mind and the sense is also a cause of perception. The contact of the soul and the mind is not only a cause of perception but also of inference, comparison and verbal cognition. But the contact of the sense and the object is the specific cause of perception alone. Hence it has been expressly mentioned. Not only is it the specific cause, it is also the dominant cause of perception as evidenced in the case where a loud sound or the like forces itself upon the notice of a man in sleep or absorbed in other things. Moreover, it is by reference to the senses and the objects that cognitions are differentiated as tactual, ocular, olfactory, etc.

When a perception forces itself into the soul during sleep or distraction the contact of the mind with the soul and the sense surely takes place. This contact is not due to the volition and attention of the soul. But in the soul abides another attribute namely *adṛiṣṭa*, produced by Activity and the Faults, which accomplishes all things. Directed by *adṛiṣṭa* the mind comes into contact with the sense. *Adṛiṣṭa* it is which produces substances, attributes and actions, induces action in the four classes of atoms and in the mind, and produces bodies, senses and objects.

Some argue that Perception is really inference, because in it from the apprehension of a part the whole is cognised. For instance, the eye sees a part of the tree and the cognition of the tree is produced. Let us consider this objection to our doctrine of Perception as a separate *pramāṇa*. The tree is either a mass of atoms or an organised whole different from the atoms. In the former case neither the part apprehended nor the other part

is the tree ; hence there can be no inference from the one to the other. If it is said that from the one part the other part is inferred and then the two parts are integrated producing the cognition of the tree, then the cause of the cognition of the tree is not inference but something else. In the latter case as in the opinion of the opponent the whole is not present in the part apprehended it is not apprehended and even if it is apprehended then there is no occasion for its inference. Moreover, the reason advanced by the opponent, namely apprehension of the part, disproves his case, for at least the part is the object of Perception. Lastly inference is based on Perception, *e.g.* of fire and smoke as connected.

What is then the object other than the part ? Is it a whole or an aggregate of atoms ? By a whole we mean a unity, the product as distinguished from its constituent parts, of which the parts are the substratum and in which the causes of apprehension are present. Every product is such a whole and not a mere aggregate of atoms. Such being the case there is not merely the apprehension of a part only but also of the whole associated with the part. To this the opponent replies by saying that as the whole by its very conception covers all the parts and is not limited to any single part it is impossible that there should be the apprehension of the whole in the apprehension of a part. We reply that partial apprehension is intelligible in the case of the parts which by their nature are disconnected and mutually exclude one another. But in the case of the whole such partial apprehension is impossible because it is an indivisible unity and has no part except its constituents from which it is distinct. By its nature the whole is apprehended as a whole along with the parts which are apprehended and is not apprehended with the parts which are not apprehended.

Topic 15 : Of the Whole (Avayavî) : Sûtras : 33—36.

The doubt as to the existence of the whole as distinct from its constituent parts is not justified. These constituent parts, *viz.*, the atoms, are themselves imperceptible. And if the whole did not exist there would be non-apprehension of "all," that is, substance, attribute, action, genus, species, and combination (*vide* Vais'eṣika-Sûtra, I. i, 4). But these are actually apprehended, *e.g.* the pot (substance) is dark, one, large, connected with the floor (attributes), shakes (action), exists (genus), is earthen (species) (the attributes inhering in it by combination). The whole therefore exists. The Sûtra (II. i. 35) also supports the existence of the whole by the argument that without there being a whole the parts could not hold together nor could the thing be capable of being pulled, etc. This reasoning may not be convincing. For the holding, pulling, etc. are due to

cohesion (samgraha, integration). Cohesion is a distinct attribute co-existing with the conjunction of the parts and produced by moistness as in the case of an unburnt pot, and by melting as in the case of the burnt pot. With the whole as their cause these should have been possible in the case of a heap of dust. And where no such whole is produced, as, e.g., when pieces of wood are glued together, even there they should not have held together and been capable of being pulled.

Those who maintain that the object of perception is not the whole but the aggregate of atoms should, on the contrary, be asked : When you apprehend the object as one, what is your idea of unity ? Do you mean by it identity or plurality of objects ? If you say that unity is the identity of the object, then such unity is distinct from the diversity of the atoms, and the whole is thus established. If, on the other hand, you say that the idea that the object is one is in respect of the plurality of atoms constituting the object, then the idea is self-contradictory.

The opponent may rejoin that a plurality can by reason of distance give rise to the idea of unity as in the case of an army or a forest. We reply that this cannot be, for the reason that while diversity of the units composing an army or a forest can be apprehended on nearer approach, the diversity of the individual atoms can never be so apprehended, so that the error as to the apparent unity of an army or a forest cannot arise in regard to an assembly of atoms.

Again, an army or a forest is, on the theory of the opponent, nothing but an aggregate of atoms, and the unity of such aggregates is the very thing which is under examination. The instances cited are therefore themselves in need of proof.

Then, error presupposes correct cognition. It is possible to mistake a post for a man only when one possesses cognition of a real man. Similarly the erroneous idea of unity in respect of an aggregate of atoms presupposes the existence of unity somewhere. It cannot exist in the aggregate for the aggregate is a plurality. It must therefore exist in something distinct from the plural aggregate, *i.e.*, the whole. Hence a pot is not a mere collection of atoms but is a whole, as otherwise it could not be perceived as one.

It may be argued that the idea of unity derived from the apprehension of sound, touch, smell, etc., as one may account for the apprehension of an aggregate of atoms as one. But the argument is not supported by any special reason which would show that the apprehension of a pot as one is erroneous and not correct. Moreover, sound, touch, smell, etc., are also of a composite character like a pot.

Unity and magnitude co-exist. The atoms have no magnitude. Yet a pot constituted by them possesses magnitude. Similarly a pot possesses unity. In respect of magnitude also a pot bears no analogy to sound which is known as minute and large, for sound has no extension which can be delimited like the extension of a pot. Again, the conjunction of two objects which does take place could not be possible were they only aggregates of atoms instead of unities. Conjunction is a distinct attribute and not unreal. It develops a new attribute in the conjoint object ; a flagged staff is neither a staff nor a flag. The cause of the cognition of the staff as thus qualified is conjunction. It is apprehended along with the apprehension of the qualified object. It cannot belong to atoms or collections of atoms as in that case it could not be apprehended.

The existence of natural kinds such as cow-ness, horse-ness, tree-ness, etc. which cannot be ignored, also proves the existence of an object which is present in the aggregates of atoms and is yet different from them. These distinct objects are the unitary wholes.

Topic 16 : Of Inference : Sûtras : 37-38.

Some say that Inference can never be an instrument of true cognition because, e.g., the swelling of a river may be due to obstruction as well as to rain, the carrying off of eggs by ants may be due to disturbance of their nests as well as to imminence of rain and the screaming of the peacock may be imitative as well as real, so that the inference by means of these marks, namely that rain has fallen, that rain will fall and that rain is falling, may be all incorrect. To this we reply that this is not so, that is, that inference as an instrument of right cognition is not invalid, and that the incorrectness of the inference in the cases cited is due not to the defective nature of the process of Inference but is due to the fallacious character of the marks. It is because the man mistakes pseudo-marks for true marks that he falls into error.

Topic 17 : Of the Present Time : Sûtras : 39-43.

We have said that inference operates in respect of matters past, future and present. But the opponent denies the existence of the time present. His argument is that when a falling fruit detached from the stem approaches towards the ground all that can be seen is the distance it has fallen and the distance it has to fall and not any intervening distance which can give the idea of the present that it falls or is falling. We reply that time is manifested not by distance (space) but by action. The past is the time where action has ceased ; the future, where it will take place ; and the present, where action is apprehended in the object. Thus the past and the future depend upon the present. They cannot be a pair of correlated duals

like long and short, light and shade, for there is no reason for such correlation; nor is the past or the future itself established otherwise than by reference to the present. Moreover, there is no universal correlation of duals; e. g. colour and touch, smell and taste are not correlatives. Further, the past and the future cannot be mutually the cause of each other, for so long as one of them is not established it cannot serve as the cause of the other, and *vice versa*. The truth is that the present is manifested by the existence of the object: substance exists, attribute exists, action exists. He who denies this denies the possibility of Perception, for Perception requires contact of the senses with objects which exist, are present. Inference, etc. depend upon Perception. The denial of the present therefore amounts to a denial of knowledge itself. Again, we have apprehension of the present alone as well as in association with the past and the future. For action may be continuous as in cooking or repeated as in cutting down a tree. In these cases all the three times are associated; e.g. the cooking commenced, the cooking is going on, the cooking will be completed. The object exists, is the instance of the apprehension of the present by itself.

Topic 18: Of Comparison: Sûtras: 44-48.

Comparison (*vide* Sûtra I. i. 6), says the opponent, fails as an instrument of true cognition in any case; for if the resemblance is complete the cognition will be "As a cow so a cow"; if it is incomplete, the cognition will be, "As a bull so a buffalo"; and if it is partial the cognition will be "As one thing so anything else," which are all absurd. To this we reply that Comparison does not proceed on mere resemblance but on the well-known resemblance, that is, on the resemblance which is definitely known to be the means of establishing cognition of an object. Let then Comparison be a form of Inference, rejoins the opponent, as in both cases there is cognition of the unknown by the known. We reply that Comparison is distinguished from Inference in this that in the former it is necessary, while in Inference it is not necessary, to see the object to be known. E. g. the *bos gavæus* must be seen before it can be known as such by its resemblance to the cow. Moreover, in Comparison the resemblance must be pointed out by one to another. The man who knows both the cow and the *bos gavæus* points out the resemblance to the man who knows the cow but does not know the *bos gavæus*. Lastly, the conclusion in Comparison takes the form "as the cow so the *bos gavæus*" but the conclusion in Inference is not of this form "As the smoke, so the fire."

Topic 19: Of the Word in general: Sûtras: 49-56.

The opponent says that Testimony is not different from Inference, because (1) the meaning which is not known and which is not an object of

perception is known by means of the word which is known, as in Inference the unknown is known by means of the known, (2) cognition from Testimony does not, as does cognition from Comparison, differ from cognition from Inference, and (3) there is universal concomitance of the word and its meaning. To this we reply that in Testimony the word by itself is not competent to produce cognition of truth, and that it derives the force to produce such a cognition only from its being spoken by an âpta or truth-knowing benevolent person, as in the case of "heaven," "apsaras," "uttara kurus," "seven islands and seven oceans," "the worlds Bhûh, Bhuvah, Svar, etc.," and so on. Inference is not so dependent upon an âpta. This also constitutes the difference of cognition from Testimony to cognition from Inference. Again, the relation of the word and the meaning is that of the signifier and the significate, and is not natural (dependent on and following from a law of nature). Natural concomitance exists between two objects when both are perceptible to the senses, as in the case of fire and smoke. But objects denoted by words are not perceived by Hearing, and there are objects denoted by words which are not perceptible by any sense. Therefore the supposed natural connection of the word and meaning cannot be established by any means. It cannot be said that the meaning always accompanies the word, for in that case whenever the words food, fire, and sword are uttered the mouth should be filled with food, burnt with fire and cut with sword. Neither can it be said that the word always accompanies the meaning, for in that case the vocal apparatus should be found near the pot and other objects. It is true there is a uniformity in the relation of the word and the meaning. But this uniformity is due to convention created by the will of man and handed down from generation to generation. This is clear from the fact that the same word conveys different meanings among different races of mankind.

Topic 20 : Of the Veda : Sûtras : 57-68.

Some condemn the Veda on the ground of futility, contradiction and repetition. But where the Vedic injunctions fail of their purpose the fault does not lie with the Veda but with the performer and the performance (in the same way as scientific experiments fail in the hands of novices). The so-called contradictory injunctions have reference to different points of time. The so-called repetition is re-inculcation with a purpose. The statements in the Veda admit of interpretation in the manner of secular statements. They are either : (1) injunctions or (2) exhortations or (3) re-inculcations. E. g. (1) He who desires heaven let him perform the Agnihotra sacrifice ; or let him cook food ; (2) this is the first among the

sacrifices, this Jyotiṣtoma, etc. ; or life, strength, pleasure, etc. are all in the food ; (3) he offers Agnihotra, he offers with curd ; or cook, cook. The authoritative character of the Veda rests on its being the declaration of Âptas as in the case of Mantras and Medical Science. Mantras to counteract poisons, ghosts and lightning and medicines to cure diseases are vindicated by results. Some of the Vedic injunctions are similarly vindicated by results. The infallibility of others is inferred from the infallibility of the Âptas who have declared them. The Âptas are persons who have directly known the truth, who are kind to living beings and who are willing to communicate the truth as known by them. In the secular affairs of men also reliance on statements of âptas is seen. Moreover, the same Ṛṣis who are the seers and speakers of the Veda are also the seers and speakers of Mantras and medicines.

The Vedic words are authoritative because they are significant of truth and not because they are eternal. They are not eternal as in that case all words would be related to all objects at the same time. Non-eternality does not entail loss of significance, for ordinary secular words which are not eternal are yet significant. Secular words cannot be eternal, for in that case the statements of those who are not âptas would not be untrue. It cannot be said that the words of non-âptas are non-eternal, for there is no reason to distinguish them from the words of the âptas. In the case of secular words also their validity depends on convention and not on their eternality. In both cases the authority of the âptas confers authority on their words. The eternality of Vedic words arises from their uninterrupted succession in tradition, study and application in all ages and world-cycles (manvantaras), past and future.

Book II: Chapter ii.

Topic 21 : The Pramâṇas are not more than four : Sûtras : 1—12.

We admit that Tradition (Aitihya), Implication (Arthâpatti), Composition (Sambhava) and Non-existence or Negation (Abhâva) are also means of knowledge ; but we do not admit that they are different from the four means enumerated by us, *viz.* Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word. Tradition consists of opinions coming down from generation to generation in uninterrupted succession, the origin of which is lost in oblivion, Implication is cognition following from the sense of what is stated ; e. g., when it is said that without clouds there can be no rain, it follows that with clouds there can be rain. Composition consists in the apprehension of the

presence of one object from the apprehension of the presence of another object which never exists without the former ; e. g. the apprehension of the presence of the ounce from the apprehension of the presence of the pound. Non-existence is the negative, the contradictory, as the non-existent of the existent ; e. g., absence of rain in the presence of clouds leads to the cognition of the conjunction of the clouds with high winds.

Tradition is not different from Word or Testimony, as its authority is derived from the same source, *viz.*, its emanating from an *Āpta*. Implication Composition and Non-existence are not different from Inference which is cognition of the imperceptible by means of the perceptible. Implication and Non-existence or Negation proceed on the basis of contradiction ; Composition, cognition of the component from the composite, proceeds on the basis of universal concomitance.

Some question the validity of Implication on the ground that even when clouds exist rain does not sometimes fall. In putting forward this objection they mistake for Implication what is not Implication. From the statement that there can be no effect without a cause, it follows that where the cause exists the effect is produced. This is Implication according to the law of contradiction. The failure of the cause to produce the effect on account of the operation of counter-agents is an attribute of the cause, and not the object of cognition by Implication. The object of cognition by Implication is that the production of the effect depends upon the existence of the cause.

Non-existence or Negation is held by some to be not an instrument of cognition on the ground that the object of such cognition does not exist. This is a rash argument. There are innumerable objects of cognition which are apprehended by means of Negation in the form of cognition of non-existence. To take one example : Where from a heap of cloths some of which are marked and the others are not marked, the unmarked ones are taken out, the action of taking them out depends on their cognition and their cognition is produced by the non-existence of any mark. The negation of mark is thus a means of cognition and therefore a *pramāṇa* ; for a *pramāṇa* is nothing but a means of cognition. For the purpose of negation it is not necessary that an object should first be produced and then destroyed ; e. g., for cloths to be unmarked, it is not necessary first to put marks on them and then to efface the marks. For the negation of marks in some cloths can be perceived by seeing the presence of marks in other cloths. Negation is correlated to affirmation whether in the same or in a different substratum. Moreover, negation or non-existence is of two kinds,

antecedent and consequent. Non-existence prior to production is antecedent non-existence; non-existence after destruction is consequent non-existence. The absence of marks in cloths which have never been marked is antecedent non-existence of marks in the cloths.

Topic 22 : Sound is not eternal : Sûtras : 13—39.

Diverse opinions are held as to the duration of Sound. The Mīmāṃsakas assert that Sound is an attribute of Ether, is all-pervading, eternal, and is not produced but manifested. The Sāṃkhya hold that Sound co-exists with smell, etc., inheres in substances, is existent like smell, etc., and is not produced but manifested. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that Sound is an attribute of Ether and is liable to production and destruction like cognition. The Bauddhas think that Sound is produced from the agitation of the great Elements, is without any support and is liable to production and destruction. These opinions give rise to doubt as to what the truth of the matter may be. The truth is that Sound is non-eternal, because (1) it originates from a cause, (2) is sensible, and (3) is treated as a product. Whatever is caused is non-eternal, i. e., is also destroyed. Conjunction and disjunction of substances are the causes of Sound. They are the causes of its production and not of its manifestation. It is not an object of manifestation because it is apprehended by Hearing. The sense of Hearing is imponderable and therefore cannot go out and reach the place where Sound appears. Sound reaches the sense of Hearing in a series of sounds in the way of waves of water, after the cessation of the Conjunction (e. g. of the axe and the tree in cutting) which produces it. An object which is manifested is apprehended where it is manifested. This is not the case with Sound. The difference in the intensity of Sounds also show that they are not different from other products such as pleasure and pain. It cannot be said that Sound is one and of a uniform character and is manifested by Conjunction the strength of which accounts for the pitch of the Sound as perceived. For this cannot explain the phenomenon of the overpowering of one sound by another, e. g. of the sound of the flute by the sound of the drum. Heterogeneous objects do not overpower one another; e. g. colour does not overpower touch. An object does not overpower itself. Objects of the same class overpower one another; e. g., brighter colours overpower less bright colours. Similarly, when it is seen that the sound of the flute is drowned by the sound of the drum it must be admitted that the two sounds are two separate objects and that they vary in intensity. Intensity is their attribute and is not due to the strength of their causes. Therefore sounds are produced and not that one uniform eternal sound is only manifested,

Moreover, manifestation must take place where the causes of manifestation operate. That being so, as the flute and the drum are operated in different places Sound manifested in the flute cannot be subdued by Sound manifested in the drum. If it is said that difference of place does not matter then the beating of a drum anywhere would drown Sound manifested in all flutes all over the world at the same time. The theory thus is untenable. The phenomena of sound can be explained only on the theory that sounds are produced and that they become perceptible only when they reach the sense of Hearing in waves.

The opponent attacks the three reasons given in support of the non-eternality of sound; (1) the destruction of a pot originates from the disjunction of its causes; the non-existence of the pot after destruction is eternal, (2) genus which is perceptible is eternal, (3) as we speak of the parts of a tree or a blanket which are non-eternal so we speak of the parts of Ether and the Soul which are eternal. To this we reply; (1) There is a difference between the eternal and the pseudo-eternal. That object is eternal which has come into existence without production (by conjunction or disjunction of parts) and which never loses its self-existence. Non-existence after destruction of an object is not eternal in this sense. Moreover, in the case of sound there is no cause to originate its destruction in the manner of the pot. Therefore the analogy of the pot does not hold good. (2) Sound is non-eternal, not because it is perceptible but because of the manner in which it comes into contact with the sense of Hearing and becomes perceptible. (3) When we speak of the parts of a tree or a blanket we mean their constituents. But Ether and the Soul have no constituent parts. The use of the word parts in regard to them is metaphorical, and conveys the sense that their contact with finite objects does not pervade the whole of them. The conjunction of two fruits does not pervade the whole of them but is confined to parts only. Similarly when we say that an object is in contact with Ether or the Soul we mean that it is not in contact with every part of Ether or the Soul and to convey this meaning we say that it is in contact with a part of Ether or the Soul. As conjunction does not pervade the whole of its substrata, so sound does not pervade the whole of Ether, and cognition, etc. do not pervade the whole of the Soul.

You may ask, Why has not Gotama embodied in an aphorism the tenet that Ether and other eternal substances have no parts? Our reply is that in many topics he has not brought out all the sides; that is his characteristic. He thinks that in such cases one can ascertain the truth from the tenet of his Śāstra. The tenet of his Śāstra is, as is well known, Nyāya,

that is, many-branched Inference not inconsistent with Perception and Revelation.

Again, how are we to know that an object exists or that an object does not exist? By cognition or non-cognition according to *pramāṇa*. By this test sound is non-existent before utterance because it is then not cognised and because any obstruction to its cognition is also not cognised.

The reasons given in support of the theory that Sound is eternal are (1) that it is intangible like Ether, (2) that it is capable of being imparted by the teacher to the pupil, (3) that it admits of repetition, and (4) that the cause of its destruction is not perceived. The first reason is fallacious, because the atom which is tangible is eternal, while action which is intangible is non-eternal. As regards the second it is seen that an object of gift is perceptible on its way from the donor to the donee. But sound is not perceptible and therefore does not exist in the interval between the teacher and the pupil. Nevertheless, it may be said, instruction is received by the pupil and from the fact of instruction the existence of Sound in the interval is to be inferred, whereby the gift of Sound from the teacher to the pupil becomes possible. To this we reply that the opponent has yet to establish what constitutes instruction. Is it that Sound residing in the teacher actually moves from him and reaches the pupil, or is it imitation of what is done by the teacher as in the case of a dancing lesson? Such being the case instruction does not remove the doubt as to the validity of instruction as a mark of the possibility of the gift of Sound by the teacher to the pupil. In regard to the third reason, it is argued that as the persistence of colour makes it possible to see it again and again so the persistence of Sound renders possible its utterance times without number. But repetition is possible also in the case of objects which are not persistent, that is, are different at every time they appear. Thus, we say, he danced twice, he eats twice, etc. As regards the fourth reason it is said that the cause of the destruction of non-eternal things, e. g. a clod of earth, is seen; and that if Sound were non-eternal the cause of its destruction would also be perceived; but that such a cause is not perceived; and that therefore Sound is not non-eternal. We reply that if the non-apprehension of the cause of the destruction of Sound implies its non-destruction, the non-apprehension of the cause of its non-hearing also implies its constant hearing. Non-hearing cannot be due to absence of manifesting agents, for we have already shown the impossibility of Sound being an object of manifestation. If then the opponent's theory is reduced to this that the hearing of Sound is without any cause then why should he not admit that the destruction of Sound also is without any cause? We do

not say, however, that there can be no cognition of the cause of the destruction of sound. The existence of such cause can be inferred from the fact which we have already established that sounds are produced in a series. The first sound is produced by conjunction and disjunction and gives rise to the second sound which, in its turn, to the third and so on and on till the series is stopped and the last sound is destroyed by some obstruction such as a wall. Each succeeding sound destroys its immediate predecessor. Then, when a bell is rung various sound series of different tones, high and higher, low and lower, are heard. Such diverse differences in tone and timbre cannot co-exist in one eternal permanent Sound. And without them differences in aural cognitions cannot be explained. The cause of the differences in the intensity of sound is the degree of force with which the bell is rung and which is communicated to the sound series produced by it. The existence of such force in the bell cannot be denied. For the ringing of the bell does not produce sound when the hand is placed upon it. This shows that the force is stopped in its action by the conjunction of the hand. It is also perceived by touch that the vibrations set up in the bell by the force of ringing gradually die away. On the other hand, if the non-apprehension of the cause of the destruction of Sound proves its eternity then the manifestation of Sound after its appearance would continue for ever as no cause of its destruction is apprehended.

Sound cannot be an attribute of Ether, says the opponent; because in that case the stopping of the vibrations in the bell by the hand could not cause its destruction. According to him, sound and the vibrations which cause it must reside in the same substratum. We reply that the objection does not apply, because Ether is intangible. The non-cognition of sound in the same substance with colour, taste, smell and touch and the phenomena of sound series show that sound is the attribute of an intangible all-pervading substance, i. e. Ether. Sound exhibits a twofold difference: a bell, e. g., produces different varieties of sound and in each variety there is a difference of pitch. These differences could not be possible if sound were an attribute of the same substance with colour, etc.; as in that case like colour, etc., it would be of one unalterable character.

Topic 23 : Of the Modification of Sound : Sûtras 40-51.

Sound is either Varṇa, articulate, letter, or Dhvani, inarticulate, noise. In regard to sound as letter, when *Dadhi* and *Atra*, for instance, become *Dadhyatra*, what does happen? Modification or substitution? Is *i* modified as *y* or is replaced by *y*? We say that *i* is replaced by *y*. Our reasons are as follows: (1) When one object, e. g., a piece of gold, modifies into another

object, e.g., a ring, some attributes disappear, other attributes appear : while the same material subsists in the modification ; but this is not the case where *i* gives place to *y*. (2) The effort required in the utterance of *i* is different from the effort required in the utterance of *y*. (3) Where *y* comes in the place of *i* and where *y* stands by itself as in *yatate*, and where *i* gives place to *y* and where *i* stands by itself as in *idam*, the effort required in the utterance of the *y* in the two cases does not differ, and the effort required in the utterance of the *i* in the two cases also does not differ. (4) The modification of *i* into *y* is not cognised as the modification of milk into curd is perceived. (5) The theory of modification of letters is not necessary for the purpose of the rules of grammar. (6) One letter is not the product of another. They are all independently produced. (7) Modification can be either transformation, i.e., change of form or production. But neither is possible in the case of letters. (8) Where *bhu* takes the place of *as*, each of *bru*, you do not say modification takes place. Similarly not modification but substitution takes place in the case of single letters. (9) In the case of modification the bulk of the modification varies according to the bulk of the original ; but whether *i* is long or short makes no difference in *y*. The opponent rejoins that modifications are sometimes greater than the original as in the case of a tree from an acorn and sometimes equal to the original as in the case of a ring from a piece of gold and sometimes less than the original as in the case of yarns from cotton. To this we reply first that mere example unsupported by any reason, homogeneous or heterogenous, cannot establish a proposition ; otherwise a horse would be a modification of a bullock, both being beasts of burden. In the second place, when we refer to the bulk of the original and the modification we intend to say that a modification follows its original in essentials so that if the originals differ the modifications also must differ. But in the case in question *y* does not follow its original, i.e., it does not become long or short according as it takes the place of *i* long or short. It is therefore not a modification of *i*. It cannot be said that the base *i* is not affected by its attributes of longness and shortness and that *y* follows the base. For what happens in the modification of a base, e.g., gold or clay, is that its original form is destroyed and a new form is produced. But in the case in question there is no evidence that *i* is destroyed and *y* is produced from the disintegrated *i*. (10) When *Dadhyatra* is disjoined *i* returns to its original form, but curd never returns to milk ; therefore *y* is not a modification of *i*. It is true that a ring can be reduced to a piece of gold again. But the analogy does not hold good here. For gold remains constant ; it becomes a ring by giving up and taking up some

attributes. A similar change does not take place in the case of *i* and *y*. It cannot be said that letter-ness remains constant in *i* and *y* ; for *i* and *y* cannot be attributes of the general attribute letter-ness.

(11) Again, the letters are either eternal or non-eternal. If they are eternal, they cannot undergo modification. If they are non-eternal, then one is destroyed before another takes its place. To this it may be replied by the opponent that there are eternal things which vary in their attributes ; e.g., the atoms are imperceptible while the letters are perceptible ; therefore while the atoms do not undergo modification letters may. The argument is invalid. The reason advanced, namely difference of attributes, is a contradictory reason, it contradicts the supposed eternal character of letters. Modification and eternality are contradictory terms. On the other hand, it cannot be said that as the hearing of the letters is possible though they are destroyed at the third moment after their production, so their modification also may be possible. For a mere example cannot establish a proposition. The reason must be stated. If the hearing of the letters be the reason, then we say that the universal concomitance of the hearing of the letters and of the modifications of the letters is yet to be established. The fallacy of the opponent's argument is *sādharmya-sama* (V. i. 2).

(12) A further reason why *y* cannot be a modification of *i* is that sometimes we find *i* in the place of *y* as in *Vyadh* becoming *vidhyati*.

The expression "modification of letter" used by grammarians does not mean that one letter is transformed into, or produced by, another letter. It means the substitution of one letter in place of another. It appears in six different forms : (a) change of attribute, as when the grave takes the place of the acute accent ; (b) suppression, as when *bhu* takes the place of *as* ; (c) decrease, as when the long is replaced by the short ; (d) increase, as when the short is replaced by the long or the prolated ; (e) curtailment, as when *stah* comes in the place of *as* ; and (f) coalescence, as when the base or the affix is augmented. These are all instances of substitution.

The result of the above examination is to show that sound is non-eternal. Sound does not remain constant under change of forms nor survives in its product. It is produced at one moment, exists at the second moment and is destroyed at the third moment by the sound to which it gives rise or by the obstruction which it meets.

Topic 24 : Of the Force of Words : Sūtras : 58-69.

Gotama now proceeds to determine the force of words on which depend the validity of Word as *pramāṇa*. A word consists of letters ending in an

a *ffix*. *Affixes* are nominal or verbal. Prefixes and indeclinables have their nominal affixes elided (Paṇini, II. iv. 28). Words lead to the cognition of objects. It is therefore necessary to determine the nature or force of words. Let us take the word, cow, for example. The Word is used to denote an individual, a form and a genus. The doubt therefore arises as to whether it denotes any one or all of these objects. One party says that the word denotes the individual, because individuals which differ from one another and possess attributes, and not the genus which is unproduced, undifferentiated and devoid of form, parts and attributes, admit of (*a*) specification, this cow, that cow, etc. ; (*b*) collection, a herd of cows ; (*c*) gift, he gives cows to the learned ; (*d*) possession, the Brāhmaṇa's cow ; (*e*) enumeration, ten cows ; (*f*) growth, the cow grows ; (*g*) emaciation, the cow grows lean ; (*h*) colour, white cow ; (*i*) association, the good of the cow ; and (*j*) propagation, the cow produces a calf. To this we reply that the above uses of the word cow are rendered possible only because the objects indicated are endowed with the genus cow-ness. The use of the word cow in respect of the individual is metaphorical, as in such cases as when we say, he is a Shakespeare, he dwells on the lake, he is weaving a mat (when the mat is yet non-existent), etc., etc.

Some think that the form is the denotation of the word ; because form consists in the configuration of parts which endures, and because without the cognition of the forms we cannot distinguish a cow from a horse. This is not correct, because mere form has no connection with the genus. It is the substance cow which is connected with the genus. When we say, wash the cow, bring the cow, we mean the substance in which the genus cow-ness is present, and not a wooden cow though it possesses the appearance (individual) and form of a cow. Neither can the genus alone be the denotation of the word ; for there can be no cognition of the genus without the cognition of the individual and form.

The truth is that the individual, form and genus are all the denotation of the word. There is no fixed rule of the relation as principal and secondary among them. The force of the word is the same in regard to each of them. When specification is intended, the individual becomes principal, genus and form become secondary ; when specification is not intended, the genus becomes principal, the individual and form become secondary.

The individual is that which is manifested. It is perceptible by the senses. Every substance is not manifested to the senses. The individual is that substance which is produced by the conjunction of parts and which

is the substratum, as far as may be, of specific attributes such as smell, taste, colour, touch, gravity, density, fluidity, impetus, and finite magnitude.

The form is that by which the genus and the marks of the genus are made known. It consists in the enduring or fixed configuration of the parts of the entities, cow, etc., and of the parts of those parts.

The genus is that which produces similar cognition in respect of different substrata. By reason of it individual objects are not differentiated from one another. It is the cause of the assimilation of objects. It is a minor Sāmānya or genus when it establishes non-difference of some objects among themselves and their difference from some other objects.

Book III: Chapter I.

Topic 25 : The Senses are not the Soul : Sûtras : 1—3.

There are two kinds of predication : (1) a part is predicated of a whole of which it is a part, e.g. the tree stands by the roots ; (2) one thing is predicated of a different thing, e.g. he cuts with the axe. What is the nature of the predication in such cases as " A man sees with the eye, knows with the mind, discriminates with the intellect, feels pleasure and pain with the body " ? Are the eye, the mind, the intellect and the body predicated as parts of a whole of which they are the parts, or of something different from them ? Thus arises the doubt as to whether the soul is indetical with the organism of the body, the senses, the mind, the intellect and the feelings, or distinct from it ? The truth is that it is distinct from the organism of the body, etc. Because the same object is apprehended by the different senses. That agent which apprehends the same object by means of the different senses and assimilates or integrates the mutually independent intuitions of the different senses, is a different object. It is the soul. The senses cannot effect the assimilation, because one sense cannot perform the function of another sense. Nor can the organism, because, being an aggregate, it lacks the unity of apperception (anuvyavasāya, I see *and* touch). It is true that objects are allotted to the senses ; so that in the absence of a sense its object cannot be apprehended. E.g. the blind cannot see, the deaf cannot hear. But this does not show that each sense is a conscious entity and that the supposition of another conscious entity is superfluous. For the apprehension or non-apprehension of objects according to the efficiency or inefficiency of the senses will be the same whether the senses are themselves regarded as the conscious agents or as the instruments of a conscious agent. On the contrary, the very fact that the senses are limited in their respective functions proves the existence of the soul, as

conscious, all-knowing, the receiver of the contents of all the senses, unaffected by the distribution of objects among the senses. The following instances of the operations of the conscious agent will show that its recognition as a distinct entity cannot be avoided. (i) He who sees colour, infers (recalls) taste and smell previously perceived. He who perceives smell infers colour and taste. And so in the case of the other senses also. Again, after seeing colour one smells the flavour, and after smelling flavour one sees colour. This assimilated apprehension of the objects of all the senses without any fixed order of succession must take place in the same site and cannot have any other agent but the soul. (ii) It also assimilates the various intuitions of perception, inference, testimony and doubt, embracing manifold objects and having it as their cause, and assimilating knows, as illustrated in its comprehending the contents of a book, treating of all sensible objects. Thus, hearing letters uttered one after another, it integrates them as words and sentences and assimilates them with meaning which is not to be grasped by the ear; then, cognising the fixed relation of words and meanings, it apprehends quite a number of objects belonging to more than one sense, which cannot be apprehended by the senses severally. This absence of limitation of the objects to be known in the case of the all-knower, which meets us at every step, cannot be circumvented, by attributing consciousness to the senses.

Topic 26 : The Body is not the Soul : Sûtras 4-6.

In the Sûtra III. i. 4 the word "Body" stands for the living being in the shape of the organism of the body, the senses, cognitions and feelings. Now, the scriptures declare that killing is a sin and that sin accrues to the agent. (Even those Bauddhas who deny the existence of a soul admits the existence of virtue and vice). But if there were no soul other than the organism of the body, senses, cognitions and feelings, then the declaration of the scriptures would be meaningless and virtue and vice would be impossible. For, the organism undergoes change at every moment and is nothing but a series of changes one taking the place of another at every moment. It would follow that the organism to which the sin of killing would accrue would be different from the organism which would kill. Again, if re-birth be possible of such an organism it would not be due to past acts, so that there would be no law of 'karma' and study and practices for the sake of release would be futile. It may be argued that in the case of the killing of an organism endowed with a soul there would also be no sin, for the reason that the soul is eternal and cannot be killed. But the argument does not hold good, because we do not say that killing is the destruction of an eternal entity. By killing we mean the destruction, or the

causing the anaesthesia, disease, inefficiency, disturbance of the interconnections or the disorganisation of the body which is the field of the experience of pleasure and pain, and also of the senses which are the instruments of the apprehension of their respective objects. Or the Sûtra (III. i. 6) may mean that killing is the disturbance or disorganisation of the association of the soul with the organism of the body, senses and cognitions by virtue of which association only the soul is the agent in the experience of pleasure and pain, and without which it can have no experience. It does not mean the destruction of the soul as an eternal entity.

Topic 27 : The sense of sight is not one : Sûtras 7—14.

What is seen with the right eye is recognised as having been seen with the left eye. Such recognition also is a mark of the existence of the soul. But the opponent urges that here at any rate a soul is not needed to account for the phenomena, because the sense of sight is really one and appears as dual owing to its operating on either side of the nasal bone. The objection is futile. When one eye is destroyed the other does not suffer destruction along with it. Of course, a tree remains a tree even after a branch is cut off. But the analogy does not apply here. For a tree is an aggregate of parts each of which is an aggregate by itself. So that the destruction of a part does not entail the destruction of the other parts. But the eye is supposed to be a unity. Or, "Dṛiṣṭānta-virodha" in the Sûtra (III. i. 11) may mean that the supposition is contrary to experience. For, in the skull there are two sockets for the eyes. Again, when one eyeball is pressed the apprehension of the object by the two eyes becomes different, and on the removal of the pressure the apprehension by the two eyes becomes similar.

(a) *Association of ideas.*

The mouth waters on seeing or smelling an orange; this is due to the recollection of the taste. And this shows that consciousness is not in the sense, for what is seen by one is not recollected by another. To this the opponent replies by alleging that recollection is caused by the receipt (the object recollected) and that this, and not the soul, causes the action in the mouth at the sight or smell of an orange. But recollection must be an attribute of the soul, and as such prove the existence of the soul. On the supposition of the senses being conscious there would be either no recollection or there would be no order of recollection. For the senses are diverse agents and on the supposition there is nothing to assimilate or co-ordinate their experiences; hence there would be no recollection. Or, every sense would recollect the experience of every other sense; which is contrary to experience: one does not remember what is seen

by another. It follows that there must be a different agent capable of apprehending diverse objects ; and that is the soul. The affairs of living beings depend on memory. The watering of the mouth as the mark of the existence of the soul is a mere instance.

Then our opponent argues that memory does not infer the soul, because the cause of recollection is impression and its content the object recollected and not the soul in either case. But he has not exactly determined the content of memory. Let us see what it really is. The statement which indicates the content of memory takes one or another of the following forms ; (a) I knew that object ; (b) I have known that object ; (c) that object has been known by me ; and (d) I had knowledge in respect of this object. In each of these statements not merely the object, but the object previously known associated with the knower and the knowledge forms the content of memory ; in other words, every act of recollection comprehends the agent, the act and the object of cognition. This is in regard to an object which is not before the senses. In regard to an object which is before the senses, i. e. in the case of recognition, three cognitions are assimilated, proceeding from the one and the same agent and not from diverse agents nor from no agent. Thus, in the statement, I see now what I have seen before, the previous seeing and the consciousness of seeing are two cognitions, while the present seeing is the third cognition. These cognitions combine to connect a single object with a single agent. Thus this content of memory, the soul, which the opponent leaves undetermined, but which is present in memory and is clearly known, is sought to be negated by the reason that the object remembered is the content of memory.

Memory is not mere memory nor is the object remembered its only content. The assimilation of experiences which takes place in an act of memory cannot be possible without something to which all objects are equally accessible, as in the case of assimilation in an act of cognition. A single knower within whose purview are all objects assimilates its own cognitions as I shall know that object, I know that object, I knew that object, and, desiring to know, and not knowing for a long time, feels certain at last that it knew the object. Similarly it assimilates memory drawing its contents from the time future, present and past, operating with the desire to remember. Were the entity merely a series of impressions (or ideas), as impressions (and ideas) disappear as they arise at every moment, not a single impression (or idea) would be left which could be aware of any cognition and act of memory in association with all the three times. And without such awareness there can be no assimilation of cognition and

memory in the form of "I (know or remember)", "(This cognition or recollection is) Mine", as it is not possible in the case of cognition and memory in different bodies. It follows, therefore, that there does exist a single entity penetrating all objects which unites and maintains the unity of the series of cognitions and the series of memories, and which does not establish such unity of its cognitions and memories with that of another on account of the absence of its operation in the latter's body.

Topic 28 : The Mind is not the Soul : Sûtras : 15-17.

But, urges the opponent, the functions attributed to the soul may all be possible for the mind. We reply that the opponent is quarrelling about names and not about the reality. The instruments of knowledge such as the eye, nose, touch, must belong to a knower. So also does the thinker penetrating all objects possess an instrument of thinking in the form of the internal organ competent to reach all objects. That being so, the opponent errs in calling the knower the mind and not the soul, and not allowing the mind to be called the mind, though admitting that it is the instrument of thought. On the other hand, if he denies that the thinker possesses an instrument of thought which can reach all objects, then the knower can very well do without the instruments of knowledge, and the opposition will thereby entail the disappearance of all the senses as well. The distinction between sense-experience and thought-experience is not unfounded. Each sense is limited to its special object and cannot go beyond that limit. None of the senses can reach that other class of objects which include pleasure, etc. For the cognition of pleasure, etc. a different instrument is needed. It is known by its mark of non-simultaneity of cognitions, due to its coming into contact with the external senses one at a time.

Topic 29 : The Soul is eternal : Sûtras : 18-26.

Some entities are eternal, some are non-eternal. Is the soul which is established as distinct from the organism of the body, senses, mind and cognitions, eternal or non-eternal? The answer is that the very reasons which prove the existence of the soul throughout the stages of infancy, childhood, youth and old age, also prove its existence after its separation from the body, etc. For, an infant to whom the things of the world are yet unknown feels joy, fear and grief. This is rendered possible by memory, and not otherwise, and memory depends upon past experience, and this depends upon past life and nothing else. The somatic resonance of the infant in the presence of the causes of joy, fear and grief cannot be explained on the analogy of the opening and closing of a lotus ; for in the

case of a full grown man it is found that his changes of countenance due to joy, fear and grief are not automatic like the opening and closing of a lotus. There is therefore no reason why these should be so in the case of an infant. Moreover, the changes in a lotus are known to be due to a definite cause, namely the action of heat, cold, rain and season, and are not quite automatic. Similarly the changes of joy, etc. must be due to a definite cause, and that cause cannot be anything but the continuity of memory. Again, the new-born baby's instinctive desire for the mother's milk shows the habit of taking food and this habit necessarily implies a previous body in which the soul has experienced hunger and its satisfaction with food. This instinctive desire for food bears no analogy to the attraction of the iron towards a magnet. For the approach of the iron towards a magnet has also a definite cause; otherwise pebbles, etc., would also be drawn towards a magnet. But the cause is not apparent to the eye and has to be inferred both as regards its nature and its limitation. The inference must be made from the action itself. Thus iron approaches only a magnet, and only at a certain distance. Similarly only an infant moves for food only and when in the mother's arms. Is the cause of such movement past habit or something else? It is seen that memory of past experience causes adults to approach food for the satisfaction of hunger. The same must be the cause also in the case of the infant.

Then a man is born possessing Attraction, and the source of Attraction is the after-thought of the contents of previous experience which can be possible only in a previous body. The soul, remembering the objects experienced in a previous body, becomes attracted to those objects. Attraction thus links together two successive births and it is not possible to point to a beginning of its connection with the body.

But how do you know that the recollection of past experience gives rise to Attraction in a new-born baby, and that it is not produced in the same way as are the properties of a substance (e.g., jar) along with the substance itself from the same cause? The soul and its attraction are not produced simultaneously like a pot and its properties, because Attraction, etc. are due to *saṃkalpa*, imagination, thought. It is seen that Attraction is produced by the thought of living beings enjoying objects; the thought springs from the memory of past experiences. Hence it is inferred that the Attraction which the baby feels is also caused by the memory of past experiences. Attraction could be produced like the property of a pot were the soul a product and were the cause of Attraction something other than the memory of past experiences. But neither of these is the case. Should it be supposed that *adṛiṣṭa*, i.e., merit and demerit, is the cause of Attraction,

even then connection with a previous body cannot be denied ; for the production of adṛiṣṭa must have taken place in the previous life and not in this.

The truth is that Attraction for an object arises from the entire occupation of the mind with that object, and this is nothing but habitual experience of the object which determines modes of thinking in future. Attraction differs according to the sphere of birth which is determined by karma or adṛiṣṭa, and the new-born entity derives its name from the sphere of its birth.

Topic 30 : The Body is of the Earth, earthy : Sûtras : 27-31.

It has been demonstrated that the soul's connection with the body is without beginning and that the body in which it experiences pleasure and pain is due to its own karma. It is to be investigated whether the body possesses a single character like the sense of smell, etc., or a diverse character. Doubt arises in this respect owing to the differences of opinion on the subject. The truth is that the human body is constituted by the element of Earth alone, because the distinctive attribute of Earth, namely smell, is observed in it. At the same time it is not denied that the other elements conjoin with Earth as conditions in the production of the human body. Similarly all the elements conjoin to produce aqueous, igneous, aerial and etherial bodies in different worlds to serve the particular purposes of the souls. There is also scriptural authority for the view that the human body is constituted by Earth alone, e.g., "Let thy eye go to the sun...let thy body go to the Earth" (Ṛigveda, X. xvi. 3) ; "I make the sun thy eye ...I make the Earth thy body" (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XVII. viii. 4-6.) In the one the product resolves into its quiescent original ; in the other the product is derived from the original.

Topic 31 : The Senses are constituted by the Elements : Sûtras : 32-51.

To take the case of the eye (Sight) : Colour is perceived when the pupil of the eye is unimpaired, and is not perceived when it is impaired. The pupil is a material body. On the other hand, the pupil itself does not come into contact with the object when its colour is perceived. At the same time there must be some contact as otherwise perception of colour cannot be possible. The eye therefore must be immaterial in the sense of not being constituted by the manifested or visible elements, and must be all-pervading. In this state of uncertainty one argues that the senses must be immaterial and all-pervading because they apprehend objects of widely divergent dimensions from the acorn to the Himalaya mountain. To this the reply is that the preception

of objects of different dimensions by the eye is due to different contacts of ocular rays with the objects. Such contact is essential in ocular perception as is proved by the fact there is no perception where there is an obstruction. It is no argument against the existence of ocular rays that they are not perceived. For perception is not the sole test of existence. Inference by the mark of obstruction preventing contact proves their existence, as it does in the case of the other side of the moon and the lower portion of the earth. The rule of perception varies in its application according to the nature of substances and attributes. E. g., water vapour hanging in the air is not perceived but its cool touch is felt ; heat rays are not perceived, but their warmth is experienced. Similarly Fire exists in various conditions. In the solar rays both colour and touch are developed and so they are perceived. In the rays of light from a lamp colour is developed and touch is undeveloped ; these too are perceptible. Fire in hot water possesses developed touch and undeveloped colour ; hence it is imperceptible. In the ocular fire both colour and touch are undeveloped ; hence it is imperceptible. The development or accession of intensity of colour is one of the conditions of the perception of colour.

This peculiarity of the ocular rays arises from the nature of the senses. Like the multi-form aggregations of all substances the organisation of the senses is brought about by merit and demerit to subserve the purpose of the soul which consists in the cognition of objects and the experience of pleasure and pain.

Some thinkers argue as follows : The resilience of the sense of sight on meeting an obstruction is an attribute of a material substance. For this is the case with all material substances in all circumstances. On the other hand, the penetration of glass, mica, etc., by the ocular rays shows that they are non-material. So the point remains doubtful. We say that this is not so, for the reason given is erratic. For such penetration is also seen in the case of the light of a lamp which illumines objects beyond glass, etc., and of heat which cooks grains in a vessel.

Non-perception again may be due to overpowering, as in the case of a meteor which is not seen when the sun shines. In the case of ocular rays there is such a special cause of their non-perception, namely, as already stated, want of development or intensity. That the ocular rays lack in intensity also appears from the fact that the eye cannot apprehend objects without the aid of external light. The ocular rays are not overpowered, for overpowering can take place only when the thing overpowered has been developed. The ocular rays are not perceived even at night in all cases.

That such rays exist appears from the observation of these rays in the eyes of prowlers by night, e. g., cat, tiger, etc. There is no generic difference between the eyes of these animals and of men, because the sight in both cases is impeded by obstructions.

The perception of objects behind a plate of glass or mica or a thin stratum of cloud offers no argument against the proposition that the contact of the senses with the objects is the cause of cognition. For in these cases there is really no obstruction, but actual contact is established through the glass, etc. The sun's rays also cause burning through a crystal. In all such cases the interspaces among the components of the intervening substances provide a passage whereby direct contact is established between the rays and the objects on which they operate.

But why cannot a wall, e. g., offer such a passage? Because a wall is not constituted in the same way as glass is. How do you know this? This is known from the nature of the things as revealed by their effects. The ocular rays reflected from the smooth surface of the mirror makes one's own face perceptible. This clarity of the mirror is its nature. Similarly a wall does not reflect light rays. This is its nature. Thus experience shows that glass, etc., offers no obstruction, while a wall, etc., do, to the passage of light rays. And no arbitrary limitations can be imposed upon facts established by perception and inference. For these *pramāṇas* reveal reality as it is. Objects as they really are, in their own nature, in their own character, are established by the *pramāṇas*. These must be accepted as such and must not be modified at random. Obstruction is inferred in the case of a wall by the fact of the non-perception of objects behind it. Non-obstruction is inferred in the case of glass, etc. by the fact of perception of objects behind them.

Topic 32 : The Senses are manifold : Sūtras : 52-61.

Some say that, though the senses are located in different parts of the body, they are in reality only one, as the skin is present in every such location. It is true that even inspite of the presence of the skin a blind man does not see. But the skin is differentiated in its power in different parts of the body and that is the reason why the blind do not see, because blindness means loss of the particular power in the particular part of the skin. This argument of the opponent is self-destructive. For it amounts to an admission of the difference of the senses. Moreover, not only the skin but the elements of Earth, etc., constitute the site of the senses, Touch cannot be the one and universal sense, as in that

case colour, touch, taste, etc. would all be perceived simultaneously, which is not the case. In the perception of colour Touch cannot establish contact between itself and an object screened from view, and perception without contact of sense and object is impossible. The objects of sense again are more than one, and the senses have to perform more than one function. The sense of touch cannot serve the purpose of the sense of sight and *vice versa*. So also in the case of the other senses. Sensible objects being five, the senses also must be five in number. Moreover, they produce five different kinds of cognition, are located in five different sites, have five different operations, possess five different shapes and have five different origins. Sight operates by going out of the eyes and reaching its objects. Sound reaches Hearing in waves. The other senses operate when the objects come into contact with them by the movement of the body. Smell, Taste and Touch are limited in shape to their sites. Sight residing in the pupils of the eyes goes out to pervade objects. Hearing is nothing else than Ether and is all-pervading. It is inferred by the perception of sound. It does not reveal all sounds because it is limited by its site according to the merit and demerit of the soul. The origins of the senses are the five elements respectively, as they severally make manifest and apprehend the specific attributes of the five elements. They are not modifications of the unmanifest matter (avyakta.)

Topic 33 : The Objects of the Senses : Sūtras : 62-73.

Smell, Taste, Colour and Touch are the attributes of Earth ; Taste, Colour and Touch, of Water ; Colour and Touch, of Fire ; Touch, of Air ; and Sound, of Ether. The opposite view is that the elements possess only one attribute each and that other attributes are perceived in them owing to their interpenetration by other elements. The interpenetration, it is also said, is not mutual among all the elements but of the preceding by the succeeding in the order of their mention as Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ether. This view is not correct. For, as a matter of fact, bodies formed of Earth and Water are perceptible to the eye ; they must therefore possess colour. Moreover, interpenetration must affect both the element interpenetrated and that interpenetrating. But colour is not perceived in Air though it is said to interpenetrate Fire. The theory of interpenetration therefore has to be rejected.

What is the explanation then of the fact that the senses constituted by the elements do not apprehend all the attributes of their respective elements? The explanation is that the senses become dominant in respect of that attribute which is prominent in their respective elements. This limitation of the scope of the senses is due to the *saṃskāra*, i.e., tendency or

potency which is the resultant of karma (appetency) of the soul which they serve, just as the things of the world, e.g., poison, herbs, gems, etc., serve specific purposes of man according to his karma, and every single thing does not serve all his purposes.

The senses are also limited in their scope in this that they are themselves insensible in respect of their own attributes. Sight, for instance, cannot see its own colour. Smell cannot smell its own smell. This is because in perception the instrument must be endowed with the same attribute as the object, and when its own attribute is to be the object of its apprehension, the condition of perception is not present. In other words, an attribute cannot apprehend itself :—a sense does not apprehend its own attribute because of the absence of the auxiliary attribute. The perception of sound by Hearing is an exception which tests the rule. Hearing is composed of Ether. In the perception of sound it is independent of the possession of the attribute of sound as an auxiliary. That Hearing is composed of Ether is known as follows : The soul is the hearer. Mind cannot be the instrument of hearing ; as in that case there would be no deafness as mind is not liable to destruction. Earth, Water, Fire and Air are not known to have the capacity to produce Hearing. Ether therefore is the constituent of Hearing.

Book III : Chapter ii.

Topic 34 : Cognition is not eternal : Sûtras 1-9.

It is a matter of common experience that cognitions appear and disappear. Their non-eternality is quite manifest, and is taken for granted in N.-S., I. i. 16. The topic is concerned with the refutation of the speculation of the Sâṃkhyas that Buddhi is eternal. In support of the view they argue that unless Buddhi, cognition, were eternal, re-cognition would not be possible. To this the reply is that the reason given is not valid, because it has yet to be proved that re-cognition is done by Buddhi, and not by the soul, as we hold. We maintain that cognition, perception, apprehension, awareness, intuition, understanding is an attribute of the soul. If you hold that consciousness belong to the instrument you have to explain the nature of the conscious soul. If you admit that cognition is by the Buddhi, the inner instrument, you should explain what nature, what attribute, what reality is left to the conscious soul, what use it makes of cognition residing in Buddhi. If you say that the soul makes conscious and Buddhi knows, then where is the difference ? To make conscious, to know, to perceive and to apprehend convey the same meaning. If, on the other hand, you admit

t that Buddhi makes known and the soul knows, we agree. Buddhi is then the instrument of cognition, the mind. The mind is eternal, but recognition of objects is not the reason for its eternality. For then the eyes too would be eternal, for one recognises with the left eye what is seen with the right eye. Recognition belongs to the knower and not to the instrument of knowledge.

The Sāṃkhyas also hold that Buddhi is eternal and that modifications in the form of cognitions emanate from it according to objects and that the modifications are in essence not different from the original. This view again is not correct. For in that case all objects would be perceived at the same time, which is not the case. Again, if Buddhi and its modifications were identical then the disappearance of the modification would entail the disappearance of Buddhi also. This shows that Buddhi and its modifications are not identical in essence. Further, they are different and modifications arise in the mind one after another which account for the fact that the objects of all the senses are not apprehended all at once. Also when the mind is attached to one object there can be no cognition of another object. This shows that the mind is not all-pervading and moves from one object to another. Our view is that the inner instrument, the mind, is eternal but not all-pervading ; that the mind is one while its cognitive modifications are manifold ; and that this could not be possible were the modifications identical with the mind in essence. The soul therefore knows and not the mind. The mind's attachment to one object really means its contact with one sense. The attachment or occupation is really of the soul. There is no force in the argument that the modification like the mind with which it is identical is really one but looks as many in the same way as does a crystal look diverse in the proximity of different colours in succession, so that simultaneous cognitions of all objects need not necessarily be entailed. For the diversity in the case of the crystal is only apparent while the diversity of cognitions is real, as it is a fact of experience that cognitions appear and disappear one after another.

Topic 35 : The transiency of the things of the world : Sûtras : 10-17.

The Sāṃkhya who maintains that the crystal remaining constant undergoes modifications is opposed by the Nihilist who urges that nothing in the world is permanent, that everything is in a flux, and that the crystal is a new crystal at every successive moment, as is found in the case of the human body which decays, throws off refuse and grows again by assimilating food. We have to point out that the proposition is too wide

and is supported neither by perception nor by inference, and that we can give our assent to it in accordance with our observation of nature. Growth and decay in recurrence are seen in the human body. These are not seen in stones and crystals. We also demur to the speculation of the thorough-going Nihilist that a new entity is produced at every moment out of the ashes of the old, for the reason that the causes of such wholesale production and destruction are not apprehended. The destruction of milk and the production of curd furnishes no analogy. For the destruction of milk is seen and the cause of its destruction is inferred. The production of curd is seen and its cause is inferred. In the case of the crystal no such production or destruction is seen, and there is no occasion for the inference of any cause.

Some (Sāṃkhyas) say in reply to the Nihilist that milk is not destroyed but only transforms into a different character, or merely develops different properties. To them we say that the constituents of milk disintegrate and reintegrate as curd, whereby the destruction of milk is inferred. What we deny is that there is a total destruction of milk and that curd is entirely a new product and that there is no cause for such destruction and production. Seeing that in some cases the cause of destruction is apprehended and that in some it is not apprehended it cannot be admitted that all is a flux.

Topic 36 : Cognition is an attribute of the Soul : Sûtras : 18-41.

Cognition is either present when it is called intuition, or past when it is called recollection. The intuition of the red colour of a rose, for instance, survives in memory even after the destruction of the eye and the rose. It therefore belongs not to the object nor to the sense but to the knower. The knower, again, is not the mind, but the soul. For the mind is only an instrument under the control of the soul. It is the inner instrument which brings about the cognition of pleasure and pain and recollection. If cognition be its attribute then it would cease to be an instrument. Its existence as an instrument is inferred by the non-simultaneity of cognitions. If you distinguish between the mind and the inner instrument, then what we call the soul you call the mind, and what we call the mind you call the inner instrument. Your difference with us is about names only. Or the Sûtra (III. ii. 19) may mean that whereas simultaneous cognitions of diverse objects by the mind is impossible, the Yogins by their power of Yoga bring about simultaneous cognitions in several bodies with all the senses created by them for the purpose to exhaust their karma, and that this shows that cognitions do not belong to the mind but to the soul. It

may be objected that cognitions cannot belong to the soul because as the soul is all-pervading and eternal, (i) simultaneous cognitions of all objects and (ii) the eternality of cognitions will be thereby entailed. Our reply to the first is that the cause of the production of cognition is not merely the contact of the senses with the objects but also the contact of the senses with the mind, and that as mind is atomic simultaneous cognitions of all objects is impossible. To the last we reply that every embodied soul knows within itself that cognition is non-eternal; and that like one sound by another a preceding cognition is destroyed by a succeeding one.

But then impressions produced by cognitions are the causes of recollection, and these, according to you, says an objector, abide in the soul; the contact of the soul and the mind which is equally a cause of recollection, also exists; how is it that all the memories of the soul from the beginning of time are not revived at one and the same moment? Some meet the objection with the reply that the mind serially comes into contact with the different parts of the soul on which cognitions have left their impress and that for this reason all memories are not revived simultaneously. The reply is not correct. For the mind can never come into contact with the soul as transcending the body, (the soul being a universal and eternal substance, it pervades the body and also transcends it), because the function of the mind is confined within the body. The life of an embodied soul consists in its conjunction with the mind together with a vehicle of the experience (body) necessitated by past karma which is in fruition. That the mind without a body is incapable of subserving the purpose of soul appears from the fact that the contact of the mind and the soul generates the double effort of support and direction, and that if the mind operated outside the body the body would drop down by gravity for want of support.

The swift movement of the mind will not solve the difficulty, for there are memories which take a considerable length of time to revive them through a series of intermediate stages which for long keep the mind engaged. Moreover, conjunction of the soul and mind independently of the body is not the cause of recollection. The body is the field of the soul's experience. If without it the mere conjunction of the mind with the soul could produce cognition, pleasure, etc., then the body would be perfectly useless.

Some of us point out that the contact of the mind and the soul outside the body cannot be established either by the direction of the soul, or by chance, or by the mind's being the knower. For the direction of the soul

implies that the soul already knows the object of memory to which it directs the mind ; and if the memory is already revived there is no need for any contact of the mind. All memories are not revived by chance, i. e. all of a sudden ; some take mental effort for a long time to revive them. Nor is the mind the knower. But this, we say, is only a partial view of the matter. For cognitions do take place and there must be particular conjunction of the soul and the mind, as when a thorn suddenly pricks the foot of a man and pain is felt by him when his mind was engaged elsewhere, e. g. a beautiful scenery. As this particular conjunction is due to *adṛiṣṭa*, conjunction may be similarly produced by *adṛiṣṭa* serially in the case of non-simultaneous revival of all memories. The true reply, however, to the explanation offered, namely that the mind serially comes into contact with parts of the soul, is as given, that is, that the mind must operate within the body and not outside it.

The contact of the soul and the mind and the impressions are not the sole causes of recollections. These depend also on attention and cognition of signs (vide *Sūtra* III. ii. 41). Recollections do not occur simultaneously because their causes do not occur simultaneously. Even in cases of flashes of memory recollection is not independent of attention, etc. What happens in such cases is that the mind is occupied with several objects and one of them engages attention and revives a memory without our being aware of the cause of such revival. The mind is associated with the soul in the body for a specific purpose determined by *adṛiṣṭa*. Its dimension is atomic. It can come into contact with one impression at a time. Hence there can be no simultaneity of recollections.

Some hold the view that while cognition is an attribute of the soul, desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the attributes of the inner instrument, i. e. the mind. This view is not correct. For we find that these refer to one and the same agent and substratum as cognition. It is the knower which resolves to put forth effort for the acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Therefore, these must also be the attributes of the soul.

The Materialist twists the above argument to his advantage. Says he : You argue that acquisition and avoidance proceed from desire and aversion and that desire and aversion are attributes of consciousness. But atoms are acted upon by attraction and repulsion. They must then possess desire and aversion and therefore be conscious. To this we reply that uniformity in the one and want of uniformity in the other distinguish

the two cases. Gravity, e. g., is a property of all material substances ; it adheres to them in all circumstances. But while activity is found in atoms it is absent from such things as a pot. The activity which is found in material bodies such as an axe, or in the atoms, is caused by the will of the knower or by his karma under the will of the All-Knower. A second objection to the materialistic view is that as each atom would be endowed with consciousness, there would be a plurality of knowers in a single product, which is not warranted by any reason. Moreover, the reasons previously given for the existence of the soul and its eternality completely refute the theory that consciousness belongs to material substances.

To sum up : Consciousness does not belong to the mind or for the matter of that to the senses or the elements ; for the reasons already adduced commencing with Sûtra I. i. 10, "Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure and pain are the marks of the Soul", and also on account of their existing for the sake of another, and also in virtue of the moral law. They exist for the sake of another whose volition incites them to activity. Then, on the supposition that consciousness belongs to the elements, senses and the mind, all of which disintegrate at death, the consequences of their activity would befall the soul at or as rebirth, which is contrary to the moral law. Hence by proof by exhaustion consciousness must be the attribute of the soul. Moreover, the reasons already given in support of this have been vindicated by the refutation of the arguments against them. Or the word "Upapatti" in the Sûtra (III. ii. 41) means rebirth, and furnishes an additional reason in support of the view that consciousness belongs to the soul. A series of cognitions without a soul cannot account for rebirth. It can offer no explanation of saṃsāra and release. If the world were a congeries of series of conscious states there could be no harmony, no co-ordination, no organisation in society and the conduct of the affairs of the world would be impossible. Within the man also there would be the same chaos and confusion, and recollection would be an impossibility, because one state could not remember what was experienced by an antecedent state. Therefore the soul which knows also recollects. Its nature is to know. Every one is aware of the unity of the cognitions "I shall know", "I know," "I knew."

Topic 37 : Cognition is momentary : Sûtras : 42-45.

Cognition lasts but an instant, as it is action. Its continuity is only apparent as in the case of the motion of an arrow shot from a bow which is really a series of instantaneous motions. So long as the pot, e. g., is present before the eyes there is cognition ; as soon as it is removed the

cognition ceases. The duration of cognition is made up of cognitions arising every moment. On the other hand, the persistence of cognition will mean perpetual perception, and recollection will be rendered unnecessary ; for the cause of recollection is not cognition but the impression left by cognition. It is a misconception to hold that cognition which disappears as soon as it is produced can give us only the apprehension of the genus and not of the individual, as in the case of a flash of lightning. In the flash of lightning you can see that a thing is a man but cannot determine his individual characteristics. Similar would be the case were cognition instantaneous. The objection is groundless. For the character of the cognition depends upon the causes which give rise to it. Where the cause of the cognition is fleeting the apprehension is indeterminate, general ; where it is not fleeting the apprehension is determinate, detailed. For cognition is the apprehension of an object, whether indeterminate or determinate. The various characteristics of an object, generic and specific, provide cognition with its manifold contents. In respect of each such content the cognition is self-complete and determinate. It is merely a convention to speak of the cognition of the generic aspects of an object as indeterminate and of the cognition of its specific aspects as determinate. The instantaneity of cognition in no way affects perception even when the object is also momentary. E. g. in a lamp the flame consists of a series of radiant energies emitted by the lamp. Each such radiation is an object of cognition, and the series of such cognitions gives us the perception of the flame of the lamp.

Topic 38 : Consciousness is not in the Body : Sûtras : 46-55.

The colour and other attributes of the body co-exist with the body. But a dead body does not possess consciousness. It cannot be compared to momentum, for momentum depends upon definite causes and no such causes of consciousness are found present or absent in the body. The cause of consciousness in the body can be neither in the body as in that case death would make no difference, nor in another substance as in that case there would be no reason why it should not produce consciousness in stones and stocks, nor in both as in that case there would be no reason why consciousness should be produced in the body and not in other things of the same class with it. The disappearance of consciousness from the body at death cannot also be compared to the destruction of the dark colour of earth by baking, for baking does not merely destroy black colour but also produces red colour, while no such new production in the body is found at death, but the total cessation of consciousness. Moreover, baking

produces red colour in earth because the materials for such colour exist in the earth. But in the body are not found agencies destructive of consciousness. Further, consciousness pervades every particle of the body and on the theory in question there would be innumerable conscious entities in a single body : so that pleasure, pain and cognition would be entirely localised in the part affected and would not affect any other part, which is contrary to experience. Our statement that consciousness pervades every part of the body of course excludes the hair, nails, etc. For they do not constitute the body which extends upto the skin only. The body is defined as the seat of the senses, the field of the activity of the soul and the mind, and of the experience of pleasure, pain, cognition. Moreover, the attributes of the body are either imperceptible as, e.g., gravity, or perceptible as, e.g., colour ; but consciousness is neither imperceptible because one is aware of it nor sensible because it is apprehended by the mind. It follows that consciousness is not an attribute of the body. And this conclusion further confirms the previous conclusion that cognition does not belong to the mind, the senses and the body but to the soul.

Topic 39 : Of the Mind : Sûtras : 56-59.

In the organism of the mind, senses, cognitions and the body there is only one mind. The unity of the mind is inferred from the non-simultaneity of cognitions of several objects through the different senses. When we observe the different movements of an individual we seem to have several cognitions at one and the same time. But this is due to the swiftness of the cognitions and of the movements of the mind. Every one is aware within oneself that cognitions arise in sequence according to the serial operation of the senses in respect of their objects. Recollections also appear in sequence. This shows that succession and not simultaneity is the truth. That swiftness of cognitions and of the movements of the mind obliterates, as it were, their succession is best illustrated when we at a glance grasp the meaning of a sentence which involves the hearing of each letter as uttered, their formation into words, the recollection of the meanings of the words, their syntactical connection, etc. And the same reason, namely non-simultaneity of cognitions, also establishes that the mind is atomic.

Topic 40 : Adṛiṣṭa is the cause of the Body : Sûtras : 60-72.

• Karma, i.e. the activity or the start made by speech, cognition and the body, produces as its fruit merit and demerit which abide in the soul. Moved by these and not independently the elements produce the body. Dwelling in the body the soul regards the body as itself. Being attached

to the body and out of the craving for enjoyment in it the soul cognises objects and creates saṃskāras or appetencies in the form of merit and demerit which lead to rebirth where again the same sequence of cause and effect is repeated, and so on. This succession of events can be possible only on the explanation that the elements are moved for the production of the body under the influence of karma to subserve the ends of the soul. It is seen that a man, to serve his purposes, makes conveyances and the like from suitable materials. The Atheist says that in making a statue sand, stone, colouring and other materials are used as they exist in nature without reference to any karma and that so the case may be with the production of the body from the elements. We reply that it is yet to be established that sand, stone, etc. exist in nature by themselves without reference to any karma and not to serve the ends of the soul. Moreover, a statue is not produced from seeds whereas the body is. This involves three karmas, viz. of the soul experiencing life in the womb and of the parents enjoying the fruit in the shape of a son. Further, food taken by the mother nourishes and develops the embryo till birth through various processes of assimilation. It is thus clear that the action of the materials in forming and developing the body is dependent upon karma. The operation of karma is also manifest from the fact that every approach of the parents does not become fruitful.

Not only is karma the cause of the production of the body ; it is also the cause of the conjunction of a particular body with a particular soul. The body is a highly intricate mechanism and cannot as such be brought about by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. Similarly the bodies of no two men are exactly the same. This perplexing diversity of outfit in the form of the body can be explained only by karma, namely that every man has his own destiny to fulfil and that he gets the body which he merits.

The causality of karma in the production of the body also accounts for the soul's disjunction from the body on the exhaustion of karma, through the removal of delusion by true knowledge. Thus the seed of future birth is not produced and karma in fruition is exhausted by experience. Were the elements, on the other hand, which are indestructible, independent causes of the production of the body, there would be no release.

The Sāṃkhya hold that the soul's non-experience of Prakṛiti or Matter is the cause of the production of the body in and through which the soul is to experience Prakṛiti, and that when the experience is accomplished the soul regains final separation from the body. On this theory a released soul also may again be connected with the body. For if

experience is necessary for the soul when it had no body experience may be necessary also after its separation from the body. It cannot be argued that separation from the body takes place after the purpose of the soul's experience of Prakṛiti has been accomplished and that therefore there is no reason for its being again connected with the body. For the experience of a single soul fulfils the purpose of the experience of Pakṛiti, and Pakṛiti which has performed before one soul has its object accomplished; yet we find that the production of bodies is uninterrupted. The production of the body is therefore not from non-karma and for the purpose of the soul's experience of Prakṛiti. It is due to karma and for the experience of the fruit of karma.

Others maintain that the soul's experience is not of Pakṛiti but of the fruits of karma and that this is brought about by adṛiṣṭa inhering in atoms. This attribute of the atoms is a cause of activity. Impelled by it the atoms come together and form the body. The mind then enters the body. In the body so formed and possessed by the mind the soul cognises objects. But in this view also bodies can be produced even for a released soul because the attribute of adṛiṣṭa appertaining to the atoms is indestructible.

Others again opine that the mind by its own adṛiṣṭa enters the body. In that case also there can be no separation of the mind from the body. For to what will this separation be due? On our theory karma in fruition in the present body is exhausted by experience and separation from the body takes place. The adṛiṣṭa of the mind, on the other hand, cannot be the cause of both birth and death.

Further, if the elements as such could produce the body then the body once produced would, in the absence of any cause of destruction, continue for ever. If death were due to chance then there would not be so much diversity in the manner of death as is seen.

Some think that as the dark colour of the atom is destroyed for ever by the application of heat and red colour is produced in its place, so on the theory of the production of the body by adṛiṣṭa the body will not be produced again in the state of release. This view is altogether unsupported by any reason. No familiar instance is cited. Neither perception nor inference is advanced.

Or "Akṛita—abhyāgama—prasaṅga," in the Sūtra (III-ii-72) means that the doctrine that the production of the body is not due to karma will entail that the experience of pleasure and pain is without any cause. This is contrary to perception, inference and scriptural texts. This would mean

that acts are neither good nor bad and that the acts of men are not responsible for their experience of pleasure and pain. This is the false view of perverted minds.

BOOK IV : CHAPTER i.

Topic 41 : Activity and Faults : Sûtras 1—2.

Activity (I. i. 17) and Faults (I. i. 18) have already been explained. They have been examined in the examination of the body, etc. from which spring merits and demerits. The Faults, like cognition, are attributes of the soul. They are the causes of saṃsāra or transmigration, because they are the causes of activity and re-birth. As saṃsāra is without beginning, they also proceed without beginning. They cease to be when false knowledge is destroyed by knowledge of the truth.

Topic 42 : Faults fall into three groups : Sûtras : 3—9.

There are three collections of Faults : (1) Attraction consisting of lust, greed, craving, longing and covetousness ; (2) Aversion consisting of anger, envy, jealousy, hatred and implacability ; (3) Delusion consisting of false knowledge, doubt, pride and carelessness. Attachment is the mark of Attraction ; want of forbearance, of Aversion ; and misapprehension, of Delusion. Every man is aware of their existence within himself. The fact that they are all liable to be destroyed by knowledge of the truth does not show that they do not fall into distinct classes. For the colours of the earth such as blue, etc. are distinct colours, though they can be all destroyed by the application of heat. The colours again are quite distinct though they have a common source, *viz.* fire. Similarly, the Faults are quite distinct from one another, though false knowledge is their common origin.

Among the Faults Delusion is the worst. For a man who is free from it is not influenced by the other two. Misapprehension runs through Attraction and Aversion also. Delusion therefore is their cause. And it is thus that they disappear on the removal of Delusion by knowledge of the truth.

Topic 43 : Pretyabhâva (Transmigration) : Sûtras : 10—13.

Birth is not production ; death is not destruction. The eternity of the soul makes pretyabhâva possible. The eternal soul forsakes the former body and takes up another body. Both these processes constitute pretyabhâva. To say that the production and destruction of entities constitute pretyabhâva is to deny the moral law according to which one experiences the consequences of one's own acts. While the doctrine of total annihilation would render the teachings of the R̥ṣis meaningless.

How, from causes of what character, are bodies, etc. produced? A body is not produced from another body. A pot is not produced from another pot. All is not the cause of all. Like produces like. A pot is produced from potsherds of the like material. This is the testimony of perception which is the highest evidence. On the strength of this experience it can be inferred that the causes of the gross elements of earth, etc. are the most subtle supersensible eternal substances possessing colour and other attributes found in the gross elements. The existence of such substances is thus revealed. The inference is from the known to the unknown.

The gross elements which are produced from the most subtle eternal elements furnish the materials for the production of the body, senses and objects with which the soul becomes associated after leaving its previous body. This is the truth. The views of sectarians will be next considered.

Topic 44 : The Void is not the cause of the World : Sûtras : 14-18.

Some say that the sprout comes into existence by destroying the seed, i.e., that from the non-existence of the seed is the existence of the sprout. This is not correct. For if the sprout is the cause of the destruction of the seed then it must have existence before the seed is destroyed, and in that case it cannot be said to come into existence from the destruction of the seed. It is true that causal predication is made in respect of objects past and future; e.g., a lost article causes sorrow; a son yet to be born causes pleasure. But such predication rests on mere sequence. So also when the sprout which is yet to appear is said to be the cause of the destruction of the seed the predication of causality merely states a sequence, and not a true causal relation, namely that the sprout is produced from the destroyed seed, i.e., that existence springs from non-existence. The truth is that the parts of a structure disintegrate and reintegrate into another structure, and that bodies are produced from such reintegration and not from non-existence or void. The relation of antecedent and consequent between these two processes is not denied.

Topic 45 : Îs'vara (God) is not the material cause of the World : Sûtras 19-21.

Some say that the void may not be the material cause of the world but that Brahman is the material cause of the fabric of names and forms; because it is seen that the destiny of man does not depend upon the efforts of man alone but also on the dispensation of God also. This view is not correct. For Brahman cannot be conceived otherwise than as a soul. Îs'vara is a soul which is all-doing, all-knowing, all-embracing. Apimâ (power to become smaller than even an atom), etc. are

His eight excellences. He acts by mere will (and not by physical means) and disposes the merits and demerits appertaining to each soul and the elements of earth, etc. to activity. He is thus absolutely free in the work of creation. He is like a friend; He is the father of created beings. These attributes cannot be possible in Him without the possession of cognition. Therefore He cannot be anything but a soul. So also declares the Śruti: "The seer, the cogniser, the all-knower, the Lord." He cannot be comprehended by perception, inference and revelation. He can be indicated only by the analogy of our own souls.

Topic 46 : The World is not the Result of Chance : Sûtras : 22-24.

Some say that like the sharpness of thorns, streaks of colour in rock minerals and the smoothness of the stone, the production of the body, etc. is from material causes without the intervention of an efficient cause. This view does not differ from the view that the creation of the body, etc. is not the result of the action of man, which has been refuted in III. ii. 60-72.

Topic 47 : All is not non-eternal : Sûtras : 25-28.

Some say that all things are non-eternal as production and destruction are their nature. Some oppose this tenet by asserting that the alleged non-eternality must itself be eternal and thus will furnish an opposition to the non-eternality of all things (including non-eternality.) But non-eternality cannot be eternal; like fire destroying itself along with the fuel, it ceases to be along with the destruction of all things. The true reply to the tenet of the non-eternality of all things is that there can be no denial of what is really eternal. What is eternal and what is non-eternal is to be settled by the test of cognition. Things which are found by means of the pramāṇas to be liable to production and destruction must be regarded as non-eternal, while things which are not found to be so liable must be regarded as eternal. The eternals thus determined are the most subtle elements, ether, time, space, soul, mind, their attributes, genus, species, combination.

Topic 48 : All is not eternal : Sûtras : 29-33.

Some say that as all things are nothing but the five elements and as the five elements are eternal, all things must, therefore, be eternal. This tenet is negated by our actual cognition of the production and destruction of things. The mere resemblance of things to the elements in respect of their attributes is not a true mark of the inference of their eternity. For there are reasons also to account for their difference in regard to duration. The resemblance in respect of attributes only shows that the elements are the material causes of the things. On the other hand, there is actual cognition of production, and of the cause of production, of things. This

cognition proves their non-eternality. The activity of man who seeks to produce what is pleasant and to destroy what is painful, also presupposes that all things are not eternal. It is further well-known that composite substances undergo production and destruction. Again, sound, action, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are neither included among the elements nor possess their attributes. It cannot be said that the cognition of production is as unreal as cognition in a dream ; for the same can be said about the cognition of the elements. Moreover, there is this fundamental difference between eternal and non-eternal things that the former are beyond the reach of the senses and are not subject to production and destruction. (Thus is the Sāṃkhya view refuted. The view of those who believe in autogenesis is next considered.)

It is said that production and destruction are mere changes of attribute and not of substance which is constant, and so eternal ; in other words, that there are really not production and destruction but only development and envelopment. But this view of the persistence of entities at all times fails to provide any means of differentiation as to (1) development and envelopment, (2) the attribute developed and the one enveloped, (3) the moments of development and envelopment, (4) the particular attribute developed and enveloped and another, (5) the past and the future. Hence the view must be rejected.

Topic 49 : All is not discrete : Sūtras : 34-36.

Some say that an entity as a single unity does not exist, because the names by which entities are denoted connote a plurality ; e. g. a "Jar" is the name of a bundle of attributes such as colour, taste, touch and smell, and of parts such as bottom, sides, neck, etc. But this is not right ; for attributes are different from substance and parts are different from the whole, as already explained (see II. i. 33-36.) Moreover, names do not change ; for instance, we say, "The jar I saw I touch, the jar I touched I see". Then, mere collocations of atoms are imperceptible, because atoms are so. That which is perceived in a collocation of atoms is a single entity. Again, the admission of a collocation whether of atoms or of attributes or of parts is the admission of a unity.

Topic 50 : All is not void : Sūtras : 37-40.

Some say that all is non-existence, because existence and non-existence appear in every entity ; e. g. in a cow there is presence of cow-ness and there is absence of horse-ness and everything else. The argument involves a twofold contradiction. (1) "All" is definable, as it means more than one and without exception ; while "non-existence" is not definable, as it is the

negation of existence. (2) If all is non-existence then one thing, *e.g.* cow-ness, cannot be the negation of another thing *e.g.* horseness. Then, all entities have existence by their own nature ; a cow is existent as a cow. There is no cognition of a cow as non-existence. When it is said that a cow is non-existent in the form of a horse and it is not said that a cow is non-existent in the form of a cow, it is admitted that a cow as a cow is existent. The statement that a cow is not a horse is a denial of their identity and not of the cow as an entity.

The opponent rejoins that what is called the nature or character of an entity has merely a relative existence like length and shortness. To this the reply is that relativity depends upon an absolute standard. If both the terms long and short are relative then they destroy each other. These terms, again, do not apply to atoms or objects of equal size. If relativity were a fact as asserted, then surely some difference would have appeared in them. What relativity really implies is that when two objects are seen together it enables us to see the excess of the one over the other.

Topic 51 : Reality is not numerically fixed : Sûtras : 41-43.

Some say that (1) all is one, being equally existent, (2) all is dual, being eternal and non-eternal, (3) all is a triad, being the cogniser, the means of cognition, and the cognisable, (4) all is a quartet, being the knower, the means of knowing, the knowable, and knowledge ; and so forth. This is not correct, because of impossibility of proof. For if the matter to be proved and the reason for it are diverse then the number asserted is exceeded ; if not, then in the absence of any reason there can be no proof. It is no answer to say that a part of the matter to be proved will furnish the reason for the proof. For in unity there can be no part. So in the case of duality, etc. These views deny the diversity of objects formed in special characters, and are thus opposed to perception, inference and testimony, and therefore false. The truth is that objects are classified according to their resemblances and diversified according to their differences.

Totic 52 : Phala (Fruit) : Sûtras : 44-53.

It is seen that when a man cooks his food, he gets the fruit of his labour immediately, while when he sows seed he gets the harvest after a lapse of time. Therefore when it is said that heaven is the fruit of the performance of *agnihotra* sacrifice, the doubt arises as to whether the fruit will be obtained immediately or after a lapse of time. We know that heaven is not obtained immediately. On the other hand, we do not see

how it can be obtained afterward, for the activity in the shape of the performance of the sacrifice must have ceased to operate long ago. To this the reply is that activity produces Saṃskāra (potency) in the form of merit and demerit, which in co-operation with other conditions produces the fruit at another time, in the same way as water poured at the root of a tree causes through intermediate agencies the appearance of flowers and fruits. It is true that in the case of the tree, the action and the result both appear in the same body, *i.e.*, the tree, while in the case of the sacrifice, the action is performed in one body and the fruit is enjoyed in another body. But bodies are merely the fields, the performer-enjoyer is the soul. The soul performs the action, the merit resides in the soul, the fruit in the form of happiness accrues to the soul. Where the fruit of action is declared to be a son, a wife, cattle, wealth, etc., these are only the symbols and sources of happiness which is the real fruit.

Topic 53 : Duḥkha (Pain) : Sūtras : 54-57.

Pain has been enumerated after Fruit (in I. i. 9, and defined in I. i. 21. Pleasure has been neither enumerated nor defined.) The omission however does not imply a total denial of pleasure ; for such denial is impossible seeing that all beings bear testimony to the existence of pleasure. The teaching that pleasure is to be regarded as denoted by the word pain is given, for the purpose of the avoidance of pain, to one who, on account of the experience of the stream of births and deaths, has become indifferent and desires to avoid pain. For all beings, all the worlds, all re-births are, through the co-existence of pain, penetrated with bādhanā or impediment or hindrance or obstruction which is the characteristic of pain. In the text (IV. i. 54) "Birth" means that which is born, namely the body, senses and cognition. The impediment is of various grades. It is the greatest in the case of those who are in hell ; middling, of the lower animals ; least, of men ; less, of the celestial beings and of dispassionate men. Thus seeing that impediment in some degree or other exists in all the worlds the teachers apply the definition of pain to pleasure as well as to its means, namely the body, senses, cognition. Hereby attraction towards the worlds ceases, thirst for them is cut off, release is obtained from all pain. It is like the avoidance of the pain of death by one who throws away milk mixed with poison.

Pleasure no doubt appears in the intervals of pain. But the longing for and pursuit of pleasure and the attendant evils such as non-fulfilment of desire, its partial fulfilment, fulfilment with risks, etc., produce various mental suffering, and consequently even at the moment of pleasure the

impediment to the freedom of the soul continues. It is for this reason that "birth" is declared as pain, and not on account of the non-existence of pleasure. Again, there is no pleasure in the attainment and enjoyment of which pain in some form or other is not experienced. Moreover, "birth", infirmity, disease, contact with disagreeable things, separation from agreeable things, non-fulfilment of desire are the necessary conditions and inevitable consequences of the pursuit of pleasure. But a man with whom pleasure is the supreme good regards these also as grades of pleasure and thus never gets free from transmigration. For the awakening of such a man also "birth" is declared as pain. The expression "Birth is pain" (in IV. i. 54) however does not mean that the body, senses and cognition are by their own nature pain, but that they like pleasure are so being interpenetrated with impediment.

Topic 54 : Apavarga (Release) : Sûtras 58-67.

Some say that the attainment of release is impossible on account of (1) the chain of debts, (2) the chain of perversions, and (3) the chain of activity. The repayment of debts is enjoined as follows : "A Brâhmaṇa, as he is born, is born encumbered with three debts : by celibacy and study he repays the debt to the Ṛṣis ; by performing sacrifices, to the deities ; and by begetting progeny, to the Pitṛis" (Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa. 1-7-2-1). As regards sacrifices it is further laid down . "These sacrifices agnihotra, dars'a and puruṣamâsa shall be performed until death or infirmity intervenes. Either by infirmity or by death is one freed from the obligation to perform." So no time is left for the pursuit of release. (Perversions are false knowledge, egotism, attraction, aversion and love of life. Yoga-Sûtra, II. 3). These cling to one from life to life. Again, from birth till death the activity of the speech, mind and body never leaves a man for a moment. Therefore the attainment of release as described in I. i. 2 is not established.

To the above the reply is as follows : (1) In the text of the Śatapatha Brâhmaṇa the word "debts" is used not in its primary but in a secondary sense. For primarily a debt and its repayment must be *inter vivos*. That condition is not present in the case under consideration. The secondary application of the word is for the sake of condemnation and commendation. Like a debtor who does not repay his debts a man who does not perform acts deserves condemnation ; and like a debtor who repays his debts a man who performs acts deserves commendation. Again, the expression "as he is born" is also used in a secondary sense. For surely an infant has neither the desire for the fruit of, nor the capacity to perform, all those acts, sacrifice, etc. Similarly the declaration about performance

of acts till infirmity or death should be rationally interpreted. For if it is taken literally it becomes superfluous, for infirmity and death necessarily put a stop to all performance. The declaration really means that performance should be continued till the desire is satisfied with the attainment of fruit. The word "Jarā" which the objector has explained as infirmity really means the fourth stage of life, the stage of renunciation. For it is then that a man having, after realising the futility of all worldly objects, renounced the desire for worlds, wealth and progeny, is freed from the obligation to perform acts. "Jarā" cannot mean infirmity or inability here, for in the case of men who are not themselves able to perform acts, a proxy is allowed such as a disciple whose service is required by the gift of learning.

Again, the text in question is a re-inculcation (and not an original injunction, as there is no word in it to express an injunction). It can be interpreted either as a re-inculcation or as one pleases. The former interpretation is the more rational. The sense therefore is that a householder has no option but to perform prescribed acts as a debtor has no option but to repay debts. The performances which accomplish the fruit, and not the fruit, are the subject of a man's effort. Injunctions lay down the means which is to be brought into operation and the fruit which is to be produced. "Jāyamāna", as he is born, therefore refers to him whom these concern, namely the householder. This is not to deny the other stages of life, namely the student, the renunciate and the recluse. For every Śāstra is confined to its own subject matter. These Brāhmaṇa texts are concerned with the duties of householders only.

Ṛiks (sacred verses) and Brāhmaṇas (sacred prose texts) declare release (for all stages of life). Thus there are the Ṛiks : (a) Ṛiṣis, begetting progeny and desiring wealth, entered death by reason of acts; other Ṛiṣis, discriminative, attained immortality beyond the reach of acts.

(b) Neither by act nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation some attained immortality; beyond heaven (i. e. outside the reign of Avidyā), hidden in the cave (i. e. beyond the reach of ordinary pramāṇas), that which shines, the yatis (recluses) enter.

(c) Know I this Person, great, of the splendour of the sun, beyond darkness; by knowing Him one crosses over death; there is no other path for the journey.

There are also the Brāhmaṇas : (a) There are three supports of Dharma, sacrifice, study and gift. The first is penance; the second is the celibate-student residing in the university or college of the preceptor; the third is such a student who spends his life in the college. All of them go to

the regions of the virtuous. He who is steady in Brahman attains immortality. (Chhândogya Upaniṣad, II. xxiii. 1).

(b) Desiring this world only the renunciates take to renunciation. (Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. iv. 22).

(c) Now they declare that man is in essence desire. As he desires so he resolves ; as he resolves so he acts ; as he acts so he becomes.

Thus declaring that transmigration is the result of acts, the texts teach what is good : Desiring, when he becomes non-desiring, desire-free, desire-less, self-desiring, desire-fulfilled, his prâṇas (vital forces) do not go out, they are withdrawn into the soul even here. Being truly Brahman, he attains Brahman. (Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, IV. iv. 5, 6).

Therefore it is unreasonable to say that the chain of debts prevents release. The text, Those four paths leading to deities, (Taittirîya Saṃhitâ, V. vii. 23), again, shows that there are four, and not one, stages of life.

The text about the performance of agnihotra, dars'a and pûrṇamâsa applies only to those who desire the fruit. For the Veda enjoins the closing of sacrifices and renunciation. Thus, "Having fulfilled the prâjâpatya sacrifice, having offered all his possessions in it, transplanting the fires in the soul, let a Brâhmaṇa walk away from the world". This shows that the removal of the sacrificial fires is enjoined for those who have risen above the desire for progeny, wealth and worlds and have ceased to desire the fruit of sacrifices. So declare the Brâhmaṇa texts ; e. g. Resolving to take to another order of life Yâjñavalkya addressed Maitreyî thus : I wish, O dear one, to go away from this place ; let me reconcile you to Kâtyâyanî. O Maitreyi, you have received initiation from me. That much, O dear one, is immortality. So saying Yâjñavalkya went away.

The performance of acts till infirmity and death could not be intended for all without distinction. For such acts end with the collection of the sacrificial vessels at death which can be possible in the case of householders only. Had that been the intention there would have been no declaration of rising above desires as in the text : It so happened in days of yore that Brâhmaṇas, versed in the sacred lore and learned, did not desire progeny ; (they thought) what should we do with progeny ? we for whom the soul is the whole world. They, rising above the desires for progeny, wealth and worlds, led the life of mendicants. (Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, III. v. 1). For such men acts ending with the collection of the sacrificial vessels cannot be possible. Moreover, the fruit does not incite all men to activity to the same extent

The order of the householder is not the only order of life. Itihâsas, Purâṇas and Dharmas'âstras declare four orders of life. These as well as

the sacred verses and Brāhmaṇa texts are authoritative in regard to their respective subject matters, like the senses. Sacrifice is the subject matter of the sacred verses and Brāhmaṇa texts; the character of men, of Itihāsas and Purāṇas; and social conduct, of the Dharmas'āstras. If Dharmas'āstras had no authority, chaos would ensue through non-regulation of the conduct of men. The authority of Itihāsas and Purāṇas has been declared by the Brāhmaṇa text: Atharvāṅgīrasa declared the Itihāsa and Purāṇa; they constitute the fifth of the Vedas (Chhândogya Upaniṣad, III. iv. 2).

(2) The chain of perversions also can offer no obstacle to the attainment of release. For as in the case of a man in deep sleep, when he dreams no dreams, the chain of attraction and the chain of pleasure and pain are snapped, so also in the state of release. And this the knowers of Brahman instance as the condition of the released soul.

(3) In the case of a man whose perversions have suffered decay, the activity does not tend to re-birth at the end of the previous birth. Such re-birth is caused by *adṛiṣṭa*, *i.e.* merit and demerit abiding in the soul. Absence of re-birth at the end of the previous birth is release. This does not entail the futility of acts. For what is declared is that re-birth does not take place at the end of the previous birth, and not that the experience of the consequences of acts is denied. In such a case all previous acts reach fruition in the last birth.

An objection is raised by some who say that the stream of perversions is natural and without beginning and therefore impossible of being cut short. It is no answer to this objection that just as antecedent non-existence (which is without beginning) of an entity is terminated by the entity when produced, so the natural stream of perversions is not eternal. Neither is the objection met by the argument that just as the natural dark colour of the atom from before time is terminated by the application of fire, even so is the stream of perversions. For eternality and non-eternality are attributes of positive entities only; their application to non-entities is only metaphorical. There is also no reason for the conclusion that the dark colour of the atom is without beginning. Nor is there any reason for the proposition that what is not in need of production is non-eternal.

The true answer to the objection is as follows: Subconscious will is the efficient cause of the perversions, attraction, etc. They are due to acts and to themselves mutually. Attraction, aversion and delusion arise from subconsciously produced wrong notions of things as attractive, repulsive and delusive. Acts produce the bodies of living beings and in them the perversions of attraction, aversion and delusion according to a fixed rule. For it is actually seen that attraction is dominant in some

bodies, and delusion in some others. Their production is also reciprocal. The deluded man is attracted; the deluded man is angered; the attracted man is deluded; the angered man is deluded. Now, the production of the false notions of things ceases through knowledge of the truth and owing to the non-production of their cause there follows the absolute non-production of attraction, etc. There is again no special force in the statement that the stream of perversions is without beginning. For all these entities, the body, etc., associated with the soul, come down in sequence without beginning. There is nothing which was not produced before and has been produced for the first time, except knowledge of the truth. Such being the case it is not premised by us that what is not liable to production is capable of destruction. As regards acts which produce the bodies of living beings in diverse classes of animal life, they do not become the efficient cause of the production of attraction, etc., after the destruction of false notions of things is brought about by the knowledge of the truth about them. They continue, however, to be productive of pleasure and pain, for in producing them they are independent of false notions.

Book IV : Chapter ii.

Topic 55 : Production of knowledge of Truth : Sûtras 1—3.

Now, false knowledge is not mere non-production of true knowledge. It is not a negative but a positive thing. It is delusion. The object the false knowledge of which is the seed of saṃsāra or succession of births and deaths, is to be known in its essence. False knowledge consists in the apprehension of the not-soul as the soul, in the delusion, the ahaṃkāra (I—manufacture) in the form “I am (this)”. Ahaṃkāra is the vision of one who sees the not-soul as “I am (this)”. The objects of ahaṃkāra are the body, senses, mind, feelings and cognitions. When a man feels convinced about this assemblage of objects, the body, etc., as “I am (this)”, as his very self, their destruction he regards as the destruction of himself, and being overcome with the desire for their non-destruction, adopts them again and again, and so adopting them, strives for birth and death; and as no separation from them takes place, he is never absolutely released from pain. He who sees all this as pain, the vehicle of pain, and pleasure tinged with pain, knows pain thoroughly, and pain so known decays for want of adoption or acceptance, like food mixed with poison. Similarly he sees the faults and action as causes of pain. So he abandons the faults. The faults having decayed, activity does not tend to re-birth (IV. i. 63). Thus the man discriminates (1) that re-birth, fruit and pain are the things to be known, (2) that action and faults are to be avoided, (3) that release is to be attained, and (4) that knowledge of truth is the means of its attainment.

Having thus divided the knowables as those which are wrongly identified with the soul, those to be known, those to be abandoned and those to be attained, when the man devotes himself to them, constantly turns them over in thought and influences them with thought, there appears to him perfect vision, awareness of the things as they are, knowledge of truth. The knowables from the body to pain (I. i. 9) are due to faults because they are the objects of false knowledge. True knowledge about them prevents ahaṁkāra or their identification with the soul. And so through knowledge of truth, on the successive removal of pain, birth, etc. (I. i. 2), release is obtained. This is a resume of the teachings of all Śāstras and is not a new teaching.

The objects of the senses are the objects of desire. They are colour, etc. When they are wrongly conceived they cause the operation of attraction, aversion and delusion. So meditation for the sake of true knowledge should be first concentrated on them. After wrong notions about them have ceased then thought should be focussed on the body, etc. which are more nearly connected with the soul so as to remove ahaṁkāra in respect of them. Thus the man who is dispassionate to objects external as well as internal, is called released.

The cause of the faults is the conceit which regards objects as wholes and pays no attention to their parts. For instance, when a man is attracted to a woman, and a woman is attracted to a man, they are attracted by the particular parts of the body such as the teeth, lips, eyes, nose, or by some special features in them. Such attention increases the passion for each other. The faults which it entails are to be abandoned. Attention should be directed to the impure aspects of the body such as the hair, flesh, blood, bones, sinews, etc. By this means the attraction of passion is destroyed. Thus everything presents a twofold aspect, good and bad. It should be regarded as bad. Food mixed with poison is considered as poison.

Topic 56 : Relation of the Whole and Parts : Sūtras 4-17.

There can be no doubt about the existence of the whole over and above the parts (see II. i. 33 *et seq.*) To this the following objections are urged : (1) Each single part cannot exist in the entire whole owing to the difference of their size and as that would entail the exclusion of the other parts. (2) It cannot occupy a portion of the whole because the whole as conceived has no such portions. (3) The whole cannot reside in each single part as their sizes are different and as that would entail that a substance is constituted by a single component. (4) It cannot reside in a portion of a part because parts have no portions. (5) It is not known to

exist away from the parts. (6) It cannot be an attribute of the parts for the reasons stated before.

To this the reply is : The doubt is not justified ; for the whole being a single entity, the distinction of entire and parts is inapplicable to it. When it is said that the whole resides in the parts what is meant is that the whole covers the parts, *i. e.* it makes possible for the parts to combine to form a single entity. So that parts may have independent existence, but there can be no whole unless there were parts. Therefore in the case of a person who seeks the supreme good what is prohibited is the conceit which regards objects as wholes, and not that the existence of wholes is denied. Just as false notions in respect of colour, etc. is prohibited, and not that colour, etc. are denied.

Again, single atoms are not perceptible. They cannot be therefore perceptible in mass. Yet bodies constituted by atoms are perceptible. What makes them perceptible is the existence of wholes over and above the parts. The something perceptible in the collocation of atoms is the whole. To say that there is no perception of the whole in the parts is suicidal ; for in the last analysis only the atoms are left and they are not object of perception ; so that the required object of perception, *i. e.* parts, is reduced to something imperceptible. On the other hand, the argument cannot be pushed to the extreme conclusion denying the total existence of all things. For atoms cannot be so negated. They are the least indivisible parts of bodies.

Topic 57 : The Partless : Sûtras 18-25.

Nothing exists, rejoins the pessimist ; the wholes are reduced to partless atoms, but partless eternal atoms are an impossibility, because the ether must pervade them both inside and outside in which case they cannot be partless, or, if the ether does not so pervade them, then the ether cannot be all-pervading as is claimed for it. To this the reply is that the terms inside and outside can be applied only to a body composed of parts and are inapplicable to the atoms themselves which are partless. As regards the ether it cannot but be all-pervading. For nothing ponderable or corporeal exists which is not in conjunction with the ether. A sound produced spreads over the ether. Conjunctions with minds, atoms, and their effects also spread over the ether. The characteristics of the ether are that it is nowhere parted and re-united like water by a passing boat, and that nowhere does it offer resistance to moving bodies. This shows that it is partless and intangible.

Then an atom cannot be a product ; for if it is a product its constituents must be more minute and in that case it will not be an atom. As partless it is eternal. A product is non-eternal, not because of the

pervasion of the ether but because of the disintegration of the parts. The pessimist rejoins that the atoms cannot be partless, for the reason that they possess a definite shape (spherical) and also enter into conjunctions among themselves. The objection to this rejoinder is that it will lead to infinite regression which is illogical, and will also eliminate gravity and diversity of dimensions and entail equality of dimension between the whole and the part as a consequence of infinity of parts in each part and part of a part.

Topic 58 : External objects are not transient : Sûtras 26-37.

(The Buddhist addresses the Naiyâyika thus :) You defend the existence of external objects on the ground of our cognitions of those objects. But they are false cognitions. For instance, the cognition of a piece of cloth is a figment of the imagination. Because when a cloth is dissected only the yarns are left, and no cloth is found. Similarly in all cases. (The Naiyâyika replies :) This argument involves a self-contradiction. If an analysis of things by reason is possible then the non-cognition of the real nature of the things is impossible. The product is not perceived separately from its causes because it subsists in them. Where the causes are imperceptible analysis of their products by reason surely causes their distinct apprehension ; as in the case of the atoms. Moreover, analysis by reason is the same as cognition by means of the pramâṇas. The pramâṇas establish the existence of external objects. On the other hand, there can be no proof of the proposition that all is non-existent. For if there is any proof then "all" which includes proof is not non-existence. If there is no proof the proposition is not established. It cannot be said that there is no existence, but only a conceit, of pramâṇas and prameyas as in the case of objects seen in a dream, hallucination, mirage, etc. For there is no reason to support the supposition. In the first place, there is no reason to believe that objects seen in a dream are unreal. On the contrary, there are reasons to show that they are real. Diversity of dream cognitions must be due to different causes. In the second place, if it is said that dream cognitions are unreal because they disappear on waking then it is admitted that apprehension and non-apprehension are respectively the marks of inference of the existence of things existent and non-existent. Objects of dream are no more unreal than objects of recollection and imagination. All these objects are based on reality previously apprehended. After waking, by comparison with waking cognitions, dreams are found to be unreal. So that the experiences of the waking consciousness form the real basis of dream cognitions.

Thus there are objects and wrong cognitions of objects. Wrong cognitions of objects are destroyed through true knowledge as the conceit of the

cognition of objects in dreams disappears on waking. Similarly the sun's rays opposed by the radiation of heat from the earth quiver and are mistaken for water. On nearer view the wrong cognition is removed. So everywhere what is destroyed is the wrong cognition, and not the object. No man has ever at any place a wrong cognition which is not without a real cause. Moreover, there is a duality of cognition in each of the cases cited : the magician, the waking man and the man near by know the phenomena of the magic, dream and mirage as unreal, while the spectators, the sleeping man and the man at a distance know them as real. These diverse cognitions could not be possible if all things were non-existent.

(As to the Nihilist) : wrong cognition itself cannot be negated ; for its cause and its existence are apprehended. Every man is aware of wrong cognition and of its cause. Wrong cognition therefore has existence. Wrong cognition embraces a twofold object, reality and appearance, *e. g.* the pillar and man, where a pillar is mistaken for a man. It arises from the perception of the common attributes of two similar things. Where, on the other hand, all objects are of a uniform character devoid of name and reality (as with the opponent), there can be no possibility of wrong cognition. In the case of smell and other prameyas, the cognitions of which are said to be wrong, the cognitions are certainly true cognitions, because they do not embrace the duality of reality and appearance. Therefore it is unreasonable to hold that the cognitions of pramāṇas and prameyas are wrong.

Topic 59 : Development of True Knowledge : Sūtras 38-49.

When the mind is withdrawn from the senses and is held steadfast by the retentive effort, its conjunction with the soul takes place (as in the state of deep sleep). When this conjunction of the mind with the soul is associated with the desire to know the truth (which is not the case in deep sleep), cognitions in respect of the objects of the senses are not produced. From the habitual cultivation of this state does cognition of truth arise. There are objects however which by their intensity or by their nature force themselves upon consciousness even in this state of the mind ; *e. g.* thunderclap, hunger, thirst, heat, cold, diseases, etc. Nevertheless the habit of Yoga or concentration or communion is possible as the result of excellence of virtue or merit which is the cause of true knowledge, accumulated by practice preformed in previous lives. For the purpose of avoiding distractions instruction has been given for the practice of Yoga in forests, caves and river beds. The virtue born of the practice of Yoga accompanies a man even in another life. In the fullness of its accumulation as the cause of true knowledge, and there being the contemplation of Samādhi or the repose

of the mind in the soul, true knowledge is produced. Even in ordinary affairs a man is heard to say : "I did not see, my mind was elsewhere."

In the state of release objects, however intense, cannot force themselves on the soul. For they can produce cognitions only through conjunction with the senses. And the necessary condition of the production of cognitions is the body brought into existence under the influence of past acts, as the seat of effort, senses and objects. Release is the non-existence, through the non-existence of merit and demerit, of the body and senses as the seat of the condition of the production of cognitions. It follows therefore that release is deliverance from all pain. Because in the state of release the seed of all pain, the vehicle of all pain, is destroyed.

For the attainment of release reclamation of the soul is to be accomplished by means of Yama and Niyama and of the practices enjoined by the rules of self-culture. Yama (non-violence, veracity, non-covetousness, study and non-accumulation of wealth) is enjoined for all men. Niyama (cleanliness of body and mind, contentment, penance, sacred study and contemplation of God) is enjoined for special classes. Reclamation of the soul means decrease of demerit and increase of merit. Rules of self-culture are to be known from the treatises on Yoga. The practices therein taught are Tapas (penance), Prāṇāyāma (control of breath), Pratyāhāra (withdrawal of the mind), Dhyāna (contemplation) and Dhāraṇā (fixity of contemplation). The practice of meditation in respect of the objects of the senses is for the sake of the destruction of attraction and aversion. The means is the adoption of the conduct of the Yogins.

The other means are the study and practice of the science of the soul, *i. e.* Ānvikṣiki, the spiritual science. Practice consists in constant study, hearing and judging. For the maturity of the wisdom so acquired, in the form of removal of doubt and awakening to unknown objects, in other words, for the confirmation of what has been ascertained by oneself as the truth, converse should be held with those who are versed in the lore, whether they be disciples, preceptors, or fellow students, who are eager to attain the supreme good, provided they are not jealous. If it is considered that the advancement of a counter-thesis to the thesis propounded by them may not be welcome to them, attempt need not be made to establish one's own thesis. One should merely express the desire to know the truth and be willing to receive wisdom. In this way one should engage in converse with them and correct one's own view as well as the conflicting views of extreme thinkers.

Topic 60 : Maintenance of True Knowledge : Sūtras 50-60.

Like the cover of thorns for the safety of the sprouting seed, sophism

and cavil may be employed for the safety of the search for the truth, by those who are not yet free from faults and who have not yet attained true knowledge, against those who launch an attack out of zeal for their own views. And a counter-attack may be made upon those who offer insult from pride of learning, for their subjugation and not out of the desire to know the truth. This permission is only for the sake of maintaining the knowledge acquired and not for the sake of gain, worship or reputation.

Book V. Chapter I.

Topic 61. Examination of Jâtis by resemblance and difference : Sûtras 1—3.

Jâtis are reasons urged in opposition to the reason advanced in support of a demonstration. They are of twenty-four kinds. They do not succeed in refuting the opposition. Their common function is to equate or to reduce the opponent's reason to the same class with themselves. This they do in twenty-four different ways and from these they derive their respective definitions. Thus, (1) to oppose resemblance to resemblance as the reason : The soul possesses action, because it possesses volition or adṛiṣṭa (merit and demerit) which is the cause of action, in the same way as does a pebble possess action as it is shot from a catapult which is a cause of action. This demonstration by means of resemblance is opposed by the following equally based on resemblance. The soul does not possess action, because it is all-pervading, in the same way as the sky, being all-pervading, does not possess action. And no special reason exists to determine the validity of the one as against the other conclusion. In the absence of such a reason the opposition counteracts the demonstration. (2) To oppose difference to (a) resemblance and (b) difference : (a) The pebble shot from a catapult is finite but the soul is not finite, therefore the soul does not possess action like the pebble. (b) The sky is inactive because it does not possess the cause of activity ; but the soul possess the cause of activity, therefore it is not inactive. The reply to these antinomies of reason is that the thesis or the counter-thesis is established in the same way as a particular animal is established to be a cow through its possession of cowness. Antinomies arise where the demonstration is based on mere resemblance or mere difference, and not on the possession of a distinctive attribute or character. An animal is established as a cow, not merely through its resemblance to another animal possessing dewlap, etc., but through such resemblance and the possession of the particular or distinctive genus, viz., cowness. Similarly mere dissimilarity to a horse does not establish a cow, but dissimilarity of characteristic attribute. Antinomies arise from fallacies of reason.

Topic 62 : Six Jâtis relative to the Sâdhya and Dṛiṣṭānta : Sûtras 4-6.

These arise from confusion of the diverse attributes of the sâdhya

(the thing to be established) and the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example). (1) If the soul is active like a pebble, it is also touchable like the pebble, on the other hand, if it is not touchable, it cannot be active. (2) The pebble which is active is not all-pervading; therefore the soul which is active like the pebble, must also be not all-pervading. (3) The activity of the pebble is certain, therefore the activity of the soul is equally certain. (4) The activity of the soul is uncertain, being yet to be demonstrated, therefore the activity of the pebble is equally uncertain. (5) Objects possessing the cause of action are some heavy, *e. g.*, the pebble, and some light, *e. g.* air; therefore objects possessing the cause of action are some active, *e. g.*, the pebble and some inactive, *e. g.*, the soul. (6) If, as is the pebble so is the soul, then as is the soul so is also the pebble.

The reply to the above is that what is established cannot be repudiated and that comparison through resemblance in parts is established as in the case: as the cow so the *bos gaurus*, where their difference in many respects is no reason against the inference. Similarly where the inferential attribute is found in the *dr̥ṣṭānta* in universal relation with the attribute to be established, the difference between the *sādhya* and the *dr̥ṣṭānta* in other respects cannot hinder the inference. As regards the assumption of uncertainty in the *dr̥ṣṭānta* and certainty in the *sādhya*, (3), (4) and (6) above, no such confusion is possible, because a *dr̥ṣṭānta* for the purpose of demonstration is that object in respect of which there is unanimity of opinion amongst men both trained and untrained.

Topic 63. Extension or Non-extension of the Hetu to the Sādhya.
Sūtras 7—8.

The opposition to the demonstration takes this form: The inferential mark and the attribute to be established either co-exist or do not co-exist in the *sādhya* or subject. If they co-exist then nothing else remains to be demonstrated. If they do not co-exist, then there can be no demonstration; for a lamp cannot illumine an object with which it does not co-exist in the same place. To this the reply is that the co-existence or non-co-existence of the two attributes is not a material factor in the production of an effect. For it is seen that a pot is produced when the agent, instruments and the ground come into contact with the lump of clay, while suffering may be caused to a man by means of supernatural powers directed from a distance.

Topic 64. Regression and Counter-example: Sūtras 9—11.

The opposition is to the effect that the example itself requires demonstration and that an equally suggestive counter-example exists. To this the reply is: (1) Those who wish to see, bring a lamp for the illumination of the object to be seen, while the lamp itself is seen without another lamp.

Similarly an example is an already known object and serves the purpose of making known what is yet unknown. It is useless to establish its cause. (2) If the counter-example can cause an inference why not an example ? The absence of any special character is common to both.

Topic 65. Non-production : Sûtras 12—13.

The opposition is to the effect that sound, e. g., is said to be non-eternal because it comes after effort, but that prior to its production when sound is not produced the character of coming after effort which is the cause of non-eternality, does not exist, and that therefore sound is eternal and cannot be produced. To this the reply is that when sound becomes sound it is produced and in being produced comes after effort and that thus the cause of its non-eternality is obtained.

Topic 66. Doubt : Sûtras 14—15.

The opposition is to the effect that there is resemblance of sound, e. g. to the eternal, namely potness, both being cognisable by the senses, and also to the non-eternal, namely pot, the character of coming after an effort appertaining to both, and that therefore it is doubtful whether sound be eternal or non-eternal. To this the reply is that where doubt arises from the, cognition of resemblance without the cognition of difference the doubt ceases on the cognition of difference, e. g., the cognition of coming after effort ; that where doubt arises from the cognition of both resemblance and difference the doubt can never cease ; and that mere resemblance can never be an eternal source of doubt.

Topic 67 : Prakaraṇa (Topic) : Sûtras : 16—17.

Here the opposition moves within the topic and does not advance any outside reason for or against the thesis or counterthesis which constitutes the topic. Thus, sound is non-eternal because it comes after effort, like a pot ; and sound is eternal because it resembles potness which is eternal, both being perceptible to the senses. It is required to determine which of these two views represents the truth. To say that sound resembles the non-eternal because it comes after effort is futile. It leaves the counterthesis unimpaired. For both proceed upon resemblance. The truth is that the thesis and counter-thesis arise not from resemblance but from absence of true knowledge. As soon as truth is determined the topic comes to an end.

Topic 68 : Hetu (Reason, Mark) : Sûtras : 18—20.

The opposition is to the effect that the Mark is no Mark, because, if it exists before or after the sâdhya (subject), it can have no operation, and if it exists along with the sâdhya there is no knowing which is the sâdhya and which the Mark. To this the reply is that the same argument would apply to the opponent's denial of the Mark. The truth is that it is a matter

of common experience that the production of what is to be produced and the knowledge of what is to be known do follow from causes. The opposition based on the points of time is futile.

Topic 69 : Arthâpatti (Presumption) : Sûtras : 21—22.

The opposition is that the argument that sound is non-eternal by reason of its resemblance to non-eternal objects, namely in coming after effort, implies that sound is eternal by reason of its resemblance to eternal objects, namely in being touchless. To this the reply is that the argument by presumption would apply equally against the opponent, that the presumptive argument does not determine the truth, and that mere divergence of nature is no ground for presumption, e. g., the fact that pebbles which are solid fall to the ground, does not imply that water which is liquid does not fall to the ground.

Topic 70 : Non-difference : Sûtras : 23—24.

The opposition is to the effect that if the resemblance of sound and the pot in respect of their coming after effort leads to their resemblance in being non-eternal, then the resemblance of all objects in respect of their being existent leads to their resemblance in other respects. To this the reply is that the "other respects" should be defined. If the expression means non-eternality, then the non-eternality of sound which is the thesis is admitted by the opponent. The truth is that existence is the highest genus and there is no other common attribute possessed by all existent objects. The Vainâs'ikas (Nihilists) no doubt maintain that like existence non-eternality also is a common attribute of all objects. Their thesis then should be: All entities are non-eternal, because they are existent. The thesis is so wide that no instance can be found for the demonstration. And a Reason or Mark without an instance does not exist. A part of the sâdhya (all entities) cannot be the instance, because the character of a sâdhya is that it is yet to be established. Moreover, if the sâdhya is to furnish the instance it will furnish instances both eternal and non-eternal whereby the object of the nihilist will be defeated.

Topic 71 : Demonstration : Sûtras : 25-26.

The opposition is to the effect that as in the case of sound, e. g., the cause of its non-eternality is demonstrable, so is also the cause of its eternality, *viz.* absence of touch. To this the reply is that if the opposition is valid the non-eternality of sound is admitted, and that if the argument is not valid the opposition also falls to the ground.

Topic 72 : Cognition : Sûtras : 27-28.

The opposition is that the cognition of sound does not depend only on the cause which is specified, *viz.* its coming after effort, but that there is

cognition of sound also when the branches of trees are broken by high winds (without the effort of man). To this the reply is "coming after effort" is the statement of a cause and not of *the* cause of sound, and that as to be a product is the mark of non-eternality, the opposition does not rebut the demonstration. The existence of sound bears no analogy to the existence of underground water, for example. The latter exists but is not perceived because of some obstruction. But no such obstruction to perception exists in the case of sound. Therefore it cannot be said to exist unperceived. Hence sound is not an instance of the manifestation of an existent object but of the production of a non-existent object.

Topic 73 : Non-cognition : Sutras 29-31.

The opposition is to the effect that in the case of sound the non-cognition of the obstruction to its perception is itself as such incapable of cognition, and that the non-cognition of its non-cognition proves the existence of such obstruction, and that therefore it does not follow that obstructions do not prevent the cognition of sound (prior to its manifestation). In other words, non-cognition which is urged against the existence of obstruction equally applies to the non-cognition of obstruction.

To this the reply is that cognition is of the nature of apprehension, while non-cognition is of the nature of non-apprehension, and that the object of cognition is something that exists, while the object of non-cognition is something that does not exist. Therefore when cognition does not apprehend, come into contact with, any obstruction in the case of sound it follows that such obstruction does not exist. Cognition or non-cognition is not its own object ; the object is something different. Otherwise non-cognition will destroy itself ; and leave obstruction and its cognition unaffected. Moreover, every body is aware of diverse forms of cognition within himself. So that a man becomes aware of the non-cognition of obstruction to the preception of sound in the same way as when he feels that his doubt remains or that his doubt is removed.

Topic 74 : Non-eternal : Sûtras : 32-34.

The opposition is that as sound is said to be non-eternal by reason of its resemblance to a pot, so for the same reason all entities would be non-eternal. To this the reply is that the opposition destroys itself, because if all entities are to be non-eternal owing to their resemblance to a pot, then the opposition will be equally futile as the thesis which it seeks to refute (i. e. non-eternality of sound), owing to its resemblance to the thesis in being presented in the form of an argument of five members. Moreover, mere difference does not constitute the inferential mark. The mark of inference is that particular form of resemblance or difference which is universally

known to be the means of the establishment of the proposed attribute in the sādhyā.

Topic 75 : the Eternal : Sūtras : 35-36.

The opposition is that the non-eternality of sound is itself either eternal or non-eternal and that in the former case sound also must be eternal and that in the latter case the supposed non-eternality of sound will some time cease and sound will be eternal. To this the reply is that the allegation that the non-eternality of sound is eternal is an admission of its non-eternality which is sought to be opposed. Moreover, by the non-eternality of sound is meant that sound which has been produced, ceases to exist after destruction, and not that non-eternality is a positive quality inhering in sound. In such a case of non-existence due to destruction as the non-eternality of sound the question does not arise as to whether the non-eternality is eternal or non-eternal. Eternality and non-eternality again are contradictory attributes and cannot be predicated together of the same thing at the same time.

Topic 76 : the Effect : Sūtras : 37-38.

The opposition is to the effect that the reason, "coming after effort", does not necessarily infer the production of something which had no existence before, e. g. a pot, but that it may also infer the effect as manifestation by the removal of obstruction, so that sound, though an effect, being manifested, may yet be eternal. To this the reply is that where manifestation is effected by the removal of obstruction the obstruction is known, but that in the case of sound there is cognition of no such obstruction the removal of which by effort causes its manifestation. It follows that sound is non-eternal.

Topic 77 : Futile Controversy of Six Steps : Sūtras : 39-43.

(Where the opposition employs a futile reason and the speaker meets it with a proper reply the controversy ends in the determination of the truth as shown in the Sūtras 1 to 38. But where the speaker also employs a futile reason to meet a futile reason the controversy drifts into six steps and ends in confusion). The six steps have been exhibited in the text.

Book V : Chapter ii.

Topic 78 : Errors of the Proposition and the Mark : Sūtras : 1-6.

They are five in number :

- (1) Admission of the attribute of the counter-example in one's own example which is the means of the establishment of one's proposition.
- (2) Substitution for one's own proposition a different proposition suggested by the reason put forward by the opponent.
- (3) Contradiction between the proposition and the reason.

(4) Abandonment of the proposition on opposition.

For examples of the above see pages 208-210.

(5) Qualification of the Mark, on opposition. E. g. : The speaker sets out with the proposition that all manifested objects must have a common origin, and advances the reason that magnitude is their common attribute. The opponent urges that magnitude is seen in things not having the same origin as well as in things having the same origin. Upon this the speaker qualifies his reason and re-states it as that all manifested things, while endowed with the same nature of causing pleasure, pain and delusion, possess magnitude. He thus changes the reason and admits that the reason previously advanced was not sufficient to establish the proposition. And as regards the reason subsequently put forward, it fails of its purpose in the absence of an Example; for an Example must be of a different class and his own reason, all things etc., precludes the possibility of any such example being found; while, if it is found, it must be something having a different origin and thereby hurt his proposition.

Topic 79 : Errors of Failure to Establish the Proposition : Sûtras : 7—10.

The number of such errors is four :

(1) Irrelevancy, (2) absence of sense, (3) obscurity, and (4) incoherence.

For examples see pages 211-213.

Topic 80 : Errors of Misstatement of one's argument : Sûtras : 11—13.

There are three of such errors :

(1) Absence of order among the members of the Nyâya.

(2) Absence of one or more of the members of the Nyâya.

(3) Redundancy of Reasons or Examples.

For examples see pages 213-214.

Topic 81 : Error of Repetition : Sûtras : 14—15.

Repetition should be distinguished from re-inculcation (see II. i. 65). Repetition also includes express mention of what appears clear by implication. For examples see page 215.

Topic 82 : Errors of Non-reply : Sûtras : 16—19.

Their number is four :

(1) Failure to re-state the counter-thesis, so as to demolish it.

(2) Ignorance of the meaning of the counter-thesis, which cannot therefore be demolished.

(3) Want of ready wit, which naturally courts defeat.

(4) Evasion on some pretext.

Topic 83 : Errors of Weakness and Confusion : Sûtras : 20—22.

They are :

(1) Admission of the opponent's view and turning it against him.

(2) Overlooking the censurable in the opposition.

(3) Censuring the non-censurable in the opposition.

Topic 84 : Errors of Inconsistency and Fallacies of Reason : Sûtras : 23—24.


These are :

(1) Deviation from tenet, i. e., random discourse at variance with the subject proposed. For example see the text.

(2) Fallacies of reason are, as described, grounds of defeat, and not on any other account. By their very nature they furnish occasions for rebuke.

APPENDIX D.

Alphabetical Index to the Sūtras.



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